In the present study of Descartes' epistemological investigations, I have tried to show that his renowned principle of clarity and distinctness is not, in fact, one but two axioms. Most interpreters and critics have taken the two formulations of such a principle here considered as successive moments of it. At best, this position is insufficient, for each "version" of the principle of clarity and distinctness guarantees different kinds of cognitive content. Moreover, while the validity of one "version" is not dependent on the thesis of God's veracity, no such thing can be asserted of the validity of the other. These two formulations of the principle of clarity and distinctness are: 1. Whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true; 2. whatever we perceive clearly and distinctly as belonging to the nature of something can indeed be predicated of the thing in question. The fust formula corresponds to what I have characterized as "presentative" knowledge; the second one expresses the guarantee of "representative" knowledge. This distinction is all-important for solving the question of whether Descartes' proofs of God's existence and veracity-both the a priori and the a posteriori proofs that we find in the Cartesian corpus-are circular. On the basis of such a distinction, it is possible to argue that at least the ontological argument-and possibly as well the proof "par les effets"-is not at all dependent on the principle of clarity and distinctness, which in tum draws its ultimate validity from God's faithfulness. In other words, as suggested above, only the second "version" needs to be guaranteed by God's veracity. On the other hand, the first "version" has no normative value, for it merely describes what is the case whenever a clear and distinct cognition occurs. An example of this is our knowledge of God as the most perfect being. Illilhe Cartesian principle of clear and distinct knowledge underwent various formulations. In my opinion, each successive version of the principle seems to responds both to a refmement in Descartes' thought and to the explicit demands imposed upon it by the context in which we find it.1 This is especially apparent when we examine the different expressions of the principle from a specific point of view, name284 SARA F. GARCiA-G6MEZ ly, in relation to Descartes' exposition of his discovery of the cogito and of the problem of divine veracity. It can be argued that once he radicalizes his methodic doubt, he ought to renounce his previous unanalyzed position. Indeed, having rendered the "I think" explicit, he may no longer assume that the clarity of the perception-as experienced by the ego-is simpliciter a sufficient guarantee for the abiding truth of the content which is thereby made present. Consequently, Descartes embarks in a series of investigations that lead him to the problem of the existence of God and of his relation to knowledge. As we shall soon see, much can be gained from taking a closer look at such inves
{"title":"God and Descartes’ Principle of Clear and Distinct Knowledge","authors":"Sara F. García-Gómez","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/1989146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/1989146","url":null,"abstract":"In the present study of Descartes' epistemological investigations, I have tried to show that his renowned principle of clarity and distinctness is not, in fact, one but two axioms. Most interpreters and critics have taken the two formulations of such a principle here considered as successive moments of it. At best, this position is insufficient, for each \"version\" of the principle of clarity and distinctness guarantees different kinds of cognitive content. Moreover, while the validity of one \"version\" is not dependent on the thesis of God's veracity, no such thing can be asserted of the validity of the other. These two formulations of the principle of clarity and distinctness are: 1. Whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true; 2. whatever we perceive clearly and distinctly as belonging to the nature of something can indeed be predicated of the thing in question. The fust formula corresponds to what I have characterized as \"presentative\" knowledge; the second one expresses the guarantee of \"representative\" knowledge. This distinction is all-important for solving the question of whether Descartes' proofs of God's existence and veracity-both the a priori and the a posteriori proofs that we find in the Cartesian corpus-are circular. On the basis of such a distinction, it is possible to argue that at least the ontological argument-and possibly as well the proof \"par les effets\"-is not at all dependent on the principle of clarity and distinctness, which in tum draws its ultimate validity from God's faithfulness. In other words, as suggested above, only the second \"version\" needs to be guaranteed by God's veracity. On the other hand, the first \"version\" has no normative value, for it merely describes what is the case whenever a clear and distinct cognition occurs. An example of this is our knowledge of God as the most perfect being. Illilhe Cartesian principle of clear and distinct knowledge underwent various formulations. In my opinion, each successive version of the principle seems to responds both to a refmement in Descartes' thought and to the explicit demands imposed upon it by the context in which we find it.1 This is especially apparent when we examine the different expressions of the principle from a specific point of view, name284 SARA F. GARCiA-G6MEZ ly, in relation to Descartes' exposition of his discovery of the cogito and of the problem of divine veracity. It can be argued that once he radicalizes his methodic doubt, he ought to renounce his previous unanalyzed position. Indeed, having rendered the \"I think\" explicit, he may no longer assume that the clarity of the perception-as experienced by the ego-is simpliciter a sufficient guarantee for the abiding truth of the content which is thereby made present. Consequently, Descartes embarks in a series of investigations that lead him to the problem of the existence of God and of his relation to knowledge. As we shall soon see, much can be gained from taking a closer look at such inves","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"283-302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/1989146","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71232812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891414
Jon N. Torgerson
{"title":"Reichenbach and Smart on Temporal Discourse","authors":"Jon N. Torgerson","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891414","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"381-394"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891414","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891416
Raja Bahlul
{"title":"Ockham’s Razor and the Identity of Indiscernables","authors":"Raja Bahlul","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891416","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"405-414"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891416","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Though Karl Marx never developed a systematic theory of the state, he did have much to say about state action. In recent times philosophers have made attempts to capture essential elements of Marx's political theory in order to reconstruct a general understanding of his ideas about state action that is consistent with his theory of history. It has been my purpose in this paper to layout and synthesize recent developments in this area with ideas developed in the late 1960's and early 1970's in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of what Marx meant. The debate of nearly two decades past, between instrumentalists and structuralists, is developed here in the context of more recent theories of "abdication" and "class balance" to generate four basic principles of state action consistent with Marx's statements about the state.
{"title":"Towards a Marxist Theory of the State","authors":"S. Gold","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/1989141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/1989141","url":null,"abstract":"Though Karl Marx never developed a systematic theory of the state, he did have much to say about state action. In recent times philosophers have made attempts to capture essential elements of Marx's political theory in order to reconstruct a general understanding of his ideas about state action that is consistent with his theory of history. It has been my purpose in this paper to layout and synthesize recent developments in this area with ideas developed in the late 1960's and early 1970's in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of what Marx meant. The debate of nearly two decades past, between instrumentalists and structuralists, is developed here in the context of more recent theories of \"abdication\" and \"class balance\" to generate four basic principles of state action consistent with Marx's statements about the state.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/1989141","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891431
C. L. Sheng
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of marginal consequences of a group moral action. The situations in which a group action is taken are studied and classified. The assumption that the agents of a group action are similarly (or symmetrically) situated is clearly specified and emphasized. Then a probabilistic approach is used to determine the marginal consequences of a group action. It is shown that the refutation of utilitarian generalization by Bart Gruzalski is unjustified because of his misinterpretation of marginal consequences. Finally the delicate situations of maximizing and minimizing conditions are analyzed. It is concluded that if the probability of participation p is not known, then the contributory consequences approach is the only approach that can be used. If the probability of participation p is known or can be estimated, then the use of the marginal consequences approach seems to be justified and preferable.
{"title":"“Marginal Consequences” and Utilitarianism","authors":"C. L. Sheng","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891431","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of marginal consequences of a group moral action. The situations in which a group action is taken are studied and classified. The assumption that the agents of a group action are similarly (or symmetrically) situated is clearly specified and emphasized. Then a probabilistic approach is used to determine the marginal consequences of a group action. It is shown that the refutation of utilitarian generalization by Bart Gruzalski is unjustified because of his misinterpretation of marginal consequences. Finally the delicate situations of maximizing and minimizing conditions are analyzed. It is concluded that if the probability of participation p is not known, then the contributory consequences approach is the only approach that can be used. If the probability of participation p is known or can be estimated, then the use of the marginal consequences approach seems to be justified and preferable.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"143-163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891431","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71232194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891411
A. Gobar
{"title":"Erklärung and Begründung in Kantian Epistemology: A Reading of Synthetic Propositions A Priori","authors":"A. Gobar","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891411","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"343-358"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891411","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does the "free market" foster more freedom for individuals generally and less coercion? Libertarians and other market advocates argue that the unfettered market maximizes freedom and hence has less coercion than any feasible alternative. Welfare liberals, Socialist, and Marxists, in different ways, argue against the claim that the unrestricted market maximizes freedom generally. Both supporters and critics agree that coercion undermines freedom and that that is what is ultimately prima facie wrong with it. Further, they agree that the extent to which an economic system includes coercion provides a serious strike against it. The problem is that there is little consensus on the necessary conditions for coercion. In this paper I will be concerned with the nature of coercive relationships in the market. Market interactions have a particular character and occur within a specific institutional framework. Other accounts of coercion have failed to capture the unique character of coercion in the market because they have failed to take into account certain nontrivial facts about the market which are essential to the analysis of coercive market relations. l.tJloes the "free market" foster more freedom for individuals generally and less coercion? Libertarians and other market advocates argue that the unfettered market maximizes freedom and hence has less coercion than any feasible alternative. Welfare liberals, Socialist, and Marxists, in different ways, argue against the claim that the unrestricted market maximizes freedom generally. Both supporters and critics agree that coercion undermines freedom and that that is what is ultimately prima facie wrong with it. Further, they agree that the extent to which an economic system includes coercion provides a serious strike against it. The problem is that there is little consensus on the necessary conditions for coercion. In this paper I will be concerned with the nature of coercive relationships in the market. Market interactions have a particular character and occur within a specific institutional framework. Other accounts of coercion have failed to capture the unique character of coercion in the mar-
{"title":"Bargaining Advantages and Coercion in the Market","authors":"J. Mcgregor","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/1989147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/1989147","url":null,"abstract":"Does the \"free market\" foster more freedom for individuals generally and less coercion? Libertarians and other market advocates argue that the unfettered market maximizes freedom and hence has less coercion than any feasible alternative. Welfare liberals, Socialist, and Marxists, in different ways, argue against the claim that the unrestricted market maximizes freedom generally. Both supporters and critics agree that coercion undermines freedom and that that is what is ultimately prima facie wrong with it. Further, they agree that the extent to which an economic system includes coercion provides a serious strike against it. The problem is that there is little consensus on the necessary conditions for coercion. In this paper I will be concerned with the nature of coercive relationships in the market. Market interactions have a particular character and occur within a specific institutional framework. Other accounts of coercion have failed to capture the unique character of coercion in the market because they have failed to take into account certain nontrivial facts about the market which are essential to the analysis of coercive market relations. l.tJloes the \"free market\" foster more freedom for individuals generally and less coercion? Libertarians and other market advocates argue that the unfettered market maximizes freedom and hence has less coercion than any feasible alternative. Welfare liberals, Socialist, and Marxists, in different ways, argue against the claim that the unrestricted market maximizes freedom generally. Both supporters and critics agree that coercion undermines freedom and that that is what is ultimately prima facie wrong with it. Further, they agree that the extent to which an economic system includes coercion provides a serious strike against it. The problem is that there is little consensus on the necessary conditions for coercion. In this paper I will be concerned with the nature of coercive relationships in the market. Market interactions have a particular character and occur within a specific institutional framework. Other accounts of coercion have failed to capture the unique character of coercion in the mar-","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"23-50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/1989147","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71232704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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