{"title":"Delams Lewis on Persons and Responsibility: A Critique","authors":"L. N. Oaklander","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/1988131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/1988131","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"181-187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/1988131","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper contrasts the religiosity ihai is expressed by the mysticism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which moves away from ihe traditional "narraiives" of revealed religion, with Wittgenstein's later expressions of religiosity, which endorse ihose "narratives" and iake place within them. The paper discusses the importance of this development in Wittgenstein's religious experience in relaiion to the developments in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Both religious and philosophical developments are placed in the context of Wittgenstein's self-directed anti-Semitism, which is interpreted in terms of ihe anomalies of Jewish assimilation and acculturation in the inhospitable environment of European anti-Semitism. The outcome is an account of Wittgenstein as a historical figure, which can shed light on many aspects of his philosophy. To gain credibility, the account proceeds by means of a close exegesis of some Wittensteinian passages that were not adequately explained before.
{"title":"Religious Belief and Jewish Identity in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy","authors":"I. Nevo","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/1988134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/1988134","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contrasts the religiosity ihai is expressed by the mysticism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which moves away from ihe traditional \"narraiives\" of revealed religion, with Wittgenstein's later expressions of religiosity, which endorse ihose \"narratives\" and iake place within them. The paper discusses the importance of this development in Wittgenstein's religious experience in relaiion to the developments in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Both religious and philosophical developments are placed in the context of Wittgenstein's self-directed anti-Semitism, which is interpreted in terms of ihe anomalies of Jewish assimilation and acculturation in the inhospitable environment of European anti-Semitism. The outcome is an account of Wittgenstein as a historical figure, which can shed light on many aspects of his philosophy. To gain credibility, the account proceeds by means of a close exegesis of some Wittensteinian passages that were not adequately explained before.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"225-243"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/1988134","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/19881322
Pedro V. Amaral
{"title":"Harmony in Descartes and the Medical Philosophers","authors":"Pedro V. Amaral","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/19881322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/19881322","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"499-556"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/19881322","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/19881326
R. McKim
I begin with an examination of Berkeley's various suggestions about how to account for the continued existence of physical objects which are unperceived by finite spirits. After dismissing some of these suggestions I attempt to combine others in a unified theory which involves an appeal to what finite perceivers would perceive if they were in the right conditions, to the operation of the will of God, and to the perception of God. I assess the merits, both philosophical and textual, of the unified theory. In the final section I comment on the implications of this theory of continuity for our conception of a Berkeleian physical object. 1. The Continuity Problem. If esse est percipi, that is if to be is to be perceived, then physical objects which are not being perceived do not exist. Yet commonsense suggests that physical objects exist when they are not being perceived. How is Berkeley to make sense of this commonsense belief? It is hard to know how important it is to Berkeley to accommodate commonsense beliefs. I assume that the more prevalent and deep-seated he takes a putative commonsense belief to be, the greater is his concern to show he can accept it, or at least to show how it can be interpreted so that it is consistent with his views. The commonsense belief in the continued existence of unperceived objects is very prevalent and very deep-seated. So it is no surprise to find Berkeley dealing with the issue of continuity from the earliest entry in the Philosophical Commentaries to the final pages of the Dialogues. 2. Two Unsatisfactory Responses to the Continuity Problem. Sometimes it seems that Berkeley's response to the continuity problem is simply that it is impossible to believe in the existence of unperceived objects, for "unperceived object" is a contradiction in terms. What is not perceived does not exist. This response is presented in the course of Berkeley's reply to the fourth objection to his views which he considers in the Principles. The fourth objection is that it follows from his principles that "things are every moment annihilated and created anew" and that "[the] objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the par-
{"title":"What Is God Doing in the Quad","authors":"R. McKim","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/19881326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/19881326","url":null,"abstract":"I begin with an examination of Berkeley's various suggestions about how to account for the continued existence of physical objects which are unperceived by finite spirits. After dismissing some of these suggestions I attempt to combine others in a unified theory which involves an appeal to what finite perceivers would perceive if they were in the right conditions, to the operation of the will of God, and to the perception of God. I assess the merits, both philosophical and textual, of the unified theory. In the final section I comment on the implications of this theory of continuity for our conception of a Berkeleian physical object. 1. The Continuity Problem. If esse est percipi, that is if to be is to be perceived, then physical objects which are not being perceived do not exist. Yet commonsense suggests that physical objects exist when they are not being perceived. How is Berkeley to make sense of this commonsense belief? It is hard to know how important it is to Berkeley to accommodate commonsense beliefs. I assume that the more prevalent and deep-seated he takes a putative commonsense belief to be, the greater is his concern to show he can accept it, or at least to show how it can be interpreted so that it is consistent with his views. The commonsense belief in the continued existence of unperceived objects is very prevalent and very deep-seated. So it is no surprise to find Berkeley dealing with the issue of continuity from the earliest entry in the Philosophical Commentaries to the final pages of the Dialogues. 2. Two Unsatisfactory Responses to the Continuity Problem. Sometimes it seems that Berkeley's response to the continuity problem is simply that it is impossible to believe in the existence of unperceived objects, for \"unperceived object\" is a contradiction in terms. What is not perceived does not exist. This response is presented in the course of Berkeley's reply to the fourth objection to his views which he considers in the Principles. The fourth objection is that it follows from his principles that \"things are every moment annihilated and created anew\" and that \"[the] objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the par-","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"637-653"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/19881326","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/19881332
Erdinç Sayan
{"title":"A Closer Look at the Chinese Nation Argument","authors":"Erdinç Sayan","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/19881332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/19881332","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"129-136"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/19881332","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ferdinand Schoeman criticizes the liberal view of the family which holds that parental rights are based in and limited by parental duties to the child. Instead he proposes the construction of principles based on the value of familial intimacy. Schoeman claims that only by recognizing the value of intimacy can we account for the degree of autonomy we legitimately grant parents in their relations with their children. In opposition, I argue that he misinterprets the liberal view. A correct interpretation allows an appropriate degree of parental autonomy and familial intimacy but without sacrificing the child's developmental needs. A widely held interpretation of the liberal view of the family maintains that the primary basis of parental rights is to permit parents to fulfill their paternalistic duties to provide for the welfare of their children. Therefore parental duties take precedence over parental rights. When a child's welfare would be seriously endangered by a parental decision or action, the state has a duty to intervene. Influenced by this perspective, the courts have adopted a "best interests of the child" standard of reviewing cases involving child rearing. Ferdinand Schoeman criticizes this view in three essays on the basis and limits of parental autonomy.l Schoeman's disagreement with the liberal position involves the following claims: 1) Liberalism cannot account for the degree of autonomy we legitimately grant parents in their relations with their children. 2) Because the family has its own goals and principles of decision making, liberal principles should not be imposed upon it. 3) Liberalism ignores and fails to protect the value of the intimacy of familial relationships. 4) By adopting the legalistic language of rights and duties liberalism cannot adequately analyze intimate relationships.
{"title":"Schoeman’s Alternative to the Liberal View of the Family","authors":"R. O'Neil","doi":"10.5840/pra1987/1988133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pra1987/1988133","url":null,"abstract":"Ferdinand Schoeman criticizes the liberal view of the family which holds that parental rights are based in and limited by parental duties to the child. Instead he proposes the construction of principles based on the value of familial intimacy. Schoeman claims that only by recognizing the value of intimacy can we account for the degree of autonomy we legitimately grant parents in their relations with their children. In opposition, I argue that he misinterprets the liberal view. A correct interpretation allows an appropriate degree of parental autonomy and familial intimacy but without sacrificing the child's developmental needs. A widely held interpretation of the liberal view of the family maintains that the primary basis of parental rights is to permit parents to fulfill their paternalistic duties to provide for the welfare of their children. Therefore parental duties take precedence over parental rights. When a child's welfare would be seriously endangered by a parental decision or action, the state has a duty to intervene. Influenced by this perspective, the courts have adopted a \"best interests of the child\" standard of reviewing cases involving child rearing. Ferdinand Schoeman criticizes this view in three essays on the basis and limits of parental autonomy.l Schoeman's disagreement with the liberal position involves the following claims: 1) Liberalism cannot account for the degree of autonomy we legitimately grant parents in their relations with their children. 2) Because the family has its own goals and principles of decision making, liberal principles should not be imposed upon it. 3) Liberalism ignores and fails to protect the value of the intimacy of familial relationships. 4) By adopting the legalistic language of rights and duties liberalism cannot adequately analyze intimate relationships.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"217-224"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/pra1987/1988133","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-01-01DOI: 10.5840/pra1987/198813Supplement35
Donald A. Cress
{"title":"Canadian and American Dissertations on Descartes and Cartesianism 1865-1984","authors":"Donald A. Cress","doi":"10.5840/pra1987/198813Supplement35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pra1987/198813Supplement35","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"26 1","pages":"1-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/pra1987/198813Supplement35","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P.J. McGrath has recently challenged the standard claim that to escape the problem of evil one need only alter one's conception of God by limiting his power or his goodness. If we assume that God is infinitely good but not omnipotent, then God can scarcely be a proper object of worship. And if we assume that if God is omnipotent but limited in goodness, he becomes a moral monster. Either way evil remains a problem for theistic belief. I argue that McGrath fails to distinguish between the deductive and inductive problem of evil and between a limitation in God's "strength" and a limitation in God's "ability to act", and that once these distinctions are made, his argument fails. According to P.J. McGrath, almost all theologians and atheologians at least implicitly argue that to escape the problem of evil "one need only alter one's conception of God by limiting his power or his goodness". But this is wrong, he tells us. First, if we assume that God is infinitely good but not omnipotent, then God can "scarcely be a proper object of worship". For "some evils which formerly existed have been eliminated by human ingenuity" and "to say that [God] was unable to do so is to reduce his power to such an extent that it is difficult to see how he could any longer be regarded as divine". Second, if we assume that God is omnipotent but limited in goodness, he becomes "a moral monster". For only a being "more akin to an evil demon than to a deity" would "tolerate the sorts of evils which actually exist simply because of his lack of concern for the welfare of others". And, finally, if we assume God is limited in both goodness and power, we can avoid some of "the difficulties surrounding the second option". But this option is "even less acceptable than the first", for a being doubly limited is even less worthy of worship than one limited only in power. Thus, he concludes, "evil constitutes a problem for belief in even a scaled down version of deity"'! McGrath's conclusion is important, and his discussion has an initial ring of plausibility. But he fails to make two crucial distinctions which must be made in this context. OnGe made, his argument is greatly weakened.
{"title":"Evil and a Finite God: A Response to McGrath","authors":"D. Basinger","doi":"10.5840/pra1987/1988138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pra1987/1988138","url":null,"abstract":"P.J. McGrath has recently challenged the standard claim that to escape the problem of evil one need only alter one's conception of God by limiting his power or his goodness. If we assume that God is infinitely good but not omnipotent, then God can scarcely be a proper object of worship. And if we assume that if God is omnipotent but limited in goodness, he becomes a moral monster. Either way evil remains a problem for theistic belief. I argue that McGrath fails to distinguish between the deductive and inductive problem of evil and between a limitation in God's \"strength\" and a limitation in God's \"ability to act\", and that once these distinctions are made, his argument fails. According to P.J. McGrath, almost all theologians and atheologians at least implicitly argue that to escape the problem of evil \"one need only alter one's conception of God by limiting his power or his goodness\". But this is wrong, he tells us. First, if we assume that God is infinitely good but not omnipotent, then God can \"scarcely be a proper object of worship\". For \"some evils which formerly existed have been eliminated by human ingenuity\" and \"to say that [God] was unable to do so is to reduce his power to such an extent that it is difficult to see how he could any longer be regarded as divine\". Second, if we assume that God is omnipotent but limited in goodness, he becomes \"a moral monster\". For only a being \"more akin to an evil demon than to a deity\" would \"tolerate the sorts of evils which actually exist simply because of his lack of concern for the welfare of others\". And, finally, if we assume God is limited in both goodness and power, we can avoid some of \"the difficulties surrounding the second option\". But this option is \"even less acceptable than the first\", for a being doubly limited is even less worthy of worship than one limited only in power. Thus, he concludes, \"evil constitutes a problem for belief in even a scaled down version of deity\"'! McGrath's conclusion is important, and his discussion has an initial ring of plausibility. But he fails to make two crucial distinctions which must be made in this context. OnGe made, his argument is greatly weakened.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"285-287"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/pra1987/1988138","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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