Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891425
E. Curley
{"title":"Cavell and the Comedy of Remarriage","authors":"E. Curley","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891425","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"581-603"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891425","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Humean Minds and Moral Theory","authors":"Sheldon Wein","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/1989143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/1989143","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"229-236"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/1989143","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71232138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sein und Zeit Revisited","authors":"B. Singer","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/1989149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/1989149","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"311-332"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/1989149","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71232711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Historically, the view, prevalent in contemporary economics and decision theory as well as philosophy, that rational action consists simply in satisfying one's desires, whatever they may be, as efficiently as possible, is to be found first in Book II of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. This view has counterintuitive and self-refuting implications, in that it recognizes as rational behavior that may reveal a clear degree of irresponsibility or psychological instability. Accordingly, many Hume scholars have tried to show recently that this view was not Hume's; and that, on the contrary, Hume did supply an account of rational [mal ends--in his discussion of the calm passions, the "steady and general view" that corrects the biases and contingencies of an individual's desires and perceptions, and elsewhere. But a detailed reconstruction of Hume's views on these matters that assembles all the relevant texts does not support this thesis. Instead, it undermines it. Hence the counterintuitive and self-refuting implications of Hume's view of rational action must be allowed to stand. IMlccording to what I shall call the traditional view, reason functions to make inferences and categorical and hypothetical judgments, formulate hypotheses, and derive conclusions from evidential statements, deductive premises, and syllogisms. Reason on the traditional view is a logical arbiter, a calculator and discoverer of the relations between abstract concepts and states or events in the world. There is a certain model of rational action, call it the utility-maximization model of rationality, which many have taken to be a direct consequence of the traditional view of reason. The basic premise of the utility-maximization model is that rationality is a purely theoretical or logical capacity which consists in ascertaining, through investigation and calculation, the most efficient means possible of achieving our desired [mal ends, whatever these may be. "Efficient means" typically include whatever resources happen to be available to us, i.e., time, energy, physical labor, and material goods, expended with as little cost as possible. Call this basic premise the positive utility-maximization
{"title":"Hume on Rational Final Ends","authors":"Adrian M. S. Piper","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/1989142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/1989142","url":null,"abstract":"Historically, the view, prevalent in contemporary economics and decision theory as well as philosophy, that rational action consists simply in satisfying one's desires, whatever they may be, as efficiently as possible, is to be found first in Book II of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. This view has counterintuitive and self-refuting implications, in that it recognizes as rational behavior that may reveal a clear degree of irresponsibility or psychological instability. Accordingly, many Hume scholars have tried to show recently that this view was not Hume's; and that, on the contrary, Hume did supply an account of rational [mal ends--in his discussion of the calm passions, the \"steady and general view\" that corrects the biases and contingencies of an individual's desires and perceptions, and elsewhere. But a detailed reconstruction of Hume's views on these matters that assembles all the relevant texts does not support this thesis. Instead, it undermines it. Hence the counterintuitive and self-refuting implications of Hume's view of rational action must be allowed to stand. IMlccording to what I shall call the traditional view, reason functions to make inferences and categorical and hypothetical judgments, formulate hypotheses, and derive conclusions from evidential statements, deductive premises, and syllogisms. Reason on the traditional view is a logical arbiter, a calculator and discoverer of the relations between abstract concepts and states or events in the world. There is a certain model of rational action, call it the utility-maximization model of rationality, which many have taken to be a direct consequence of the traditional view of reason. The basic premise of the utility-maximization model is that rationality is a purely theoretical or logical capacity which consists in ascertaining, through investigation and calculation, the most efficient means possible of achieving our desired [mal ends, whatever these may be. \"Efficient means\" typically include whatever resources happen to be available to us, i.e., time, energy, physical labor, and material goods, expended with as little cost as possible. Call this basic premise the positive utility-maximization","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"193-228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/1989142","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1988/19891418
Stephen E. Friedman
Throughout his metaphysical writings, Sellars maintains that current microtheory, with its particulate paradigm, can never depict adequately-even in principle-a universe populated with sentient beings like us. Why not? Experience for us involves the presence of an occurrent perceptual core of ultimately homogeneous secondary qualities. Sellars' "Grain Argument" demonstrates (1) that physical objects qua clouds of discrete particles cannot instantiate such qualities and (2) that they cannot be assigned to an intrasentient realm construed as clusters of discrete, particulate neurons. Neither, contends Sellars, can they simply be eliminated from the inventory of any theory claiming to be both empirical and conceptually independent of common sense. And since common sense fails to provide an adequate picture of reality, our only course is to abandon the particulate paradigm of current microtheory in favor of a process paradigm. This paper traces and develops, in dialog form, these arguments. Dramatis Personae: Wilfrid Sellars, Bruce Aune, Robert Hooker, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty. Scene: Sellars' country house. The guests have gathered for the monthly meeting of the Scientific Realists Club. Sellars: Good afternoon, gentlemen. How wonderful is it of nature to provide such a beautiful setting for our gathering: the sun is shining, the flowers are in full bloom, and the blue jays have already ceased their screaming at my cats. I have taken the liberty of setting up our meeting on the patio; there is coffee, tea, wine, and something to nibble on while we converse. Let's see: Bruce, why don't you sit there next to Robert; Paul, why don't you proliferate theories with Richard on that side, opposite 426 STEPHEN FRIEDMAN Bruce and Robert. I'll sit at the head of the table where I can work the tape recorder, just in case one of us says something we might want to remember later. Rorty: Thanks so much, Wilfrid. As always, you are a fine host. As you know, we believe that all things in the universe and their characteristics, merely material or organic, sentient or otherwise, are properly conceived as systems of atoms and their complex states. At the end of our last meeting, you promised to take us through your argument against our position. Sellars: Indeed! Let's begin, though, at the beginning. My principal aim in this discussion is to demonstrate that a certain depiction of reality is inadequate, even in principle. That depiction has it that all ordinary physical objects and sentient beings can be construed as systems-however complex-Of the basic particles of the most current versions of microphysics. Let us call this thesis Physica~ Reductive Materialism.1 There are two versions of Physi~ Reductive Materialism, the Identity View and Eliminative Materialism. Consequently, my argument against Physica~ Reductive Materialism, gentlemen, will be a complex, two-part affair: the first part seeks to undermine the Identity View while the second aims at refuting El
{"title":"Ultimate Homogeneity: A Dialog","authors":"Stephen E. Friedman","doi":"10.5840/PRA1988/19891418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1988/19891418","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout his metaphysical writings, Sellars maintains that current microtheory, with its particulate paradigm, can never depict adequately-even in principle-a universe populated with sentient beings like us. Why not? Experience for us involves the presence of an occurrent perceptual core of ultimately homogeneous secondary qualities. Sellars' \"Grain Argument\" demonstrates (1) that physical objects qua clouds of discrete particles cannot instantiate such qualities and (2) that they cannot be assigned to an intrasentient realm construed as clusters of discrete, particulate neurons. Neither, contends Sellars, can they simply be eliminated from the inventory of any theory claiming to be both empirical and conceptually independent of common sense. And since common sense fails to provide an adequate picture of reality, our only course is to abandon the particulate paradigm of current microtheory in favor of a process paradigm. This paper traces and develops, in dialog form, these arguments. Dramatis Personae: Wilfrid Sellars, Bruce Aune, Robert Hooker, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty. Scene: Sellars' country house. The guests have gathered for the monthly meeting of the Scientific Realists Club. Sellars: Good afternoon, gentlemen. How wonderful is it of nature to provide such a beautiful setting for our gathering: the sun is shining, the flowers are in full bloom, and the blue jays have already ceased their screaming at my cats. I have taken the liberty of setting up our meeting on the patio; there is coffee, tea, wine, and something to nibble on while we converse. Let's see: Bruce, why don't you sit there next to Robert; Paul, why don't you proliferate theories with Richard on that side, opposite 426 STEPHEN FRIEDMAN Bruce and Robert. I'll sit at the head of the table where I can work the tape recorder, just in case one of us says something we might want to remember later. Rorty: Thanks so much, Wilfrid. As always, you are a fine host. As you know, we believe that all things in the universe and their characteristics, merely material or organic, sentient or otherwise, are properly conceived as systems of atoms and their complex states. At the end of our last meeting, you promised to take us through your argument against our position. Sellars: Indeed! Let's begin, though, at the beginning. My principal aim in this discussion is to demonstrate that a certain depiction of reality is inadequate, even in principle. That depiction has it that all ordinary physical objects and sentient beings can be construed as systems-however complex-Of the basic particles of the most current versions of microphysics. Let us call this thesis Physica~ Reductive Materialism.1 There are two versions of Physi~ Reductive Materialism, the Identity View and Eliminative Materialism. Consequently, my argument against Physica~ Reductive Materialism, gentlemen, will be a complex, two-part affair: the first part seeks to undermine the Identity View while the second aims at refuting El","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"425-453"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1988/19891418","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.5840/pra1988/19891428
S. Gold
It is often assumed that one cannot be forced to accept an offer as one can always reject it and be no worse off than one would have been had the offer not been made; offers involve benefits rather than the pains associated with threats. The confusion arises from the fact that we often also assume that in all cases where Q is forced to choose to do what P wants him to do, P coerces Q. I have argued that coercion is only one "mode of non-voluntary compliance". By distinguishing the different ways one can be forced to comply with another's wishes, I have attempted to sketch out the various ways that non-voluntary compliance can operate with offers as well as threats. Dn the past few years a good deal of attention has been paid to the issue of coercion and the possibility of being forced to comply with an offer.1 On the face of it, it seems that one cannot be forced to accept an offer as one can always reject the proposal and be no worse off than one would have been had the offer not been made; offers, after all, involve temptations and benefits rather than the pressures and pains associated with threats. Much of the confusion, I would suggest, comes from the common sense tendency to assume that in all cases where Q is forced to choose to do what P wants him to do, P coerces Q. I will argue that coercion is only one "mode of non-voluntary compliance", or one way in which a person can be forced to do what another person wants him or her to do. By distinguishing the different ways one can be forced to comply with another's wishes, I hope to sketch out the various ways that non-voluntary compliance can operate with offers as well as threats.
{"title":"Non-Voluntary Compliance","authors":"S. Gold","doi":"10.5840/pra1988/19891428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pra1988/19891428","url":null,"abstract":"It is often assumed that one cannot be forced to accept an offer as one can always reject it and be no worse off than one would have been had the offer not been made; offers involve benefits rather than the pains associated with threats. The confusion arises from the fact that we often also assume that in all cases where Q is forced to choose to do what P wants him to do, P coerces Q. I have argued that coercion is only one \"mode of non-voluntary compliance\". By distinguishing the different ways one can be forced to comply with another's wishes, I have attempted to sketch out the various ways that non-voluntary compliance can operate with offers as well as threats. Dn the past few years a good deal of attention has been paid to the issue of coercion and the possibility of being forced to comply with an offer.1 On the face of it, it seems that one cannot be forced to accept an offer as one can always reject the proposal and be no worse off than one would have been had the offer not been made; offers, after all, involve temptations and benefits rather than the pressures and pains associated with threats. Much of the confusion, I would suggest, comes from the common sense tendency to assume that in all cases where Q is forced to choose to do what P wants him to do, P coerces Q. I will argue that coercion is only one \"mode of non-voluntary compliance\", or one way in which a person can be forced to do what another person wants him or her to do. By distinguishing the different ways one can be forced to comply with another's wishes, I hope to sketch out the various ways that non-voluntary compliance can operate with offers as well as threats.","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"115-120"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/pra1988/19891428","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.5840/pra1988/19891432
Peter Fuss
The thesis pursued here is that Madison, in articulating the principles of political philosophy underlying his defense of the proposed constitution in his contributions to the Federalist Papers of 1787-8, can best be understood as at once invoking, enriching, and on several key points all but abandoning the "classical republican" or "civic humanist" tradition. I analyze the ambivalent character of Madison's response to Plato and Aristotle, Machiavelli and Rousseau with respect to the quality and complexity of the body politic, the principle of representation, the containment of factionalism, and the nature of political legitimation and renewal. Imly general consensus, James Madison's renown as a political thinker rests on a dual foundation. Most historians continue to bestow on him the title "Father of the Constitution"; and all agree that his contributions to the Federalist Papers-a series of eighty-five hastily composed, anonymous "letters to the public" printed in New York's leading newspapers in 1787 and 1788-helped establish this remarkable document as the most authoritative commentary on the u.s. Constitution ever written, and perhaps as the one indisputable American classic in political theory.1 Much less widely recognized, and argued for only fairly recently,2 is the fact that, thanks largely to Madison's influence, both documents belong to a single though complex tradition of experience and thought known as classical republicanism or civic humanism. Originally practiced in Periclean Athens and in pre-imperial Rome, it found its first great philosophical articulation in Aristotle. After a long hiatus, it flourished once more in the fifteenth-century Florence of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, had a brief rebirth in seventeenth-century Holland, and played a key role in the seventeenthand eighteenth-century revolutionary political history of England and her American colonies. Characteristic of civic humanism from the first was broad popular participation, and on occasion even popular sovereignty, through the instrumentalities of "mixed" government in a tight-knit community that sought to minimize, or at least temper the political effects of, socioeconomic differences between individuals and classes. RepUblicanism provided a fourth alternative to the so-called "classical" options: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, embodying elements derived from each of them but itself reducible to none of them. Pervasive in this tradition is a fear of corruption from within, and a corresponding preoccupation with citizenly virtue,
{"title":"James Madison and the Classical Republican Tradition","authors":"Peter Fuss","doi":"10.5840/pra1988/19891432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pra1988/19891432","url":null,"abstract":"The thesis pursued here is that Madison, in articulating the principles of political philosophy underlying his defense of the proposed constitution in his contributions to the Federalist Papers of 1787-8, can best be understood as at once invoking, enriching, and on several key points all but abandoning the \"classical republican\" or \"civic humanist\" tradition. I analyze the ambivalent character of Madison's response to Plato and Aristotle, Machiavelli and Rousseau with respect to the quality and complexity of the body politic, the principle of representation, the containment of factionalism, and the nature of political legitimation and renewal. Imly general consensus, James Madison's renown as a political thinker rests on a dual foundation. Most historians continue to bestow on him the title \"Father of the Constitution\"; and all agree that his contributions to the Federalist Papers-a series of eighty-five hastily composed, anonymous \"letters to the public\" printed in New York's leading newspapers in 1787 and 1788-helped establish this remarkable document as the most authoritative commentary on the u.s. Constitution ever written, and perhaps as the one indisputable American classic in political theory.1 Much less widely recognized, and argued for only fairly recently,2 is the fact that, thanks largely to Madison's influence, both documents belong to a single though complex tradition of experience and thought known as classical republicanism or civic humanism. Originally practiced in Periclean Athens and in pre-imperial Rome, it found its first great philosophical articulation in Aristotle. After a long hiatus, it flourished once more in the fifteenth-century Florence of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, had a brief rebirth in seventeenth-century Holland, and played a key role in the seventeenthand eighteenth-century revolutionary political history of England and her American colonies. Characteristic of civic humanism from the first was broad popular participation, and on occasion even popular sovereignty, through the instrumentalities of \"mixed\" government in a tight-knit community that sought to minimize, or at least temper the political effects of, socioeconomic differences between individuals and classes. RepUblicanism provided a fourth alternative to the so-called \"classical\" options: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, embodying elements derived from each of them but itself reducible to none of them. Pervasive in this tradition is a fear of corruption from within, and a corresponding preoccupation with citizenly virtue,","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"165-181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/pra1988/19891432","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71232243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.5840/pra1988/19891417
Thomas W. Smythe
Discussion of the human soul has bulked large in the literature of philosophy and religion. I defend the possibility of disembodied Cartesian minds by examining the criticisms of three philosophers who argue that there are serious difficulties about any attempt to account for the identity of such Cartesian minds through time. I argue that their criticisms of the possibility of disembodied minds are damaging but not fatal. I hold that the central issue behind their criticisms of Cartesian minds is whether any nonphysical mental criterion can be formulated for the identity of such entities. Even though no such criterion can be given, disembodied minds that persist through time remain logical possibilities. Inlhree distinguished philosophers-Peter Strawson, Terence Penelhum, and Derek Parfit-have given arguments against the existence of disembodied Cartesian minds based on considerations about personal identity. I shall rebut their arguments. Although I see no convincing reason to believe there are disembodied Cartesian minds, I think they are distinct logical possibilities_ I will defend this possibility against these arguments because I do not think the arguments hold any water. P.F. Strawson gives a very typical criticism of Cartesian dualism and disembodied minds. He says that in order to be able to reidentify individual items of any kind, we must first be able to identify them. In order to identify any given item, we must have a way of individuating items of that kind; we must know when we have one such item rather than two. Cartesian dualists, however, hold that the concept of a mind is genuinely independent of talk about a person, a human being or a man. For a Cartesian,the concept of a mind is not dependent on the concept of a person the way talk of surfaces is dependent on the concept of a material object. It is essential to Cartesianism "that the application of the notions of identity and numerability of souls (consciousness) should not be determined by their application to persons."1 We know how to apply the concepts of identity and difference to individual human beings, but the Cartesian cannot rely on this since, "the concept of the identity of a soul or consciousness over time is not derivative from, dependent upon, the concept of the iden416 THOMAS W. SMYTHE tity of person over time".2 The Cartesian must either admit that the concepts of identity and difference of minds are derivative from the concepts of identity and difference of human beings, or supply us with an independently intelligible account of the individuation and identity of Cartesian minds. The former amounts to giving up Cartesian dualism. The latter cannot be done since no mental criteria for personal identity are sufficient of themselves. Therefore, Cartesian dualism and talk about disembodied minds is mistaken. I shall consider Strawson's criticism as it pertains only to the real possibility of disembodied minds. The main point is that we lack any way of identifying a
{"title":"Disembodied Minds and Personal Identity","authors":"Thomas W. Smythe","doi":"10.5840/pra1988/19891417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/pra1988/19891417","url":null,"abstract":"Discussion of the human soul has bulked large in the literature of philosophy and religion. I defend the possibility of disembodied Cartesian minds by examining the criticisms of three philosophers who argue that there are serious difficulties about any attempt to account for the identity of such Cartesian minds through time. I argue that their criticisms of the possibility of disembodied minds are damaging but not fatal. I hold that the central issue behind their criticisms of Cartesian minds is whether any nonphysical mental criterion can be formulated for the identity of such entities. Even though no such criterion can be given, disembodied minds that persist through time remain logical possibilities. Inlhree distinguished philosophers-Peter Strawson, Terence Penelhum, and Derek Parfit-have given arguments against the existence of disembodied Cartesian minds based on considerations about personal identity. I shall rebut their arguments. Although I see no convincing reason to believe there are disembodied Cartesian minds, I think they are distinct logical possibilities_ I will defend this possibility against these arguments because I do not think the arguments hold any water. P.F. Strawson gives a very typical criticism of Cartesian dualism and disembodied minds. He says that in order to be able to reidentify individual items of any kind, we must first be able to identify them. In order to identify any given item, we must have a way of individuating items of that kind; we must know when we have one such item rather than two. Cartesian dualists, however, hold that the concept of a mind is genuinely independent of talk about a person, a human being or a man. For a Cartesian,the concept of a mind is not dependent on the concept of a person the way talk of surfaces is dependent on the concept of a material object. It is essential to Cartesianism \"that the application of the notions of identity and numerability of souls (consciousness) should not be determined by their application to persons.\"1 We know how to apply the concepts of identity and difference to individual human beings, but the Cartesian cannot rely on this since, \"the concept of the identity of a soul or consciousness over time is not derivative from, dependent upon, the concept of the iden416 THOMAS W. SMYTHE tity of person over time\".2 The Cartesian must either admit that the concepts of identity and difference of minds are derivative from the concepts of identity and difference of human beings, or supply us with an independently intelligible account of the individuation and identity of Cartesian minds. The former amounts to giving up Cartesian dualism. The latter cannot be done since no mental criteria for personal identity are sufficient of themselves. Therefore, Cartesian dualism and talk about disembodied minds is mistaken. I shall consider Strawson's criticism as it pertains only to the real possibility of disembodied minds. The main point is that we lack any way of identifying a","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"14 1","pages":"415-423"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/pra1988/19891417","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.5840/pra1988/19891430
Charles Sayward
In a recent paper Nicholas Sturgeon claims moral explanations constitute one area of disagreement between moral realists and noncognitivists. The correctness of such explanation is consistent with moral realism but not with noncognitivism. Does this difference characterize other anti-realist views? I argue that it does not. Moral relativism is a distinct anti-realist view. And the correctness of moral explanations is consistent with moral relativism. I. MORAL REALISM AND MORAL RELATIVISM 11~llicolas Sturgeon characterizes moral realism as comprising these theses: ... that our moral terms typically refer to real properties; that moral statements typically express propositions capable of truth and falsity; and that our ordinary methods of arriving at moral judgments provide us with at least some approximate knowledge of moral truths. I suspect that, in addition, we ought not to count a view as realist unless it holds that these moral truths are in some interesting sense independent of the subjective indicators-our moral beliefs and moral feelings, as well as moral conventions constituted bi coordinated individual intentions-that we take as guides to them. Sturgeon admits, "This last condition is va~e, and I can fmd no consensus in the literature about exactly how to spell it out ... ,,2 I think the statement of this last condition amounts to saying that moral truth is not code-relative. By a moral code I shall mean a general moral point of view that could be spelled out by specifying a set of norms. A person might possess a moral code without being able to do this spelling out. The vast majority of people who have moral codes are in this position. But the specification of the code is always something which in principle could be done.
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Pub Date : 1987-10-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/198813SUPPLEMENT36
R. Brumbaugh
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