Pub Date : 1987-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/19881312
Charles G. Echelbarger
{"title":"Hume on Deduction","authors":"Charles G. Echelbarger","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/19881312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/19881312","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"351-365"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/19881312","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71229927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/19881313
B. On
{"title":"Could There Be a Humean Sex-Neutral General Idea of Man?","authors":"B. On","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/19881313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/19881313","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"367-377"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/19881313","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71229945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/19881327
Thomas A. Michaud
Alfred Schutz formulated his phenomenology with the aim of circumventing what he perceived to be the idealistic character of Husserl's theory of meaning constitution. Schutz contended that constitution for Husserl was idealistically creationistic in the sense that the meanings and very being of phenomena were merely the created products of the constitutive acts of consciousness itself. This article argues, however, that Schutz's theory of constitution is not without an idealistic character in that the meanings which consciousness constitutes and predicates to phenomena are simply created by consciousness itself. This argument is articulated through 1) a delineation of the basic principles of Schutz's phenomenology, 2) an explication of his theory of constitution, and finally, 3) an exposition of its idealistic character with, by way of contrast, a brief account of how and why Maurice Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology expunged all features of idealistic constitution. Most anyone familiar with Edmund Husserl's work is also aware of the criticism that Husserl's theory of constitution is epistemologically idealistic. Though this criticism is even today a debated issue in Husser lean scholarship, it was levelled against Husserl's theory by certain of his colleagues and students. Notable among them is Alfred Schutz whose own phenomenological project was in large part designed to overcome what he perceived as the radically idealistic character of constitution in Husserl's phenomenology. Schutz contended that Husserl's concept of constitution underwent a transformation in the course of its development. Originally, according to Schutz, "constitution meant clarification of the sense-structure of conscious life • . • tracing back all cogitata to intentional operations of on-going conscious life".1 But, this notion of constitution "changed from a clarification of the sense of being, into the foundation of the structure of being; it ... changed from explication into creation".2 In other words, for Schutz, Husserl's concept of constitution devolved from being a means by which the meaning of the being of the phenomena of the life-world could be explained into the means by which the meaning and the very being of life-worldly phenomena are created. However, although Schutz aimed to circumvent Husserl's creationistic approach, it will be argued in this article that Schutz's theory of constitution is not without an idealistic character. In particular, it will 64 THOMAS A. MICHAUD be shown that Schutz's theory suffers from an idealism of meaning. This term "idealism of meaning" implies that for Schutz the meanings that consciousness constitutes and predicates to the phenomena of the lifeworld are merely intrasubjectively produced. The constituted meanings are simply the products of subjective consciousness itself and are not derived from or based upon meanings that consciousness receives from the objective, intersubjective life-world. The articulation of thi
{"title":"Schutz’s Theory of Constitution: An Idealism of Meaning","authors":"Thomas A. Michaud","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/19881327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/19881327","url":null,"abstract":"Alfred Schutz formulated his phenomenology with the aim of circumventing what he perceived to be the idealistic character of Husserl's theory of meaning constitution. Schutz contended that constitution for Husserl was idealistically creationistic in the sense that the meanings and very being of phenomena were merely the created products of the constitutive acts of consciousness itself. This article argues, however, that Schutz's theory of constitution is not without an idealistic character in that the meanings which consciousness constitutes and predicates to phenomena are simply created by consciousness itself. This argument is articulated through 1) a delineation of the basic principles of Schutz's phenomenology, 2) an explication of his theory of constitution, and finally, 3) an exposition of its idealistic character with, by way of contrast, a brief account of how and why Maurice Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology expunged all features of idealistic constitution. Most anyone familiar with Edmund Husserl's work is also aware of the criticism that Husserl's theory of constitution is epistemologically idealistic. Though this criticism is even today a debated issue in Husser lean scholarship, it was levelled against Husserl's theory by certain of his colleagues and students. Notable among them is Alfred Schutz whose own phenomenological project was in large part designed to overcome what he perceived as the radically idealistic character of constitution in Husserl's phenomenology. Schutz contended that Husserl's concept of constitution underwent a transformation in the course of its development. Originally, according to Schutz, \"constitution meant clarification of the sense-structure of conscious life • . • tracing back all cogitata to intentional operations of on-going conscious life\".1 But, this notion of constitution \"changed from a clarification of the sense of being, into the foundation of the structure of being; it ... changed from explication into creation\".2 In other words, for Schutz, Husserl's concept of constitution devolved from being a means by which the meaning of the being of the phenomena of the life-world could be explained into the means by which the meaning and the very being of life-worldly phenomena are created. However, although Schutz aimed to circumvent Husserl's creationistic approach, it will be argued in this article that Schutz's theory of constitution is not without an idealistic character. In particular, it will 64 THOMAS A. MICHAUD be shown that Schutz's theory suffers from an idealism of meaning. This term \"idealism of meaning\" implies that for Schutz the meanings that consciousness constitutes and predicates to the phenomena of the lifeworld are merely intrasubjectively produced. The constituted meanings are simply the products of subjective consciousness itself and are not derived from or based upon meanings that consciousness receives from the objective, intersubjective life-world. The articulation of thi","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"56 1","pages":"63-71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/19881327","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71230361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/19881311
J. Humber
{"title":"Sexual Perversion and Human Nature","authors":"J. Humber","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/19881311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/19881311","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"331-350"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/19881311","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71229876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1987-04-01DOI: 10.5840/PRA1987/19881325
K. Alberts
Roderick Chisholm contrasts semantic theories that presuppose "the primacy of the intentional" with those that presuppose "the primacy of the linguistic". In The First Person he attempts to develop an analysis of first person singular reference that presupposes the primacy of the intentional. In this paper I attempt to develop a semantics of first person singular reference (what I call 'I-reference') that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic. I do three things in the paper. First, I criticize Chisholm's (and Frege's) account. Second, I attempt to answer the general criticism that is commonly leveled against an analysis of 'I' that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic. Third and finally, building upon insights of David Kaplan, I present an interpretation of meaning-rule under which'!' operates in its first person use. It is customary in the philosophy of language to contrast semantical theories that provide a truth-functional analysis of meaning with those that provide a communicational analysis. In The First Person: A Study in Intentionality and Reference (Chisholm, 1983) Roderick Chisholm cuts up this territory differently. He advises us to distinguish between theories that "presuppose the primacy of the intentional" and those that "presuppose the primacy of the linguistic". These are broad categories, but as I shall use the terms in this paper, a theory which presupposes the primacy of the intentional (hereinafter IT or ITR) takes thought or some other intentional entity to be conceptually prior to language in the mechanism of reference. Conversely, a theory that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic (hereinafter LT or LTR) takes language to be logically prior to thought. In contrast to the traditional classification, Chisholm's revised scheme groups Frege and, for example, a philosopher such as Grice into the same camp, for each takes an intentional entity (for Frege, a "sense"; for Grice, a "speaker's intention") to operate as the primary vehicle of reference. Chisholm's program is to use first person singular reference--what we may call 'I-reference'--as a test against which both ITR and LTR may be evaluated. His thesis contains both a metaphysical and semantical component. The metaphysical component, largely a holdover from the views developed in Person and Object (Chisholm, 1976), consists of the theory that the structure of reulity is built upon the irreducibly sub-
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{"title":"Nicholas of Cusa and Man’s Knowledge of God","authors":"John L. Longeway","doi":"10.5840/PRA1987/1988139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PRA1987/1988139","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82315,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy research archives (Bowling Green, Ohio : 1982)","volume":"13 1","pages":"289-313"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1987-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PRA1987/1988139","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71231072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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