{"title":"Unconventional Trade: Bartering for Weapons","authors":"J. Feldman","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1986.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1986.0029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"1 1","pages":"201 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89396362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Limits of Victory: The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties (review)","authors":"Lawrence T. Dirita","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1986.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1986.0009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"2016 1","pages":"259 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86676383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (review)","authors":"C. Littel","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1987.0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1987.0041","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"76 1","pages":"239 - 240"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86700453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Interview: Bani Sadr with Maxwell Glen","authors":"Bani Maxwell Sadr, Max Glen","doi":"10.1353/sais.1981.0077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.1981.0077","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"56 1","pages":"12 - 5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90984542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I? 1991, the Gulf War and evidence of civil strife in Yugoslavia and elsewhere brought to a quick end any hope that the demise of the Cold War would inaugurate a brave new world order. Although Iraq's aggression was defeated by an overwhelming display of U.S. military power, as well as by an unprecedented exercise in collective security, it served as a reminder that the future was likely to include many more new conflicts, always costly and often deadly. Nearly everywhere in the West, the mood has turned inward and become apprehensive. Such gloom in the West is not new, to be sure. Throughout the Cold War, predictions of likely defeats and impending disasters were common, as political leaders gave up on the future too early and too readily. In the mid-1970s, for example, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's evocation of an "unhappy" world allegedly "going toward catastrophe" was largely shared during a decade that opened with reminders of pre-World War I crises— from Fashoda to Sarajevo—all designed to point to a drift toward superpower confrontation in either the Third World or in central Europe.1 But, however flawed these analogies were, they rested on much substantive
{"title":"Defining Moments","authors":"S. Serfaty","doi":"10.1353/sais.1992.0048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.1992.0048","url":null,"abstract":"I? 1991, the Gulf War and evidence of civil strife in Yugoslavia and elsewhere brought to a quick end any hope that the demise of the Cold War would inaugurate a brave new world order. Although Iraq's aggression was defeated by an overwhelming display of U.S. military power, as well as by an unprecedented exercise in collective security, it served as a reminder that the future was likely to include many more new conflicts, always costly and often deadly. Nearly everywhere in the West, the mood has turned inward and become apprehensive. Such gloom in the West is not new, to be sure. Throughout the Cold War, predictions of likely defeats and impending disasters were common, as political leaders gave up on the future too early and too readily. In the mid-1970s, for example, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's evocation of an \"unhappy\" world allegedly \"going toward catastrophe\" was largely shared during a decade that opened with reminders of pre-World War I crises— from Fashoda to Sarajevo—all designed to point to a drift toward superpower confrontation in either the Third World or in central Europe.1 But, however flawed these analogies were, they rested on much substantive","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"25 1","pages":"51 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91079918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
assumed undifferentiable national interests, the availability of unlimited means to oppose the direct and indirect expansion of Soviet power and influence, and the inadvisability of negotiation with the Soviet Union until a rearmed America could once again bargain from a position of strength.1 As a student of containment noted in 1983, "One would, in fact, have to go back to the later Truman administration to find a comparable emphasis on the accumulation of military hardware and a corresponding degree of skepticism regarding negotiations."2 By the end of the Reagan administration's first term it had substantially failed in its efforts to revitalize global containment. Ironically, however, if the first half of 1985 vividly illustrated those failings, it also witnessed the emergence of what is presently claimed to be a significant opportunity to overcome them. In his 6 February 1985 State of the Union address, the president first publicly set forth what others were soon to call the Reagan Doctrine:
{"title":"The Reagan Doctrine and Global Containment: Revival or Recessional","authors":"R. Hansen","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1987.0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1987.0044","url":null,"abstract":"assumed undifferentiable national interests, the availability of unlimited means to oppose the direct and indirect expansion of Soviet power and influence, and the inadvisability of negotiation with the Soviet Union until a rearmed America could once again bargain from a position of strength.1 As a student of containment noted in 1983, \"One would, in fact, have to go back to the later Truman administration to find a comparable emphasis on the accumulation of military hardware and a corresponding degree of skepticism regarding negotiations.\"2 By the end of the Reagan administration's first term it had substantially failed in its efforts to revitalize global containment. Ironically, however, if the first half of 1985 vividly illustrated those failings, it also witnessed the emergence of what is presently claimed to be a significant opportunity to overcome them. In his 6 February 1985 State of the Union address, the president first publicly set forth what others were soon to call the Reagan Doctrine:","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"13 1","pages":"39 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90910129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aiding Eastern Europe in a a Capital-Short World","authors":"L. Silk","doi":"10.1353/sais.1992.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.1992.0003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"12 1","pages":"1 - 10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91272537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Russia and the West: The Next to Last Phase","authors":"G. Liška","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1981.0066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1981.0066","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"111 1","pages":"141 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89524914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With die end ofthe Cold War, Europe is likely to face a resumption of many historical tensions diat were suppressed in the postwar era, as well as new sources of instability. Despite all efforts to encourage democratic and market reforms in die former Soviet Union—almost certainly the most important region affecting Europe's security—and to use diplomacy to manage the lesser crises in Europe, contingencies are even more likely to arise now dian in die past in which Western Europe may need to employ, or at least must have a convincing option to employ, military force. Nowhere is die need for military cooperation more apparent than in die former state of Yugoslavia. The war has shown, however, mat neidier die collective defense system of die North Adantic Treaty Organization (nato) nor the economic integration efforts of die European Community (EC) have been truly effective in responding to security challenges. Thus any contingencies will require not merely appropriate military responses, but also attention to die political framework widiin which diose responses should be organized. The Maastricht meeting, at which diis issue was confronted in late 1991, provided only a provisional answer, and die danget remains diat die Adantic and European perspectives ofthe European security framework will prove to be incompatible. In adjusting to die challenges brought about by die end of die Cold War, die members of die Western security structure face three critical tasks: creating a new strategic rationale for die Alliance; deciding how to contribute to stability in die
{"title":"Needed: A Framework for European Security","authors":"Stefan Fröhlich","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1994.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1994.0010","url":null,"abstract":"With die end ofthe Cold War, Europe is likely to face a resumption of many historical tensions diat were suppressed in the postwar era, as well as new sources of instability. Despite all efforts to encourage democratic and market reforms in die former Soviet Union—almost certainly the most important region affecting Europe's security—and to use diplomacy to manage the lesser crises in Europe, contingencies are even more likely to arise now dian in die past in which Western Europe may need to employ, or at least must have a convincing option to employ, military force. Nowhere is die need for military cooperation more apparent than in die former state of Yugoslavia. The war has shown, however, mat neidier die collective defense system of die North Adantic Treaty Organization (nato) nor the economic integration efforts of die European Community (EC) have been truly effective in responding to security challenges. Thus any contingencies will require not merely appropriate military responses, but also attention to die political framework widiin which diose responses should be organized. The Maastricht meeting, at which diis issue was confronted in late 1991, provided only a provisional answer, and die danget remains diat die Adantic and European perspectives ofthe European security framework will prove to be incompatible. In adjusting to die challenges brought about by die end of die Cold War, die members of die Western security structure face three critical tasks: creating a new strategic rationale for die Alliance; deciding how to contribute to stability in die","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"30 1","pages":"35 - 52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88488058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whhile Leonid Brezhnev was still alive a Soviet planner contemplating the strength of his country's foreign trade position could have been forgiven for reaching some rather complacent conclusions. My country, he might have said, is big and self-sufficient in most natural resources, so its dependence on foreign trade is relatively small. Its imports are equivalent to roughly a tenth of national income, a percentage in line with the United States. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union conducts more than half of its trade within the shelter of the guaranteed markets and comparatively stable prices of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). In trade with the West, the Soviet Union had a great piece of luck in the 1970s, thanks to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The oil on which the Soviet Union has relied for some twothirds of its hard currency exports soared in value in those years, and so the country could buy more from the West without running up the sort of hard currency debt that crippled Poland. There seemed every chance that this luck would last. Stalin had created a system for conducting foreign trade that provided shelter from potentially devastating Western competition without noticeably harming Soviet exports to the West. Soviet protectionism against the West provoked no "retaliatory" restrictions on Soviet oil deliveries to Western markets. On the contrary, the West seemed prepared
{"title":"Soviet Trade with the Industrialized West","authors":"D. Franklin","doi":"10.1353/SAIS.1988.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/SAIS.1988.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Whhile Leonid Brezhnev was still alive a Soviet planner contemplating the strength of his country's foreign trade position could have been forgiven for reaching some rather complacent conclusions. My country, he might have said, is big and self-sufficient in most natural resources, so its dependence on foreign trade is relatively small. Its imports are equivalent to roughly a tenth of national income, a percentage in line with the United States. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union conducts more than half of its trade within the shelter of the guaranteed markets and comparatively stable prices of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). In trade with the West, the Soviet Union had a great piece of luck in the 1970s, thanks to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The oil on which the Soviet Union has relied for some twothirds of its hard currency exports soared in value in those years, and so the country could buy more from the West without running up the sort of hard currency debt that crippled Poland. There seemed every chance that this luck would last. Stalin had created a system for conducting foreign trade that provided shelter from potentially devastating Western competition without noticeably harming Soviet exports to the West. Soviet protectionism against the West provoked no \"retaliatory\" restrictions on Soviet oil deliveries to Western markets. On the contrary, the West seemed prepared","PeriodicalId":85482,"journal":{"name":"SAIS review (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)","volume":"182 1","pages":"75 - 88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73532721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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