Pub Date : 2023-04-28DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500127
Ye Hailin
Since the Biden administration took office, China–US relations have been undergoing major adjustments. The US has strategically accelerated the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and related containment mechanisms against China, building multilateral networks led by the US to contain China on multiple fronts. As China–US strategic rivalry keeps intensifying, China faces increasingly complex peripheral strategic environment, regional economic cooperation and security situation. Through the analysis of the intentions and plans of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it is found that there is a huge mismatch between the cost that the US can afford to adopt the strategy and its expected benefits, and a significant gap also exists between its current comprehensive national power and its ability to afford the cost of the strategy, which will severely limit the implementation effects of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. These factors therefore create conditions for China, as the weaker party, to effectively cope with and successfully hedge against various challenges posed by the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.
{"title":"The Logical Contradictions of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s Response","authors":"Ye Hailin","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500127","url":null,"abstract":"Since the Biden administration took office, China–US relations have been undergoing major adjustments. The US has strategically accelerated the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and related containment mechanisms against China, building multilateral networks led by the US to contain China on multiple fronts. As China–US strategic rivalry keeps intensifying, China faces increasingly complex peripheral strategic environment, regional economic cooperation and security situation. Through the analysis of the intentions and plans of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it is found that there is a huge mismatch between the cost that the US can afford to adopt the strategy and its expected benefits, and a significant gap also exists between its current comprehensive national power and its ability to afford the cost of the strategy, which will severely limit the implementation effects of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. These factors therefore create conditions for China, as the weaker party, to effectively cope with and successfully hedge against various challenges posed by the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78903270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-28DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500115
Guangjiang Bao
Indonesia has been actively seeking to improve its status and has gradually developed a trinity of national–regional–world status, consisting of independent status, regional leadership status and middle power status. In the context of China–US strategic competition, Indonesia is more sensitive to the consolidation and pursuit of its status. In response, Indonesia not only inherits the traditional diplomatic policy of “rowing between two rocks” and refuses to take sides between China and the US, but also tries to lead the ASEAN countries to develop a “third way” in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper analyzes Indonesia’s perception of and response to China–US strategic competition from the perspective of status politics, arguing that status politics plays a key role as the underlying logic of Indonesia’s “free and active” diplomacy — maintaining close relations with both China and the United States at the material level can enhance Indonesia’s economic and military status, and maintaining autonomy at the social level can gain international recognition of its status.
{"title":"China–US Strategic Competition and Indonesia’s Status Anxiety","authors":"Guangjiang Bao","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500115","url":null,"abstract":"Indonesia has been actively seeking to improve its status and has gradually developed a trinity of national–regional–world status, consisting of independent status, regional leadership status and middle power status. In the context of China–US strategic competition, Indonesia is more sensitive to the consolidation and pursuit of its status. In response, Indonesia not only inherits the traditional diplomatic policy of “rowing between two rocks” and refuses to take sides between China and the US, but also tries to lead the ASEAN countries to develop a “third way” in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper analyzes Indonesia’s perception of and response to China–US strategic competition from the perspective of status politics, arguing that status politics plays a key role as the underlying logic of Indonesia’s “free and active” diplomacy — maintaining close relations with both China and the United States at the material level can enhance Indonesia’s economic and military status, and maintaining autonomy at the social level can gain international recognition of its status.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75078738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-07DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500097
Zhao Wanyi, Li Mingjiang
The severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of public health management for the economy and society in every country. It also proved the necessity of international cooperation in the health sector to deal with global health challenges and realize sustainable development. As one of the major players in global health governance, China has made significant contributions to anti-COVID cooperation through the Health Silk Road, a key component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing’s vaccine cooperation was particularly noteworthy in Southeast Asia, a very important region in China’s BRI design. The bilateral vaccine collaboration between China and regional states has provided good experiences for regional health cooperation and paved the way for the further promotion of the Health Silk Road in the post-pandemic era.
{"title":"China’s COVID-19 Vaccine Cooperation with Southeast Asia: A Boost for the Health Silk Road Initiative","authors":"Zhao Wanyi, Li Mingjiang","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500097","url":null,"abstract":"The severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of public health management for the economy and society in every country. It also proved the necessity of international cooperation in the health sector to deal with global health challenges and realize sustainable development. As one of the major players in global health governance, China has made significant contributions to anti-COVID cooperation through the Health Silk Road, a key component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing’s vaccine cooperation was particularly noteworthy in Southeast Asia, a very important region in China’s BRI design. The bilateral vaccine collaboration between China and regional states has provided good experiences for regional health cooperation and paved the way for the further promotion of the Health Silk Road in the post-pandemic era.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80740745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-05DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500103
Fangfei Jiang
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) proposed by the Biden administration has gone through three major stages — conception, preparation and engagement, and initial negotiation — and focuses on four key pillars: Connected Economy, Resilient Economy, Clean Economy, and Fair Economy. In fact, this initiative supplements and reinforces the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, while carrying forward and advancing the “America First” policy. It is a new attempt of the US to build an economic club exclusive of China in the Indo-Pacific and to lead in building a new structure for regional cooperation, as well as a diplomatic signal deliberately released by the Biden administration to its Eurasian allies during the Russia–Ukarine conflict. As the prospects of the IPEF are still of much uncertainty, it might exert few substantial impacts on China in the short term. However, we should still be alert to its long-term adverse influence on China–US relations, China’s surrounding international environment and foreign relations, the development of regional economic cooperation and world economy, as well as the stability of international order. Given the domestic situation in the US and the attitude of the other members, the progress of IPEF negotiations in the four pillars may vary significantly in the coming period.
{"title":"An Analysis of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF): Essence, Impacts and Prospects","authors":"Fangfei Jiang","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500103","url":null,"abstract":"The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) proposed by the Biden administration has gone through three major stages — conception, preparation and engagement, and initial negotiation — and focuses on four key pillars: Connected Economy, Resilient Economy, Clean Economy, and Fair Economy. In fact, this initiative supplements and reinforces the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, while carrying forward and advancing the “America First” policy. It is a new attempt of the US to build an economic club exclusive of China in the Indo-Pacific and to lead in building a new structure for regional cooperation, as well as a diplomatic signal deliberately released by the Biden administration to its Eurasian allies during the Russia–Ukarine conflict. As the prospects of the IPEF are still of much uncertainty, it might exert few substantial impacts on China in the short term. However, we should still be alert to its long-term adverse influence on China–US relations, China’s surrounding international environment and foreign relations, the development of regional economic cooperation and world economy, as well as the stability of international order. Given the domestic situation in the US and the attitude of the other members, the progress of IPEF negotiations in the four pillars may vary significantly in the coming period.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76659591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-05DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500085
Zong Wei
The Biden administration regards the Indo-Pacific region as the pivot of U.S. global strategy, and China as the primary strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and even the globe. It has implemented forward diplomacy and forward military deployment and promoted Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, attempting to involve allies inside and outside the region in an all-round competition against China and maintain U.S. regional hegemony. Despite the challenges in implementing the Indo-Pacific Strategy, such as U.S. global strategic balance, funding shortage, difficulty in coordinating the allies, and inconsistency of domestic and foreign policy, the Biden administration will continue to promote related policy initiatives, which have and will continue to affect the political, economic, and security order in the Asia-Pacific region and impede the healthy and stable development of U.S.–China relations.
{"title":"The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and its Impacts on Asia-Pacific Order","authors":"Zong Wei","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500085","url":null,"abstract":"The Biden administration regards the Indo-Pacific region as the pivot of U.S. global strategy, and China as the primary strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and even the globe. It has implemented forward diplomacy and forward military deployment and promoted Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, attempting to involve allies inside and outside the region in an all-round competition against China and maintain U.S. regional hegemony. Despite the challenges in implementing the Indo-Pacific Strategy, such as U.S. global strategic balance, funding shortage, difficulty in coordinating the allies, and inconsistency of domestic and foreign policy, the Biden administration will continue to promote related policy initiatives, which have and will continue to affect the political, economic, and security order in the Asia-Pacific region and impede the healthy and stable development of U.S.–China relations.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"211 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73224748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500073
He Xiao
The Biden administration has demonstrated high emphasis on economic competition among major powers. Although it has stated multiple times that the US does not seek confrontation with China, the Biden administration’s security policy toward China, compared with that of the Trump administration, is more confrontational, which is underscored by its constant pushing of China’s red line in the Taiwan issue. Strategic competition against China is clearly regarded as the pivot of the foreign policy by the Biden administration, which has lowered expectation of China and has changed the mentality of striving for “big deals” to “no deal” in its China policy. The Biden administration believes that the US has a long-term advantage, and has developed a composite strategy comprised of two tactics based on its perception of the strategic positioning and the competitive status of China and the US. The first is a dominant strategy of (to gain advantages by risk avoiding), namely to cut off China’s access to external technological innovation resources and maintain the long-term advantage of the US while avoiding bilateral interactions of high costs, risks, and uncertainties, in order to ensure a lasting and secure victory as much as possible. The second is a supporting strategy of (to prevent wars by enhancing commitment), which aims to prevent China from taking high-risk actions or launching military challenges against the US on key issues when perceiving disadvantage. and focus, respectively, on economic and security policies, which together constitute the logic for the US strategic competition against China. To this end, the US has strengthened its strategic deterrence against China by reinforcing its key foreign commitments and mobilizing its allies.
{"title":"Risk Avoidance and Deterrence: Duality of the US Policy toward China","authors":"He Xiao","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500073","url":null,"abstract":"The Biden administration has demonstrated high emphasis on economic competition among major powers. Although it has stated multiple times that the US does not seek confrontation with China, the Biden administration’s security policy toward China, compared with that of the Trump administration, is more confrontational, which is underscored by its constant pushing of China’s red line in the Taiwan issue. Strategic competition against China is clearly regarded as the pivot of the foreign policy by the Biden administration, which has lowered expectation of China and has changed the mentality of striving for “big deals” to “no deal” in its China policy. The Biden administration believes that the US has a long-term advantage, and has developed a composite strategy comprised of two tactics based on its perception of the strategic positioning and the competitive status of China and the US. The first is a dominant strategy of (to gain advantages by risk avoiding), namely to cut off China’s access to external technological innovation resources and maintain the long-term advantage of the US while avoiding bilateral interactions of high costs, risks, and uncertainties, in order to ensure a lasting and secure victory as much as possible. The second is a supporting strategy of (to prevent wars by enhancing commitment), which aims to prevent China from taking high-risk actions or launching military challenges against the US on key issues when perceiving disadvantage. and focus, respectively, on economic and security policies, which together constitute the logic for the US strategic competition against China. To this end, the US has strengthened its strategic deterrence against China by reinforcing its key foreign commitments and mobilizing its allies.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"376 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84945764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-18DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500061
Zhu Feng
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, China and Japan have fought against the epidemic through high-level contacts, donation and so on. The Chinese proverb “mountains and rivers on foreign land, wind and moon under the same sky” gave warmth of friendship to the bilateral relations. However, since Yoshihide Suga won the election, the Sino-Japanese relations have taken a worsening turn. The current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida further takes counterbalancing China as top priority. The “anti-COVID-19 diplomacy” in 2020 had very limited improvement on Sino-Japanese relations. It is clear that since the implementation of the U.S. strategic competition policy against China, Japan, without hesitation, turns to the “national interest theory” and “international contribution theory” by positioning to counterbalance China. Japan has become one of the few Asian countries that have completely sided with US in the China–US strategic competition. Since the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the principle of “good-neighborhood” has been totally replaced by the seemingly determined approach of “counterbalance” proposed by Japanese politicians. Japan has gone beyond the issue of its neighboring areas, trying to assist the United States’ strategic containment of China, which has added a new variable to China’s neighboring diplomacy.
{"title":"Geostrategy and Great Power Relations: A Reanalysis of the Basic Trends of Sino-Japanese Relations","authors":"Zhu Feng","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500061","url":null,"abstract":"Since the outbreak of COVID-19, China and Japan have fought against the epidemic through high-level contacts, donation and so on. The Chinese proverb “mountains and rivers on foreign land, wind and moon under the same sky” gave warmth of friendship to the bilateral relations. However, since Yoshihide Suga won the election, the Sino-Japanese relations have taken a worsening turn. The current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida further takes counterbalancing China as top priority. The “anti-COVID-19 diplomacy” in 2020 had very limited improvement on Sino-Japanese relations. It is clear that since the implementation of the U.S. strategic competition policy against China, Japan, without hesitation, turns to the “national interest theory” and “international contribution theory” by positioning to counterbalance China. Japan has become one of the few Asian countries that have completely sided with US in the China–US strategic competition. Since the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the principle of “good-neighborhood” has been totally replaced by the seemingly determined approach of “counterbalance” proposed by Japanese politicians. Japan has gone beyond the issue of its neighboring areas, trying to assist the United States’ strategic containment of China, which has added a new variable to China’s neighboring diplomacy.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91328807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-12DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500024
Zhang Yuyan, Xia Guangtao
The systematic importance of US Treasuries for the global financial market stems from their attribute of fundamental collateral. This paper attempts to use the concept of fundamental collateral, as well as its basic features and functions, to explain how US Treasuries have strengthened the international status of the US dollar, and examines the prospects of a diversifying global fundamental collateral market.
{"title":"Fundamental Collateral: A Concept to Understand Global Macroeconomics and Financial Market","authors":"Zhang Yuyan, Xia Guangtao","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500024","url":null,"abstract":"The systematic importance of US Treasuries for the global financial market stems from their attribute of fundamental collateral. This paper attempts to use the concept of fundamental collateral, as well as its basic features and functions, to explain how US Treasuries have strengthened the international status of the US dollar, and examines the prospects of a diversifying global fundamental collateral market.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78014192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-07DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500012
Song Guoyou
In the final year of Trump’s tenure, China and the US put the trade war on hold by signing their phase-one economic and trade agreement, but the COVID-19 pandemic has brought new challenges to the China–US economic and trade relations. The US trade and economic policies toward China advocated by Trump had to be suspended due to his failure to win the re-election, demonstrating that his economic and trade strategy for China has ended in failure. However, the succeeding Biden administration has not totally abandoned the overall design of Trump’s economic and trade policies toward China, and has continued the core policies of imposing additional tariffs on China and maintaining the US economic competitive advantage. After the collision during the Trump administration, the China–US economic and trade relations still show the fundamental characteristics of complementarity and mutual benefit. Under the Biden administration, the renewal of the phase-one economic and trade agreement, the transformation of the economic alliance, the security of the supply chain, the coordination of global economic issues in the post-pandemic era, etc. will become the new focuses of China–US economic and trade relations.
{"title":"China–US Economic and Trade Relations: Trump and Beyond","authors":"Song Guoyou","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500012","url":null,"abstract":"In the final year of Trump’s tenure, China and the US put the trade war on hold by signing their phase-one economic and trade agreement, but the COVID-19 pandemic has brought new challenges to the China–US economic and trade relations. The US trade and economic policies toward China advocated by Trump had to be suspended due to his failure to win the re-election, demonstrating that his economic and trade strategy for China has ended in failure. However, the succeeding Biden administration has not totally abandoned the overall design of Trump’s economic and trade policies toward China, and has continued the core policies of imposing additional tariffs on China and maintaining the US economic competitive advantage. After the collision during the Trump administration, the China–US economic and trade relations still show the fundamental characteristics of complementarity and mutual benefit. Under the Biden administration, the renewal of the phase-one economic and trade agreement, the transformation of the economic alliance, the security of the supply chain, the coordination of global economic issues in the post-pandemic era, etc. will become the new focuses of China–US economic and trade relations.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91012088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.1142/s2737557922500048
Siling Yang, Jilei Ren
2021 was a watershed year for the US, Japan, India, and Australia vis-à-vis their Quadrilateral Cooperation mechanism, which successfully transitioned from a loose coordinating body to a grouping of allied actors. Reviewing the historical development of the Quad, three distinct phases can be identified: the conceptual stage, the strategy development stage, and the third phase of evolution toward an alliance. During the first two phases, the Quad was not more than a loose coordinating structure, but in the last phase, it started to take on the characteristics of an alliance-like body. The primary reason we can conclude that it has evolved into an alliance body is that the organization has started to mold behavioral norms, and it further aims to establish a monopoly over the provision of norms in the Indo-Pacific region. Three factors have played a role in driving the US, Japan, India, and Australia to build the Quad into an alliance body: first is the pursuit of general interests; second is the global situation brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on their relations; third is the formation of a shared objective. These three factors combined worked to shape the Quad into an alliance. As the Quad primarily targets China, its emergence as an alliance will have impacts on China’s security environment that cannot be ignored. In response, China should implement its “neighborhood first” strategy, promote the [Formula: see text] Leader’s Summit on Mutual Respect with its neighboring countries, and advance the comprehensive deepening of economic cooperation between China and ASEAN. These steps can help China respond to the rapidly changing Indo-Pacific geo-political situation.
{"title":"The Quad: From Loose Coordination Toward an Alliance","authors":"Siling Yang, Jilei Ren","doi":"10.1142/s2737557922500048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2737557922500048","url":null,"abstract":"2021 was a watershed year for the US, Japan, India, and Australia vis-à-vis their Quadrilateral Cooperation mechanism, which successfully transitioned from a loose coordinating body to a grouping of allied actors. Reviewing the historical development of the Quad, three distinct phases can be identified: the conceptual stage, the strategy development stage, and the third phase of evolution toward an alliance. During the first two phases, the Quad was not more than a loose coordinating structure, but in the last phase, it started to take on the characteristics of an alliance-like body. The primary reason we can conclude that it has evolved into an alliance body is that the organization has started to mold behavioral norms, and it further aims to establish a monopoly over the provision of norms in the Indo-Pacific region. Three factors have played a role in driving the US, Japan, India, and Australia to build the Quad into an alliance body: first is the pursuit of general interests; second is the global situation brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on their relations; third is the formation of a shared objective. These three factors combined worked to shape the Quad into an alliance. As the Quad primarily targets China, its emergence as an alliance will have impacts on China’s security environment that cannot be ignored. In response, China should implement its “neighborhood first” strategy, promote the [Formula: see text] Leader’s Summit on Mutual Respect with its neighboring countries, and advance the comprehensive deepening of economic cooperation between China and ASEAN. These steps can help China respond to the rapidly changing Indo-Pacific geo-political situation.","PeriodicalId":85727,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of East Asian affairs","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84150649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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