Niklas Kreilkamp, Sascha Matanovic, Maximilian Schmidt, Arnt Wöhrmann
Due to agency problems, firms use management control systems to motivate employees to act in the firms’ interest. This process includes motivating employees to increase effort as well as aligning risk preferences. Whereas Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) review and discuss research findings regarding the effects of monetary incentives on effort and performance, we approach the latter component, i.e., risk. The purpose of this literature review is to systematically present and review research findings regarding the effects of monetary incentives on risk-taking. We thus distinguish between individual performance-based pay, equity-based pay and tournament compensation. Further, implications for incentive system design in practice as well as paths for future research are discussed. On the one hand, we provide suggestions on how to increase employee risk-taking and reduce loss-aversive behavior. On the other hand, we discuss instruments that prevent employees from taking high (excessive) risks. Ultimately, when designing incentive systems, it is always crucial to consider the potential effects on both effort and risk-taking.
{"title":"How Executive Incentive Design Affects Risk-Taking: A Literature Review","authors":"Niklas Kreilkamp, Sascha Matanovic, Maximilian Schmidt, Arnt Wöhrmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3373121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373121","url":null,"abstract":"Due to agency problems, firms use management control systems to motivate employees to act in the firms’ interest. This process includes motivating employees to increase effort as well as aligning risk preferences. Whereas Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) review and discuss research findings regarding the effects of monetary incentives on effort and performance, we approach the latter component, i.e., risk. The purpose of this literature review is to systematically present and review research findings regarding the effects of monetary incentives on risk-taking. We thus distinguish between individual performance-based pay, equity-based pay and tournament compensation. Further, implications for incentive system design in practice as well as paths for future research are discussed. On the one hand, we provide suggestions on how to increase employee risk-taking and reduce loss-aversive behavior. On the other hand, we discuss instruments that prevent employees from taking high (excessive) risks. Ultimately, when designing incentive systems, it is always crucial to consider the potential effects on both effort and risk-taking.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90425007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study earnings surprises disclosed hours before M&A announcements in which both merging firms operate in the same 1-digit SIC as the earnings-releasing firms. These surprises correlate with the acquirers’ M&A announcement return. Consistent with behavioral theory, one week after the M&A announcement, acquirers’ response to the earnings surprises disappears. While acquirers’ stock misvaluation is transitory, other effects to the M&A process are permanent. Larger earnings surprises are related to increases in bid competition, in takeover premiums, and in withdrawn M&As. These results indicate that behavioral biases, characterized by trend-seeking and extrapolation, generate material distortions in some M&A transactions.
{"title":"The Real Effects of Trend-Seeking and Extrapolation: Evidence from M&As","authors":"Eliezer M. Fich, Guosong Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2996714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2996714","url":null,"abstract":"We study earnings surprises disclosed hours before M&A announcements in which both merging firms operate in the same 1-digit SIC as the earnings-releasing firms. These surprises correlate with the acquirers’ M&A announcement return. Consistent with behavioral theory, one week after the M&A announcement, acquirers’ response to the earnings surprises disappears. While acquirers’ stock misvaluation is transitory, other effects to the M&A process are permanent. Larger earnings surprises are related to increases in bid competition, in takeover premiums, and in withdrawn M&As. These results indicate that behavioral biases, characterized by trend-seeking and extrapolation, generate material distortions in some M&A transactions.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90964155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We conduct three experiments to examine whether increased automation can reduce the effects of independence conflicts on audit firm liability. Our experiments manipulate (1) whether procedures are performed by an auditor or an artificial intelligence and (2) whether the audit firm was careful in maintaining the appearance of independence from the audit client. Results of the first experiment identify that automation significantly reduces the effect of the appearance of independence conflicts on jurors’ judgments of audit firm liability. This effect is driven by changes in jurors’ trust in the audit process. A second experiment replicates this finding and provides additional process evidence, including evidence that jurors’ judgments are intentional. Our third experiment replicates the findings in a simpler setting with simpler manipulations to provide further robustness. Our study contributes to literature on auditor negligence, and advances understanding of how changes in the audit landscape might affect audit firm liability.
{"title":"Can Automation Reduce the Effect of Independence Conflicts on Audit Firm Liability?","authors":"R. Libby, Patrick D. Witz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3734629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3734629","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct three experiments to examine whether increased automation can reduce the effects of independence conflicts on audit firm liability. Our experiments manipulate (1) whether procedures are performed by an auditor or an artificial intelligence and (2) whether the audit firm was careful in maintaining the appearance of independence from the audit client. Results of the first experiment identify that automation significantly reduces the effect of the appearance of independence conflicts on jurors’ judgments of audit firm liability. This effect is driven by changes in jurors’ trust in the audit process. A second experiment replicates this finding and provides additional process evidence, including evidence that jurors’ judgments are intentional. Our third experiment replicates the findings in a simpler setting with simpler manipulations to provide further robustness. Our study contributes to literature on auditor negligence, and advances understanding of how changes in the audit landscape might affect audit firm liability.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89650131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We reconcile the empirically flat relation between historical betas and stock returns (flat security market line) with the common usage of the CAPM based on historical betas in valuation. Analysts bias cash flow growth expectations upwards for high-beta firms, so that the value-reducing effect of higher historical systematic risk cancels out and buy/sell-recommendations remain unrelated to beta. The association between beta and growth overestimation is driven by estimates conventionally used in the industry (e.g., Bloomberg betas), suggesting that analysts adjust growth expectations to offset beta's valuation effects, instead of exhibiting a coincidental overoptimism for high-beta firms.
{"title":"Growth Expectations out of WACC","authors":"Petri Jylha, Michael Ungeheuer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3618612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3618612","url":null,"abstract":"We reconcile the empirically flat relation between historical betas and stock returns (flat security market line) with the common usage of the CAPM based on historical betas in valuation. Analysts bias cash flow growth expectations upwards for high-beta firms, so that the value-reducing effect of higher historical systematic risk cancels out and buy/sell-recommendations remain unrelated to beta. The association between beta and growth overestimation is driven by estimates conventionally used in the industry (e.g., Bloomberg betas), suggesting that analysts adjust growth expectations to offset beta's valuation effects, instead of exhibiting a coincidental overoptimism for high-beta firms.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82652912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dereck Barr‐Pulliam, S. Mason, Kerri-Ann Sanderson
Despite specialists’ role in producing fair value measurements, they often encounter tensions that give rise to conflict between the specialists and both their organizational and professional demands. This study surveyed 222 highly qualified specialists to examine how differences in specialists’ domain knowledge and their employer type influence perceptions of a particular type of conflict—organizational-professional conflict (OPC). First, we find that specialists who primarily value financial instruments and are employed by non-professional services firms (e.g., banks) report significantly higher OPC levels, lower job satisfaction, and higher turnover intentions. Next, we find that prior experience in an organization like one’s current employer mitigates your perceived OPC level. Lastly, we find that specialists who have a dual role in working with auditors and management report higher OPC levels when they spend more of their time assisting auditors in evaluating fair value measurements’ reasonableness.
{"title":"Should I Stay or Should I Go?: The Joint Effects of Valuation Specialists’ Knowledge Domain and Employer Type on Perceptions of Organizational-Professional Conflict","authors":"Dereck Barr‐Pulliam, S. Mason, Kerri-Ann Sanderson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3576993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576993","url":null,"abstract":"Despite specialists’ role in producing fair value measurements, they often encounter tensions that give rise to conflict between the specialists and both their organizational and professional demands. This study surveyed 222 highly qualified specialists to examine how differences in specialists’ domain knowledge and their employer type influence perceptions of a particular type of conflict—organizational-professional conflict (OPC). First, we find that specialists who primarily value financial instruments and are employed by non-professional services firms (e.g., banks) report significantly higher OPC levels, lower job satisfaction, and higher turnover intentions. Next, we find that prior experience in an organization like one’s current employer mitigates your perceived OPC level. Lastly, we find that specialists who have a dual role in working with auditors and management report higher OPC levels when they spend more of their time assisting auditors in evaluating fair value measurements’ reasonableness.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79694093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charles (Chad) Ham, Rebecca N. Hann, Maryjane R. Rabier, Wenfeng Wang
Using a novel dataset of online job postings by accounting firms, this study empirically examines audit offices’ skill preferences and whether they relate to audit quality. Consistent with prior work in labor economics, we find the demand for cognitive, social, and technology- related skills has increased over our sample period of 2007-2017. We also find substantial variation in the demand for these skills not only across audit firms, but also across offices within an audit firm, suggesting that audit offices are not homogeneous in their demand for auditor skills. Among the three skills, we find the demand for social skills has the strongest relation with audit quality. This association is stronger for large or industry specialist audit offices and for complex clients, suggesting the benefits of social skills are greater when effective coordination and knowledge transfer are crucial in achieving high-quality audits. Taken together, our findings suggest that an audit office’s skill preferences represent an important office attribute that can affect audit quality.
{"title":"Auditor Skill Demands and Audit Quality: Evidence from Job Postings","authors":"Charles (Chad) Ham, Rebecca N. Hann, Maryjane R. Rabier, Wenfeng Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3727495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727495","url":null,"abstract":"Using a novel dataset of online job postings by accounting firms, this study empirically examines audit offices’ skill preferences and whether they relate to audit quality. Consistent with prior work in labor economics, we find the demand for cognitive, social, and technology- related skills has increased over our sample period of 2007-2017. We also find substantial variation in the demand for these skills not only across audit firms, but also across offices within an audit firm, suggesting that audit offices are not homogeneous in their demand for auditor skills. Among the three skills, we find the demand for social skills has the strongest relation with audit quality. This association is stronger for large or industry specialist audit offices and for complex clients, suggesting the benefits of social skills are greater when effective coordination and knowledge transfer are crucial in achieving high-quality audits. Taken together, our findings suggest that an audit office’s skill preferences represent an important office attribute that can affect audit quality.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76310465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Costello, Down, and Mehta (2020) trace their slider intervention to deviations from the credit line amount recommended by a credit scoring model. The deviations are followed by larger delinquency declines and bigger sales orders, and Costello et al. interpret these results using discretion-based theories. However, incremental deviations are concentrated on newer clients rather than those the lender has accumulated soft information about. Deviations also appear larger for public than private borrowers. My discussion evaluates whether these results align with discretion-based theories, and explores alternative interpretations based on salience and unique aspects of the trade credit setting. Differences in interpretation aside, the evidence is informative about technological advances in commercial lending. I conclude with an overview of several recent advances and discuss the implications for lending research.
{"title":"Technology is Changing Lending: Implications for Research (A Discussion of Costello, Down, and Mehta (2020))","authors":"Andrew Sutherland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3695597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695597","url":null,"abstract":"Costello, Down, and Mehta (2020) trace their slider intervention to deviations from the credit line amount recommended by a credit scoring model. The deviations are followed by larger delinquency declines and bigger sales orders, and Costello et al. interpret these results using discretion-based theories. However, incremental deviations are concentrated on newer clients rather than those the lender has accumulated soft information about. Deviations also appear larger for public than private borrowers. My discussion evaluates whether these results align with discretion-based theories, and explores alternative interpretations based on salience and unique aspects of the trade credit setting. Differences in interpretation aside, the evidence is informative about technological advances in commercial lending. I conclude with an overview of several recent advances and discuss the implications for lending research.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76322302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Accounting research on the effects of incentives on creativity finds that paying for quantity of output yields the same level of high-creativity output as paying for only creativity or for both creativity and quantity (Kachelmeier et al. 2008). This finding is surprising and counter to economic theory, which suggest multi-dimensional performance measurement systems should lead to superior performance. However, research thus far has not examined whether the results hold up in the context of feedback. Feedback has the potential to change the effect of performance dependent incentives on creativity because it informs individuals about the success (or failure) of their prior task completion strategies. We use an experiment to investigate how feedback and incentive type influence creativity in a two-round setting. Our study examines the effect of feedback on output when incentives are fixed or incentivize either creativity-only, quantity-only, or quantity and creativity. We find that, after feedback, incentives with a quantity component (e.g., quantity-only and quantity and creativity incentives) result in superior production of high-creativity output compared to fixed or creativity-only incentives.
关于激励对创造力影响的会计研究发现，为产出数量付费与只为创造力付费或为创造力和数量付费产生的高创造力产出水平相同(kachhelmeier et al. 2008)。这一发现令人惊讶，与经济学理论背道而驰。经济学理论认为，多维绩效衡量体系应该会带来卓越的绩效。然而，迄今为止的研究还没有检验这些结果在反馈的背景下是否站得住脚。反馈有可能改变绩效激励对创造力的影响，因为它告诉个体他们之前的任务完成策略的成功(或失败)。我们通过实验研究了反馈和激励类型在两轮环境下对创造力的影响。我们的研究考察了当激励是固定的，或者仅激励创造力，仅激励数量，或数量加创造力时，反馈对产出的影响。我们发现，在反馈之后，与固定或只有创造力的激励相比，具有数量成分的激励(例如，仅数量和数量和创造力激励)导致高创造力产出的优越生产。
{"title":"Does Feedback Matter? The Impact of Incentive Type and Feedback on Creativity","authors":"Alisa G. Brink, Bernhard Reichert, J. M. Sarji","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3695312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695312","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting research on the effects of incentives on creativity finds that paying for quantity of output yields the same level of high-creativity output as paying for only creativity or for both creativity and quantity (Kachelmeier et al. 2008). This finding is surprising and counter to economic theory, which suggest multi-dimensional performance measurement systems should lead to superior performance. However, research thus far has not examined whether the results hold up in the context of feedback. Feedback has the potential to change the effect of performance dependent incentives on creativity because it informs individuals about the success (or failure) of their prior task completion strategies. We use an experiment to investigate how feedback and incentive type influence creativity in a two-round setting. Our study examines the effect of feedback on output when incentives are fixed or incentivize either creativity-only, quantity-only, or quantity and creativity. We find that, after feedback, incentives with a quantity component (e.g., quantity-only and quantity and creativity incentives) result in superior production of high-creativity output compared to fixed or creativity-only incentives.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85700219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This experimental study explores the impact of hierarchal team decision processing in face-to-face (F2F) and computer mediated communication (CM) settings on auditors’ risk assessment and financial statement adjustment decisions. Results indicate that while hierarchal team processing of issues does not significantly impact auditor risk assessments, team processing does significantly impact auditors’ proposed adjustment decisions. Findings reveal that auditors exhibit significantly riskier decision making after hierarchical team discussions when discussions are conducted F2F versus CM, as audit experience increases, and when auditors have some versus no prior experience working on audit engagements with team members (ETM). Higher levels of task experience, however, moderate the impact of ETM on auditors’ adjustment decisions. Findings also reveal strong within-team agreement with the most experienced team member following hierarchical team processing of issues. Lastly, results show that priming of team members prior to team discussions does not significantly impact audit judgments.
{"title":"The Impact of Hierarchical Teams, Method of Communication, and Auditor Priming on Key Audit Decisions","authors":"Patricia Wellmeyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3690562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3690562","url":null,"abstract":"This experimental study explores the impact of hierarchal team decision processing in face-to-face (F2F) and computer mediated communication (CM) settings on auditors’ risk assessment and financial statement adjustment decisions. Results indicate that while hierarchal team processing of issues does not significantly impact auditor risk assessments, team processing does significantly impact auditors’ proposed adjustment decisions. Findings reveal that auditors exhibit significantly riskier decision making after hierarchical team discussions when discussions are conducted F2F versus CM, as audit experience increases, and when auditors have some versus no prior experience working on audit engagements with team members (ETM). Higher levels of task experience, however, moderate the impact of ETM on auditors’ adjustment decisions. Findings also reveal strong within-team agreement with the most experienced team member following hierarchical team processing of issues. Lastly, results show that priming of team members prior to team discussions does not significantly impact audit judgments.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78316577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study explores the effect of employee organizational identity on developing effective compensation contracts to improve organizational performance. We adopt the economic identity theory to mathematically model and test this model using data from a Japanese listed firm that uses an exogenous, uniform incentive scheme based on a seniority system. Situating low-level sales managers as agents and department managers as principals in the mathematical analysis reveals that when organizations do not set optimal compensation contracts, the expected utility of department managers is not high — even if they have high levels of organizational identity — because utility depends on the magnitude of incentive coefficients. Empirical results show that the coefficient of organizational identity has a significant positive relationship with organizational performance. However, surprisingly, when the incentive coefficient is high, the relationship between organizational identity and performance is negative. These results indicate that organizational identity is a “double-edged sword” in incentive schemes with a seniority system, and managers should tune their targets and incentive schemes more finely to optimize firm performance.
{"title":"Organizational Identity and Performance in Compensation Contracts: Theory and Evidence","authors":"T. Wakabayashi, Makoto Kuroki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3687868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3687868","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the effect of employee organizational identity on developing effective compensation contracts to improve organizational performance. We adopt the economic identity theory to mathematically model and test this model using data from a Japanese listed firm that uses an exogenous, uniform incentive scheme based on a seniority system. Situating low-level sales managers as agents and department managers as principals in the mathematical analysis reveals that when organizations do not set optimal compensation contracts, the expected utility of department managers is not high — even if they have high levels of organizational identity — because utility depends on the magnitude of incentive coefficients. Empirical results show that the coefficient of organizational identity has a significant positive relationship with organizational performance. However, surprisingly, when the incentive coefficient is high, the relationship between organizational identity and performance is negative. These results indicate that organizational identity is a “double-edged sword” in incentive schemes with a seniority system, and managers should tune their targets and incentive schemes more finely to optimize firm performance.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82927162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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