Using hand‐collected data, we creatively construct an ‘on‐balance‐sheet shadow banking business’ (OBS‐SBB) measure to precisely quantify commercial banks’ shadow banking activity concealed on their balance sheets. We show that OBS‐SBB activities could both increase individual and systemic risks. To further test the underlying mechanisms, we use China’s implementation of Basel III as an exogenous shock and employ the difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that banks demand OBS‐SBB in order to bypass capital requirements, previously less‐capitalised banks significantly increase their OBS‐SBB ex‐post, and greater impact is found among small and medium‐sized banks and during loose monetary policy periods.
{"title":"Shadow Banking Shadowed in Banks’ Balance Sheets: Evidence from China's Commercial Banks","authors":"Feifei Zhu, J. Chen, Zihao Chen, Huixuan Li","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12558","url":null,"abstract":"Using hand‐collected data, we creatively construct an ‘on‐balance‐sheet shadow banking business’ (OBS‐SBB) measure to precisely quantify commercial banks’ shadow banking activity concealed on their balance sheets. We show that OBS‐SBB activities could both increase individual and systemic risks. To further test the underlying mechanisms, we use China’s implementation of Basel III as an exogenous shock and employ the difference‐in‐differences approach. We find that banks demand OBS‐SBB in order to bypass capital requirements, previously less‐capitalised banks significantly increase their OBS‐SBB ex‐post, and greater impact is found among small and medium‐sized banks and during loose monetary policy periods.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91316195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the impact of considering key audit matters (KAM) on auditor judgment performance. This study uses a 2×2 between-subjects experiment based on a goodwill impairment testing case with 73 auditors. The two independent variables KAM consideration (present vs. absent) and client pressure (high vs. low) are manipulated. As dependent variables, skeptical judgment and action as different facets of auditor judgment performance are used. The results suggest that auditors exhibit significantly less skeptical judgment when KAM consideration is present than when KAM consideration is absent. This implies that, when considering KAM, auditors are more willing to acquiesce to their clients’ desired accounting treatments due to moral licensing. By showing that KAM consideration leads to less skeptical judgment, it can be documented that the new KAM reporting requirement, intended to improve the communicative value of the auditor’s report for users (IAASB, 2012), comes at the expense of auditor judgment performance. As in every experiment, the risk that the results are case-specific has to be acknowledged.
{"title":"Does Considering Key Audit Matters Affect Auditor Judgment Performance?","authors":"Nicole V. S. Ratzinger‐Sakel, Jochen C. Theis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3003318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3003318","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of considering key audit matters (KAM) on auditor judgment performance. This study uses a 2×2 between-subjects experiment based on a goodwill impairment testing case with 73 auditors. The two independent variables KAM consideration (present vs. absent) and client pressure (high vs. low) are manipulated. As dependent variables, skeptical judgment and action as different facets of auditor judgment performance are used. The results suggest that auditors exhibit significantly less skeptical judgment when KAM consideration is present than when KAM consideration is absent. This implies that, when considering KAM, auditors are more willing to acquiesce to their clients’ desired accounting treatments due to moral licensing. By showing that KAM consideration leads to less skeptical judgment, it can be documented that the new KAM reporting requirement, intended to improve the communicative value of the auditor’s report for users (IAASB, 2012), comes at the expense of auditor judgment performance. As in every experiment, the risk that the results are case-specific has to be acknowledged.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82166263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A career as an accountant is seen as promising bright prospects because this profession provides intellectual challenges and invaluable learning experiences. This study aims to determine the reasons for the accounting profession's career selection. This study uses the variables of financial rewards, professional recognition, professional training, job market considerations, and personality as factors that influence the choice of profession, namely public accountants, management accountants, accountant educators, and government accountants. The population in this study were all accounting students of semester seven and semester five who were active at STIE Perbanas Surabaya, with a total of 225 students for semester seven and 258 students for semester five. Research samples with non-probability techniques. The data of this study are primary data obtained from distributing questionnaires. Kruskal Wallis analysis technique is used to test the proposed hypothesis. Based on the test results, it was concluded that accounting students who chose the profession as public accountants, management accountants, educator accountants, and government accountants had different perceptions about the factors of financial rewards, professional recognition, professional training, and job market considerations. However, there was no difference in the perception of the personality.
{"title":"Accounting Students Perceptions on Factors Affecting Career Choices","authors":"Donny Dwi Cahyadi, Sari Andayani, D. Suryaningrum","doi":"10.33005/jasf.v2i2.63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33005/jasf.v2i2.63","url":null,"abstract":"A career as an accountant is seen as promising bright prospects because this profession provides intellectual challenges and invaluable learning experiences. This study aims to determine the reasons for the accounting profession's career selection. This study uses the variables of financial rewards, professional recognition, professional training, job market considerations, and personality as factors that influence the choice of profession, namely public accountants, management accountants, accountant educators, and government accountants. The population in this study were all accounting students of semester seven and semester five who were active at STIE Perbanas Surabaya, with a total of 225 students for semester seven and 258 students for semester five. Research samples with non-probability techniques. The data of this study are primary data obtained from distributing questionnaires. Kruskal Wallis analysis technique is used to test the proposed hypothesis. Based on the test results, it was concluded that accounting students who chose the profession as public accountants, management accountants, educator accountants, and government accountants had different perceptions about the factors of financial rewards, professional recognition, professional training, and job market considerations. However, there was no difference in the perception of the personality.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89146828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a selection of seminar slides based on our 2013 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper, Managerial Miscalibration. Using a large panel of CFO forecasts of S&P 500 returns, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are far too narrow. Realized returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only 36% of the time. We also find that executives who are miscalibrated about the stock market show similar miscalibration regarding their own firms’ prospects. Finally, firms with miscalibrated executives seem to follow more aggressive corporate policies: investing more and using more debt financing. We also feature an update where we nearly double our sample size. While it is often the case that results get weaker (or disappear) after publication, our new evidence suggests that the degree of miscalibration has worsened.
{"title":"Managerial Miscalibration: Presentation Slides","authors":"Itzhak Ben-David, J. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3478314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3478314","url":null,"abstract":"We present a selection of seminar slides based on our 2013 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper, Managerial Miscalibration. Using a large panel of CFO forecasts of S&P 500 returns, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are far too narrow. Realized returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only 36% of the time. We also find that executives who are miscalibrated about the stock market show similar miscalibration regarding their own firms’ prospects. Finally, firms with miscalibrated executives seem to follow more aggressive corporate policies: investing more and using more debt financing. We also feature an update where we nearly double our sample size. While it is often the case that results get weaker (or disappear) after publication, our new evidence suggests that the degree of miscalibration has worsened.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91326828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on corporate financial fraud in China. We find that CSR scores are negatively associated with fraudulent financial activities, suggesting that CSR firms are less likely to engage in financial fraud. The results also indicate that the negative relation is more significant for CSR performance than CSR disclosure. Additionally, we demonstrate that the negative effect of CSR is more pronounced for firms with voluntary CSR practices, continuous CSR engagements, financial pressure, and internal control weaknesses. Overall, we find that CSR is an ethical behavior that reduces financial misconduct.
{"title":"Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Fraud: Evidence from China","authors":"Lin Liao, Guanting Chen, Dengjin Zheng","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12572","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on corporate financial fraud in China. We find that CSR scores are negatively associated with fraudulent financial activities, suggesting that CSR firms are less likely to engage in financial fraud. The results also indicate that the negative relation is more significant for CSR performance than CSR disclosure. Additionally, we demonstrate that the negative effect of CSR is more pronounced for firms with voluntary CSR practices, continuous CSR engagements, financial pressure, and internal control weaknesses. Overall, we find that CSR is an ethical behavior that reduces financial misconduct.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86635511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In an abstract, incentivized experiment patterned after the investigation and adjustment decisions that characterize auditing, we find that participants who adjust for information obtained from their willful investigation specify lower adjustments than participants who get the same information without having to take investigative action. Our theory draws on mental accounting and information choice effects, which in combination predict that unfavorable outcomes from costly investigative actions can impede the willingness to incur additional costs in the adjustment process. Separating investigative and adjustment decisions in a paired variant of the task removes the effect of investigative effort on adjustments, but introduces a systematic negative effect on adjustments from sharing risk with paired participants. Our study provides potential insight into the puzzle of why auditors willingly exert costly effort to uncover material misstatements, only to subsequently waive the adjustments that would correct these misstatements.
{"title":"Does Seeking Audit Evidence Impede the Willingness to Impose Audit Adjustments?","authors":"Steven J. Kachelmeier, D. Rimkus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3469748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3469748","url":null,"abstract":"In an abstract, incentivized experiment patterned after the investigation and adjustment decisions that characterize auditing, we find that participants who adjust for information obtained from their willful investigation specify lower adjustments than participants who get the same information without having to take investigative action. Our theory draws on mental accounting and information choice effects, which in combination predict that unfavorable outcomes from costly investigative actions can impede the willingness to incur additional costs in the adjustment process. Separating investigative and adjustment decisions in a paired variant of the task removes the effect of investigative effort on adjustments, but introduces a systematic negative effect on adjustments from sharing risk with paired participants. Our study provides potential insight into the puzzle of why auditors willingly exert costly effort to uncover material misstatements, only to subsequently waive the adjustments that would correct these misstatements.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79952788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Guided by agency theory and institutional theory, we investigate the influence of the unique aspects of investment companies (ICs) on audit committee (AC) governance and compare AC IC and operating company (OC) governance practices. We use a dual-method, three-stage research approach: (1) surveys of 107 IC AC members, (2) interviews of ten AC and ten management members at ICs, and (3) interviews of ten OC AC members and follow-up interviews of the ten IC AC members. Consistent with agency theory, we find IC ACs are substantively engaged in overseeing AC operations quality (AC composition and diligence) and other critical governance areas (auditor hiring/retention, audit process, agenda setting, and critical risks), whereas management is not. In contrast, our findings for OC ACs reveal evidence of both ceremonial oversight (auditor retention/hiring and agenda setting) and substantive oversight (audit process and critical risks). Our study’s findings have important implications for regulators and practitioners.
{"title":"Insights from an Analysis of Audit Committee Governance Practices at U.S. Registered Investment Companies and Public Operating Companies","authors":"J. Jenkins, Jonathan S. Pyzoha, Mark H. Taylor","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3486312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3486312","url":null,"abstract":"Guided by agency theory and institutional theory, we investigate the influence of the unique aspects of investment companies (ICs) on audit committee (AC) governance and compare AC IC and operating company (OC) governance practices. We use a dual-method, three-stage research approach: (1) surveys of 107 IC AC members, (2) interviews of ten AC and ten management members at ICs, and (3) interviews of ten OC AC members and follow-up interviews of the ten IC AC members. Consistent with agency theory, we find IC ACs are substantively engaged in overseeing AC operations quality (AC composition and diligence) and other critical governance areas (auditor hiring/retention, audit process, agenda setting, and critical risks), whereas management is not. In contrast, our findings for OC ACs reveal evidence of both ceremonial oversight (auditor retention/hiring and agenda setting) and substantive oversight (audit process and critical risks). Our study’s findings have important implications for regulators and practitioners.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74959006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Underreporting, or reporting fewer hours than actually worked, is a prevalent behavior among auditors at all levels. Underreporting can result in negative consequences, such as tight budgets and reductions in future audit quality. In this paper, I propose a low-cost budget formatting procedure that reduces underreporting. Using an experiment, I document that individuals with higher underreporting incentives underreport less when given an aggregated budget relative to a disaggregated budget. When individuals have lower underreporting incentives, aggregating the budget has a smaller effect on underreporting. I also provide evidence of the process by performing a mediation analysis. In a second experiment, I examine a budget formatting procedure that reduces underreporting while also mitigating the loss of data richness that results from aggregation. This study provides important insights to audit firms, partners, managers, and regulators who rely on audit hours for budgets, measures of staff efficiency, and measures of audit quality.
{"title":"Reducing Underreporting by Aggregating Budgeted Time","authors":"Kim I. Mendoza","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3185578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3185578","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Underreporting, or reporting fewer hours than actually worked, is a prevalent behavior among auditors at all levels. Underreporting can result in negative consequences, such as tight budgets and reductions in future audit quality. In this paper, I propose a low-cost budget formatting procedure that reduces underreporting. Using an experiment, I document that individuals with higher underreporting incentives underreport less when given an aggregated budget relative to a disaggregated budget. When individuals have lower underreporting incentives, aggregating the budget has a smaller effect on underreporting. I also provide evidence of the process by performing a mediation analysis. In a second experiment, I examine a budget formatting procedure that reduces underreporting while also mitigating the loss of data richness that results from aggregation. This study provides important insights to audit firms, partners, managers, and regulators who rely on audit hours for budgets, measures of staff efficiency, and measures of audit quality.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80028337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P2P lending is an important research subject of rising internet finance research. This paper uses unique data from Renrendai, a leading platform in China, to test the influence of video information on P2P lending behavior. Results suggest that, first, the lower the borrower's credit rating is, the more likely they are to provide video information. Second, compared to the video‐information‐absent borrowers, the otherwise borrowers can get easier access to a loan and offer a lower interest rate. These results indicate that compared to text messages, video information can increase the borrower's creditworthiness and reduce the transaction risk. Thereupon seeing is important in online P2P lending. Third, when the borrower's credit rating is lower, the video effect is significant. The study makes sense in terms of the enrichment of P2P lending literature and the enlightenment on decision‐making of both lenders and borrowers.
{"title":"Seeing is Important: The Usefulness of Video Information in P2p","authors":"Huijuan Wang, Mengxia Yu, Lu Zhang","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12530","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12530","url":null,"abstract":"P2P lending is an important research subject of rising internet finance research. This paper uses unique data from Renrendai, a leading platform in China, to test the influence of video information on P2P lending behavior. Results suggest that, first, the lower the borrower's credit rating is, the more likely they are to provide video information. Second, compared to the video‐information‐absent borrowers, the otherwise borrowers can get easier access to a loan and offer a lower interest rate. These results indicate that compared to text messages, video information can increase the borrower's creditworthiness and reduce the transaction risk. Thereupon seeing is important in online P2P lending. Third, when the borrower's credit rating is lower, the video effect is significant. The study makes sense in terms of the enrichment of P2P lending literature and the enlightenment on decision‐making of both lenders and borrowers.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88659646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Korean market regulator designates external auditors for certain companies that have strong incentives to manage their earnings or that require strict external audits (the auditor designation system [ADS]). The ADS offers an interesting research setting for examining the effects of transferring the power of auditor selection to the regulator. Based on the results of a quasi-experiment with Korean auditors, we find that the ADS may be effective in reducing aggressive client accounting policy choices and achieve greater consensus in a hypothetical impairment loss recognition case. Although more research is needed on the various types of audit engagement systems, the results imply that the ADS may improve audit quality. Thus, auditor designation by the regulator for certain companies that try to manage their earnings (i.e., the ADS) may be a favorable alternative to the current audit engagement system. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
{"title":"The Effects of Auditor Designation by the Regulator on Auditor Decisions: Evidence from Korea","authors":"Taesup Shim, S. Pae, E. Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3451144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3451144","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Korean market regulator designates external auditors for certain companies that have strong incentives to manage their earnings or that require strict external audits (the auditor designation system [ADS]). The ADS offers an interesting research setting for examining the effects of transferring the power of auditor selection to the regulator. Based on the results of a quasi-experiment with Korean auditors, we find that the ADS may be effective in reducing aggressive client accounting policy choices and achieve greater consensus in a hypothetical impairment loss recognition case. Although more research is needed on the various types of audit engagement systems, the results imply that the ADS may improve audit quality. Thus, auditor designation by the regulator for certain companies that try to manage their earnings (i.e., the ADS) may be a favorable alternative to the current audit engagement system.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86250707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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