The “coopetition�? paradox exists when two or more organizations are simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions. In the accounting industry, small firms encounter coopetition when they align themselves with other independent firms to form accounting associations and networks (“AANs�?). AANs are a type of interorganizational relationship (“IOR�?) that provide opportunities for member firms to collaborate by sharing important resources such as expertise, best practices, and manpower. However, member firms also compete in the marketplace for clients and human capital, which incentivizes uncooperative and opportunistic behavior. If managed inadequately, coopetitive tensions can significantly hamper AAN benefits and may lead to IOR failure. Given the considerable longevity of AANs, we interview 42 high-level accounting professionals to understand AANs’ apparent successful management of these tensions. Leveraging coopetition and IOR theory, our analysis suggests that transactional mechanisms (contractual agreements, organizational structure, selection/monitoring processes) and relational mechanisms (trust, social ties, reciprocity) play key roles in encouraging healthy cooperation and competition among member firms. One of our main conclusions is that these mechanisms contribute to AAN success because they are leveraged comprehensively across each IOR life cycle phase, and they are mutually reinforcing with transactional mechanisms providing the foundation to inspire confidence and encourage the development of relational mechanisms. Our research enriches existing accounting and coopetition literature, provides a new perspective for AANs, and responds to calls to understand key factors of IOR success.
{"title":"Collaborating with Competitors: How Do Small Firm Accounting Associations and Networks Successfully Manage Coopetitive Tensions?","authors":"Kenneth L. Bills, Christie Hayne, Sarah E. Stein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3266544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3266544","url":null,"abstract":"The “coopetition�? paradox exists when two or more organizations are simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions. In the accounting industry, small firms encounter coopetition when they align themselves with other independent firms to form accounting associations and networks (“AANs�?). AANs are a type of interorganizational relationship (“IOR�?) that provide opportunities for member firms to collaborate by sharing important resources such as expertise, best practices, and manpower. However, member firms also compete in the marketplace for clients and human capital, which incentivizes uncooperative and opportunistic behavior. If managed inadequately, coopetitive tensions can significantly hamper AAN benefits and may lead to IOR failure. Given the considerable longevity of AANs, we interview 42 high-level accounting professionals to understand AANs’ apparent successful management of these tensions. Leveraging coopetition and IOR theory, our analysis suggests that transactional mechanisms (contractual agreements, organizational structure, selection/monitoring processes) and relational mechanisms (trust, social ties, reciprocity) play key roles in encouraging healthy cooperation and competition among member firms. One of our main conclusions is that these mechanisms contribute to AAN success because they are leveraged comprehensively across each IOR life cycle phase, and they are mutually reinforcing with transactional mechanisms providing the foundation to inspire confidence and encourage the development of relational mechanisms. Our research enriches existing accounting and coopetition literature, provides a new perspective for AANs, and responds to calls to understand key factors of IOR success.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72552423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sanaz Aghazadeh, Andrew M. Collins, Chad M. Stefaniak
Accounting estimates are highly subjective and multiple estimation alternatives often exist for a single account. When addressing audit-related adjustments with clients, auditors must decide whether to discuss all possible estimation alternatives or approach the client with only a single, auditor-preferred estimation alternative. In an experiment with experienced CFOs and controllers, we find clients with relatively higher status (operationalized as those with a CPA license) take more aggressive financial reporting positions when the auditor approaches the client with multiple adjustment options based on various estimation alternatives. Our study provides the first evidence that client status is a significant factor in auditor-client negotiations. We also demonstrate how auditors’ approach to client negotiations involving multiple allowable estimation alternatives can influence audit quality.
{"title":"The Effects of Client Status and the Auditor’s Presentation of Multiple Estimation Alternatives on Client Financial Reporting Aggressiveness","authors":"Sanaz Aghazadeh, Andrew M. Collins, Chad M. Stefaniak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3184358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3184358","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting estimates are highly subjective and multiple estimation alternatives often exist for a single account. When addressing audit-related adjustments with clients, auditors must decide whether to discuss all possible estimation alternatives or approach the client with only a single, auditor-preferred estimation alternative. In an experiment with experienced CFOs and controllers, we find clients with relatively higher status (operationalized as those with a CPA license) take more aggressive financial reporting positions when the auditor approaches the client with multiple adjustment options based on various estimation alternatives. Our study provides the first evidence that client status is a significant factor in auditor-client negotiations. We also demonstrate how auditors’ approach to client negotiations involving multiple allowable estimation alternatives can influence audit quality.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80986183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I discuss a new intellectual paradigm, social economics and finance—the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior. This emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other. A key, underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias: systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions. I use five “fables” (models) to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach, and offer several emergent themes. For example, social transmission bias compounds recursively, which can help explain booms, bubbles, return anomalies, and swings in economic sentiment.
{"title":"Presidential Address: Social Transmission Bias in Economics and Finance","authors":"D. Hirshleifer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3550880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550880","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss a new intellectual paradigm, social economics and finance—the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior. This emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other. A key, underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias: systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions. I use five “fables” (models) to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach, and offer several emergent themes. For example, social transmission bias compounds recursively, which can help explain booms, bubbles, return anomalies, and swings in economic sentiment.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90619974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kristian D. Allee, Devon K. Erickson, Adam M. Esplin, T. Yohn
We provide insights into the inputs and valuation models used by valuation specialists. We survey 172 valuation specialists and conduct several follow-up interviews covering various topics, including the valuation inputs, models, and industry information that they use, as well as how they estimate long-term growth and the cost of capital. We find that valuation specialists rely on their professional judgment to select a valuation model but prefer the discounted cash flow (DCF) model. They primarily rely on the firm's historical performance when forecasting the financial statements, but communication with management is particularly relevant for forecasting future earnings or cash flows. When estimating the cost of capital, they most commonly use the risk-free rate with subjective adjustments. The results of our study provide insights on the information use of valuation specialists that are relevant to other valuation specialists, managers, academic researchers, and regulators. JEL classification: M41; G12; G17; G32.
{"title":"The Characteristics, Valuation Methods, and Information Use of Valuation Specialists","authors":"Kristian D. Allee, Devon K. Erickson, Adam M. Esplin, T. Yohn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3553019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3553019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We provide insights into the inputs and valuation models used by valuation specialists. We survey 172 valuation specialists and conduct several follow-up interviews covering various topics, including the valuation inputs, models, and industry information that they use, as well as how they estimate long-term growth and the cost of capital. We find that valuation specialists rely on their professional judgment to select a valuation model but prefer the discounted cash flow (DCF) model. They primarily rely on the firm's historical performance when forecasting the financial statements, but communication with management is particularly relevant for forecasting future earnings or cash flows. When estimating the cost of capital, they most commonly use the risk-free rate with subjective adjustments. The results of our study provide insights on the information use of valuation specialists that are relevant to other valuation specialists, managers, academic researchers, and regulators.\u0000 JEL classification: M41; G12; G17; G32.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76684892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines accounting academics’ perceptions as to whether institutional pressure has increased in the previous 5–10 years subsequent to changes in the higher education environment, encouraging universities to adopt private sector managerialism. Results from 87 respondents indicated that workload pressures have increased and they experienced pressure to perform acts related to a student‐as‐customer model, which have negatively affected their well‐being and work quality. The majority are not actively seeking to leave academia, but believe it is not a good time for others to aspire to such a career. This paper contributes to the debate about the sustainability of accounting academia at Australian universities.
{"title":"Does Workload and Institutional Pressure on Accounting Educators Affect Academia at Australian Universities?","authors":"N. Steenkamp, Roslyn Roberts","doi":"10.1111/acfi.12340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12340","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines accounting academics’ perceptions as to whether institutional pressure has increased in the previous 5–10 years subsequent to changes in the higher education environment, encouraging universities to adopt private sector managerialism. Results from 87 respondents indicated that workload pressures have increased and they experienced pressure to perform acts related to a student‐as‐customer model, which have negatively affected their well‐being and work quality. The majority are not actively seeking to leave academia, but believe it is not a good time for others to aspire to such a career. This paper contributes to the debate about the sustainability of accounting academia at Australian universities.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79403002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jeffrey R. Cohen, Jennifer R. Joe, J. Thibodeau, Gregory M. Trompeter
Internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) audits have been the subject of intensive examination by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and researchers but the process through which auditors make ICFR judgments is largely a “black box.” To understand ICFR judgments, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 audit partners. Common themes in our interviews suggest that the subjectivity inherent in the ICFR evaluation task contributes to resistance against ICFR audit findings and cougnterarguments from management. Moreover, auditors perceive that their judgments are being second-guessed by PCAOB inspectors. Auditors believe that managers have difficulty accepting that material weaknesses can exist without a detected error, that management's reflexive reaction is to deny/avoid a material weakness finding, and managers routinely claim that management review controls (MRCs) would have caught the detected control deficiency. Auditors cope with management's defenses by consulting with their national office and leveraging support from strong audit committees. Data Availability: Requests for the data should be accompanied by a description of intended uses.
{"title":"Audit Partners’ Judgments and Challenges in the Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting","authors":"Jeffrey R. Cohen, Jennifer R. Joe, J. Thibodeau, Gregory M. Trompeter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3551763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551763","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) audits have been the subject of intensive examination by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and researchers but the process through which auditors make ICFR judgments is largely a “black box.” To understand ICFR judgments, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 audit partners. Common themes in our interviews suggest that the subjectivity inherent in the ICFR evaluation task contributes to resistance against ICFR audit findings and cougnterarguments from management. Moreover, auditors perceive that their judgments are being second-guessed by PCAOB inspectors. Auditors believe that managers have difficulty accepting that material weaknesses can exist without a detected error, that management's reflexive reaction is to deny/avoid a material weakness finding, and managers routinely claim that management review controls (MRCs) would have caught the detected control deficiency. Auditors cope with management's defenses by consulting with their national office and leveraging support from strong audit committees.\u0000 Data Availability: Requests for the data should be accompanied by a description of intended uses.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83441375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During a look-back analysis, auditors review prior-period evidence to understand estimation inaccuracies and assess the reliability of management’s estimation process. We find that evidence specificity moderates the relation between the consistency of an estimation inaccuracy with management’s incentives and auditors’ reliability assessments. The direction of an estimation inaccuracy has no effect on auditors’ reliability assessments when the prior-period evidence is less specific. When prior-period evidence is more specific, auditors report the highest (lowest) reliability assessments of management’s estimation process when an estimation inaccuracy is inconsistent (consistent) with management’s incentives. Auditors’ low reliability assessments in the more specific, consistent condition, however, do not translate to high risk assessments. Instead, specificity has a main effect on auditors’ risk assessments. A follow-up experiment reveals, though, an inverse relation between auditors’ reliability and risk assessments when auditors are provided procedures to address various levels of assessed misstatement risk.
{"title":"How Do Look-Back Analyses and Evidence Specificity Affect Auditors’ Planning Judgments?","authors":"Ann G. Backof, R. Martin, Jane M. Thayer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2770208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2770208","url":null,"abstract":"During a look-back analysis, auditors review prior-period evidence to understand estimation inaccuracies and assess the reliability of management’s estimation process. We find that evidence specificity moderates the relation between the consistency of an estimation inaccuracy with management’s incentives and auditors’ reliability assessments. The direction of an estimation inaccuracy has no effect on auditors’ reliability assessments when the prior-period evidence is less specific. When prior-period evidence is more specific, auditors report the highest (lowest) reliability assessments of management’s estimation process when an estimation inaccuracy is inconsistent (consistent) with management’s incentives. Auditors’ low reliability assessments in the more specific, consistent condition, however, do not translate to high risk assessments. Instead, specificity has a main effect on auditors’ risk assessments. A follow-up experiment reveals, though, an inverse relation between auditors’ reliability and risk assessments when auditors are provided procedures to address various levels of assessed misstatement risk.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82626291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Creativity and innovation have been identified by senior executives as some of the most desired characteristics of corporate culture. Accordingly, managers strive to build these cultures within their organizations. However, research in psychology suggests that these attempts may have unintended negative consequences. In this study, I predict and find that managers in a more (versus less) innovative company culture will engage in higher levels of real earnings management (REM). I then test two construal level theory-based interventions designed to reduce REM. As I predict, I find that in more innovative corporate cultures an intervention that makes downside risk more salient reduces REM, but an intervention that encourages managers to consider the “big picture” impact of their decision reduces REM to a greater extent. Unexpectedly, I also find that the effect of the “big picture” intervention reverses in a less innovative corporate culture leading to an increase in REM. My findings contribute to the emerging accounting literature regarding REM. I also extend the psychology literature investigating the link between opportunistic behavior and creativity, as well as expand research into how interventions based on construal level theory can affect judgment and decision making in an accounting context.
{"title":"The Effects of Creative Culture on Real Earnings Management","authors":"R. Guggenmos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2818499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818499","url":null,"abstract":"Creativity and innovation have been identified by senior executives as some of the most desired characteristics of corporate culture. Accordingly, managers strive to build these cultures within their organizations. However, research in psychology suggests that these attempts may have unintended negative consequences. In this study, I predict and find that managers in a more (versus less) innovative company culture will engage in higher levels of real earnings management (REM). I then test two construal level theory-based interventions designed to reduce REM. As I predict, I find that in more innovative corporate cultures an intervention that makes downside risk more salient reduces REM, but an intervention that encourages managers to consider the “big picture” impact of their decision reduces REM to a greater extent. Unexpectedly, I also find that the effect of the “big picture” intervention reverses in a less innovative corporate culture leading to an increase in REM. My findings contribute to the emerging accounting literature regarding REM. I also extend the psychology literature investigating the link between opportunistic behavior and creativity, as well as expand research into how interventions based on construal level theory can affect judgment and decision making in an accounting context.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89921343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This monograph is not a review of the empirical accounting literature. This monograph tells a story and relates it to salient empirical phenomena. Why does accounting exist? Our answer is that financial accounting helps firms function efficiently. That efficiency is manifested in many ways, and it is contextual (e.g., investment decisions and capital allocation, corporate governance, managers’ performance assessment, and contracts among various stakeholders). We often use shareholder value as the measure of efficiency, though we discuss regulation, social and contract efficiency.
{"title":"Economics of Accounting Earnings","authors":"Richard Frankel, S. Kothari, Luo Zuo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3165085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3165085","url":null,"abstract":"This monograph is not a review of the empirical accounting literature. This monograph tells a story and relates it to salient empirical phenomena. Why does accounting exist? Our answer is that financial accounting helps firms function efficiently. That efficiency is manifested in many ways, and it is contextual (e.g., investment decisions and capital allocation, corporate governance, managers’ performance assessment, and contracts among various stakeholders). We often use shareholder value as the measure of efficiency, though we discuss regulation, social and contract efficiency.","PeriodicalId":8737,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral & Experimental Accounting eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73962785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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