Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2091823
David J. Doorey, Andrew P. Hills
In the 1970s, three Canadian jurisdictions (federal, Quebec, Nova Scotia) introduced statutory unjust dismissal legislation. The objective was to extend ‘just cause’ protections long enjoyed by unionized workers to eligible non-union employees by permitting employees to file a complaint with a labour tribunal. The presumptive remedy for unjustly terminated employees was to be reinstatement. However, in practice the majority of successful complainants are not reinstated. This paper examines the history and rationale for the introduction of unjust dismissal legislation in Canada, the meaning and scope of ‘unjust’ as developed by adjudicators, and the approach of tribunals in the three jurisdictions to crafting remedies to compensate unjustly dismissed employees who are not reinstated.
{"title":"Statutory Unjust Dismissal in Canada: What is the Value of a Lost Job?","authors":"David J. Doorey, Andrew P. Hills","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2091823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2091823","url":null,"abstract":"In the 1970s, three Canadian jurisdictions (federal, Quebec, Nova Scotia) introduced statutory unjust dismissal legislation. The objective was to extend ‘just cause’ protections long enjoyed by unionized workers to eligible non-union employees by permitting employees to file a complaint with a labour tribunal. The presumptive remedy for unjustly terminated employees was to be reinstatement. However, in practice the majority of successful complainants are not reinstated. This paper examines the history and rationale for the introduction of unjust dismissal legislation in Canada, the meaning and scope of ‘unjust’ as developed by adjudicators, and the approach of tribunals in the three jurisdictions to crafting remedies to compensate unjustly dismissed employees who are not reinstated.","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"117 1","pages":"318 - 344"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89814155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2109242
Riccardo Del Punta
The regulation of dismissal has always played a central role in Italian labour law, whose main developments have been marked by reforms concerning this subject. Hence, the introduction of major legislation protecting against unjustified dismissal, symbolised by Article 18 of the 1970 Workers’ Rights Statute, heralded the ‘golden age’ of labour law. Conversely, the growing flexibilisation, which has affected Italian (and European) labour law especially since the 2000s, has led to a liberalisation, albeit partial, of the legal regulations concerning dismissal. In both cases, the ensuing debates have been highly charged politically and been much publicised in the media. This has always made a non-ideological approach to the subject difficult. The result, as will be seen, is a decidedly complicated system, made up of successive layers, and which needs to be streamlined. However, the political consensus for a new reform has not yet been reached, partly because of the difficult external context (the 2007–2008 financial crisis and its repercussions; the pandemic), and the issue is not currently on the government’s agenda. It must also be said that the successive reforms (in 2012 and 2015) did not so much concern the concept of ‘unfair dismissal’ as such, but rather the remedies regime of unfair dismissal, ie the consequences arising from a judicial finding of the unlawfulness of a dismissal. This does not mean, however, that the concept of justification of dismissal is free from controversy, at least as far as economic dismissal is concerned. In contrast, there is greater consensus on the subject of disciplinary dismissal. Having said that, the article will be organised as follows. Section 2 will provide an overview of how dismissal legislation has evolved in Italy and the reforms that have taken place. Sections 3–6 will deal with the different types of dismissal provided for under Italian law, which are respectively disciplinary dismissal, economic dismissal,
{"title":"The Regulation of Dismissal in Italy","authors":"Riccardo Del Punta","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2109242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2109242","url":null,"abstract":"The regulation of dismissal has always played a central role in Italian labour law, whose main developments have been marked by reforms concerning this subject. Hence, the introduction of major legislation protecting against unjustified dismissal, symbolised by Article 18 of the 1970 Workers’ Rights Statute, heralded the ‘golden age’ of labour law. Conversely, the growing flexibilisation, which has affected Italian (and European) labour law especially since the 2000s, has led to a liberalisation, albeit partial, of the legal regulations concerning dismissal. In both cases, the ensuing debates have been highly charged politically and been much publicised in the media. This has always made a non-ideological approach to the subject difficult. The result, as will be seen, is a decidedly complicated system, made up of successive layers, and which needs to be streamlined. However, the political consensus for a new reform has not yet been reached, partly because of the difficult external context (the 2007–2008 financial crisis and its repercussions; the pandemic), and the issue is not currently on the government’s agenda. It must also be said that the successive reforms (in 2012 and 2015) did not so much concern the concept of ‘unfair dismissal’ as such, but rather the remedies regime of unfair dismissal, ie the consequences arising from a judicial finding of the unlawfulness of a dismissal. This does not mean, however, that the concept of justification of dismissal is free from controversy, at least as far as economic dismissal is concerned. In contrast, there is greater consensus on the subject of disciplinary dismissal. Having said that, the article will be organised as follows. Section 2 will provide an overview of how dismissal legislation has evolved in Italy and the reforms that have taken place. Sections 3–6 will deal with the different types of dismissal provided for under Italian law, which are respectively disciplinary dismissal, economic dismissal,","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"39 1","pages":"188 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82860646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2114779
Reingard Zimmer
The article analyses the German System of protection against dismissal based on the Dismissal Protection Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz), but also deals with dismissals outside the KSchG as well as with extraordinary dismissals under section 626 BGB. This is done with due regard to European and International law.
{"title":"Protection Against Unfair Dismissal in Germany","authors":"Reingard Zimmer","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2114779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2114779","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyses the German System of protection against dismissal based on the Dismissal Protection Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz), but also deals with dismissals outside the KSchG as well as with extraordinary dismissals under section 626 BGB. This is done with due regard to European and International law.","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"15 1","pages":"169 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80676263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2023.2135978
Peter C. H. Chan
This article describes the origin and development of China's dismissal legislation and local regulations. It identifies the quasi-federal nature of the Chinese dismissal system. The article then examines the legal framework of dismissal in China, focusing on dismissal types, grounds for lawful dismissal, employer obligations in terminating employment, and the remedies. The article focusses on the most important and controversial dismissal type: dismissal for breach of the employer's internal regulations under Article 39(2) of the LCL. It analyses the diverging court practices and the local regulation of this type of dismissal. Finally, the article calls for a unified system to govern unlawful dismissal and considers how ILO Convention 158 can aid in refining China's dismissal system.
{"title":"The Regulation of Dismissal in China: Diverging Standards of Serious Breach Dismissal and the Need for Reform","authors":"Peter C. H. Chan","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2023.2135978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2023.2135978","url":null,"abstract":"This article describes the origin and development of China's dismissal legislation and local regulations. It identifies the quasi-federal nature of the Chinese dismissal system. The article then examines the legal framework of dismissal in China, focusing on dismissal types, grounds for lawful dismissal, employer obligations in terminating employment, and the remedies. The article focusses on the most important and controversial dismissal type: dismissal for breach of the employer's internal regulations under Article 39(2) of the LCL. It analyses the diverging court practices and the local regulation of this type of dismissal. Finally, the article calls for a unified system to govern unlawful dismissal and considers how ILO Convention 158 can aid in refining China's dismissal system.","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"53 1","pages":"208 - 227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81310612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2040162
Yael R. Lifshitz, Irit Samet
We are delighted to gather here, in this special edition of KLJ, fi ve papers which re fl ect on one of the most important books in the recent crop on theory of private law. The reviews and the authors ’ response highlight different aspects of this original and thought-provoking text. Dagan starts off from the crucial insight that property enhances autonomy for many people, but not for all. Because it both empowers and disables, property requires constant vigilance. His main thesis is therefore that a genuinely liberal property law meets this legitimacy challenge by expanding people ’ s oppor-tunities for individual and collective self-determination, while at the same time carefully restricting their options of domination over others. Liberal property empowers self-determining individuals to pursue their conception of the good. While property is not the most fundamental precondition of personal self-determination, it nonetheless has a distinctive role in empowering people. It provides them with some temporally extended control over tangible and intangible resources, which they need in order to carry out their projects and advance their plans. It is this autonomy-enhancing telos that legitimizes property and shapes, or at least should shape, its legal contours in a liberal polity. does not deny that property systems assign private authority over resources in numerous different ways or that not every system of private property can plausibly be interpreted as guided by the liberal commitment to individual self-determination. But he insists that the heavy legitimacy burden that haunts property implies that for owners ’ private authority to be justi fi ed, property must both rely upon and be guided by its
{"title":"Book Symposium on Hanoch Dagan ‘A Liberal Theory of Property’ (CUP 2021)","authors":"Yael R. Lifshitz, Irit Samet","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2040162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2040162","url":null,"abstract":"We are delighted to gather here, in this special edition of KLJ, fi ve papers which re fl ect on one of the most important books in the recent crop on theory of private law. The reviews and the authors ’ response highlight different aspects of this original and thought-provoking text. Dagan starts off from the crucial insight that property enhances autonomy for many people, but not for all. Because it both empowers and disables, property requires constant vigilance. His main thesis is therefore that a genuinely liberal property law meets this legitimacy challenge by expanding people ’ s oppor-tunities for individual and collective self-determination, while at the same time carefully restricting their options of domination over others. Liberal property empowers self-determining individuals to pursue their conception of the good. While property is not the most fundamental precondition of personal self-determination, it nonetheless has a distinctive role in empowering people. It provides them with some temporally extended control over tangible and intangible resources, which they need in order to carry out their projects and advance their plans. It is this autonomy-enhancing telos that legitimizes property and shapes, or at least should shape, its legal contours in a liberal polity. does not deny that property systems assign private authority over resources in numerous different ways or that not every system of private property can plausibly be interpreted as guided by the liberal commitment to individual self-determination. But he insists that the heavy legitimacy burden that haunts property implies that for owners ’ private authority to be justi fi ed, property must both rely upon and be guided by its","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"63 1","pages":"1 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87500382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2040163
Katy Wells
s A Liberal Theory of Property sets out a theory of property with autonomy, or self-determination, at its core. Appealing to this liberal value, Dagan contends, is the key to surmounting the justi fi catory challenge presented by the institution of property. Grounding property in autonomy also, he argues, yields some important con-clusions for the re-shaping of current property law. One of these conclusions, the structural pluralism proposal, is the focus of this response.
{"title":"Crucial Options: Dagan on Self-determination and Structural Pluralism","authors":"Katy Wells","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2040163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2040163","url":null,"abstract":"s A Liberal Theory of Property sets out a theory of property with autonomy, or self-determination, at its core. Appealing to this liberal value, Dagan contends, is the key to surmounting the justi fi catory challenge presented by the institution of property. Grounding property in autonomy also, he argues, yields some important con-clusions for the re-shaping of current property law. One of these conclusions, the structural pluralism proposal, is the focus of this response.","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"36 1","pages":"53 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76821460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2034589
Hanoch Dagan
Property is one of society’s major power-conferring institutions. It confers upon people some measure of private authority over things (both tangible and intangible). Property’s temporally-extended private authority dramatically affects people’s ability to plan and carry out meaningful projects, either on their own or with the cooperation of others. Property’s empowerment, in other words, enhances people’s self-determination. But as such property also disables (other) people and renders them vulnerable to owners’ authority. Therefore, to be (and remain) legitimate, property requires constant vigilance. In A Liberal Theory of Property I argue that a genuinely liberal property law meets this legitimacy challenge by ensuring that property’s animating principles and the most fundamental contours of its architecture follow property’s autonomy-enhancing telos. This means that liberal property must expand people’s opportunities for individual and collective self-determination while carefully restricting their options of interpersonal domination. Appreciating both property’s autonomy-enhancing service and the vulnerabilities it generates is thus key to the three pillars of liberal property – the features that distinguish it from property simpliciter: carefully delineated private authority, structural pluralism, and relational justice. It also implies that property’s legitimacy is dependent upon a background regime that guarantees to everyone the material, social, and intellectual preconditions of self-authorship. I am grateful to Ben McFarlane, Aruna Nair, Nicholas Sage, and KatyWells for their generous and rigorous engagement with the book. Their intriguing comments and the penetrating insights they each develop provide an excellent opportunity for me to clarify and refine some of the basic tenets of this account. This response is organised
{"title":"Liberal Property: Clarifications and Refinements","authors":"Hanoch Dagan","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2034589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2034589","url":null,"abstract":"Property is one of society’s major power-conferring institutions. It confers upon people some measure of private authority over things (both tangible and intangible). Property’s temporally-extended private authority dramatically affects people’s ability to plan and carry out meaningful projects, either on their own or with the cooperation of others. Property’s empowerment, in other words, enhances people’s self-determination. But as such property also disables (other) people and renders them vulnerable to owners’ authority. Therefore, to be (and remain) legitimate, property requires constant vigilance. In A Liberal Theory of Property I argue that a genuinely liberal property law meets this legitimacy challenge by ensuring that property’s animating principles and the most fundamental contours of its architecture follow property’s autonomy-enhancing telos. This means that liberal property must expand people’s opportunities for individual and collective self-determination while carefully restricting their options of interpersonal domination. Appreciating both property’s autonomy-enhancing service and the vulnerabilities it generates is thus key to the three pillars of liberal property – the features that distinguish it from property simpliciter: carefully delineated private authority, structural pluralism, and relational justice. It also implies that property’s legitimacy is dependent upon a background regime that guarantees to everyone the material, social, and intellectual preconditions of self-authorship. I am grateful to Ben McFarlane, Aruna Nair, Nicholas Sage, and KatyWells for their generous and rigorous engagement with the book. Their intriguing comments and the penetrating insights they each develop provide an excellent opportunity for me to clarify and refine some of the basic tenets of this account. This response is organised","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"17 1","pages":"3 - 22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80470244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2042898
Timothy Sayer
The role and nature of substantive review in UK administrative law doctrine is a perpetual source of debate. Its potential to infringe upon the merits of administrative decision-making, and associated concerns over ensuring a legitimate separation of powers, make this inevitable. Debates have concerned whether Wednesbury review should exist at all, whether there ought to be one standard of review or two (the ‘bifurcation’ debate), whether proportionality review incorporates sufficient evaluation of process, whether proportionality should incorporate formal criteria of deference or whether these are assimilated into the balancing process, and the appropriate intensity of proportionality review. On this latter question, a discussion which has regularly and vigorously exercised judicial minds on the UK Supreme Court (‘UKSC’) has been the ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’ standard (‘MWRF’) used in cases alleging
{"title":"Manifest Unreasonableness in the UK Supreme Court: A Doctrine Working Itself Pure","authors":"Timothy Sayer","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2042898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2042898","url":null,"abstract":"The role and nature of substantive review in UK administrative law doctrine is a perpetual source of debate. Its potential to infringe upon the merits of administrative decision-making, and associated concerns over ensuring a legitimate separation of powers, make this inevitable. Debates have concerned whether Wednesbury review should exist at all, whether there ought to be one standard of review or two (the ‘bifurcation’ debate), whether proportionality review incorporates sufficient evaluation of process, whether proportionality should incorporate formal criteria of deference or whether these are assimilated into the balancing process, and the appropriate intensity of proportionality review. On this latter question, a discussion which has regularly and vigorously exercised judicial minds on the UK Supreme Court (‘UKSC’) has been the ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’ standard (‘MWRF’) used in cases alleging","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"57 1","pages":"122 - 145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87109625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2034591
Aruna Nair
In chapter 7 of A Liberal Theory of Property, Professor Dagan offers an account of justice in the design of markets that draws on his broader account of the core legal institutions that underpin the notion of a market: property and contract. Since both institutions are facilitative of the demands of autonomy as self-determination or ‘self-authorship’, we can evaluate the justice or injustice of any market norm on the basis of whether it facilitates autonomy in this sense. In this comment on the chapter, I focus on one dimension of Dagan’s account of autonomy as self-authorship—the view that it entails both the freedom to commit to a particular story of one’s life and the freedom to ‘discard one story and begin another’—and explore its connection to the core market freedom to sell, or refuse to sell, what one owns. I begin by considering why the freedom to exit past commitments is important to property law on Dagan’s account, outlining his critique of the alternative picture of exclusion as the chief concern of property and commitment as the chief concern of contract law. Next, I consider why, on Dagan’s account, sale—as distinct from gift or abandonment—must be a vital ‘exit option’ from a property governance regime in a liberal property system and how this understanding of sale inflects the precepts of relational justice that apply in the context of the marketplace. Finally, I draw on this account to show that Dagan’s theory provides an attractively nuanced framework for analysing particular doctrines of English law that constrain freedom of sale and for thinking, more broadly, about institutions like mortgages, trusts, and bankruptcy regimes.
{"title":"Property and Autonomy in the Marketplace: Freedom to Sell as Freedom of Exit","authors":"Aruna Nair","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2034591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2034591","url":null,"abstract":"In chapter 7 of A Liberal Theory of Property, Professor Dagan offers an account of justice in the design of markets that draws on his broader account of the core legal institutions that underpin the notion of a market: property and contract. Since both institutions are facilitative of the demands of autonomy as self-determination or ‘self-authorship’, we can evaluate the justice or injustice of any market norm on the basis of whether it facilitates autonomy in this sense. In this comment on the chapter, I focus on one dimension of Dagan’s account of autonomy as self-authorship—the view that it entails both the freedom to commit to a particular story of one’s life and the freedom to ‘discard one story and begin another’—and explore its connection to the core market freedom to sell, or refuse to sell, what one owns. I begin by considering why the freedom to exit past commitments is important to property law on Dagan’s account, outlining his critique of the alternative picture of exclusion as the chief concern of property and commitment as the chief concern of contract law. Next, I consider why, on Dagan’s account, sale—as distinct from gift or abandonment—must be a vital ‘exit option’ from a property governance regime in a liberal property system and how this understanding of sale inflects the precepts of relational justice that apply in the context of the marketplace. Finally, I draw on this account to show that Dagan’s theory provides an attractively nuanced framework for analysing particular doctrines of English law that constrain freedom of sale and for thinking, more broadly, about institutions like mortgages, trusts, and bankruptcy regimes.","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"7 1","pages":"34 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85530942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/09615768.2022.2034593
M. Donald
implementing investment strategy, while many schemes are also supported by employers whose fi nancial positions and prospects for growth are dependent on current and future policies and developments in relation to climate change. Tackling poor standards of governance and risk management in pensions are priorities for TPR and we welcome working together with other regulators to address these challenges for pension schemes. 88
{"title":"Modern Challenges to the Prudence Expected of Pension Fund Trustees","authors":"M. Donald","doi":"10.1080/09615768.2022.2034593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2022.2034593","url":null,"abstract":"implementing investment strategy, while many schemes are also supported by employers whose fi nancial positions and prospects for growth are dependent on current and future policies and developments in relation to climate change. Tackling poor standards of governance and risk management in pensions are priorities for TPR and we welcome working together with other regulators to address these challenges for pension schemes. 88","PeriodicalId":88025,"journal":{"name":"King's law journal : KLJ","volume":"29 1","pages":"92 - 121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78678193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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