Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

Herman Cappelen’s book The Concept of Democracy makes a case for ‘abolitionism’, that is, abandonment of the word ‘democracy’ and related terminology (‘D-words’). Cappelen’s strategy includes a direct argument for abandonment, aiming to show that D-words are meaningless; and an indirect argument, based on a comparison of abandonment with other options (for instance, replacement or amelioration). In this critical notice, I focus on his comparative case, arguing that the competing options and their respective challenges are not so well demarcated—where this negatively affects the abandonment proposal. Furthermore, I present and defend a yet unexplored alternative: awareness. Awareness is a worthy candidate for its little costs and significant benefits in comparison to abandonment, thus deserving consideration alongside the options assessed by Cappelen.

Watson’s monograph, The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them, clearly, succinctly and deftly introduces the notion of the right to know or epistemic rights to the epistemology literature. She does this partly by connecting the conclusions and theoretical motives of the moral and legal rights literature to the epistemology literature. In part, motivated by this book’s great value, I present two objections to some of the book’s central claims. The first objection is that there is tension between (i) the book’s claim that information distribution is a basic epistemic duty that epistemic rights generate and (ii) the book’s claim that epistemic rights are complied with if subjects receive epistemic goods such as understanding and knowledge that respect their final value. The second objection is that the dyadic nature of Watson’s account of epistemic rights violation does not comport with plausible cases in which non-dominant groups’ epistemic rights have been violated and as a consequence the book’s claim that epistemic rights provide those who wield them an especially forceful rhetorical tool requires further motivation.

This is a précis of my recent monograph John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences. I first describe the key question the book is trying to answer via understanding McDowell’s thinking and the general outline of it. The key question is a Kantian how-possible question, and the outline includes the distinction between first and second nature, the contrast between Cogito and Homo sapience, and how a minded human animal can be a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person, and conceptual cum self-conscious being in the world. I then focus on two key notions of the subtitles—phenomenology and cognitive sciences—and explain how they figure in the text. After that, a chapter-by-chapter summary is provided, albeit selectively. This introductory piece ends with a prediction that McDowell’s works will still be widely discussed in the reasonable distant future.

In The Right to Know: Epistemic Rights and Why We Need Them (Routledge, 2021), Lani Watson comprehensively examines the right to know and other epistemic rights, that is, rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights, she suggests, play a key role in society today, but we often do not attend to them in the way that we should. She draws our attention to these rights, illustrating their importance using a range of examples from medicine, politics and law, and she articulates a philosophical account of these rights. Her concise but book-length treatment of the topic is clear, accessible and rigorous. This is a considerable achievement, and I find Watson’s treatment of epistemic rights to be illuminating. I do wish she would say more to expand on her discussion of certain points, but overall, she succeeds in her project to shed light on an important but underdiscussed topic. In this critical contribution, I summarize her book and then raise three questions about her discussion. First, does Watson adopt a workable conception of law and morality, given her characterization of who can have epistemic rights? Second, does the law support Watson’s conception of epistemic rights and duties, as she claims it does? Third, does Watson focus on the harm-related rationale for epistemic rights to the apparent exclusion of other rationales?

In “A New Problem for Kripkean Defenses of Origin Theses”, Sungil Han calls attention to a gap between the negative conclusions of arguments for origin essentialism (claims to the effect that a given thing could not originate in a certain way), and the positive conclusions one might hope for (claims to the effect that a given thing must originate in a certain way if it exists at all). Han proposes a way of bridging the gap. While I agree with Han that there is indeed such a gap, there is an important difference in what Han and I take the negative claims of Kripke(ans) to be. As a result, I propose a bridge that is significantly different from his. I argue that my approach is superior to Han’s.

This essay defends an account of what things are assessable for reasonableness and why. On this account, something is assessable for reasonableness if and only if and because it is the functional effect of critical reasoning.

This article provides a critical analysis of Justin Remhof’s attempt to defend the view that Nietzsche is best understood as a metaphysician.

I shall discuss Han’s analysis of the necessity of origin theses. His analysis comes in two parts. The negative part argues that well-known Kripkean arguments leave an inferential gap, thus falling short of establishing the necessity of origin theses. The positive part contends that the gap can only be bridged by Aristotelian metaphysics of essence and causation. I shall critically examine both the negative and positive parts of Han’s analysis.

Logical Empiricism as Scientific Philosophy offers a new account of the philosophical significance of logical empiricism that relies on the past forty years of literature reassessing the project. It argues that while logical empiricism was committed to empiricism and did become tied to the trajectory of analytic philosophy, neither empiricism nor logical analysis per se was the deepest philosophical commitment of logical empiricism. That commitment was, rather, securing the scientific status of philosophy, bringing philosophy into a scientific conception of the world.