Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

Since the day the term ‘aphantasia’ was coined, it has been used to refer to the inability to generate mental imagery in one’s mind. This standard view classifying aphantasia as a mental imagery condition was recently challenged by Blomkvist’s episodic memory account, according to which aphantasia should be best explained as an episodic system condition, especially deficiencies in episodic memory processes. This paper provides an in-depth comparison of different explanatory approaches to aphantasia, arguing that the standard view is preferable to Blomkvist’s novel account. After sketching out Blomkvist’s proposed model—the CESH + model, which is based on the concept of the episodic simulation system—we demonstrate that this model faces a dilemma. That is, on the one hand, if Blomkvist prioritises the explanatory role of episodic system condition, then her CESH + model would have difficulty in differentiating aphantasia from other episodic construction system disorders such as amnesia. On the other hand, if she were to avoid this problem by treating aphantasia as a specific type of malfunction particularly pertaining to mental imagery, then what plays the substantial explanatory role in this picture would still be mental imagery. After that, we demonstrate that the standard view not only avoids the defects of the CESH + model, but also provides a comprehensive explanation for the various symptoms of aphantasia. Therefore, classifying aphantasia as a mental imagery condition offers a superior explanation.

Hodroj, Latham, and Miller’s target article is the latest in a slew of recent studies that seek to investigate temporal experience using a method that involves participants reading vignettes then completing questionnaires. I have significant misgivings about this method, and in this commentary, I discuss its limitations. I start by discussing the kinds of proposals that can, and cannot, be tested in principle using the questionnaire method, suggesting that some prominent proposals fall outside its scope. I illustrate this through an analogy with the opponent process theory of colour experience, where I suggest that the tools of cognitive neuroscience are needed. I then draw attention to some of the pitfalls of the questionnaire method in general, and to some problems specific to the current study. One major issue concerns the question of whether it has been shown that participants really understood their task. I give reasons for doubting this. First, I show that it is too easy to answer the comprehension questions correctly without understanding. Second, I argue that it is not credible that participants actually held the world view entailed by the combination of responses given by a significant minority of them, suggesting that there was significant confusion. I raise several other objections before concluding with a modest suggestion for future work.

In this paper, I further defend the view, originally developed in Mitova (2022), that certain social identity groups have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. I respond to three critics—Cameron Boult (2023), Xiaofei Liu (2023), and Anne Schwenkenbecher (2024).

Contemporary debates about the metaphysics of material composition occur within the framework set by the Special Composition Question, as proposed famously by Peter van Inwagen. This question asks what one must do, what conditions must be satisfied, for some things to compose one object as proper parts. Hylomorphism is a theory that has regained prominence in contemporary metaphysics, explaining the unity of composite material objects by appealing to a special metaphysical part of those objects: structure or form. My book defends hylomorphism as a meaningful and significant answer to questions about the composition of material objects. Specifically, I propose that, if it is false that substances can have other substances as parts, hylomorphism can be shown not only to be a plausible theory but that all consistent accounts of restricted composition can be shown to be hylomorphist. After introducing and summarizing the trajectory of the book, I turn to reviewing and responding to objections from my interlocutors for this symposium.

In this essay, I reply to the critics who contributed to this symposium.

Contrary to Pritchard’s claims, in this article I argue that Newman’s version of the thesis of the independence of conviction does not offer an intellectualized, epistemological conception of reflective assent. On the contrary, I argue that Pritchard’s project of a defence of religious belief based on a parity argument fares much better under a Newmanian interpretation of dubitability, legitimation, and reflective certitude; and that Newman’s insights are instrumental for the effective defence of a middle way between rationalism and fideism against the charges that it is an inherently unstable position, and, relatedly, that it results in a disturbing combination of radical scepticism with irrational dogmatism. With the foregoing in mind, it ought to be possible to reconstruct Pritchard’s general and religious epistemology from the common, normative root of contentful, concrete certainties that Newman provides. This reconstruction will demand some important re-adjustments in Pritchard’s account. However, they will not be large enough so as to make Pritchard’s position unrecognizable. I also suggest that Newman’s rejection of the logical model of reasoning and Pritchard’s tendency to detranscendentalize certainty express substantive agreement. On the face of this suggestion, we may locate a very fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the two thinkers—namely, the idea of genuine modes of reasoning that are not subjected to formal and mechanical rules. Curiously, a Newmanian reinterpretation of Pritchard’s epistemology may help to make the latter more closely aligned with Wittgenstein.

Michael Pelczar, in his fascinating recent book, attempts to answer the main problem that phenomenalism faces, namely that it gives us a world with too many gaps and no rationale for its ordering. He does this by developing a strong doctrine of objective probability. I argue that, if this is to be strong enough to solve the problem, it is no longer immaterialist: the fine line Pelczar needs to walk cannot be held.

This paper replies to critical commentaries on my book, How to Take Skepticism Seriously (Oxford University Press, 2024), presented by Hilary Kornblith, Krista Lawlor, and Ram Neta at the 2025 Pacific American Philosophical Association conference. Kornblith and Neta’s commentaries are published in this journal. Lawlor’s commentary is published separately in Analysis.

Could there be a situation in which speakers of language A assert or accept a sentence P but speakers of language B deny its translation, while there is no ignorance, misunderstanding or error about the world on either side? In discussing this question, I am especially interested in the possibility of a substantial disagreement. Such a disagreement should concern independent facts of the matter. I dismiss several candidates for disagreement. I then present my candidate: the response-enabled property oval. The disagreement can arise because we call geometrical objects oval although oval is no mathematically eligible property. While there remain principled doubts that any disagreement can be both faultless and substantial, it is puzzling to tell how these doubts materialize in the case of disagreement on oval. I close with considering the prospects of generalizing the lesson to parallel cases like imprecision and contestable kinds like jade, tomato, fish, and reptile.