Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

In a much-discussed article, Gillian Russell claimed that “logic isn’t normative”: according to her, the usual bridge principles for logic are just derived from general principles for truth and falsity, such as “believe the truth” or “avoid falsity.” For example, we ought to believe tautologies just because we ought to believe the truth. Russell argues that this rejection of logical normativity can avoid the collapse objection for logical pluralism, which typically presupposes the normativity. In the last part of his new book Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence, Erik Stei responds that even if logic is normative in this weak derivative sense, the collapse objection re-emerges. His main point is that the collapse argument can still work even if the bridge principles are derivative (they just need to be true). In this paper I will argue against Stei’s point. I will show that there is a possible strategy which maintains the derivative normativity of logic and provides a non-trivial logical pluralism. The key to my approach is the possibility of having different normative sources for different logics. I will argue that the distinction between classical and relevant logic can be understood in this way.

In this paper, I critically examine the monist interpretation of the logic-as-model view that Erik Stei puts forth in Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence. I will argue that, in addition to the three dimensions presented in the book, there is a fourth dimension on which pluralism in logic could arise, namely epistemological pluralism. An example of such a form of pluralism is model pluralism, being the idea that we need multiple models to fully account for the subject matter of logic. Such a form of pluralism is well-recognized and widely acknowledged in (model-based) science. I argue that if we endorse the logic-as-model view, then we should also recognize such a form of model pluralism in logic. While model pluralism is consistent with metaphysical monism — the idea that there is ultimately only one extra-systemic logical consequence relation — it does put pressure on the idea that there is one uniquely best model that fully captures that phenomenon.

In Appearance & Explanation, Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti argue that phenomenal explanationism (PE) offers a superior account to phenomenal conservatism (PC) as to why seemings justify. One of their arguments for this position is that PE is in a better position to respond to skepticism than PC, since the latter faces the problem of reflective awareness while the former does not. I deny that PE has any such advantage. To the contrary, I argue that PC offers a superior response to skepticism, especially when it comes to the beliefs of non-reflective agents.

So as I understand it, the fundamental goal of Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti’s Appearance and Explanation is to offer a unified account of epistemic justification, one that incorporates insights of both phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. One might suppose that one gets the best of both views by employing the phenomenal conservative’s views about the role of appearance in order to get the initial data that needs explaining, while one appeals to explanationism to expand one’s justified beliefs beyond the data provided by appearance. But if I understand the authors, their view may be more complicated than this. While McCain and Moretti defend many views with which I agree in Appearance and Explanation, I’ll focus here on questions and objections. The first concerns the role of appearance in giving one an explanandum. The second concerns the role of appearance in reaching justified beliefs about whether a proposed explanation is better than alternatives.

Jun Otsuka, in his recent work Thinking About Statistics (2023), undertakes a philosophical investigation of fundamental statistical methodologies, with a particular emphasis on causal inference. In his ontological analysis of causal inference, Otsuka posits that causal analysis, within a given causal model, requires the modification of the underlying probabilistic distribution. This modification, he argues, effectively constitutes a transition between possible worlds. Consequently, Otsuka identifies the objective of causal inference as the discovery of inter-world laws that govern the relationships between these distinct probabilistic models (Otsuka 2023, p.168). Granting Otsuka’s ontological commitments regarding causal and probabilistic models, his interpretation of certain causal analyses as inherently inter-worldly is indeed compelling. This perspective merits particular attention given the prevailing tendency to view such analyses to mere rules for estimating causal effects. While this review does not directly challenge Otsuka’s position, it aims to further explore and contribute to this stimulating concept.

In this note, I argue that McCain and Moretti’s account of non-inferential justification is subject to the subjective point of view objection, and that for this reason, it does not provide an internalistically acceptable alternative to the account of this justification supplied by Huemer’s Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Moreover, I contend that PC’s account is not afflicted by the same problem and that it does not generate the over-intellectualization and regress problem. Finally, contra McCain and Moretti, I argue that the non-inferential justification described by PC does not engender a form of vicious epistemic circularity, and so that it does not raise the reflective awareness problem.

In his book, John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity, Tony Cheng argues that recent changes to McDowell’s theory of perceptual justification should lead him to accept that experiences possess non-conceptual content. In this paper, I take issue with Cheng’s conclusion. Instead, I argue that McDowell should adopt Travis’s position, where experiences aren’t taken to possess content at all. I argue that we can distinguish two separate Myths of the Given in McDowell’s writings. While McDowell often seamlessly moves from one to the other, I argue that it is difficult to see how he can justify this due to his recent alterations to his position. I argue that if we reject one Myth and retain the other, then McDowell can both hold on to a version of his view that the space of reasons is the space of the conceptual, all the while he accepts Travis’s arguments to the effect that experiences are devoid of content. Finally, I consider some arguments McDowell might present against accepting Travis’s position. While these objections do not convince me, what is notable about them is that, if they are sound, then they will equally count against Cheng’s intermediary position where non-conceptual contents are ascribed to experiences. Hence, I conclude that there are no grounds on which McDowell can reasonably endorse that experiences possess non-conceptual contents. Either he should stick to his conceptualism, or he should follow Travis and reject that experiences possess contents at all.

This article responds to Yafeng Shan and Jon Williamson’s 2022 volume Evidential Pluralism in the Social Sciences, focusing on the applicability of Evidential Pluralism in the field of case study research through the use of examples from political science. The article argues that Shan and Williamson’s guidance on (a) what evidence one needs to establish causation in singular case studies and (b) what one may conclude at the population level once one has done so is lacking in some important respects. Therefore, this article will speak to the wider community of social scientists and methodologists who are sympathetic to using a plurality of evidence in case study research, but who still want guidance of how to do so in a philosophically grounded manner.