Asian journal of philosophy最新文献

In the semantic debate about perspectival expressions—predicates of taste, aesthetic and moral terms, epistemic modals, etc.—intuitions about armchair scenarios (e.g., disagreement, retraction) have played a crucial role. More recently, various experimental studies have been conducted, both in relation to disagreement (e.g., Cova, 2012; Foushee and Srinivasan, 2017; Solt, 2018) and retraction (e.g., Knobe and Yalcin, 2014; Khoo, 2018; Beddor and Egan, 2018; Dinges and Zakkou, 2020; Kneer 2021; 2022; Almagro, Bordonaba Plou, and Villanueva, 2023; Marques, 2024), with the aim of establishing a more solid foundation for semantic theorizing. Both these types of data have been used to argue for or against certain views (e.g., contextualism, relativism). In this talk, I discern a common thread in the use of these data and argue for two claims: (i) which perspective is adopted by those judging the armchair scenarios put forward and by the participants in experimental studies crucially matters for the viability of the intended results; (ii) failure to properly attend to this puts recent experimental work at risk. Finally, I consider the case of cross-linguistic disagreement and retraction and assess their importance for the semantic debate about perspectival expressions, as well as for the claim that perspective matters in putting forward the data on which decisions about the right semantic view are made.

In this symposium piece, I follow Lu-Adler’s lead in scrutinizing the connections between linguistic Othering and prevailing yet exclusionary academic practices of knowledge production, focusing on linguistic epistemic injustice in academia. Specifically, I suggest that in a global academic context marked by sharp inequalities of opportunity due inter alia to linguistic Othering, language often operates as a threefold criterion for knowledge validation and hence for the allocation of credibility and intelligibility. I submit that linguistic selection (i.e., which language is used for knowledge production and transmission), linguistic form (i.e., the way a given language is spoken or written), and linguistic content (i.e., the words or concepts a given language offers and uses to describe and make sense of the world) are all ways in which language can be used to validate or invalidate processes of knowledge production and thereby result in unjust allocations of credibility and intelligibility. I argue that language can thus sometimes function as what I have called elsewhere a “meta-epistemic filter,” which creates an unjust credibility and intelligibility economy by predetermining in a structurally biased way what kinds of epistemic contributions are (made) available or count as admissible or inadmissible in the first place. I close by exploring how we might foster greater linguistic epistemic justice in academia by cultivating meta-linguistic awareness and how this might be facilitated by attending to the role that experiential (as opposed to merely propositional) knowledge might play.

In this response to Lu-Adler’s article, I focus on her claim that Kant’s positionality gives his theorizing “ideology-forming” and “world-making” power. I explore a way of understanding this idea through speech act theory, and in particular the way in which speech act theory interacts with the phenomenon of silencing. I propose two ways in which Kant’s positionality could give him world-making power. First, Kant (and other scholars) can be in a position of performing the kinds of speech acts that themselves constitute the creation of certain forms of oppression, much in the way in which a legislator can create an oppressive law simply by proclaiming it to be so. Second, Kant can be in a position of creating an illocutionary disabling effect, namely a situation in which Chinese scholars become unable to perform the speech act of assertion in academic contexts.

This is an introduction to the Topical Collection Current Themes in Epistemology: Asian Epistemology Network.

In my contribution to this book symposium on Emma Gordon’s book Human Enhancement and Well-Being, I discuss and respond to Gordon’s extensive discussion and criticisms of a skeptical argument regarding the desirability of love enhancements that I presented in a 2015 paper. I start by first explaining the overall project of Gordon’s book, make a general comment about her overall approach (which I am broadly sympathetic with), and then proceed to a detailed discussion of Gordon’s critical engagement with my 2015 argument. I defend my argument against Gordon’s interesting criticisms and argue that Gordon has not defused my skeptical challenge to the desirability of love enhancements, but I also end by identifying key points of agreement between me and Gordon. Specific topics discussed include the distinction between ways of loving and causes of loving, the value of ways of loving and the value of the causes of loving, and whether or not the ideal of robust love attachments can be seen as compatible attachments causally dependent on love enhancements.

In this article, we offer a précis of Appearance & Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology. We explain the central features of our theory of epistemic justification, Phenomenal Explanationism (PE). Further, we describe how PE applies to justification of various kinds and how it solves problems that plague its closest rival, Phenomenal Conservatism (PC).

While I find Huaping Lu-Adler’s excavation of Kant’s long-overlooked linguistic Orientalism both enlightening and thought-provoking, I disagree with her diagnosis of its theoretical and practical relevance. On the one hand, while I agree that Kant’s positionality renders all his writings and teachings presumptively impactful, there is reason to doubt that his peculiar construction of the linguistic Oriental Other had much actual impact on his disciples. On the other hand, while I agree that the Kantian ideal of public reason is inapt for rectifying the linguistic-epistemic injustices of global knowledge production, I disagree on why it is so. In particular, I argue for a shift in theoretical and practical focuses, from linguistic biases and prejudices, to the structural epistemic constraints of linguistic diversity, as well as to other political-structural conditions shaping global knowledge production.

The article discusses certain limitations of the “McDowellian language game” and its approach to naturalism, arguing that it remains too detached from contemporary scientific insights on mind and life. I question the relevance of McDowell’s conceptual framework—focusing on concepts like “second nature”, “Bildung”, and “reason” — for addressing empirical, scientifically grounded theories about human nature. As an alternative, I discuss my own interdisciplinary approach, which seeks (among others) to integrate findings from primate studies on gaze following and proto-referential gestures to shed light on the evolution of reason-giving capacities. This approach, situated at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science, provides a more empirically grounded model for understanding responsiveness to reasons as well as other McDowellian themes.

Otsuka (2023) argues for a correspondence between data science and traditional epistemology: Bayesian statistics is internalist; classical (frequentist) statistics is externalist, owing to its reliabilist nature; model selection is pragmatist; and machine learning is a version of virtue epistemology. Where he sees diversity, I see an opportunity for unity. In this article, I argue that classical statistics, model selection, and machine learning share a foundation that is reliabilist in an unconventional sense that aligns with internalism. Hence a unification under internalist reliabilism.