Ocean Management最新文献

Northern European ports are large in number but concentrated in a small geographic area. These ports vary greatly in size, organization and administration. Northern European ports are, therefore, ideal for studying relationships between success and success factors (ownership, administration, port functions, finance, etc.).

This paper discusses some of the important differences among Northern European ports and suggests relationships that may exist between the various success factors and success. Additional data and statistical analysis are required to confirm these preliminary observations. Nevertheless, these observations can be helpful in guiding future port studies.

Goss (1976) states that the purpose of ports is to be efficient in the economic sense. It is difficult to argue against this view. However, to use efficiency as a measure of success tends to reduce the importance of industrial development activities. It implies that the port's primary function is to move goods. Industrial development is, in fact, a very important function of Northern European ports. Therefore, a more comprehensive success measure would include enhancement of regional employment, capital creation, and the general level of regional economic activity.

The operation of the Antarctic Treaty is subject to review beginning in 1991. It has functioned as a model of international cooperation for 22 years but stresses on the Treaty system are increasing. In particular, interest is growing concerning the mineral resource potential of Antarctica, but the Antarctic Treaty does not address resource allocation issues. Efforts are currently underway to devise a minerals regime for Antarctica, but negotiations could take several years. If negotiations do not produce a new regime by the review date, some countries may decide to withdraw from the Treaty, signaling the end of the cooperative era in Antarctica. This paper reviews and evaluates some of the major options for a minerals regime. It is suggested that the most likely alternatives for Treaty states are those joint jurisdiction options which sidestep the contentious issue of sovereignty. External accommodation with the international community will remain a difficult problem. While the joint jurisdiction options contain several provisions for sharing with outsiders, there is room for improvement.

Oilspill risks have been estimated for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) regions of Alaska using a variety of ocean circulation/trajectory models and a single tracking/probability model. A number of circulation/trajectory models were required because the physical processes advecting oilspills vary throughout the Alaska coastal regions. The two most important factors influencing the movement of oil are ocean currents and local wind stress. Modeling work has been completed for the Northern Gulf of Alaska. Kodiak Island Area. Cook Inlet-Shelikof Strait, Bristol Bay (St. George Basin), Norton Sound, and Beaufort Sea (Diapir Field). The development of an efficient coordinate transformation procedure enabled the use of a common tracking/probability model for the calculation of oilspill risks. The common tracking/probability model traces hypothetical oilspill trajectories through a matrix of grid cells that contain information about the location of environmental resources (targets) which may be vulnerable to oilspills. In this way, the probability that an oilspill, starting at a given location, will contact a specific target could be calculated. Probabilities of oilspill contacts with targets were calculated for spills traveling for periods of 3, 10 and 30 days.

The emergence of petroleum as a key factor in the world economy in the wake of the 1973 OPEC cartel led to a surge of offshore petroleum activities the world over. The dominant element in offshore oil exploration and exploitation is usually provided by the international oil companies, except in the case of the centrally administered economies. Government policies on the questions of the extent of involvement of and government control over the foreign oil companies are determined by various national and international factors. National policies inevitably keep changing in accordance with the magnitude of discoveries of oil through the different phases of development of offshore prospects. Nevertheless, care should be taken to maintain the delicate balance between ensuring major benefits to the nation and sustaining the interests of the oil companies. Although governments may initially allow the entire running of offshore operations by the foreign firms on their own terms, the former may hold back the “golden blocks”, if any, for a later round of licensing, and indicate in the licence terms the relinquishment provisions and a minimum work programme, say, to drill the equivalent of one well per block. The concept of treating both exploration and development in a single licence would ensure the continued involmement of the exploring firms in the development programmes and production without delays. If fairly good prospects are indicated during the intermediate phase of development, governments may proceed to secure a fair share of the profits by asserting greater control over the foreign companies through appropriate tax regimes and sound marketing systems, and also by considerably expanding the capabilities of national oil companies. If ultimately petroleum reserves prove to be very substantial, it is imperative that governments exercise a much greater control over the international companies through administrative and legislative means and taxation or its alternative of production sharing or service risk contracts. It is equally important that the enthusiasm of the industry and capital market is sustained by creating a proper investment climate. Participation of national oil companies in the development programmes together with the foreign firms and promoting national offshore capabilities through R & D progrmmmes would facilitate technology transfer and prevent “Venezuelisation”.

The halibut fishery, historically, has been an important sector of Canada's Pacific coast fishing industry. The migratory halibut stocks have been shared with the United States under a joint management regime, in effect since 1923. In the past a large share of the Canadian catch was taken from waters off the American coast. After imposition of the 200-mile limit Canadian vessels were barred from the American zone. At the same time, changes in natural conditions led to a reduction in the halibut stock size. As a result the Canadian halibut fleet must content itself with a greatly reduced catch. However, conditions for rational management of the fishery have improved as a result of a new joint management agreement with the United States, guaranteeing Canada a fixed formula share of the aggregate catch of the two countries. The paper discusses the options available to Canada to restructure its halibut fishery on a reduced scale, but with better rates of return.