Ocean Management最新文献

A holistic approach to fisheries development and management, although ideal, seems hardly practicable in the real world. While commercial criteria should necessarily be the basis for the selection of industrial fishery projects, this should not be strictly insisted upon in the case of small-scale artisanal fisheries which generally characterise marine fisheries in the Indian Ocean region. The present fish catch from the Indian Ocean is one-third of the potential catch and half the existing demand in the Indian Ocean region. By the turn of this century, the present population should have reached the 2000 million mark, thereby closing the gap between the demand and the potential. At the present overall growth rate, the potential for most of the fisheries would be reached between the years 1990 and 2000, and the problems of meeting the demand beyond this century loom large even now. The marked decline of the tuna fishery calls for rigorous international management of high-sea tuna stocks and diversion of effort towards the underexploited skipjack stocks. The export-oriented crustacean fishery has already exceeded its potential, indicating the need for very urgent regulatory measures in national waters. While the overriding objective of Indian Ocean fisheries development programmes should be one of food production for solving the problem of regional malnutrition, that the programmes would be commercially viable is strongly indicated by the estimates of present and potential return on investment. Indian Ocean countries differ strongly from each other in respect of the growth of their marine fisheries. Prospects for growth will depend largely on greater economic inputs, a stable legal regime, international cooperation and a massive assistance programme under an international body like the FAO, to deal with the special problems confronting the developing Indian Ocean countries. Development prospects and needs are indicated for the nine geographical/ecological provinces extending from East Africa to Western Australia.

With the advent of extended maritime jurisdictions, new arrangements will be sought between fisheries resource owners and distant-water fishing fleets that may want to share the use of fishery resources. Each party has motives for wanting to exploit the fishery, and each has strengths and weaknesses in doing so. The purpose of this study was to develop a logical process to identify arrangements that are fair and profitable for both parties. As a case study, we examined conflicts and agreements of interest between Indonesia and Japan with respect to arrangements they might have for exploiting Indonesia's tuna. Thirty-seven possible arrangements between the two countries were evaluated by a multinational, multidisciplinary team employing goal analysis, an optimization technique for dealing with multiple objectives. The arrangements differed in the following respects: type of fishing operation (all of them longline, but differing with respect to vessel size and other characteristics); kind of processing (cold storage, canning, or freezer-carrier operations); ownership (Indonesian, joint-venture, or Japanese); base of operation (Indonesia or Japan); participating Japanese sector (small-scale tuna fishermen, medium-scale tuna fishermen, or traders and large-scale fishery companies); and marketing alternatives (fresh fish, frozen fish, or canned-goods markets).

Tradeoffs were examined among eleven goals and constraints that might be involved in negotiating an arrangement: capital investment, return on investment, employment, foreign exchange earnings, and technology transfer for Indonesia; capital investment, return on investment, employment, tuna supply, fishermen's profits, and traders' profits for Japan.

This study found many points of agreement of interests between the two countries, to the extent that they can share in efficient and profitable fishing, processing, and marketing operations where both parties can enjoy the benefits. In particular, freezer-carrier operations combined with Indonesia-based fishing offer many advantages over the recent fee fishing arrangement. Genuine conflicts of interests also were found in tradeoffs between employment and operating costs and in how the ownership and profits of the operations are shared between the two countries. Although results are preliminary and require further refinement and validation before they can assist with real fishery negotiations, this approach to exploring new options for bilateral fishery arrangements has great potential and should be pursued to the point where it can be utilized in practice.

A crucial issue in fisheries management is the extent to which management strategy should be designed to reduce risk: risk of depleting the resource and risk of business failure for the fishermen and processors. Fishery management requires that data be assimilated from a wide variety of sources into a coherent scheme for allocating fish. Many sources of risk, which can be measured as the probability of an event's occurrence, affect the objectives and outcomes of fishery management strategies. Fishery management decisions are also made in the face of uncertainty, some of which cannot be alleviated by additional information. Four general sources of risk are considered here: the resource and its changing environment; scientific research; markets for the products and factors of production; and management measures. The complexity of fishery management is illustrated through descriptions of interconnected sources of risk, and recommendations for dealing with risk and uncertainty are suggested.