Revue Libanaise de Gestion et d'économie最新文献

L'existence et la persistance de disparités régionales en matière de chômage sont des problèmes communs à de nombreux pays européens. Dans ce papier, nous analysons les disparités des mécanismes d'ajustement des taux de chômage régionaux de la France à la suite de chocs économiques purement locaux ou nationaux. Les résultats mettent en évidence des disparités significatives dans les caractéristiques des mécanismes d'ajustement dynamiques (vitesse d'ajustement, effet multiplicateur) des taux de chômage régionaux en cas de choc macroéconomique national.

The existence and persistence of regional unemployment disparities are common problems in many European countries. In this paper, we analyze the disparities adjustment mechanisms of regional unemployment rates in France as a result of economic shocks purely local or national. The results highlight significant disparities in the characteristics of dynamic adjustment mechanisms (speed adjustment, multiplier effect) of regional unemployment rates in case of national macroeconomic shock.

Résumé

L’administrateur indépendant semble être considéré comme la clef de voute du gouvernement d’entreprise en France et aux Etats Unis. Mais cette notion d’indépendance comme celle d’administrateur est confuse. La subordination des pays latins au système économique anglo-saxon génère une apparente mais fausse uniformité. Le concept d’administrateur indépendant n’est pas le même en France et aux Etats Unis. L’administrateur indépendant ne peut pas être juridiquement reconnu en France à la différence des Etats Unis. L’administrateur indépendant inconnu du droit français n’est en France qu’un gadget destiné à rassurer les investisseurs. Il encourt et fait encourir des risques. Les agences de notation chargées d’apprécier la bonne gouvernance des entreprises dans le monde devraient afin d’assurer leur crédibilité devraient affiner l’approche juridique souvent inexistante.

Abstract

The independent director seems to be the cornerstone of corporate governance in France and USA. However this concept is unclear. The subordination of Latin countries to the Anglo-Saxon economic world generates an apparent but false uniformity. An “independent director” cannot legally exist as such in France and in some others European countries unlike the United States. The independent director is a non sense under French law, it is merely a misleading gadget, used by companies to reassure the investor. The ratings agencies in charge of assessing the good governance of companies world-wide based on the presence of independent directors, should take the legal approach into consideration, in order to ensure the credibility of their ratings

Résumé

L’ambition de cette contribution exploratoire est de montrer que l’approfondissement du concept d’acadepreneuriat et le recours à la théorie des conventions permettent de porter un regard nouveau et pragmatique sur la gouvernance universitaire surtout dans le contexte moderne marqué par une démultiplication des attentes de la société à l’égard des institutions éducatives de l’enseignement supérieur.

Abstract

Underlining two paradoxes for academic governance in the modern context, this text suggests that mobilizing Acadépreneurship in practice and French Conventions’ Theory is useful for defining the good but diversified practices for universities’ government.

The importance of trust in the field of business management is commonly recognized. By contributing to simplify governance mechanisms, it helps to reduce costs. But as the trust is subject to validation / invalidation from that in which it is placed (head), it follows that reducing the costs involved can not be attributed to one of the parties involved, but to both of them (owners and managers). Thus, it appears as the result of conduct adopted by both parties and it can serve as a criterion for classification of transactions.

The objective of this work is to propose a classification of transactions based on trust and the impact of each type of transaction costs. To achieve this goal, we have undertaken to (1) review the literature concerning (1.1) the notion of trust and (1.2) the definition itself of the trust. This allows us (1.3) to propose some new insights about the vulnerability and the relation control / trust.

Then the typology of transactions that we propose (2) is based on two essential criteria : (2.1) the Continuum of trust and (2.2) the Continuum of integrity. The crossing of the two criteria gives us (2.3) the matrix of transactions.

Our proposal will be tested through an empirical study conducted using a questionnaire submitted to 21 business leaders. We will present (3) the assumptions and hypotheses and (4) the research methodology. The analysis tool used is the PCA method (Principal Component Analysis). This method, because it facilitates the identification of groups of observations, allows us to test the validity of our proposal. Finally (5), we present the results of this study and we conclude on their usefulness in a replay of the agency theory.

Résumé

Dans cette étude nous avons mené une analyse à deux étapes de l’inefficience technique des banques tunisiennes sur une période, (2002–2006), assez fragile pour le secteur bancaire tunisien (FMI, 2002 et 2007). La modélisation de l’efficience, dans le contexte de ce travail, permet de dépasser les limites des approches conventionnelles, plus particulièrement les corrélations complexes qui affectent les scores d’efficience. L’utilisation de la procédure de Simar et Wilson (2007), qui se base sur la technique du bootstrap, nous a permis d’estimer l’effet de certaines variables clés de l’activité bancaire sur l’inefficience technique des banques tunisiennes. Les résultats suggèrent que la mauvaise qualité des crédits et l’insuffisance de capitalisation sont les principales sources d’inefficience des banques tunisiennes. Les résultats montrent également que les grandes banques et les banques publiques sont les plus inefficientes. Ces dernières sont mandatées pour soutenir financièrement différents projets économiques et sociaux qui ne répondent pas toujours à une logique de profit. Deux implications essentielles en découlent : d’une part, les banques tunisiennes se trouvent dans l’obligation d’améliorer leurs techniques de gestion du risque de crédit ; d’autre part, les autorités de tutelle devraient accélérer la privatisation des banques publiques.

Classification JEL : G2, C34, C44, C67.

Abstract

In this study, we conduct a two-stage analysis of the Tunisian banks technical inefficiency. Modelling efficiency, in this context, allows overcoming the limits of conventional approaches, particularly those related to the complicated and unknown correlations affecting the efficiency scores. We use the Simar and Wilson (2007) single bootstrap procedure, to asses the effect of banking activity key variables on the technical efficiency of Tunisian banks. Results suggest that loans quality and undercapitalisation are the most important factors that affect efficiency. They also show that big size banks and public one’s are the less efficient; the latter were mandated to support various economic and social projects which don’t satisfy profitability requirements. It follows that Tunisian banks have to improve their credit risk management techniques and monetary authorities are asked to accelerate public banks privatisation.

JEL Classification: G2, C34, C44, C67.

The works on the effects of the privatization on the efficiency occupy an important place in the literature. The majority of the works emphasize the immediate effects of the privatization without caring about dynamic effects. The present work studies the aforementioned relation by trying to answer three fundamental questions. What is the effect of the privatization on the dynamic efficiency? What are the main explanatory factors of the dynamic efficiency? What is the effect of time on the dynamic efficiency? The results of the empirical study led with 22 Tunisian companies privatized totally or partially show that the privatization affects positively the efficiency especially in the means and the long term. we noticed that the economic growth and the nature of the buyers are the most significant variables which explain the dynamic efficiency. Finally we concluded that so much the privatized company goes away from the date of the privatization so much she increases her dynamic efficiency

Résumé

Les différences de structures des dépenses publiques et des recettes fiscales expliquent les divers modes de financement de la protection sociale entre la France et le Liban. En France, l’Etat intervient fortement, et depuis longtemps, dans l’activité économique et consacre une part importante de son budget au financement de la protection sociale. Par contre au Liban, l’Etat, submergé par une dette publique très élevée, ne dispose pas de moyens financiers significatifs pour financer un système de protection sociale couvrant la plupart des individus. Néanmoins, dans ce pays, les recettes fiscales sont davantage employées pour le fonctionnement des hôpitaux privés que pour le paiement des charges d’intérêt et les dépenses sociales. En France, les recettes fiscales, représentant une part beaucoup plus élevée du PIB par rapport au Liban, sont, par contre, influencées par les dépenses sociales et la dette publique.

Abstract

The differences in the structures of public expenditure and tax revenues explain the various modes of financing social protection between France and Lebanon. In France, the government intervenes heavily and since a long time in economic activity and devotes a significant portion of its budget to finance social protection. On the contrary, in Lebanon the government, overwhelmed by a very high public debt, does not have significant financial resources to fund a welfare system covering most individuals. However, in this country, tax revenues are used more for the operation of private hospitals for the payment of interest charges and social spending. In France, tax revenues are representing a much higher proportion of GDP compared to Lebanon and influenced by social spending and public debt.

The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and firm performance in a sample of 100 american firms, over the period 2001–2003. We particularly focus on board independence and CEO duality. Our results indicate a positive impact of board independence on the firm performance. We also find a negative relationship between CEO duality and performance. Finally we can indicate that Results of our empirical test fail to support stewardship theory and provide support for agency theory.

With the drop of the Tunisian financial market, many companies have engaged in a process of share repurchase. This strategy raises many questions: What justifies the repurchase of shares? How does the financial market react when a share repurchase program is announced and implemented? An investigation of companies that have carried out such programs has revealed that the main purpose of this strategy is to signal to the market that the shares are undervalued. The results of event study also indicate that the stock market, in the first days of event, has reacted more positively to the implementation (CAAR=7.35%) than it is the case with the announcement (CAAR = 4.36%) of the programs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the different practices and determinants of disclosure of financial information by Tunisian companies. The methodology is based on qualitative approach, using the interviews, and quantitative approach using a logistical regression. The results reveal that the majority of companies that opt for information disclosure are either listed companies or financial institutions. The obstacles affecting the decision of disclosure concern the family-owned form of the Tunisian companies and the increased competition characterizing some sectors. Firms that diffuse the detail information on the Internet are firms that are leaders on the market and are not family-owned.