Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2019-4-164-185
Rouslan Khestanov, Aleksander Suvalko
The article focuses on one of the most mysterious and intriguing stories of the Soviet civilization that is connected with the original ideas of the Bolsheviks and then to the Soviet nomenclature of culture. Chronologically, our research covers the first years of the formation of Soviet state institutions, the so-called Leninist and then Stalinist periods of leadership, and ends with a period that is often called “The Thaw.” In order to grasp the conceptual and doctrinal motifs for building Soviet cultural and state institutions, we used verbatim records of the Party Congresses as our main source of information. Our main task was to clarify why culture was central and strategic for early Soviet leaders. We will show how culture gave political doctrine its conceptual integrity by linking perceptions of state, leadership and governance, and communism and labour. The analysis of our sources testifies to the existence of a quite definite trajectory of cultural policy: (1) the birth of the Bolshevik cultural project, (2) its materialization in the institutions of the Soviet statehood, (3) the normalization of the created state structures and, finally, (4) the marginalization of the cultural issue. We introduced the concept of "cultural fundamentalism" to emphasize the peculiarity of the Bolshevik cultural project in which radical anti-etatism was expressed, which implied compensation by the culture of the abolished statehood. The internal logic of the development of the cultural project led, however, to a paradoxical result — the creation of a total social state. The principal thesis of the article is that the concept of culture played a central and strategic role in the construction of a new socialist state.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2021-3-43-70
I. Presnyakov
The purpose of the present paper consists of two points. First, it is to show how the internal structure and the “inner logic” of science as a value sphere are formed in Max Weber’s theory. Then, relying on logical-methodological foundations proposed by Weber, the second point is to identify how the action carried out by scientists in a “vocation” mode in a situation of “value polytheism” is realized within science. Analyzing the content of recent discussions about the empirical validity and character of Weber’s argumentation in one of his central works, The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, as well as about the autonomy and conceptual boundaries of Weber’s science, we draw a line of reasoning as follows. Firstly, we trace the changing of the methodological role of values in general, and the value of truth, in particular, in the “sciences of culture” in connection with the transition from the transcendental solution of Heinrich Rickert to Weber’s “value polytheism”. Secondly, we analyze how the relationship between Weber’s science, progress, and rationalization is structured. Thirdly, we explicate the mode of “vocation” in science, relying on the logical-methodological foundations proposed by Weber. Fourthly, we identify the development of Weber’s idea of the value autonomy of science. It is shown that Weber rejects the criterion of truth’s universality proposed by Rickert’s logical solution. However, the construction of ideal-typical concepts and the mechanics of “cognitive interest” described by Weber allows scientists to separate extra-scientific pragmatics from the scientific research itself. The progress of the “sciences of culture” for Weber is the differentiation and the emergence of new research approaches and the refinement of concepts. At the same time, science is not teleologically connected with “progress in general” and the rationalizing world, the configuration of which is a specific historical constellation. As associated with scientific work, “gaining the clarity” turns out to be not its own goal, but a possible effect of using scientific knowledge. The mode of “vocation” in a “value polytheism” situation forces scientists to contribute to the endless scientific progress; they formulate such ideal-types and causal explanations that seem adequate and sufficient from the point of view of their cognitive interests. The stability of science’s boundaries and its value autonomy are formed in Weber’s theory gradually; epistemological studies and the implementation of his sociology of the religion research “programme” make the difference between vocations in science and politics clear.
{"title":"What do Social Scientists Do in a “Value Polytheism” Situation?; Or, A Little More on Weber’s “Vocation”","authors":"I. Presnyakov","doi":"10.17323/1728-192x-2021-3-43-70","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2021-3-43-70","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the present paper consists of two points. First, it is to show how the internal structure and the “inner logic” of science as a value sphere are formed in Max Weber’s theory. Then, relying on logical-methodological foundations proposed by Weber, the second point is to identify how the action carried out by scientists in a “vocation” mode in a situation of “value polytheism” is realized within science. Analyzing the content of recent discussions about the empirical validity and character of Weber’s argumentation in one of his central works, The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, as well as about the autonomy and conceptual boundaries of Weber’s science, we draw a line of reasoning as follows. Firstly, we trace the changing of the methodological role of values in general, and the value of truth, in particular, in the “sciences of culture” in connection with the transition from the transcendental solution of Heinrich Rickert to Weber’s “value polytheism”. Secondly, we analyze how the relationship between Weber’s science, progress, and rationalization is structured. Thirdly, we explicate the mode of “vocation” in science, relying on the logical-methodological foundations proposed by Weber. Fourthly, we identify the development of Weber’s idea of the value autonomy of science. It is shown that Weber rejects the criterion of truth’s universality proposed by Rickert’s logical solution. However, the construction of ideal-typical concepts and the mechanics of “cognitive interest” described by Weber allows scientists to separate extra-scientific pragmatics from the scientific research itself. The progress of the “sciences of culture” for Weber is the differentiation and the emergence of new research approaches and the refinement of concepts. At the same time, science is not teleologically connected with “progress in general” and the rationalizing world, the configuration of which is a specific historical constellation. As associated with scientific work, “gaining the clarity” turns out to be not its own goal, but a possible effect of using scientific knowledge. The mode of “vocation” in a “value polytheism” situation forces scientists to contribute to the endless scientific progress; they formulate such ideal-types and causal explanations that seem adequate and sufficient from the point of view of their cognitive interests. The stability of science’s boundaries and its value autonomy are formed in Weber’s theory gradually; epistemological studies and the implementation of his sociology of the religion research “programme” make the difference between vocations in science and politics clear.","PeriodicalId":102221,"journal":{"name":"Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130677170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2021-3-319-331
D. Reznikov
Book Review: Timo Miettinen, Husserl and the Idea of Europe (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2020).
书评:蒂莫·米蒂宁,胡塞尔和欧洲的想法(埃文斯顿:西北大学出版社,2020)。
{"title":"The Idea of Europe and Husserlian Historical Teleology","authors":"D. Reznikov","doi":"10.17323/1728-192x-2021-3-319-331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2021-3-319-331","url":null,"abstract":"Book Review: Timo Miettinen, Husserl and the Idea of Europe (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2020).","PeriodicalId":102221,"journal":{"name":"Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129291179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2023-2-50-70
J. Graça
French historian and archaeologist Paul Veyne argued for what he saw as the fundamental lack of object in sociology in 1971. This academic field would definitely not be a science, but, at most, an auxiliary to historiography, itself devoid of any scientific condition since it refers to sublunary causalities, not allowing predictions, only “retrodictions”. Conversely, a set of “praxeologies” could be identified, the core of a future science of man, radically different from both sociology and history, including instead pure economics, operational research, and game theory. While history (and sociology) would inevitably be “Aristotelian”, that is, sublunary and imprecise, scientific disciplines could and should be predominantly “Platonic”, aiming at formal logical elegance. Veyne was only partly right, since economics itself cannot be considered a science stricto sensu. Admittedly, sociology is going through a state of multilevel crisis, allowing us to confront this situation with important recent trends for the emergence of socio-historical grand narratives, sometimes officially called history, less often historical sociology, but all eminently trans-disciplinary. The aim of this research is to overcome the limitations associated with the biographical, elitist, and Eurocentric biases characteristic of traditional historiography. On the whole, the tendency of these studies is nomothetic, but the “laws” identified are at best, approximate. Therefore, they, like economics, are condemned to operate on a mere “Aristotelian” level, and thus, the great “novel of humanity” is bound to remain essentially indeterminate.
{"title":"Writing Sociology: Writing History","authors":"J. Graça","doi":"10.17323/1728-192x-2023-2-50-70","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2023-2-50-70","url":null,"abstract":"French historian and archaeologist Paul Veyne argued for what he saw as the fundamental lack of object in sociology in 1971. This academic field would definitely not be a science, but, at most, an auxiliary to historiography, itself devoid of any scientific condition since it refers to sublunary causalities, not allowing predictions, only “retrodictions”. Conversely, a set of “praxeologies” could be identified, the core of a future science of man, radically different from both sociology and history, including instead pure economics, operational research, and game theory. While history (and sociology) would inevitably be “Aristotelian”, that is, sublunary and imprecise, scientific disciplines could and should be predominantly “Platonic”, aiming at formal logical elegance. Veyne was only partly right, since economics itself cannot be considered a science stricto sensu. Admittedly, sociology is going through a state of multilevel crisis, allowing us to confront this situation with important recent trends for the emergence of socio-historical grand narratives, sometimes officially called history, less often historical sociology, but all eminently trans-disciplinary. The aim of this research is to overcome the limitations associated with the biographical, elitist, and Eurocentric biases characteristic of traditional historiography. On the whole, the tendency of these studies is nomothetic, but the “laws” identified are at best, approximate. Therefore, they, like economics, are condemned to operate on a mere “Aristotelian” level, and thus, the great “novel of humanity” is bound to remain essentially indeterminate.","PeriodicalId":102221,"journal":{"name":"Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124887995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2019-3-309-327
A. Sitnikov
The article deals with the social phenomenology of Alfred Schütz. Proceeding from the concept of multiple realities, the author describes religious reality, analyses its relationship with everyday, theoretical, and mythological realities, and identifies the areas where they overlap and their specifics. According to Schütz’s concept, reality is understood as something that has a meaning for a human being, and is also consistent and certain for those who are ‘inside’ of it. Realities are structurally similar to one another as they are similar to the reality that is most obvious for all human beings, i.e., the world of everyday life. Religious reality has one of the main signs of genuine reality, that of internal consistency. Religious reality has its own epoché (special ascetic practices) which has similarities with the epoché of the theoretical sphere since neither serve practical objectives, and imply freedom from the transitory issues of everyday life. Just as the theoretical sphere exists independently of the life of a scientist in the physical world and is needed to transfer results to other people, so the religious reality depends on ritual actions and material objects in its striving for the transcendent. Individual, and especially collective, religious practices are performed physically and are inextricably linked with the bodily ritual. The article notes that although Schütz’s phenomenological concept of multiple realities has repeatedly served as a starting point for the development of various social theories, its heuristic potential has not been exhausted. This allows for the further analyzing and development of topical issues such as national identity and its ties with religious tradition in the modern era, when religious reality loses credibility and has many competitors, one of which is the modern myth of the nation. Intersubjective ideas of the nation that are socially confirmed as the self-evident reality of everyday life cause complex emotions and fill human lives, thus displacing religious reality or forcing the latter to come into complex interactions with the national narrative.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2021-2-290-299
H. Freyer
The Centre for Fundamental Sociology (HSE University, Moscow) and Vladimir Dal Publishing House (St. Petersburg) have initiated the Russian translation and publication of Sociology as a Science of Reality: A Logical Foundation for the System of Sociology (1930), a key work of the famous German philosopher and sociologist, Hans Freyer. In the early 1920s, Freyer, who became the first full professor of sociology in Germany, published several seminal works covering a wide range of topics in social science and political philosophy. The Introduction to the thinker’s first work on sociology in its proper meaning, published here, has the characteristics of a program manifesto outlining the basic principles for comprehending the discipline and its subject matter as a social and historical phenomenon. Freyer argues that sociology as a scholarly discipline emerges in a society that is being detached from the state; now, instead of an obvious and stable order, an insecure, precarious and unpredictable society arises, becoming a problem for itself. Consequently, alongside the formation of sociology, its object emerges; it is a heterogeneous “society” that has gained autonomy from the state while sharply divergent from that same society regarding the principles of the organization of social life. Meanwhile, the distinctive feature of European sociology is not simply its embeddedness in history, but its immediate substantial connection with the preceding philosophical tradition. This enables Freyer to raise the question of the philosophical basis of sociology as a scientific system. He also formulates the task of defining the forms of this system and outlining its primary lines. The structural and methodological comparison between the European sociology version and the American version of the discipline is particularly interesting from the perspective of the academic history.
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{"title":"Passion and Rationalism: Max Weber in Freud’s Eyes","authors":"Oleg Kil'dyushov","doi":"10.17323/1728-192x-2022-3-303-308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2022-3-303-308","url":null,"abstract":"Book review: Ionin L. Max Weber: A Drama of Life. (Moscow: Delo Publishers, RANEPA, 2022). (In Russian)","PeriodicalId":102221,"journal":{"name":"Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127161470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2019-3-286-308
V. Bystrov, V. Kamnev
This article can be considered as the history of the concept of vulgar sociologism, including both the moment of the emergence of this concept and its subsequent history. In the 20th century, new approaches were formed in the natural sciences about society and man which assumed to consider all of the ideas from the point of view of class psycho-ideology. This approach manifested itself somewhat in the history of philosophical and scientific knowledge, but chiefly in literary criticism (Friche, Pereverzev). As a result, any work of art turns into a ciphered message behind which the interest of a certain class or group hides. The critic has to solve this code and define its sociological equivalent. In the discussions against vulgar sociology, M. Lifshitz and his adherents insisted on a limitation of the vulgar-sociological approach, qualifying it as a bourgeois perversion of Marxism. They saw the principle of the criticism of vulgar sociology in the well-known statement by K. Marx about the aesthetic value of the Ancient Greek epos. The task of the critic does not only reduce to the establishment of social genetics of the work of art because he also needs to explain why this work causes aesthetic pleasure during other historical eras. In the article, it is shown that later attempts to reduce the complete spectrum of modern western philosophy and aesthetics into a paradigm of vulgar sociology of the 1920s is an unreasonable exaggeration. At the same time, in discussions in the 1930s, the question of the need of the differentiation of the vulgar-sociological approach and a sociological method in general was raised. As for sociology, this question remains relevant even today.
{"title":"Vulgar Sociologism: The History of the Concept","authors":"V. Bystrov, V. Kamnev","doi":"10.17323/1728-192x-2019-3-286-308","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2019-3-286-308","url":null,"abstract":"This article can be considered as the history of the concept of vulgar sociologism, including both the moment of the emergence of this concept and its subsequent history. In the 20th century, new approaches were formed in the natural sciences about society and man which assumed to consider all of the ideas from the point of view of class psycho-ideology. This approach manifested itself somewhat in the history of philosophical and scientific knowledge, but chiefly in literary criticism (Friche, Pereverzev). As a result, any work of art turns into a ciphered message behind which the interest of a certain class or group hides. The critic has to solve this code and define its sociological equivalent. In the discussions against vulgar sociology, M. Lifshitz and his adherents insisted on a limitation of the vulgar-sociological approach, qualifying it as a bourgeois perversion of Marxism. They saw the principle of the criticism of vulgar sociology in the well-known statement by K. Marx about the aesthetic value of the Ancient Greek epos. The task of the critic does not only reduce to the establishment of social genetics of the work of art because he also needs to explain why this work causes aesthetic pleasure during other historical eras. In the article, it is shown that later attempts to reduce the complete spectrum of modern western philosophy and aesthetics into a paradigm of vulgar sociology of the 1920s is an unreasonable exaggeration. At the same time, in discussions in the 1930s, the question of the need of the differentiation of the vulgar-sociological approach and a sociological method in general was raised. As for sociology, this question remains relevant even today.","PeriodicalId":102221,"journal":{"name":"Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126260991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2021-4-7-14
Alexander F. Filippov, A. Korbut
{"title":"Perturbations of Private and Public under COVID-19","authors":"Alexander F. Filippov, A. Korbut","doi":"10.17323/1728-192x-2021-4-7-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2021-4-7-14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":102221,"journal":{"name":"Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133138777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.17323/1728-192x-2019-3-143-171
A. Zygmont
The article considers the phenomenon of martyrdom in the Western nationalisms of the 18th–20th centuries, and is analyzed in three examples. These are the cults of Marat, Lepelletier, Chalier, and other martyrs in France during the 1789 French Revolution; the cult of Abraham Lincoln and other “martyr president” cults in the USA; and the Irish martyrdom ideologies from the 17th century to the 1916 Eastern Rising. The classic studies on nationalism (E. Gellner, B. Anderson, E. Hobsbawm, etc.) do not pay attention to the topic. Other works consider separate cases, though lack a general theory. Thus, the article’s major goals are to discover what is the role of martyrdom in nationalisms, and how is it related to religious ideas. In order to answer these questions, the author proposes a structural, or “compositional”, model, suggesting that the discourse of martyrdom consists of the three motives of founding, militancy, and mobilization. These three components work as an integral “engine” that allows a nationalist movement or a nation-state to fight to create the new reality and preserve what was created. The author suggests that the balance of these three motives in each individual case may differ, so one of the motives may be hypertrophied, while the other two motives are simply “completed” to the minimum level. Proceeding from the fact that martyrdom in nationalisms constantly refers to religious ideas, images, and rituals, the author concludes that martyrdom is an integral phenomenon with no clear borderline between “secular” or “religious” with regard to both individual cases and the elements of a much larger case.
本文考察了18 - 20世纪西方民族主义中的殉难现象,并通过三个实例进行了分析。这些是1789年法国大革命期间马拉、勒佩列蒂埃、夏利埃和其他殉道者的邪教;美国对亚伯拉罕·林肯和其他“烈士总统”的崇拜;以及从17世纪到1916年东方起义的爱尔兰殉道意识形态。关于民族主义的经典研究(E. Gellner, B. Anderson, E. Hobsbawm等)并未关注这一话题。其他作品考虑不同的案例,但缺乏一个普遍的理论。因此,本文的主要目标是发现殉道在民族主义中的作用,以及它与宗教思想的关系。为了回答这些问题,作者提出了一个结构性的或“构成性的”模型,表明殉道话语由建国、战斗和动员三种动机组成。这三个组成部分作为一个整体的“引擎”,使民族主义运动或民族国家能够为创造新的现实而斗争,并保留已经创造的东西。作者认为,这三种动机在每个个案中的平衡可能不同,因此其中一种动机可能是肥大的,而另外两种动机只是简单地“完成”到最低水平。从民族主义中的殉教经常涉及宗教观念、形象和仪式这一事实出发,作者得出结论,殉教是一种整体现象,无论是在个别情况下,还是在更大的情况下,都没有明确的“世俗”或“宗教”的界限。
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