Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献

Discourse proclaiming the advent of a fourth industrial revolution predicts significant disruption to various work domains in the near future. Auditing is one of the domains where bold claims about the potential of technology are being made, with technology expected to augment auditors' judgments and, in time, possibly automate them. Drawing on 44 in-depth interviews with auditors, regulators, and emergent artificial intelligence software providers, we question the prevailing narrative around technological change in auditing which suggests that ostensibly simple, low-level technical tasks are areas where little judgment is at play and thus are ripe for automation. We show that significant elements of deliberation, sensemaking, and reflexivity, arguably critical for the socialization of early career auditors into the profession, may be lost when automating areas of work perceived as low value, leading us to question what it means to apply judgment in auditing. Conversely, higher-level aspects of the audit process may be assisted by technology and augmented in different ways, yet new technological structures generate new areas of indeterminacy that pose new and yet unresolved demands on auditors' judgment. Overall, the paper shows how auditor habits are changing and highlights the risks posed by new technologies to the acquisition of practical knowledge by auditors.

We examine the relation between voluntary disclosure and the value of analysts' research by studying the change in the informativeness of analysts' research after managers stop providing quarterly guidance to investors. We find that the market reaction to analysts' recommendation revisions increases significantly after guidance stoppage, controlling for confounding factors as well as for firm and time fixed effects. The increase in market reaction is greater for firms with more opaque information environments and for firms that previously provided disaggregated guidance. Further, the effect of guidance stoppage on the informativeness of analysts' research reverses after managers resume guidance. Finally, textual analyses of analysts' reports before and after guidance stoppage reveal that analysts issue longer, more frequent, and more detailed reports that convey more forward-looking information after stoppages. These findings collectively shed light on the relation between the supply of voluntary disclosure and the value that sell-side analysts add to price discovery in capital markets.

Global tax enforcement policies have received increased attention since the financial crisis, with much stated focus on curbing perceived harmful tax practices of multinational corporations. Yet there is a dearth of evidence on possible differential effects of home-country tax enforcement on multinationals. We take a step toward filling this void in the tax policy discussion by examining whether there is a differential relation between changes in home-country enforcement and the tax avoidance of domestic versus multinational corporations. Using OECD data on 50 countries from 2005 to 2019, we find increases in home-country enforcement are associated with lower levels of tax avoidance for domestic firms than for multinational corporations. Using a subset of firms from the Bureau van Dijk database, we find that multinationals avoid more tax in foreign countries when home-country enforcement increases. Results are stronger for multinationals with a higher proportion of subsidiaries in low-tax countries and when enforcement spending is low. These findings have implications for policy-makers and highlight the importance of coordinated enforcement efforts across jurisdictions—such as the recently proposed global minimum tax—to successfully curb multinationals' worldwide tax avoidance.

Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment in China in which some firms become investible to foreign investors across different times (i.e., pilot firms), we explore the role that stock market liberalization plays in shaping firms' earnings management activities. In one direction, the national-level liberalization reform may elicit public attention from various stakeholders, piling pressure on managers to refrain from distorting their firms' earnings. In the other direction, the various restrictions that the government imposes on foreign investors cast doubt on whether China's capital control reform will materially affect pilot firms' incentives and scope to manipulate their earnings. To gauge which force is more dominant, we rely on a staggered difference-in-differences research design and find that pilot firms significantly reduce the magnitude of their discretionary accruals and the incidence of financial reporting irregularities from the pre- to the post-liberalization period, compared to non-pilot firms during the same time frame. Additional analysis implies that externalities in the form of stricter external monitoring from the media, institutional investors, and auditors is the major mechanism that helps market liberalization curb firms' earnings management. Our research provides insight on the importance of financial global integration to firms' earnings management practices.

We examine how disclosure delivery mode—oral versus written—influences investors' reactions to managers' tone language. We hypothesize that listening to disclosures, relative to reading them, causes managers' qualitative word choices to have a greater impact on investors' judgments. We theorize that this effect occurs because oral delivery mode promotes heuristic processing and qualitative tone language is an easy-to-process disclosure element. The results from an experiment in a conference call setting are consistent with our hypothesis and suggest a boundary condition. Specifically, the interaction of mode and tone language is significant in a setting where heuristic processing is likely (good earnings news) but not in a setting where investors are likely to scrutinize the disclosure (bad earnings news). Our results inform investors about the potential consequences of how they consume disclosures. Specifically, we show that investors are more susceptible to managers' tone language when listening to disclosures containing good news than when reading them.

Using granular gas price data and rich variation in corporate tax rates, we find that corporate taxes increase consumer prices. About 64% of the corporate tax is borne by consumers. The effect is stronger when firms have limited access to tax planning opportunities, face stricter tax enforcement, or when consumer demand is less elastic. Taxes also reduce the number of firms and their scale, consistent with a tax-induced increase in marginal cost. Our results suggest that tax policies that increase effective corporate tax rates may have unintended consequences for consumers through higher prices.

Relying on their history of legal infractions to measure individuals' risk tolerance, we examine the association between engagement partners' risk appetites and audit quality in the United States. Criminology and economics research links infraction activity with enduring personality traits that capture an individual's risk tolerance. Our evidence supports the prediction that partners known to engage in risky off-the-job behaviors conduct lower quality audits. Specifically, we find that clients of partners with prior legal infractions exhibit a higher likelihood of material misstatements revealed through subsequent restatements, greater propensity to misstate based on the F-score, more instances of “missed” material weaknesses, and less timely loss recognition, while also paying lower audit fees. In cross-sectional results consistent with expectations, we generally find that the impact of partners' risk tolerance on audit quality is more heavily concentrated in clients of non–Big 4 firms and offices without industry expertise. Collectively, our analysis contributes to emerging research on the role that individual partner characteristics play in shaping audit outcomes.

Audit firms hesitate to take full advantage of data and analytics (D&A) audit approaches because they lack certainty about how external reviewers evaluate those approaches. We propose that external reviewers use an effort heuristic when evaluating audit quality, judging less effortful audit procedures as lower quality, which could shape how external reviewers evaluate D&A audit procedures. We conduct two experiments in which experienced external reviewers evaluate one set of audit procedures (D&A or traditional) within an engagement review, while holding constant the procedures' level of assurance. Our first experiment provides evidence that external reviewers rely on an effort heuristic when evaluating D&A audit procedures—they perceive D&A audit procedures as lower in quality than traditional audit procedures because they perceive them to be less effortful. Our second experiment confirms these results and evaluates a theory-based intervention that reduces reviewers' reliance on the effort heuristic, causing them to judge quality similarly across D&A and traditional audit procedures.

We examine the role of CEO power in the appointment of accounting financial experts (AFEs) to firm audit committees. Our results show that firms with powerful CEOs have a lower likelihood of appointing AFEs to their audit committees. In addition, effective AFEs—those characterized by experience, high status, and social independence from the CEO—are less likely to be appointed in firms with powerful CEOs. In the presence of powerful CEOs, effective AFEs are also less likely to be designated audit committee chair. The absence of effective AFEs is associated with the use of accounting discretion by powerful CEOs to meet or just beat analyst earnings forecasts. We find no evidence that AFEs choose to avoid serving on the boards of firms with powerful CEOs. Our findings are consistent with powerful CEOs influencing board appointments post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act through informal channels, including through their social ties with nominating committees. Our results suggest that current regulations prohibiting CEO involvement in the director nomination process and specifying who qualifies as a financial expert may be insufficient to ensure audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality.

Prior literature has studied firm uniqueness and its implications for capital market participants by investigating earnings uniqueness. We recognize that cost and revenue uniqueness provide separate insights about firm uniqueness because different forces drive firm-specific revenues and costs. Cost uniqueness is of special interest because costs are opaque to investors and more complex than revenues. Therefore, we examine how cost uniqueness affects information uncertainty from the perspective of external participants. We find that idiosyncratic stock return volatility increases with cost uniqueness independently and incrementally from revenue uniqueness. We validate these results with several cross-sectional tests that provide insights into the forces that drive the association between information uncertainty and cost uniqueness. In addition, we find that higher cost uniqueness is associated with finer cost disclosure. Overall, we show that cost uniqueness is an important dimension of cost behavior that is linked to strategic decision-making and affects uncertainty surrounding firm valuation.