Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献

Lenders are reluctant to finance firms' innovation activities because such activities tend to be opaque, with a high likelihood of negative outcomes that could hamper loan repayment. We posit that public credit registries (PCRs), which play an important role in credit information sharing in many countries, can facilitate financing by reducing adverse selection and moral hazard and increasing bank competition. Using the staggered establishment of PCRs in different countries and an international firm–patent data set, we find that credit information sharing positively affects firm innovation, especially in firms that experience a larger increase in bank debt financing after the establishment of a PCR. This finding is consistent with the notion that credit information sharing promotes firm innovation by easing bank debt financing frictions. We also find a stronger effect in countries that experience a large increase in bank competition after the establishment of a PCR—consistent with increased bank competition serving as a channel through which credit information sharing facilitates bank debt financing, thereby generating a positive effect on firm innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when the established PCR has features that promote credit information sharing. It is also more pronounced for opaque firms and firms in innovation-intensive industries, indicating that credit information sharing helps to reduce financing frictions. Finally, we posit and find evidence that firm efficiency in transforming innovation inputs into outputs improves after the establishment of a PCR. Overall, our paper offers novel insights into how credit information sharing facilitates firm innovation.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandates the PCAOB to enforce compliance with its audit standards fairly. However, the enforcement process is not sufficiently transparent for public evaluation of its fairness, prompting a call by a former Board member for transparency of the process and for improvement suggestions from the public. Further, academic evidence on the PCAOB enforcement is limited. We address this call and the gap in the literature by interviewing 33 difficult-to-access participants about the enforcement process: 20 sanctioned auditors and 13 former PCAOB enforcement staff members. Using procedural justice theory as a lens in evaluating our data, we conclude the enforcement process lacks fairness in key components. Both auditors and former enforcement staff express concerns that staff use overly damning one-sided language in public orders, do not assess investor harm, and face incentives to sanction auditors, particularly small firms that cannot afford costly defense. We contribute to the literature on PCAOB enforcement by offering new insights into the enforcement process from firsthand perspectives of sanctioned auditors and former enforcement staff, deepening understanding of how enforcement practices align with the PCAOB's mandate for fair procedures. We also discuss process improvement suggestions from our participants and important future research opportunities.

Given the importance of research resource allocation within brokerage firms, we examine key factors that influence the issuance of individual versus team analyst reports. Using a comprehensive sample of analyst reports from China for the 2008–2021 period, we find that this decision is influenced by (1) the brokerage firm's client interests, whereby firms held by the brokerage firm's mutual fund clients and firms that are the brokerage firm's underwriting clients receive more team than individual reports from the brokerage firm, and (2) the nature of corporate events, whereby routine events receive more team reports and nonroutine events receive more individual reports. Additional analyses suggest that analysts' personal traits and analyst team characteristics also affect the decision. Our findings further the understanding of the factors that affect the organization and resource allocation of sell-side equity research.

Academic research investigating the economic consequences of tax avoidance is almost always interested in the consequences of intentional, deliberate actions undertaken to reduce taxes relative to income. Therefore, it is crucial that such research distinguishes between intentional and incidental tax avoidance, since failure to do so can create endogeneity concerns and lead to incomplete and incorrect economic inferences. In this paper, we first develop a framework that conceptually defines and distinguishes between intentional and incidental tax avoidance. We highlight that the endogeneity problem arises because intentional tax avoidance is not directly observable. We consider two approaches to mitigating endogeneity concerns and apply these approaches by reexamining two influential studies that investigate the economic consequences of tax avoidance. We show how controlling for past accounting losses eliminates the effect of tax avoidance on credit spreads (Hasan et al. 2014, Journal of Financial Economics, 113(1), 109–130) and how using an instrumental variables approach changes the sign of the relation between tax sheltering and stock price crash risk (Kim et al., 2011, Journal of Financial Economics, 100(3), 639–662). Overall, our paper punctuates the importance of both (1) conceptually distinguishing between incidental and intentional tax avoidance and (2) econometrically addressing the challenges that arise when empirical differentiation between incidental and intentional tax avoidance is important to the research question.

Our study reveals that financial analysts issue more pessimistic forecasts for their investment banking clients' competitors than for unrelated firms. Our evidence is consistent with this behavior stemming from analysts' strategic incentives rather than their true beliefs. We find that analysts' pessimism for the client's competitors is more pronounced when the client is more important to analysts' brokerage houses, when high uncertainty prevents competitors from detecting analysts' strategic motives, and when analysts' brokerage houses are less prestigious. Additionally, we explore the economic consequences of the pessimism from the perspectives of the covered firms, brokerage houses, and financial analysts. Finally, we consider the impact of the 2003 Global Analyst Research Settlement. Overall, our results demonstrate that issuing pessimistic forecasts for clients' competitors is an understudied channel through which analysts curry favor with their investment banking clients.

Financial reporting fraud continues to cost companies millions of dollars annually and is a major source of concern for regulators, stakeholders, and auditors. While academic research has largely focused on external auditors' fraud detection efforts, we analyze whether auditors can help prevent occurrences of fraud through low-cost reputational signals of higher “strategic reasoning”; strategic reasoning refers to strategies that individuals take in light of the anticipated actions of others (see van der Hoek et al., 2005, A logic for strategic reasoning, AAMAS '05, 157−164). Specifically, we consider the potential impact on manager behavior of signaling whether audit professionals use zero-, first-, and second-order audit approaches. Zero-order audit approaches involve making decisions based mostly on the auditor's incentives, first-order approaches involve decisions based mostly on the client's incentives, and second- or higher-order audit approaches involve decisions based on the client's incentives while recognizing that the client will respond to the auditor's decisions (see Wilks & Zimbelman, 2004, Accounting Horizons, 18(3), 173–184). Using a context-rich experiment in which manager participants have no history of interacting with the auditor, we find that the likelihood of fraud occurring is lower when it is signaled that audit partners and their teams use a first- or second-order strategic audit approach compared to a zero-order approach, due to an increase in the perceived likelihood of the auditor detecting fraud. We also consider whether signaling an auditor's level of strategic reasoning influences the level of effort used to conceal fraud and find an increase in the expected level of fraud effort for managers in the first- and second-order audit conditions.

Prior literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency generally overlooks the connection between firms' financial and managerial reporting systems. As a result, it is difficult to determine whether increases in the quality of firms' internal information environments (IIQ) and/or the quality of their external information environments (EIQ) explain improvements in investment efficiency following financial reporting changes. Leveraging the transition window to the new lease standard (Accounting Standards Codification [ASC] 842), we use a difference-in-differences design and find that firms that materially change their internal controls due to ASC 842 (treatment firms) significantly improve their investment efficiency in the final year of the transition window. Multiple falsification tests rule out that contemporaneous improvements in treatment firms' EIQ explain our finding. Additional channel analyses suggest the increases in IIQ for treatment firms predominantly alleviate moral hazard risk between central and divisional managers within the firm, leading to a reduction in empire building. Our findings extend the literature on the relationship between financial reporting and investment efficiency. They also contribute to the literature on the consequences of ASC 842 by answering the FASB's call for research on how ASC 842 affects firms' asset utilizations.

The United Kingdom mandated expanded audit reports in two waves, starting in 2013 and 2017, respectively. Prior studies of the first wave, which included large and highly regulated companies, concluded that expanded reports have limited incremental value. We focus on the second wave, which included companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The AIM is characterized by emerging companies that are smaller, riskier, and subject to lighter regulatory requirements and to private monitoring. We examine whether investors and other stakeholders benefit from expanded reports in this setting. We document that AIM companies have shorter expanded reports and fewer key audit matters. Next, we demonstrate that these reports have negligible incremental information value for investors or consequences for the quality and cost of audits. Finally, although we find that some variations in the expanded reports' content are associated with investor reactions to the annual report and with audit fees, variations in external monitoring and company size do not play an incremental role. By focusing on a set of companies with weaker information environments, our findings help to extend the conclusions from prior studies about the limited incremental value of expanded reports.

Academic and anecdotal evidence suggests that acquirers prefer to record higher goodwill values in business combinations so they can benefit from higher post-acquisition earnings when goodwill is only tested for impairment. We conduct multiple experiments to test the hypothesis that this perspective ignores two costs that acquirers may also consider. Specifically, goodwill generally carries negative market perceptions and is associated with a risk of costly future impairment losses. Our results indicate that consideration of these two costs offsets acquirers' preferences for the earnings benefit of upwardly biasing goodwill. We also document that when there is no earnings benefit from higher goodwill valuations—namely, in a setting where goodwill is amortized to expense—we observe acquirers downwardly biasing goodwill values. Overall, our findings add nuance to our understanding of managerial discretion in the context of business combinations.

Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.