Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献

We use multiple methods to examine how depletion and auditors' skeptical dispositions interact to affect auditors' challenging of managers in negotiations over financial statement amounts. We expect auditors are likely depleted from effortfully exercising self-regulation during the busy times when these negotiations occur. Individuals in a depleted state tilt toward natural, less effortful behaviors. Thus, we posit that the effects of depletion will diverge depending on the auditor's skeptical disposition—a determinant of how natural or effortful they will find the skeptical behaviors (e.g., challenging) versus client service behaviors (e.g., maintaining the client relationship and audit efficiency) required for negotiations. We predict that client service auditors (i.e., low skeptics) will challenge managers less in negotiations when depleted versus non-depleted, while high skeptic auditors will challenge more when depleted. We test this interactive prediction in an abstract experiment where we manipulate depletion and measure auditors' skeptical dispositions using trait skepticism. Findings support our predictions. We also develop a new measure of auditors' client service–skeptic disposition based on the skepticism literature that adds nuance to the traditional lower versus higher skeptic labels. In a second study, interviews with audit partners validate the realism of our depletion and client service–skeptic constructs and corroborate our experimental findings. Our study sheds light on depletion effects in auditors' negotiations with their clients and how the effects differ based on auditor personalities.

Using data collected from 21 interviews with audit committee members (ACMs) of Canadian reporting issuers, this study examines the ways in which ACMs understand and enact the additional responsibilities placed on them by regulators in the post–Sarbanes-Oxley Act era. Adopting a social constructivist approach to knowledge and expertise, the study shows that despite the financial literacy requirements for ACMs, financial expertise is far from being uniformly understood by ACMs. Indeed, ACMs perceive expertise in many different ways, which leads them to engage in a wide variety of practices to fulfill their responsibilities on audit committees (ACs). The analysis of the data makes it possible to identify three oversight styles—observing, inspecting, and storytelling—that illustrate the differences in how ACMs understand their role, prepare for AC meetings, invest time in this preparation, and develop lines of questioning. These findings provide empirical insights into both the substantive and symbolic roles of ACs and illustrate the role of knowledge and ignorance in shaping ACMs' understanding of their oversight role. This study also raises questions about the soundness of having ACs oversee multiple different processes. By highlighting that ACMs do not comprehend and enact their role uniformly, this study reveals the important nuances in ACMs' oversight approaches.

We examine a regulatory change that increased the reporting frequency of mutual funds' portfolios. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that firms with greater ownership by mutual funds increase share repurchases following the regulatory change. We show that these share repurchases are a firm's rational response to undervaluation, which occurs because fund managers become shortsighted following the regulation and sell companies with good long-term prospects. Collectively, our results shed light on an unintended consequence of more frequent reporting in a delegated asset management framework.

This study uses machine-learning methods to predict next-period change in profitability based on a model proposed by Penman and Zhang (2004, Working paper, Columbia University and University of California, Berkeley; “PZ”). We find that new machine-learning methods predict out of sample substantially better than traditional regression methods and provide richer interpretations about the role and impact of different predictor variables through their nonlinear relationships and interaction effects. For example, our results contrast with previous research by showing that both components of the DuPont decomposition (change in profit margin and change in asset turnover) are informative of next-period changes in profitability. Our results are robust across different performance metrics, alternative machine-learning models, and software. Furthermore, an unconstrained machine-learning model using a larger feature space could not significantly improve the performance of the PZ model. PZ variables alone accounted for most of the explanatory power of the unconstrained model, suggesting the PZ model is both well specified (in terms of feature selection) and robust in higher dimensional settings. With respect to the economic significance of this information, we find mixed results. The market appears to adjust its expectations more in line with the machine-learning predictions relative to the PZ model but the portfolio returns are not significantly different.

This study examines how principals adjust their control over agents based on their prior controlling experience. According to standard economic theory, principals should be equally willing to decrease their control as they are to increase it. However, I use psychological theory to predict that prior experience with exercising tight control reinforces a principal's belief that agents are self-interested and that they should be controlled. In contrast, I predict that the reinforcement of the belief that agents are socially interested and should not be controlled is weaker for principals who have prior experience with exercising loose control. I test my prediction using an experiment that exposes principals to either an increase or a decrease in the economic costs of control. The results support the predictions by exhibiting an asymmetric adjustment pattern. The data also show theory-consistent conditions under which the asymmetry in principals' control adjustments diminishes. Overall, my study suggests that prolonged experience with exercising high levels of control over agents may cause principals to hold on to their control disproportionally.

We propose financial statement similarity as a measure of financial reporting comparability. The firm-pair version of our measure reflects the degree to which two firms report similar relations within their financial statement items; this version can help managers and market participants identify peer firms. The firm-year version of our measure reflects the degree to which a firm reports financial statement relations that are similar to other members of its industry; this version can help market participants, regulators, and auditors screen firms for further attention. Our measure uses the presence and amounts of almost all financial items reported by a firm. We validate our measure in four sets of analyses to establish concurrent validity and in three sets of analyses to establish predictive validity. In all these tests, we contrast our measure with the comparability measure in De Franco et al. (2011) and a multivariate measure that considers the presence, but not amounts, of financial statement items. Our measure outperforms the alternatives and can be a useful tool for users.

The stated goal of the SEC Whistleblower Program introduced as part of the Dodd-Frank Act was to deter securities violations and thereby to strengthen investor protection. We document significant reductions in the likelihood of financial reporting fraud by US firms following the introduction of this program. The reductions are robust to controlling for other regulatory changes in the Dodd-Frank Act and economic trends. Given that employees of firms with weaker internal compliance and reporting programs are more likely to report irregularities directly to the SEC rather than internally, we predict and find that these firms are more likely to change their reporting behavior. We also show that the observed reductions are attributable to an improvement in internal whistleblower programs and the hiring of more capable audit committee members after the program's inception. Collectively, these findings provide important large-sample evidence of significant benefits of the SEC Whistleblower Program for deterring financial reporting fraud and of the efficacy of bounty-type whistleblower programs.

We investigate how firms' use of derivatives impacts voluntary disclosure and offer four main findings. First, we find that when firms begin using derivative instruments, they increase the frequency of management earnings forecasts. Second, using path analysis, we find a direct link between derivative usage and forecast frequency, as well as an indirect link through reduced earnings volatility. Third, we find that CEOs with more pronounced career concerns increase forecast frequency only when derivatives make earnings easier to forecast and find no evidence that investor demand drives the decision to provide a forecast. These results suggest that the primary mechanism for the association between derivative usage and forecast frequency is a reduction in the manager's costs of providing the forecasts. Finally, we find that the majority of derivative-induced forecasts are uninformative to capital market participants, especially after FAS 161 provided the necessary underlying data to understand how firms use derivatives. Overall, we provide the first empirical evidence that firms that use derivatives issue more management forecasts, but we also find that these incremental forecasts are largely uninformative and appear driven by managerial career concerns.

This study examines the benefits and costs to a company of publicly announcing that it is seeking a potential sale or merger. I find that the announcement leads to increased market attention and a more robust merger and acquisition sales process—the benefits of improved transparency. However, I also find evidence of the announcement alienating stakeholders and increasing business disruption—the costs of credible disclosure. I document the countervailing valuation effects of these benefits and costs, where the net valuation effect depends on whether the company is subsequently acquired. This research is important because it (1) demonstrates the disclosure's impact on the company through multiple channels, (2) estimates the valuation effects, and (3) identifies key considerations for investors and other stakeholders who bear the consequences of such a disclosure.

Motivated by prior literature on organizational identification and 23 semistructured interviews with a variety of US audit partners and directors, we examine whether the gender and ethnic diversity of an office's audit partners influences the retention of the office's audit professionals and the quality of the audits conducted by the office. Using hand-collected data on US audit partners, we find that greater levels of (or changes in) diversity in office audit partners' gender and ethnicity are associated with lower (reduced) turnover among office audit professionals and higher (increased) office-level audit quality. We conduct a path analysis based on the most common mechanisms highlighted in our interviews to provide further insight into the audit quality results. The results indicate partial mediation through increased retention, greater gender and ethnic diversity among office audit personnel, client continuity, and increased efficiency. Further tests reveal that the association with audit quality is incremental to, and distinct from, the effect of individual engagement partner characteristics and does not reflect client screening. The findings underscore the importance of gender and ethnic diversity among office audit partners to organizational outcomes and provide important practical implications for audit firms.