Pub Date : 2023-01-19DOI: 10.1177/00104140231152772
Jan Matti Dollbaum, Graeme B. Robertson
Why do people become opposition activists in authoritarian regimes where dissent invites social censure and can be dangerous? We make a new contribution to answering this classic question: personality. For the first time outside of democratic contexts, we investigate the association between personality traits and opposition activism, arguing that some traits work universally, while others interact with political context. We propose that—as in democracies—high extraversion predicts political activism, regardless of its pro- or anti-regime orientation, and, in particular, that extraversion is critical to explain the shift from online to offline action. We also argue that—contrary to democratic contexts—low agreeableness predicts opposition activism in autocracies, because it reduces the perceived costs of non-conformity. We test these arguments based on two independent survey samples from Russia, a stable authoritarian regime. In a series of statistical tests, including two case-control designs, we find consistent support for all hypotheses.
{"title":"The Activist Personality: Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Opposition Activism in Authoritarian Regimes","authors":"Jan Matti Dollbaum, Graeme B. Robertson","doi":"10.1177/00104140231152772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152772","url":null,"abstract":"Why do people become opposition activists in authoritarian regimes where dissent invites social censure and can be dangerous? We make a new contribution to answering this classic question: personality. For the first time outside of democratic contexts, we investigate the association between personality traits and opposition activism, arguing that some traits work universally, while others interact with political context. We propose that—as in democracies—high extraversion predicts political activism, regardless of its pro- or anti-regime orientation, and, in particular, that extraversion is critical to explain the shift from online to offline action. We also argue that—contrary to democratic contexts—low agreeableness predicts opposition activism in autocracies, because it reduces the perceived costs of non-conformity. We test these arguments based on two independent survey samples from Russia, a stable authoritarian regime. In a series of statistical tests, including two case-control designs, we find consistent support for all hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1695 - 1723"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44946298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-17DOI: 10.1177/00104140231152759
Alon Yakter
While support for redistribution remains high across Europe, voting for left-wing parties, traditionally identified with this agenda, has been under par. Past research explains this puzzle by class-based disagreements about redistributive priorities and by second-dimension attitudes. These explanations, however, assume coherent voter preferences reacting to structural changes. By contrast, I argue that part of the puzzle also lies in attitudinal ambivalence—simultaneous negative and positive evaluations—regarding redistributive policy. Using cross-sectional public opinion and party position data, I find that such ambivalence increases with lower political sophistication, greater value conflict, and weaker economic need. Electorally, it deepens detachment between support for redistribution and left-wing self-identification and increases voting for more economically and culturally right-wing parties. These patterns hold independently of class differences and second-dimension attitudes and replicate stably in earlier data. The findings contribute to ongoing debates about attitude structures and voting patterns and illuminate an additional challenge for economically progressive parties.
{"title":"Attitudinal Ambivalence on Redistribution: Causes and Electoral Implications Across Europe","authors":"Alon Yakter","doi":"10.1177/00104140231152759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152759","url":null,"abstract":"While support for redistribution remains high across Europe, voting for left-wing parties, traditionally identified with this agenda, has been under par. Past research explains this puzzle by class-based disagreements about redistributive priorities and by second-dimension attitudes. These explanations, however, assume coherent voter preferences reacting to structural changes. By contrast, I argue that part of the puzzle also lies in attitudinal ambivalence—simultaneous negative and positive evaluations—regarding redistributive policy. Using cross-sectional public opinion and party position data, I find that such ambivalence increases with lower political sophistication, greater value conflict, and weaker economic need. Electorally, it deepens detachment between support for redistribution and left-wing self-identification and increases voting for more economically and culturally right-wing parties. These patterns hold independently of class differences and second-dimension attitudes and replicate stably in earlier data. The findings contribute to ongoing debates about attitude structures and voting patterns and illuminate an additional challenge for economically progressive parties.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1631 - 1662"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49656937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1177/00104140231152784
J. D. Bryan
Despite waves of democratic backsliding over the last decade, most global citizens still claim to support democracy. On the other hand, many citizens become more supportive of specific anti-democratic actions when their preferred political side can benefit. How, then, do citizens justify their consistent “explicit support for democracy” with their more malleable support for the implementation of liberal democracy? This paper uses cross-national survey data from 74 countries and two methods—a standard cross-sectional analysis and a within-country variation design—to show that a citizen’s conceptualization of democracy, or what democracy means to them, is subject to partisan-motivated reasoning. In other words, citizens are more likely to conceptualize democracy in illiberal terms, like emphasizing the need for obeying authority, when their preferred political party is in power. The findings suggest one’s conception of democracy can be a fluid attitude that citizens mold to match their partisan self-interest.
{"title":"What Kind of Democracy Do We All Support? How Partisan Interest Impacts a Citizen’s Conceptualization of Democracy","authors":"J. D. Bryan","doi":"10.1177/00104140231152784","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152784","url":null,"abstract":"Despite waves of democratic backsliding over the last decade, most global citizens still claim to support democracy. On the other hand, many citizens become more supportive of specific anti-democratic actions when their preferred political side can benefit. How, then, do citizens justify their consistent “explicit support for democracy” with their more malleable support for the implementation of liberal democracy? This paper uses cross-national survey data from 74 countries and two methods—a standard cross-sectional analysis and a within-country variation design—to show that a citizen’s conceptualization of democracy, or what democracy means to them, is subject to partisan-motivated reasoning. In other words, citizens are more likely to conceptualize democracy in illiberal terms, like emphasizing the need for obeying authority, when their preferred political party is in power. The findings suggest one’s conception of democracy can be a fluid attitude that citizens mold to match their partisan self-interest.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1597 - 1627"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46353809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-14DOI: 10.1177/00104140231152769
Pedro C. Magalhães, J. K. Skiple, Miguel M. Pereira, Sveinung Arnesen, H. L. Bentsen
How do people respond to different decision-making processes in high courts? One long-standing view suggests that citizens expect courts to be neutral arbiters of legal controversies. Although the relevance of such “myth of legality” has been challenged, we know very little about the relationship between the portrayals of the motives of courts and justices and public attitudes in civil law countries. We explore this question in a pair of experiments in Norway and Portugal where we isolate the effects of different institutional frames from outcome favorability. We find that while partisan frames are detrimental to fairness perceptions and acceptance of decisions, depictions of judicial decision-making that emphasize policy goals do not adversely affect citizens’ responses in comparison with legalistic frames. The results suggest that, even in civil law systems, preserving the myth of legality may not be a necessary condition to elicit public support for judicial decisions.
{"title":"Beyond the Myth of Legality? Framing Effects and Public Reactions to High Court Decisions in Europe","authors":"Pedro C. Magalhães, J. K. Skiple, Miguel M. Pereira, Sveinung Arnesen, H. L. Bentsen","doi":"10.1177/00104140231152769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152769","url":null,"abstract":"How do people respond to different decision-making processes in high courts? One long-standing view suggests that citizens expect courts to be neutral arbiters of legal controversies. Although the relevance of such “myth of legality” has been challenged, we know very little about the relationship between the portrayals of the motives of courts and justices and public attitudes in civil law countries. We explore this question in a pair of experiments in Norway and Portugal where we isolate the effects of different institutional frames from outcome favorability. We find that while partisan frames are detrimental to fairness perceptions and acceptance of decisions, depictions of judicial decision-making that emphasize policy goals do not adversely affect citizens’ responses in comparison with legalistic frames. The results suggest that, even in civil law systems, preserving the myth of legality may not be a necessary condition to elicit public support for judicial decisions.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1537 - 1566"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44067626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-13DOI: 10.1177/00104140231152745
P. Johnson, Shauna N. Gillooly
Why do criminal actors publicly display threatening messages? Studies of organized crime emphasize that criminal actors rely on clandestine networks of influence. Subtle or coded threats are an effective means of extending that influence, but publicizing these threats appears to undermine their chief advantage. We argue that publicized threats broadcast an imagined order, delineating who has a place in society under criminal control, and who does not. To demonstrate this argument, we construct a “grammar of threat” and use this to analyze public threats broadcast by four criminal actors: two groups in Colombia and two in Mexico. The analysis demonstrates that every group projects an order through their threats, but that the order imagined varies by group. Some orders are more clearly ideological; some are more localized or more expansive. These findings highlight the important role of communication—distinct from but often combined with violence—in criminal governance.
{"title":"Grammar of Threat: Governance and Order in Public Threats by Criminal Actors","authors":"P. Johnson, Shauna N. Gillooly","doi":"10.1177/00104140231152745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152745","url":null,"abstract":"Why do criminal actors publicly display threatening messages? Studies of organized crime emphasize that criminal actors rely on clandestine networks of influence. Subtle or coded threats are an effective means of extending that influence, but publicizing these threats appears to undermine their chief advantage. We argue that publicized threats broadcast an imagined order, delineating who has a place in society under criminal control, and who does not. To demonstrate this argument, we construct a “grammar of threat” and use this to analyze public threats broadcast by four criminal actors: two groups in Colombia and two in Mexico. The analysis demonstrates that every group projects an order through their threats, but that the order imagined varies by group. Some orders are more clearly ideological; some are more localized or more expansive. These findings highlight the important role of communication—distinct from but often combined with violence—in criminal governance.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1567 - 1596"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43876252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1177/00104140221089653
Michael Albertus
Patchiness in rural development remains a salient feature of many developed and developing countries that have struggled historically to overcome enormous national disparities in economic structure and well-being. This paper examines how one major, explicit rural policy ostensibly aimed at rural advancement—land reform—can impact uneven development in the countryside. It does so in Italy, where a major land reform redistributed large landholdings to individual peasant families after World War II. Based on original fine-grained data on land redistribution and a geographical regression discontinuity analysis that takes advantage of Italy’s zonal land reform approach, I find that greater land reform fueled comparative underdevelopment and precarity locally over the long term. Several related mechanisms delayed development in land reform zones: a slower transition out of agriculture, lower labor mobility, and an aging demographic. These are generalizable mechanisms that could operate in other cases of land reform beyond Italy.
{"title":"The Persistence of Rural Underdevelopment: Evidence from Land Reform in Italy","authors":"Michael Albertus","doi":"10.1177/00104140221089653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221089653","url":null,"abstract":"Patchiness in rural development remains a salient feature of many developed and developing countries that have struggled historically to overcome enormous national disparities in economic structure and well-being. This paper examines how one major, explicit rural policy ostensibly aimed at rural advancement—land reform—can impact uneven development in the countryside. It does so in Italy, where a major land reform redistributed large landholdings to individual peasant families after World War II. Based on original fine-grained data on land redistribution and a geographical regression discontinuity analysis that takes advantage of Italy’s zonal land reform approach, I find that greater land reform fueled comparative underdevelopment and precarity locally over the long term. Several related mechanisms delayed development in land reform zones: a slower transition out of agriculture, lower labor mobility, and an aging demographic. These are generalizable mechanisms that could operate in other cases of land reform beyond Italy.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"65 - 100"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48405952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-24DOI: 10.1177/00104140221139389
Z. Lei
Does the patron-client connection between local governments and their superiors improve or hurt the local economic development? Although recent research suggests that patron-client connections boost local economic performance, this paper investigates the potential costs and risks of connection-driven economic development. With a difference-in-differences design applied to Chinese prefecture-level cities, I find that politically connected cities were more likely to win their superior’s support to obtain the projects approved by the four-trillion-Yuan stimulus enacted in 2008 and increased the city’s public investment in infrastructure. Meanwhile, these politically connected cities accumulated more public debts than other unconnected cities. Furthermore, those cities that lacked such political connections were more likely to promote private investment by introducing business-friendly policies. These results show that patron-client connections make an economic development model that features government investment and public debts more possible than the one that depends on vibrant entrepreneurship and private investment.
{"title":"The Political Resource Blessing or Curse? Patronage Networks, Infrastructure Investment, and Economic Development in China","authors":"Z. Lei","doi":"10.1177/00104140221139389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221139389","url":null,"abstract":"Does the patron-client connection between local governments and their superiors improve or hurt the local economic development? Although recent research suggests that patron-client connections boost local economic performance, this paper investigates the potential costs and risks of connection-driven economic development. With a difference-in-differences design applied to Chinese prefecture-level cities, I find that politically connected cities were more likely to win their superior’s support to obtain the projects approved by the four-trillion-Yuan stimulus enacted in 2008 and increased the city’s public investment in infrastructure. Meanwhile, these politically connected cities accumulated more public debts than other unconnected cities. Furthermore, those cities that lacked such political connections were more likely to promote private investment by introducing business-friendly policies. These results show that patron-client connections make an economic development model that features government investment and public debts more possible than the one that depends on vibrant entrepreneurship and private investment.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1156 - 1188"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49516562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-23DOI: 10.1177/00104140221139375
A. Walter, P. Emmenegger
Do ethnic majorities and minorities have diverging preferences for fiscal capacity? Do these preferences converge during national emergencies such as interstate war? In this paper, we provide evidence from a natural experiment to demonstrate that politically salient minority-majority divisions undermine the development of fiscal capacity. In addition, we show that the pressure of interstate war is insufficient to supersede differences in support for the expansion of state’s capacity for taxation between majority and minority groups. More specifically, we employ a regression discontinuity design using a natural border that separates linguistic groups and municipality outcomes of a popular vote on the introduction of direct taxation at federal level in Switzerland during the First World War. The findings suggest that salient minority-majority divisions have a negative effect on the expansion of states’ capacity for taxation even during periods of interstate war.
{"title":"Ethnic Minorities, Interstate War, and Popular Support for Fiscal Capacity Development","authors":"A. Walter, P. Emmenegger","doi":"10.1177/00104140221139375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221139375","url":null,"abstract":"Do ethnic majorities and minorities have diverging preferences for fiscal capacity? Do these preferences converge during national emergencies such as interstate war? In this paper, we provide evidence from a natural experiment to demonstrate that politically salient minority-majority divisions undermine the development of fiscal capacity. In addition, we show that the pressure of interstate war is insufficient to supersede differences in support for the expansion of state’s capacity for taxation between majority and minority groups. More specifically, we employ a regression discontinuity design using a natural border that separates linguistic groups and municipality outcomes of a popular vote on the introduction of direct taxation at federal level in Switzerland during the First World War. The findings suggest that salient minority-majority divisions have a negative effect on the expansion of states’ capacity for taxation even during periods of interstate war.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1365 - 1397"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42851995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-22DOI: 10.1177/00104140221141833
A. Menon
Do refugees reshape long-term political behavior in receiving areas? I argue that forced migration can foster a strong group identity among refugees, which can mobilize them toward political parties that champion their identity-based grievances. To test this argument, I examine how one of the largest forced migrations in modern history, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany after WWII, shaped their electoral behavior over time. Using an original database of district-level data from 32 elections spanning a century, I find that communities which received greater shares of expellees remain more supportive of the expellees’ political champions—the radical right—over time. This relationship is particularly manifested when identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. Mechanism evidence, including novel data on expellee monuments and associations, suggests that a durable expellee identity helps account for these results. My analysis reveals an enduring behavioral legacy resulting from forced migration.
{"title":"The Political Legacy of Forced Migration: Evidence from Post-WWII Germany","authors":"A. Menon","doi":"10.1177/00104140221141833","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221141833","url":null,"abstract":"Do refugees reshape long-term political behavior in receiving areas? I argue that forced migration can foster a strong group identity among refugees, which can mobilize them toward political parties that champion their identity-based grievances. To test this argument, I examine how one of the largest forced migrations in modern history, the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany after WWII, shaped their electoral behavior over time. Using an original database of district-level data from 32 elections spanning a century, I find that communities which received greater shares of expellees remain more supportive of the expellees’ political champions—the radical right—over time. This relationship is particularly manifested when identity-based grievances are unresolved and politically salient. Mechanism evidence, including novel data on expellee monuments and associations, suggests that a durable expellee identity helps account for these results. My analysis reveals an enduring behavioral legacy resulting from forced migration.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1398 - 1432"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42000078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-21DOI: 10.1177/00104140221141837
A. Getmansky, Chagai M. Weiss
Does war-time military service affect partisan preferences? We argue that military service increases the salience and potential costs of war. Therefore, soldiers who serve during mismanaged wars will associate the ruling party with incompetence and be less likely to support the ruling party in the future. To test our argument, we analyze almost 50 years of Israel National Election Studies. Employing a regression discontinuity design, we show that compared with respondents who were too young to serve in the Yom Kippur war, respondents just old enough to serve report lower support for the Labor party well after the war ended. This effect is likely driven by soldiers’ unwillingness to support a party they associate with security incompetence. We further show that the negative effect of military service does not materialize in well-managed wars, contributing to the literature on the political consequences of war and attitude formation.
{"title":"War-Time Military Service Can Affect Partisan Preferences","authors":"A. Getmansky, Chagai M. Weiss","doi":"10.1177/00104140221141837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221141837","url":null,"abstract":"Does war-time military service affect partisan preferences? We argue that military service increases the salience and potential costs of war. Therefore, soldiers who serve during mismanaged wars will associate the ruling party with incompetence and be less likely to support the ruling party in the future. To test our argument, we analyze almost 50 years of Israel National Election Studies. Employing a regression discontinuity design, we show that compared with respondents who were too young to serve in the Yom Kippur war, respondents just old enough to serve report lower support for the Labor party well after the war ended. This effect is likely driven by soldiers’ unwillingness to support a party they associate with security incompetence. We further show that the negative effect of military service does not materialize in well-managed wars, contributing to the literature on the political consequences of war and attitude formation.","PeriodicalId":10600,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Studies","volume":"56 1","pages":"1475 - 1505"},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48839179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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