Antidumping laws have existed in some form since the early twentieth century. Ostensibly aimed at protecting domestic producers from unfair trade practices, they have frequently been used as weapons of protectionism even when dumping has not occurred. When this happens, some special interest group gains at the expense of the general public. Studies have found that antidumping laws result in a negative-sum game, since the losses exceed the gains, an outcome that violates utilitarian ethical principles. Antidumping laws also violate property and contract rights, since they prevent consenting adults from trading the property they have for the property they want. This paper begins with a review of the theory and practice of antidumping laws, then proceeds to apply ethical principles to determine whether individuals who launch antidumping investigations are acting ethically and concludes that President Barack Obama “needs to be bold on trade” by starting out with correcting the popular view that “dumping” is bad and those who dump should be penalized. Frederic Bastiat pointed out the fallacy of this view in 1845, yet the view is not only still with many American politicians but widely believed to be true among U.S. domestic manufacturers. President Obama should proclaim the following: In a free enterprise economic system, domestic producers have no inherent claim on the funds of consumers. The only ethical way of obtaining consumer funds is through voluntary trade. Using the force of government to obtain the funds (by prohibiting foreign suppliers from competing) puts domestic producers in the role of the aggressor, and in fact makes consumers the real victims. That is exactly what happens when a domestic producer appeals to the government to request an anti-dumping investigation against some foreign producer that is merely taking away business. Therefore, all anti-dumping laws and policies should be abrogated to promote freer trade. A bibliography containing links to more than 100 trade articles is also included.
{"title":"Antidumping Laws Should Be Consigned to the History Books","authors":"Robert W. McGee, Yeomin Yoon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2861270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2861270","url":null,"abstract":"Antidumping laws have existed in some form since the early twentieth century. Ostensibly aimed at protecting domestic producers from unfair trade practices, they have frequently been used as weapons of protectionism even when dumping has not occurred. When this happens, some special interest group gains at the expense of the general public. Studies have found that antidumping laws result in a negative-sum game, since the losses exceed the gains, an outcome that violates utilitarian ethical principles. Antidumping laws also violate property and contract rights, since they prevent consenting adults from trading the property they have for the property they want. This paper begins with a review of the theory and practice of antidumping laws, then proceeds to apply ethical principles to determine whether individuals who launch antidumping investigations are acting ethically and concludes that President Barack Obama “needs to be bold on trade” by starting out with correcting the popular view that “dumping” is bad and those who dump should be penalized. Frederic Bastiat pointed out the fallacy of this view in 1845, yet the view is not only still with many American politicians but widely believed to be true among U.S. domestic manufacturers. President Obama should proclaim the following: In a free enterprise economic system, domestic producers have no inherent claim on the funds of consumers. The only ethical way of obtaining consumer funds is through voluntary trade. Using the force of government to obtain the funds (by prohibiting foreign suppliers from competing) puts domestic producers in the role of the aggressor, and in fact makes consumers the real victims. That is exactly what happens when a domestic producer appeals to the government to request an anti-dumping investigation against some foreign producer that is merely taking away business. Therefore, all anti-dumping laws and policies should be abrogated to promote freer trade. A bibliography containing links to more than 100 trade articles is also included.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126399078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The complexity and subjectivity of the judgement task conceals the existence of biases that undermines the quality of the process. This paper presents a weighted aggregation function that attempts to reduce the influence of biased judgements on the final score. We also discuss a set of desirable properties. The proposed weighted aggregation function is able to correct the "nationalism bias" found by Emerson et al. (2009) in the 2000 Olympic Games diving competition and suggest the possibility of a reputation bias. Our results can be applied to judgement sports and other activities that require the aggregation of several personal evaluations.
{"title":"Judgement and Ranking: Living with Hidden Bias","authors":"António M. Osório C.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2844486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2844486","url":null,"abstract":"The complexity and subjectivity of the judgement task conceals the existence of biases that undermines the quality of the process. This paper presents a weighted aggregation function that attempts to reduce the influence of biased judgements on the final score. We also discuss a set of desirable properties. The proposed weighted aggregation function is able to correct the \"nationalism bias\" found by Emerson et al. (2009) in the 2000 Olympic Games diving competition and suggest the possibility of a reputation bias. Our results can be applied to judgement sports and other activities that require the aggregation of several personal evaluations.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133730343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After the contentious electoral policy 2011-12 in Russia the new reform of party's legislation was conducted, that led to an increase in the number of political parties. Currently, 77 officially registered political parties are in the country. However, the regional legislative elections in 2012-2015 demonstrate the limited representation of the new party-political interests. When a relatively large electoral volatility party system is still limited pluralistic (mostly system of "4 2"), and dominant mixed electoral system in regions does not allow small parties hold their deputies in the regional parliaments. The study of regional elections of 2012-2015 shows that the main reason for the limited representation is exclusive institutional design of electoral politics. This institutional design at the elections of the State Duma deputies in 2016, appears to be the main reason for the formation of "pluralism without representation" at the federal level.
{"title":"Governance of Electoral Policy in Russia: New Political Parties and Institutional Limits for Representation","authors":"L. Smorgunov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2940703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940703","url":null,"abstract":"After the contentious electoral policy 2011-12 in Russia the new reform of party's legislation was conducted, that led to an increase in the number of political parties. Currently, 77 officially registered political parties are in the country. However, the regional legislative elections in 2012-2015 demonstrate the limited representation of the new party-political interests. When a relatively large electoral volatility party system is still limited pluralistic (mostly system of \"4 2\"), and dominant mixed electoral system in regions does not allow small parties hold their deputies in the regional parliaments. The study of regional elections of 2012-2015 shows that the main reason for the limited representation is exclusive institutional design of electoral politics. This institutional design at the elections of the State Duma deputies in 2016, appears to be the main reason for the formation of \"pluralism without representation\" at the federal level.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116871942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Fiscal Model of Presidential Elections, as modified after its failure to forecast President Obama’s reelection in 2012, accounts for all but three out of sample retrodictions since 1916. This year, its point forecast has the incumbent Democrats losing with 48.2% of the two-party vote.
总统选举的财政模型(Fiscal Model of Presidential Elections)在预测奥巴马总统2012年的连任失败后进行了修改，自1916年以来，除了三次之外，其他所有的样本预测都是正确的。今年，该机构预测现任民主党将以48.2%的两党选票落败。
{"title":"Fiscal Model Forecast for the 2016 Presidential Election","authors":"Alfred G. Cuzán","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2821878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2821878","url":null,"abstract":"The Fiscal Model of Presidential Elections, as modified after its failure to forecast President Obama’s reelection in 2012, accounts for all but three out of sample retrodictions since 1916. This year, its point forecast has the incumbent Democrats losing with 48.2% of the two-party vote.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125438231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research project was supported by the Australian Research Council DECRA funding scheme to Dr. Carolien van Ham, project number RG142911, project name DE150101692, and by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; by Swedish Research Council, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden and Jan Teorell, Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden; by Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to Wallenberg Academy Fellow Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Varieties of Democracy Annual Conference, Gothenburg, 26-28 May 2015; and the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 3-6 September 2015. We thank Jennifer Gandhi, Nancy Bermeo, Adam Glynn, Matthew Wilson, Staffan Darnolf, Gerald Munck, John Gerring, and other participants for their highly valuable and insightful comments. Any remaining errors are of course, our own.
本研究项目由澳大利亚研究理事会DECRA资助Carolien van Ham博士，项目编号RG142911，项目名称DE150101692, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg，瑞典哥德堡大学V-Dem研究所;瑞典研究理事会，PI:瑞典哥德堡大学V-Dem研究所Staffan I. Lindberg和瑞典隆德大学政治学系Jan Teorell;由克努特和爱丽丝·瓦伦堡基金会赠送给瑞典哥德堡大学V-Dem研究所瓦伦堡学院研究员斯塔凡·林德伯格。本文的早期版本已于2015年5月26日至28日在哥德堡举行的民主多样性年会上发表;美国政治科学协会年会，旧金山，2015年9月3-6日。我们感谢Jennifer Gandhi、Nancy Bermeo、Adam Glynn、Matthew Wilson、Staffan Darnolf、Gerald Munck、John Gerring和其他与会者非常宝贵和富有洞察力的评论。剩下的错误当然是我们自己的。
{"title":"Choosing from the Menu of Manipulation Explaining Incumbents’ Choices of Electoral Manipulation Tactics","authors":"Carolien van Ham, S. Lindberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2788475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2788475","url":null,"abstract":"This research project was supported by the Australian Research Council DECRA funding scheme to Dr. Carolien van Ham, project number RG142911, project name DE150101692, and by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; by Swedish Research Council, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden and Jan Teorell, Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden; by Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to Wallenberg Academy Fellow Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Varieties of Democracy Annual Conference, Gothenburg, 26-28 May 2015; and the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 3-6 September 2015. We thank Jennifer Gandhi, Nancy Bermeo, Adam Glynn, Matthew Wilson, Staffan Darnolf, Gerald Munck, John Gerring, and other participants for their highly valuable and insightful comments. Any remaining errors are of course, our own.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123491481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does American political representation work as predicted by theory? On average, political candidates diverge considerably in their ideological positioning, but do they diverge less on issues of particular salience to their local constituents? We combine data on congressional roll call votes, electoral outcomes, district demographics, and substantive information about bills to search for convergence in the places we would most expect to find it. Despite the predictions of prominent models, legislators diverge just as much even when their constituents have strong interests in a particular policy area. These results provide new insights into policymaking and political representation, and they help distinguish between different theoretical explanations for why candidate positions diverge.
{"title":"The Elusive Quest for Convergence","authors":"Anthony Fowler, Andrew B. Hall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2262600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2262600","url":null,"abstract":"Does American political representation work as predicted by theory? On average, political candidates diverge considerably in their ideological positioning, but do they diverge less on issues of particular salience to their local constituents? We combine data on congressional roll call votes, electoral outcomes, district demographics, and substantive information about bills to search for convergence in the places we would most expect to find it. Despite the predictions of prominent models, legislators diverge just as much even when their constituents have strong interests in a particular policy area. These results provide new insights into policymaking and political representation, and they help distinguish between different theoretical explanations for why candidate positions diverge.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129208910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What explains the cross-national variation in inflation rates in developed countries? Previous literature has emphasised the role of ideas and institutions, and to a lesser extent interest groups, while leaving the role of electoral politics comparatively unexplored. This paper seeks to redress this neglect by focusing on one case where electoral politics matters for inflation: the share of the population above 65 years old in a country. I argue that countries with a larger share of elderly have lower inflation because older people are both more inflation averse and politically powerful, forcing governments to pursue lower inflation. I test my argument in three steps. First, logistic regression analysis of survey data confirms older people are more inflation averse. Second, panel data regression analysis of party manifesto data reveals that European countries with more old people have more economically orthodox political parties. Third, time series cross-section regression analyses demonstrate that the share of the elderly is negatively correlated with inflation in both a sample of 21 advanced OECD economies and a larger sample of 175 countries. Ageing may therefore push governments to adopt a low inflation regime.
{"title":"The Impact of the Elderly on Inflation Rates in Developed Countries","authors":"Tim Vlandas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2756584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2756584","url":null,"abstract":"What explains the cross-national variation in inflation rates in developed countries? Previous literature has emphasised the role of ideas and institutions, and to a lesser extent interest groups, while leaving the role of electoral politics comparatively unexplored. This paper seeks to redress this neglect by focusing on one case where electoral politics matters for inflation: the share of the population above 65 years old in a country. I argue that countries with a larger share of elderly have lower inflation because older people are both more inflation averse and politically powerful, forcing governments to pursue lower inflation. I test my argument in three steps. First, logistic regression analysis of survey data confirms older people are more inflation averse. Second, panel data regression analysis of party manifesto data reveals that European countries with more old people have more economically orthodox political parties. Third, time series cross-section regression analyses demonstrate that the share of the elderly is negatively correlated with inflation in both a sample of 21 advanced OECD economies and a larger sample of 175 countries. Ageing may therefore push governments to adopt a low inflation regime.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123953481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ruling elite is one of the main actors of the political process. The leading position of the political elite in societies in transformation allows this actor to determine the amount of possible changes in the system. Analysis of the characteristics of the reproduction of the ruling elite in transforming conditions allows to diagnose the amount and direction of change in the social system. The study analyzes the specific features of reproduction of the political elite as a self-referential system.
{"title":"The Self-Referential Reproduction of Élites in Transformational Political System","authors":"N. Ponomarenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2755491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2755491","url":null,"abstract":"The ruling elite is one of the main actors of the political process. The leading position of the political elite in societies in transformation allows this actor to determine the amount of possible changes in the system. Analysis of the characteristics of the reproduction of the ruling elite in transforming conditions allows to diagnose the amount and direction of change in the social system. The study analyzes the specific features of reproduction of the political elite as a self-referential system.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115349502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the determinants of alignment in bilateral partnerships. While it was impossible to think about international cooperation without referring to the term “alliances” during much of the Cold War period, strategic partnerships have taken a central place in many states’ diplomatic tool kits over the past two decades. This paper sheds light on such international alignment decisions by examining the case of China’s partnership diplomacy in the period from 1990 to 2014. Theoretically, the analysis draws on scholarly insights about alliance formation and international cooperation to formulate two broad assumptions about partner choice, which are based on interest‐driven and ideology‐based rationales of alignment. Binary regression estimations highlight the importance of economic interests in explaining partnership onset. In contrast to common arguments about alliance formation, partnerships seem to be less driven by shared domestic ideologies. In fact, bilateral partnerships help bridge ideological gaps, enabling the partners’ pursuit of economic gains and diplomatic preferences, at least in the case of China.
{"title":"International Alignment between Interests and Ideology: The Case of China's Partnership Diplomacy","authors":"Georg Strüver","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2786635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2786635","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the determinants of alignment in bilateral partnerships. While it was impossible to think about international cooperation without referring to the term “alliances” during much of the Cold War period, strategic partnerships have taken a central place in many states’ diplomatic tool kits over the past two decades. This paper sheds light on such international alignment decisions by examining the case of China’s partnership diplomacy in the period from 1990 to 2014. Theoretically, the analysis draws on scholarly insights about alliance formation and international cooperation to formulate two broad assumptions about partner choice, which are based on interest‐driven and ideology‐based rationales of alignment. Binary regression estimations highlight the importance of economic interests in explaining partnership onset. In contrast to common arguments about alliance formation, partnerships seem to be less driven by shared domestic ideologies. In fact, bilateral partnerships help bridge ideological gaps, enabling the partners’ pursuit of economic gains and diplomatic preferences, at least in the case of China.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128994313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The International Monetary Fund is one of the largest international organizations using a weighted voting system. The weights of its 188 members are determined by a fixed amount of basic votes plus some extra votes for so-called Special Drawing Rights (SDR). On January 26, 2016, the conditions for the SDRs were increased at the 14th General Quota Review, which drastically changed the corresponding voting weights. However, since the share of voting weights in general is not equal to the influence, of a committee member on the committees overall decision, so-called power indices were introduced. So far the power distribution of the IMF was only computed by either approximation procedures or smaller games than then entire Board of Governors consisting of 188 members. We improve existing algorithms, based on dynamic programming, for the computation of power indices and provide the exact results for the IMF Board of Governors before and after the increase of voting weights. Tuned low-level details of the algorithms allow the repeated routine with sparse computational resources and can of course be applied to other large voting bodies. It turned out that the Banzhaf power shares are rather sensitive to changes of the quota.
{"title":"Computing the Power Distribution in the IMF","authors":"Sascha Kurz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2742118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742118","url":null,"abstract":"The International Monetary Fund is one of the largest international organizations using a weighted voting system. The weights of its 188 members are determined by a fixed amount of basic votes plus some extra votes for so-called Special Drawing Rights (SDR). On January 26, 2016, the conditions for the SDRs were increased at the 14th General Quota Review, which drastically changed the corresponding voting weights. However, since the share of voting weights in general is not equal to the influence, of a committee member on the committees overall decision, so-called power indices were introduced. So far the power distribution of the IMF was only computed by either approximation procedures or smaller games than then entire Board of Governors consisting of 188 members. We improve existing algorithms, based on dynamic programming, for the computation of power indices and provide the exact results for the IMF Board of Governors before and after the increase of voting weights. Tuned low-level details of the algorithms allow the repeated routine with sparse computational resources and can of course be applied to other large voting bodies. It turned out that the Banzhaf power shares are rather sensitive to changes of the quota.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134235534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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