This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of path-persistence and consistency. We show that farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations always exist and that any singleton farsighted stable set with common expectations is a farsighted stable set with heterogeneous expectations. We characterize singleton farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states that can be supported as singleton farsighted stable sets.
{"title":"Farsighted Stability With Heterogeneous Expectations","authors":"Francis Bloch, A. Nouweland","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3400094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3400094","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of path-persistence and consistency. We show that farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations always exist and that any singleton farsighted stable set with common expectations is a farsighted stable set with heterogeneous expectations. We characterize singleton farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states that can be supported as singleton farsighted stable sets.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123645206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Approximately one in forty adult U.S. citizens has lost their right to vote, either temporarily or permanently, as a result of a felony conviction. Because laws restricting voting by felons and ex-felons disproportionately affect minorities, and minorities tend to vote for Democratic candidates, it has been hypothesized that felony disenfranchisement hurts Democratic candidates in elections, thus helping Republican candidates. We test this hypothesis using variation in felony disenfranchisement laws across U.S. states and over time. During the 2000s, a number of states restored the voting rights of ex-felons. Using difference-in-differences regressions, we estimate the effect of laws reenfranchising ex-felons on the vote shares of major party candidates in elections for seats to the U.S. House of Representatives. We argue that the regression estimates provide an upper bound for the true effect of restoring voting rights to ex-felons on the vote shares of major party candidates. Using this upper bound, no House majority would have been reversed in any year between 1998 and 2012, had all states allowed ex-felons to vote.
{"title":"The Voting Rights of Ex-Felons and Election Outcomes in the United States","authors":"T. Klumpp, Hugo M Mialon, Michael A. Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2934489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2934489","url":null,"abstract":"Approximately one in forty adult U.S. citizens has lost their right to vote, either temporarily or permanently, as a result of a felony conviction. Because laws restricting voting by felons and ex-felons disproportionately affect minorities, and minorities tend to vote for Democratic candidates, it has been hypothesized that felony disenfranchisement hurts Democratic candidates in elections, thus helping Republican candidates. We test this hypothesis using variation in felony disenfranchisement laws across U.S. states and over time. During the 2000s, a number of states restored the voting rights of ex-felons. Using difference-in-differences regressions, we estimate the effect of laws reenfranchising ex-felons on the vote shares of major party candidates in elections for seats to the U.S. House of Representatives. We argue that the regression estimates provide an upper bound for the true effect of restoring voting rights to ex-felons on the vote shares of major party candidates. Using this upper bound, no House majority would have been reversed in any year between 1998 and 2012, had all states allowed ex-felons to vote.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124080607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
KPMG's discussion of Bribery and Corruption as a Key Audit Matter (KAM) in the Extended Auditor's Reports (EAR) of Rolls-Royce for 2013-2015 is examined as implying limitations on EARs in general. The KAM for Bribery and Corruption was apparently written in view of the company's legal interests rather than from the point of view of what an investor would want to know from a truly independent representative with that kind of privileged access. The Financial Reporting Council has stated that the two purposes of EARs are (i) to inform investors and (ii) to give them greater confidence in the audit. However, (i) the Bribery and Corruption KAM failed significantly to inform investors, while yet, troublingly, giving the impression of informing them. Moreover, (ii) it encouraged a misplaced confidence, in view of the roughly $1 billion in fines and clawbacks in the (generous, highly mitigated) Rolls-Royce Deferred Prosecution Agreements of January 2017.
{"title":"The Illusion of Insight in an Extended Auditor's Report","authors":"M. Pakaluk","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2934682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2934682","url":null,"abstract":"KPMG's discussion of Bribery and Corruption as a Key Audit Matter (KAM) in the Extended Auditor's Reports (EAR) of Rolls-Royce for 2013-2015 is examined as implying limitations on EARs in general. \u0000The KAM for Bribery and Corruption was apparently written in view of the company's legal interests rather than from the point of view of what an investor would want to know from a truly independent representative with that kind of privileged access. \u0000The Financial Reporting Council has stated that the two purposes of EARs are (i) to inform investors and (ii) to give them greater confidence in the audit. However, (i) the Bribery and Corruption KAM failed significantly to inform investors, while yet, troublingly, giving the impression of informing them. Moreover, (ii) it encouraged a misplaced confidence, in view of the roughly $1 billion in fines and clawbacks in the (generous, highly mitigated) Rolls-Royce Deferred Prosecution Agreements of January 2017.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134498401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
President William McKinley’s decision to go to war with Spain is not well understood. Since McKinley kept very few written records, little is known about his actual thought process. As a result, historians have struggled with the apparent contradiction between McKinley’s initial commitment to peace and subsequent decision to go to war and tend to focus on identifying outside forces that can explain the reversal. In this paper, I develop a model of optimal reneging. Contrary to conventional narratives among historians that McKinley’s decision to go to war was a contradiction of his earlier position, my model suggests that McKinley’s decision can be understood as an optimal timing problem. I start with the premise that a country would prefer to enter conflict only when its military capability is sufficient to make a victory likely. Thus, a country will commit to peace until its military capability reaches some threshold. Once military capability reaches this threshold, it is optimal to renege on a commitment to peace. I conduct simulations of the model to determine the likelihood that McKinley would renege during his first term. I find that if the ex ante estimate of the benefits of war were 2 - 2.6 times the ex ante estimate of cost, then the probability of reneging after one year is approximately 1% - 18%. If the perceived benefits were 2.7 times the ex ante estimate of cost (or greater), entry during McKinley’s first term is certain.
{"title":"William McKinley, Optimal Reneging, and the Spanish-American War","authors":"Joshua R. Hendrickson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2927877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927877","url":null,"abstract":"President William McKinley’s decision to go to war with Spain is not well understood. Since McKinley kept very few written records, little is known about his actual thought process. As a result, historians have struggled with the apparent contradiction between McKinley’s initial commitment to peace and subsequent decision to go to war and tend to focus on identifying outside forces that can explain the reversal. In this paper, I develop a model of optimal reneging. Contrary to conventional narratives among historians that McKinley’s decision to go to war was a contradiction of his earlier position, my model suggests that McKinley’s decision can be understood as an optimal timing problem. I start with the premise that a country would prefer to enter conflict only when its military capability is sufficient to make a victory likely. Thus, a country will commit to peace until its military capability reaches some threshold. Once military capability reaches this threshold, it is optimal to renege on a commitment to peace. I conduct simulations of the model to determine the likelihood that McKinley would renege during his first term. I find that if the ex ante estimate of the benefits of war were 2 - 2.6 times the ex ante estimate of cost, then the probability of reneging after one year is approximately 1% - 18%. If the perceived benefits were 2.7 times the ex ante estimate of cost (or greater), entry during McKinley’s first term is certain.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133940742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper deals with the corruption in Indian political system in context of election campaign expenditures. The issue has caught public attention due to the efforts by Prime Minister of India against corruption in public life. Now there is debate in India about the modalities by which greater transparency can be exercised by institutions both political and governmental which can curb use of black money in the election expenses. The paper has discussed shortly about the history of various steps taken by previous national governments in this context, in addition to it the role played by national and corporate financial and legal institutions. The paper has, in short discussed about the prospective changes that can be made by different stakeholders and has also described the various models of election campaigning like ‘state sponsored campaigning’ and ‘national electoral fund’.
{"title":"Reforms in Election Funding in India","authors":"M. Chaudhary, Manoj Kumar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2915025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2915025","url":null,"abstract":"This paper deals with the corruption in Indian political system in context of election campaign expenditures. The issue has caught public attention due to the efforts by Prime Minister of India against corruption in public life. Now there is debate in India about the modalities by which greater transparency can be exercised by institutions both political and governmental which can curb use of black money in the election expenses. The paper has discussed shortly about the history of various steps taken by previous national governments in this context, in addition to it the role played by national and corporate financial and legal institutions. The paper has, in short discussed about the prospective changes that can be made by different stakeholders and has also described the various models of election campaigning like ‘state sponsored campaigning’ and ‘national electoral fund’.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"59 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126121665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the 1990’s, India’s foreign policy has gone through transformation in harmony with the changing global scenario. The disintegration of USSR, demise of the bipolar world and domestic economic problems impelled India to realign its foreign policy and fine-tune its foreign relations of the earlier decades. In modern world of globalization, India has improved its relations with United States and other western countries, established relations with Israel and embraced multilateralism, to solve its major problems on the economic front. India has made progress toward participating in regional multilateral arrangements in both the economic and security realms. It has also expressed support for some major principles of multilateral cooperation. BRICS is one such institution formed for new world order of multilateralism and realigning political grouping BRICS have come together in a political grouping in a way that has far exceeded most expectations. For India, co-operation with the BRICS is more important in terms of addressing its food and energy security issues, and combating terrorism. Engaging China has been one of the important components of India’s foreign policy in recent years. In spite of diversity in culture, geography and political system common interest of development and security in new emerging world order can make this institution even more relevant. The BRICS holds promise of greater understanding and cooperation among the member States also it may develop forum for solving bilateral issues also.
{"title":"India's Foreign Policy and BRICS","authors":"Manoj Kumar, M. Chaudhary","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2908709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2908709","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 1990’s, India’s foreign policy has gone through transformation in harmony with the changing global scenario. The disintegration of USSR, demise of the bipolar world and domestic economic problems impelled India to realign its foreign policy and fine-tune its foreign relations of the earlier decades. In modern world of globalization, India has improved its relations with United States and other western countries, established relations with Israel and embraced multilateralism, to solve its major problems on the economic front. India has made progress toward participating in regional multilateral arrangements in both the economic and security realms. It has also expressed support for some major principles of multilateral cooperation. BRICS is one such institution formed for new world order of multilateralism and realigning political grouping BRICS have come together in a political grouping in a way that has far exceeded most expectations. For India, co-operation with the BRICS is more important in terms of addressing its food and energy security issues, and combating terrorism. Engaging China has been one of the important components of India’s foreign policy in recent years. In spite of diversity in culture, geography and political system common interest of development and security in new emerging world order can make this institution even more relevant. The BRICS holds promise of greater understanding and cooperation among the member States also it may develop forum for solving bilateral issues also.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129031479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Democracy usually is identified by the right to vote. However, in recent times voting procedures have been criticized, as they seemingly do not guarantee that all parts of the population have an adequate voice in the established political process. We suggest invigorating an old but nearly forgotten procedure to overcome this deficit: Aleatoric Democracy based on a combination of voting and random decisions. By using random mechanisms the interests of the whole population are considered. Persons and ideas, being so far disregarded, are taken into account. Democracy becomes vivid and creative, and does not run the danger of being entrenched.
{"title":"Aleatoric Democracy","authors":"B. Frey, M. Osterloh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2905045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2905045","url":null,"abstract":"Democracy usually is identified by the right to vote. However, in recent times voting procedures have been criticized, as they seemingly do not guarantee that all parts of the population have an adequate voice in the established political process. We suggest invigorating an old but nearly forgotten procedure to overcome this deficit: Aleatoric Democracy based on a combination of voting and random decisions. By using random mechanisms the interests of the whole population are considered. Persons and ideas, being so far disregarded, are taken into account. Democracy becomes vivid and creative, and does not run the danger of being entrenched.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127940274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper reexamines Lipset’s theory of democratization, by distinguishing the role of (economic) development from that of education, inequality, and (natural) resources. We highlight two contrasting effects of education and human capital accumulation. On the one side, education prompts economic growth and enriches the budget of the autocratic elite. On the other side, education increases the “awareness” of citizens - capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor-market aspirations - and forces the elite to expand redistribution. Along the lines of this trade-off, our theory provides a Lipsetian explanation of the positive relationship between economic development, education, and democratization, and of the negative relationship between inequality and democratization. Furthermore, we obtain new insights on the resources-curse hypothesis and on the design of effective aid to education.
{"title":"A Lipsetian Theory of Democratization: Development, Education, Inequality, and Resources","authors":"R. Boucekkine, P. Piacquadio, Fabien Prieur","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2914232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2914232","url":null,"abstract":"The paper reexamines Lipset’s theory of democratization, by distinguishing the role of (economic) development from that of education, inequality, and (natural) resources. We highlight two contrasting effects of education and human capital accumulation. On the one side, education prompts economic growth and enriches the budget of the autocratic elite. On the other side, education increases the “awareness” of citizens - capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor-market aspirations - and forces the elite to expand redistribution. Along the lines of this trade-off, our theory provides a Lipsetian explanation of the positive relationship between economic development, education, and democratization, and of the negative relationship between inequality and democratization. Furthermore, we obtain new insights on the resources-curse hypothesis and on the design of effective aid to education.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"1937 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128021703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-11-16DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.44
G. Kirchgässner
For about 45 years, vote and popularity functions have been estimated for many countries, indicating that both voting intentions and actual votes are influenced by economic development. The economy is, of course, not the only and probably not always the most important factor, but there is no doubt anymore that it is an important factor. The most relevant variables are still unemployment and/or real growth, and inflation. The estimated coefficients vary considerably between countries and time periods. In studies done, retrospective sociotropic voting dominates. However, the evidence is not so univocal; rather, it tells that voting has egotropic as well as sociotropic aspects, and it is prospective as well as retrospective. It is still open what roles self-interest and altruism play in voting.
{"title":"Voting and Popularity","authors":"G. Kirchgässner","doi":"10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780190469771.013.44","url":null,"abstract":"For about 45 years, vote and popularity functions have been estimated for many countries, indicating that both voting intentions and actual votes are influenced by economic development. The economy is, of course, not the only and probably not always the most important factor, but there is no doubt anymore that it is an important factor. The most relevant variables are still unemployment and/or real growth, and inflation. The estimated coefficients vary considerably between countries and time periods. In studies done, retrospective sociotropic voting dominates. However, the evidence is not so univocal; rather, it tells that voting has egotropic as well as sociotropic aspects, and it is prospective as well as retrospective. It is still open what roles self-interest and altruism play in voting.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124013430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we examine the impact of political reservations for women on NREGA, India's largest public works program. The 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution mandated for one third of the Panchayats to be randomly assigned for female leaders in the village council. Using detailed data on Panchayat elections, employment and public works expenditure for 9 districts in Uttar Pradesh, we find a significant increase in the demand for work under the program but find no effect in the actual take up of work by both men and women. Further, we find mixed evidence with respect to the type of works taken up by female leaders versus their male counterparts. Our study thus adds to the literature on public works distribution and the role of female leaders in governments.
{"title":"Political Reservation for Women and Delivery of Public Works Program","authors":"Nayana Bose, Shreyasee Das","doi":"10.1111/rode.12336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12336","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine the impact of political reservations for women on NREGA, India's largest public works program. The 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution mandated for one third of the Panchayats to be randomly assigned for female leaders in the village council. Using detailed data on Panchayat elections, employment and public works expenditure for 9 districts in Uttar Pradesh, we find a significant increase in the demand for work under the program but find no effect in the actual take up of work by both men and women. Further, we find mixed evidence with respect to the type of works taken up by female leaders versus their male counterparts. Our study thus adds to the literature on public works distribution and the role of female leaders in governments.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133996446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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