The article challenges the current definitions of "smart contract" which present as a "contract" what is simply an automated form of its performance. And points out that they are "smart" only from the economic point of view of one side of the transaction, which takes advantage of its informational advantage. "Granular norms", instead, are quite common in advanced capitalist markets but increasingly raise concerns about their possible collision with the principle of non-discrimination, especially in the case of consumer goods and services.
{"title":"‘Smart Contracts’, ‘Granular Norms’ and Non-Discrimination","authors":"V. Zeno-Zencovich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3703862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3703862","url":null,"abstract":"The article challenges the current definitions of \"smart contract\" which present as a \"contract\" what is simply an automated form of its performance. And points out that they are \"smart\" only from the economic point of view of one side of the transaction, which takes advantage of its informational advantage. \"Granular norms\", instead, are quite common in advanced capitalist markets but increasingly raise concerns about their possible collision with the principle of non-discrimination, especially in the case of consumer goods and services.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"37 4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79271388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The market size and strength of the major digital platform companies have invited international concern about how such firms should best be regulated to serve the interests of wider society, with a particular emphasis on the need for new anti-trust legislation. Using a normative innovation systems approach, this paper investigates how current anti-trust models may insufficiently address the value-extracting features of existing data-intensive and platform-oriented industry behavior and business models. To do so, we employ the concept of economic rents to investigate how digital platforms create and extract value. Two forms of rent are elaborated: ‘network monopoly rents’ and ‘algorithmic rents’. By identifying such rents more precisely, policymakers and researchers can better direct regulatory investigations, as well as broader industrial and innovation policy approaches, to shape the features of platform-driven digital markets.
{"title":"Public Value and Platform Governance","authors":"M. Mazzucato, J. Entsminger, R. Kattel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3741641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3741641","url":null,"abstract":"The market size and strength of the major digital platform companies have invited international concern about how such firms should best be regulated to serve the interests of wider society, with a particular emphasis on the need for new anti-trust legislation. Using a normative innovation systems approach, this paper investigates how current anti-trust models may insufficiently address the value-extracting features of existing data-intensive and platform-oriented industry behavior and business models. To do so, we employ the concept of economic rents to investigate how digital platforms create and extract value. Two forms of rent are elaborated: ‘network monopoly rents’ and ‘algorithmic rents’. By identifying such rents more precisely, policymakers and researchers can better direct regulatory investigations, as well as broader industrial and innovation policy approaches, to shape the features of platform-driven digital markets.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"124 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74996610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Complex systems are characterized by complex interactions among agents and emergence of complex phenomena that are more or less surprising ex-ante. These emergent phenomena entail harm to individuals and pose risks to the system as such — so-called systemic risk. Complexity poses challenges to regulation. Complex interaction is a challenge for determining causal responsibility and an adequate allocation of legal liabilities, and surprise is a challenge for designing ex-ante regulations to avoid emergent phenomena when they are harmful. This paper explores principles for complexity-robust regulations that proactively can address complexity. Complexity-robust regulation entails complexity-robust legal duties, complexity-robust liability for joint activity, complexity-robust causal concepts, and complexity-robust enforcement. The principles of complexity-robust regulation outlined in this paper can be used in combination and independently.
{"title":"Complexity-Robust Regulation","authors":"P. Østbye","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3700499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700499","url":null,"abstract":"Complex systems are characterized by complex interactions among agents and emergence of complex phenomena that are more or less surprising ex-ante. These emergent phenomena entail harm to individuals and pose risks to the system as such — so-called systemic risk. Complexity poses challenges to regulation. Complex interaction is a challenge for determining causal responsibility and an adequate allocation of legal liabilities, and surprise is a challenge for designing ex-ante regulations to avoid emergent phenomena when they are harmful. This paper explores principles for complexity-robust regulations that proactively can address complexity. Complexity-robust regulation entails complexity-robust legal duties, complexity-robust liability for joint activity, complexity-robust causal concepts, and complexity-robust enforcement. The principles of complexity-robust regulation outlined in this paper can be used in combination and independently.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82485247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent proposals by the neo-Brandeisian School of antitrust seek to ameliorate harms to society created by social media monopolies. While this initiative sounds great on paper, their solutions are inadequate, as they leave the proprietary, profit-seeking structure of social media networking intact. As a result, the neo-Brandeisian framework fails to cope with the harms of Big Social Media networks, such as privacy harms, user manipulation, the amplification of sensational content, the problems of online advertising, digital colonialism, and environmental degradation. This Article argues that social media socialism based on a democratic commons should replace Big Social Media networks. It suggests an interlocking set of tools to decentralize social networks, including network interoperability, data portability, data decentralization, a fully Free and Open Source Software stack, and socialist legal solutions. The guiding framework is based on a People’s Tech model that places ownership and control of social media directly into the hands of the global public. It proposes solutions to (1) force interoperability, data portability, data decentralization, and a Free and Open Source Software stack on social media providers; (2) put rules in place to prevent new business practices that concentrate wealth and power; (3) abolish or amend laws inconsistent with social media socialism; (4) pass strong privacy laws; (5) subsidize the social media commons through a Digital Tech New Deal; (6) form regulatory bodies to regulate social media; (7) formulate solutions jointly with the international community within a decolonial framework designed for global equality, reparations, and environmental sustainability. The Article begins by outlining the harms produced by social media monopolies. Next, it provides a socialist critique of neo-Brandeisian philosophy and its proposals to fix social media. Following that, it explains how commons-based social media decentralization works -- including its history, philosophy, and core components -- using the Fediverse and LibreSocial as case examples. The final section outlines a People's Tech model for social media socialism and addresses possible challenges.
新布兰代斯反垄断学派(new brandeisian School of antitrust)最近提出的建议，试图减轻社交媒体垄断对社会造成的危害。虽然这一举措在纸面上听起来很棒，但他们的解决方案是不够的，因为他们没有改变社交媒体网络的专有、逐利结构。因此，新布兰代斯框架无法应对大型社交媒体网络的危害，如隐私损害、用户操纵、煽情内容的放大、在线广告问题、数字殖民主义和环境恶化。本文认为，基于民主公地的社交媒体社会主义应该取代大型社交媒体网络。它提出了一套相互关联的工具来分散社交网络，包括网络互操作性，数据可移植性，数据去中心化，完全免费和开源软件堆栈，以及社会主义法律解决方案。该指导框架基于“人民科技”模式，将社交媒体的所有权和控制权直接交到全球公众手中。它提出了以下解决方案:(1)在社交媒体提供商上强制互操作性，数据可移植性，数据去中心化以及免费和开源软件堆栈;(2)制定规则，防止财富和权力集中的新商业行为;(3)废除或修改与社交媒体社会主义不符的法律;(4)制定强有力的隐私法;(5)通过数字技术新政补贴社交媒体公地;(6)组建监管机构，对社交媒体进行监管;(7)在旨在实现全球平等、赔偿和环境可持续性的非殖民化框架内，与国际社会共同制定解决办法。文章首先概述了社交媒体垄断带来的危害。接下来，它对新布兰代斯哲学及其修复社交媒体的建议进行了社会主义批判。接下来，它解释了基于公共的社交媒体去中心化是如何工作的——包括它的历史、哲学和核心组件——使用Fediverse和LibreSocial作为案例。最后一部分概述了社会媒体社会主义的人民科技模式，并解决了可能面临的挑战。
{"title":"Social Media Socialism: People’s Tech and Decolonization for a Global Society in Crisis","authors":"Michael Kwet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3695356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695356","url":null,"abstract":"Recent proposals by the neo-Brandeisian School of antitrust seek to ameliorate harms to society created by social media monopolies. While this initiative sounds great on paper, their solutions are inadequate, as they leave the proprietary, profit-seeking structure of social media networking intact. As a result, the neo-Brandeisian framework fails to cope with the harms of Big Social Media networks, such as privacy harms, user manipulation, the amplification of sensational content, the problems of online advertising, digital colonialism, and environmental degradation. \u0000 \u0000This Article argues that social media socialism based on a democratic commons should replace Big Social Media networks. It suggests an interlocking set of tools to decentralize social networks, including network interoperability, data portability, data decentralization, a fully Free and Open Source Software stack, and socialist legal solutions. \u0000 \u0000The guiding framework is based on a People’s Tech model that places ownership and control of social media directly into the hands of the global public. It proposes solutions to (1) force interoperability, data portability, data decentralization, and a Free and Open Source Software stack on social media providers; (2) put rules in place to prevent new business practices that concentrate wealth and power; (3) abolish or amend laws inconsistent with social media socialism; (4) pass strong privacy laws; (5) subsidize the social media commons through a Digital Tech New Deal; (6) form regulatory bodies to regulate social media; (7) formulate solutions jointly with the international community within a decolonial framework designed for global equality, reparations, and environmental sustainability. \u0000 \u0000The Article begins by outlining the harms produced by social media monopolies. Next, it provides a socialist critique of neo-Brandeisian philosophy and its proposals to fix social media. Following that, it explains how commons-based social media decentralization works -- including its history, philosophy, and core components -- using the Fediverse and LibreSocial as case examples. The final section outlines a People's Tech model for social media socialism and addresses possible challenges.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"767 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77525846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Spanish Abstract: El estudio de los contratos inteligentes en el sistema financiero ha captado la atención de la industria, los reguladores y de la academia. Existen discusiones relacionadas con la aproximación para regularlos. Mientras que algunos defienden el uso de principios por su estructura amplia, mayor flexibilidad y capacidad de adaptación, otros por el contrario urgen por una estrategia más estricta guiada por reglas . Este trabajo entiende que más allá de la estructura de reglas o principios, la estrategia de regulación que se adopte debe recordar y acentuar criterios fundamentales en la evolución de las normas jurídicas como regula iuris. Esto es, una progresiva disminución de su visión como un mandamiento (imperare) y el correlativo aumento de su expresión de permisión (permettere) . Con esta base debatiremos el rol que la regulación realmente responsiva puede tener como instrumento de intervención y control en el uso del cambiante panorama de los contratos inteligentes adoptados en el sistema financiero. Para desarrollar este argumento y verificar su utilidad el capítulo se divide en tres secciones. La primera destinada a introducir el contexto de origen y desarrollo de la regulación realmente responsiva por Baldwin y Black, así como a identificar las oportunidades y limitaciones asociadas a su implementación. La segunda parte explorará los conceptos fundamentales de los contratos inteligentes en el sistema financiero, tomando como punto de referencia las cláusulas del Loan Máster Agreement para discutir cuáles son más o menos fácilmente automatizables y anticipar algunas limitaciones. La tercera sección, por su parte, se enfoca en identificar cómo los elementos de la regulación realmente responsiva pueden contribuir a mitigar las limitaciones del diseño e implementación de los contratos inteligentes. En particular, su utilidad para mitigar y controlar los efectos negativos de la asimetría de información y posible ambigüedad de los contratos inteligentes.]
English Abstract: The study of smart contracts in the financial system has captured the attention of industry, regulators, and academia. There are discussions related to the approach to regulate them. While some defend the use of principles because of their broad structure, greater flexibility and adaptability, others instead urge a stricter rule-guided strategy. This work understands that beyond the structure of rules or principles, the regulatory strategy adopted must remember and emphasize fundamental criteria in the evolution of legal norms such as regula iuris. That is, a progressive decrease in its vision as a commandment (imperare) and the corresponding increase in its expression of permission (permettere). On this basis, we will discuss the role that truly responsive regulation can have as an instrument of intervention and control in the use of the changing landscape of smart contracts adopted in the financial system. To develop this argument the chapt
摘要:金融系统中智能合约的研究引起了业界、监管机构和学术界的关注。关于监管它们的方法有一些讨论。一些人主张使用原则，因为它们具有广泛的结构、更大的灵活性和适应性，而另一些人则敦促采取更严格的、以规则为导向的战略。本文认为，除了规则或原则的结构之外，所采用的监管策略必须记住并强调法律规范演变中的基本标准，如《法律规范》。也就是说，他作为命令(imperare)的视觉逐渐减少，而相应增加的授权表达(permettere)。在此基础上，我们将讨论真正响应式监管作为一种干预和控制工具，在金融系统中采用的智能合约不断变化的格局中所能发挥的作用。为了发展这一论点并验证其有效性，本章分为三个部分。第一个旨在介绍鲍德温和布莱克的真正响应性监管的起源和发展背景，并确定与实施相关的机会和限制。第二部分将探讨金融系统中智能合约的基本概念，以贷款主协议的条款为参考点，讨论哪些条款或多或少容易自动化，并预测一些限制。第三部分侧重于确定真正响应式监管的元素如何有助于减轻智能合约设计和实现的限制。特别是，它在减轻和控制信息不对称的负面影响和智能合约可能的模糊性方面的有用性。] English Abstract: The study of smart contracts in The financial system, has暴力The注意of industry regulator,和学院。目前正在讨论如何规范这些问题。一些国家主张使用原则，因为它们的结构广泛，具有更大的灵活性和适应性，而另一些国家则敦促采取严格的以规则为指导的战略。本文认为，除了规则或原则的结构之外，所采用的监管战略还必须记住并强调法律规范(如法律规范)演变中的基本标准。也就是说，它作为命令(imperare)的观念逐渐减少，相应的是它表达许可(permettere)的观念增加。在此基础上，我们将讨论真正的响应性监管作为一种干预和控制工具在利用金融系统中采用的智能合约不断变化的格局方面所能发挥的作用。为了进一步阐述这一论点，本章分为三个部分。第一次会议的目的是介绍鲍德温和布莱克提出的真正响应性条例的起源和发展背景，并确定其实施的机遇和局限性。第二部分将探讨金融系统中智能合约的基本概念，以贷款主协议的条款为参考点，讨论哪些条款更容易自动执行，哪些条款不容易自动执行，并预期一些限制。第三节的重点是确定真正响应性监管的要素如何有助于减轻智能合约设计和实施的限制。特别是，它在减轻和控制信息不对称的负面影响和智能合约潜在的模模性方面的用途。
{"title":"[Los Contratos Inteligentes en el Sistema Financiero y la Regulación Realmente Responsiva][Smart Contracts and Really Responsive Regulation] En proceso de publicación Libro Mercados Financieros y Nuevas Tecnologías- Universidad Externado de Colombia","authors":"Ligia Catherine Arias-Barrera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3684831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3684831","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Spanish Abstract:</b> El estudio de los contratos inteligentes en el sistema financiero ha captado la atención de la industria, los reguladores y de la academia. Existen discusiones relacionadas con la aproximación para regularlos. Mientras que algunos defienden el uso de principios por su estructura amplia, mayor flexibilidad y capacidad de adaptación, otros por el contrario urgen por una estrategia más estricta guiada por reglas . Este trabajo entiende que más allá de la estructura de reglas o principios, la estrategia de regulación que se adopte debe recordar y acentuar criterios fundamentales en la evolución de las normas jurídicas como regula iuris. Esto es, una progresiva disminución de su visión como un mandamiento (imperare) y el correlativo aumento de su expresión de permisión (permettere) . Con esta base debatiremos el rol que la regulación realmente responsiva puede tener como instrumento de intervención y control en el uso del cambiante panorama de los contratos inteligentes adoptados en el sistema financiero. Para desarrollar este argumento y verificar su utilidad el capítulo se divide en tres secciones. La primera destinada a introducir el contexto de origen y desarrollo de la regulación realmente responsiva por Baldwin y Black, así como a identificar las oportunidades y limitaciones asociadas a su implementación. La segunda parte explorará los conceptos fundamentales de los contratos inteligentes en el sistema financiero, tomando como punto de referencia las cláusulas del Loan Máster Agreement para discutir cuáles son más o menos fácilmente automatizables y anticipar algunas limitaciones. La tercera sección, por su parte, se enfoca en identificar cómo los elementos de la regulación realmente responsiva pueden contribuir a mitigar las limitaciones del diseño e implementación de los contratos inteligentes. En particular, su utilidad para mitigar y controlar los efectos negativos de la asimetría de información y posible ambigüedad de los contratos inteligentes.]<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The study of smart contracts in the financial system has captured the attention of industry, regulators, and academia. There are discussions related to the approach to regulate them. While some defend the use of principles because of their broad structure, greater flexibility and adaptability, others instead urge a stricter rule-guided strategy. This work understands that beyond the structure of rules or principles, the regulatory strategy adopted must remember and emphasize fundamental criteria in the evolution of legal norms such as regula iuris. That is, a progressive decrease in its vision as a commandment (imperare) and the corresponding increase in its expression of permission (permettere). On this basis, we will discuss the role that truly responsive regulation can have as an instrument of intervention and control in the use of the changing landscape of smart contracts adopted in the financial system. To develop this argument the chapt","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77172720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When externalities are present, is the inclusion of the affected stakeholders in the firm's decision process a better solution than government regulation? Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet (2015) argue that it is, and propose an objective for the stakeholder corporation as well as a market mechanism to implement it. This paper shows that: (1) within the framework of Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet's (2015) model, the shareholder-oriented firm and the government can implement the same outcome even when the government does not know the firm's costs; (2) outside that framework, the proposed stakeholder objective fails to address the inefficiency. The results help garner more insight into the difficulties and limitations of embedding the stakeholder corporation into a general equilibrium model.
当外部性存在时，将受影响的利益相关者纳入公司决策过程是否比政府监管更好?Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet(2015)认为是，并提出了利益相关者公司的目标以及实现这一目标的市场机制。本文表明:(1)在Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet(2015)模型框架下，即使政府不知道企业的成本，股东导向的企业和政府也可以实现相同的结果;(2)在该框架之外，提议的利益相关者目标未能解决效率低下问题。研究结果有助于深入了解将利益相关者公司嵌入一般均衡模型的困难和局限性。
{"title":"On the Shareholder-versus Stakeholder-Firm Debate","authors":"Camelia Bejan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3680968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3680968","url":null,"abstract":"When externalities are present, is the inclusion of the affected stakeholders in the firm's decision process a better solution than government regulation? Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet (2015) argue that it is, and propose an objective for the stakeholder corporation as well as a market mechanism to implement it. This paper shows that: (1) within the framework of Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet's (2015) model, the shareholder-oriented firm and the government can implement the same outcome even when the government does not know the firm's costs; (2) outside that framework, the proposed stakeholder objective fails to address the inefficiency. The results help garner more insight into the difficulties and limitations of embedding the stakeholder corporation into a general equilibrium model.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87486371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how firms’ internal organization shapes the impact of international trade. Using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census and a difference-in-difference specification, I find that, relative to standalone firms, conglomerates are more likely to restructure after trade liberalization episodes, focusing on their core competency and improving firm productivity and product market performance. Adjustments through the extensive margin account for the majority of the productivity growth differential between conglomerates and standalones experiencing trade shocks. Aggregate industry productivity remains relatively unchanged in industries dominated by conglomerates’ core business but decreases significantly in others. My findings suggest that firms’ internal organization has important consequences on the effects of trade policies. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
{"title":"Organizational Form and Trade Liberalization: Plant-Level Evidence","authors":"John (Jianqiu) Bai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2702516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2702516","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how firms’ internal organization shapes the impact of international trade. Using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census and a difference-in-difference specification, I find that, relative to standalone firms, conglomerates are more likely to restructure after trade liberalization episodes, focusing on their core competency and improving firm productivity and product market performance. Adjustments through the extensive margin account for the majority of the productivity growth differential between conglomerates and standalones experiencing trade shocks. Aggregate industry productivity remains relatively unchanged in industries dominated by conglomerates’ core business but decreases significantly in others. My findings suggest that firms’ internal organization has important consequences on the effects of trade policies. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82501098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The technology industry has seen rapid growth over the last few decades and many populists and reformers seek to reign in this growth with amendments to various antitrust regulatory structures. This paper continues my previous analysis of these general reforms while specifically analyzing predatory price discrimination and recoupment theory. Brandesian economists wish to swing the antitrust sword to protect small businesses against big corporations. Advocates look at the policy of bigness and claim that permitting its existence must be incorrect and that the courts should counteract bigness with antitrust litigation results shaped not based on economics and consumer welfare but on policy concerns.
The critic of the current antitrust system that provides the most relevant and thorough critique of the current system is Yale’s Lina Kahn in her student note Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox. While her note raises several concerns with Amazon’s business strategy, she specifically targets the structural dominance of Amazon through an alleged predatory price discrimination scheme aimed at undercutting competition and establishing its monopoly in the ebook marketplace. Kahn analyzes Amazon’s growing market dominance along with the alleged difficulties in reigning in its market power through modern day antitrust authority. Most striking, is Khan contention that the Apple v. United States case should have examined Amazon’s role in why the book publishers developed a price fixing and exclusionary scheme against Amazon.
These arguments, while in theory may seem particularly compelling for reformists who are troubled by the rise of big tech; are in fact flawed. As I advocate below, claiming predatory price discrimination as a theory of harm is illogical as a practical matter and opening up this theory would be cumbersome on courts, would lead to perverse results, and would not increase consumer welfare.
{"title":"Predatory Pricing and the Flaws in Brandesian Economics Challenging Recoupment Theory","authors":"John R. Fortin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3676799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3676799","url":null,"abstract":"The technology industry has seen rapid growth over the last few decades and many populists and reformers seek to reign in this growth with amendments to various antitrust regulatory structures. This paper continues my previous analysis of these general reforms while specifically analyzing predatory price discrimination and recoupment theory. Brandesian economists wish to swing the antitrust sword to protect small businesses against big corporations. Advocates look at the policy of bigness and claim that permitting its existence must be incorrect and that the courts should counteract bigness with antitrust litigation results shaped not based on economics and consumer welfare but on policy concerns. <br><br>The critic of the current antitrust system that provides the most relevant and thorough critique of the current system is Yale’s Lina Kahn in her student note Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox. While her note raises several concerns with Amazon’s business strategy, she specifically targets the structural dominance of Amazon through an alleged predatory price discrimination scheme aimed at undercutting competition and establishing its monopoly in the ebook marketplace. Kahn analyzes Amazon’s growing market dominance along with the alleged difficulties in reigning in its market power through modern day antitrust authority. Most striking, is Khan contention that the Apple v. United States case should have examined Amazon’s role in why the book publishers developed a price fixing and exclusionary scheme against Amazon. <br><br>These arguments, while in theory may seem particularly compelling for reformists who are troubled by the rise of big tech; are in fact flawed. As I advocate below, claiming predatory price discrimination as a theory of harm is illogical as a practical matter and opening up this theory would be cumbersome on courts, would lead to perverse results, and would not increase consumer welfare.<br>","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73878778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent years have seen the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members embark upon various initiatives that seek to harmonize their competition regimes. These ongoing efforts to modernize and harmonize ASEAN competition laws take place amid a longstanding effort by both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) to export their respective competition laws throughout the world. This raises a critical question: should the ASEAN countries attempt to mimic the competition regimes of other developed nations, notably those that are in force in the EU and the US? And, if so, which one of these regimes should they draw more inspiration from? This paper seeks to dispel the myth that the European model of competition enforcement would necessarily provide a superior blueprint. To the contrary, it shows that the evolutionary, common-law-like regime that has emerged in the US has many strengths that are often overlooked by contemporary competition policy scholarship, and which might provide a particularly good fit for the economic and political realities of the ASEAN member states. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the high-level differences between the American and European approaches to competition policy. Section 3 shows that the US and Europe also differ substantially in terms of the conduct that may constitute an infringement of competition law — the EU system being significantly more restrictive. Section 4 turns to the thorny problem of digital platforms, in particular, and argues that while the European model might more readily facilitate intervention against digital platforms, the resulting cases may be detrimental to consumers and the economy more broadly. Section 5 posits that reducing economic concentration — sometimes cited as a byproduct of European-style competition enforcement — should not be a self-standing goal of antitrust policy. Finally, Section 6 argues that many of the economic and political characteristics of the ASEAN economy cut in favor of using the US model of competition enforcement as a blueprint for further development and harmonization of ASEAN competition law.
{"title":"Should ASEAN Antitrust Laws Emulate European Competition Policy?","authors":"Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer, Sam Bowman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3709730","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709730","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have seen the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members embark upon various initiatives that seek to harmonize their competition regimes. These ongoing efforts to modernize and harmonize ASEAN competition laws take place amid a longstanding effort by both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) to export their respective competition laws throughout the world. This raises a critical question: should the ASEAN countries attempt to mimic the competition regimes of other developed nations, notably those that are in force in the EU and the US? And, if so, which one of these regimes should they draw more inspiration from? This paper seeks to dispel the myth that the European model of competition enforcement would necessarily provide a superior blueprint. To the contrary, it shows that the evolutionary, common-law-like regime that has emerged in the US has many strengths that are often overlooked by contemporary competition policy scholarship, and which might provide a particularly good fit for the economic and political realities of the ASEAN member states. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the high-level differences between the American and European approaches to competition policy. Section 3 shows that the US and Europe also differ substantially in terms of the conduct that may constitute an infringement of competition law — the EU system being significantly more restrictive. Section 4 turns to the thorny problem of digital platforms, in particular, and argues that while the European model might more readily facilitate intervention against digital platforms, the resulting cases may be detrimental to consumers and the economy more broadly. Section 5 posits that reducing economic concentration — sometimes cited as a byproduct of European-style competition enforcement — should not be a self-standing goal of antitrust policy. Finally, Section 6 argues that many of the economic and political characteristics of the ASEAN economy cut in favor of using the US model of competition enforcement as a blueprint for further development and harmonization of ASEAN competition law.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74284576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is well known that firms utilize non-price strategies to distinguish their products from those of rivals. However, there is no specification of the market power that such choices provide the firm let alone their integration to the firm level. This note provides a chronological rendering of such efforts being attempted in recent literature.
{"title":"Measuring the Market Power of Firms and their Strategies","authors":"Ramamohan Rao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3679514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3679514","url":null,"abstract":"It is well known that firms utilize non-price strategies to distinguish their products from those of rivals. However, there is no specification of the market power that such choices provide the firm let alone their integration to the firm level. This note provides a chronological rendering of such efforts being attempted in recent literature.","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83208456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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