In many real-life situations that involve exchanges of arguments, individuals may differ on their assessment of which supports between the arguments are in fact justified, i.e., they put forward different support-relations. When confronted with such situations, we may wish to aggregate individuals’ argumentation views on support-relations into a collective view, which is acceptable to the group. In this paper, we assume that under bipolar argumentation frameworks, individuals are equipped with a set of arguments and a set of attacks between arguments, but with possibly different supportrelations. Using the methodology in social choice theory, we analyze what semantic properties of bipolar argumentation frameworks can be preserved by aggregation rules during the aggregation of support-relations.
{"title":"Collective Argumentation: The Case of Aggregating Support-Relations of Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks","authors":"Weiwei Chen","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.335.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.335.8","url":null,"abstract":"In many real-life situations that involve exchanges of arguments, individuals may differ on their assessment of which supports between the arguments are in fact justified, i.e., they put forward different support-relations. When confronted with such situations, we may wish to aggregate individuals’ argumentation views on support-relations into a collective view, which is acceptable to the group. In this paper, we assume that under bipolar argumentation frameworks, individuals are equipped with a set of arguments and a set of attacks between arguments, but with possibly different supportrelations. Using the methodology in social choice theory, we analyze what semantic properties of bipolar argumentation frameworks can be preserved by aggregation rules during the aggregation of support-relations.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116562601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Diego A. Vel'azquez, Armando Castañeda, D. Rosenblueth
Halpern and Moses were the first to recognize, in 1984, the importance of a formal treatment of knowledge in distributed computing. Many works in distributed computing, however, still employ informal notions of knowledge. Hence, it is critical to further study such formalizations. Action models, a significant approach to modeling dynamic epistemic logic, have only recently been applied to distributed computing, for instance, by Goubault, Ledent, and Rajsbaum. Using action models for analyzing distributed-computing environments, as proposed by these authors, has drawbacks, however. In particular, a direct use of action models may cause such models to grow exponentially as the computation of the distributed system evolves. Hence, our motivation is finding compact action models for distributed systems. We introduce communication pattern models as an extension of both ordinary action models and their update operator. We give a systematic construction of communication pattern models for a large variety of distributed-computing models called dynamic-network models. For a proper subclass of dynamic-network models called oblivious, the communication pattern model remains the same throughout the computation.
{"title":"Communication Pattern Models: An Extension of Action Models for Dynamic-Network Distributed Systems","authors":"Diego A. Vel'azquez, Armando Castañeda, D. Rosenblueth","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.335.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.335.29","url":null,"abstract":"Halpern and Moses were the first to recognize, in 1984, the importance of a formal treatment of knowledge in distributed computing. Many works in distributed computing, however, still employ informal notions of knowledge. Hence, it is critical to further study such formalizations. Action models, a significant approach to modeling dynamic epistemic logic, have only recently been applied to distributed computing, for instance, by Goubault, Ledent, and Rajsbaum. Using action models for analyzing distributed-computing environments, as proposed by these authors, has drawbacks, however. In particular, a direct use of action models may cause such models to grow exponentially as the computation of the distributed system evolves. Hence, our motivation is finding compact action models for distributed systems. We introduce communication pattern models as an extension of both ordinary action models and their update operator. We give a systematic construction of communication pattern models for a large variety of distributed-computing models called dynamic-network models. For a proper subclass of dynamic-network models called oblivious, the communication pattern model remains the same throughout the computation.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132277792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and expensive/problematic extension to general normal form games. We point out that such a proper generalization will likely involve the concept of program equilibrium. Finally we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria related to Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.
{"title":"Game-theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents","authors":"Gabriel Istrate","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.335.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.335.19","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and expensive/problematic extension to general normal form games. We point out that such a proper generalization will likely involve the concept of program equilibrium. Finally we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria related to Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126953985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting method. A growing body of literature explores strategic voting when there is uncertainty about how others will vote. In this paper, we study strategic voting when there is uncertainty about the voting method. We introduce three notions of manipulability for a set of voting methods: sure, safe, and expected manipulability. With the help of a computer program, we identify voting scenarios in which uncertainty about the voting method may reduce or even eliminate a voter's incentive to misrepresent her preferences. Thus, it may be in the interest of an election designer who wishes to reduce strategic voting to leave voters uncertain about which of several reasonable voting methods will be used to determine the winners of an election.
{"title":"Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method","authors":"W. Holliday, E. Pacuit","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.297.17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.17","url":null,"abstract":"Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting method. A growing body of literature explores strategic voting when there is uncertainty about how others will vote. In this paper, we study strategic voting when there is uncertainty about the voting method. We introduce three notions of manipulability for a set of voting methods: sure, safe, and expected manipulability. With the help of a computer program, we identify voting scenarios in which uncertainty about the voting method may reduce or even eliminate a voter's incentive to misrepresent her preferences. Thus, it may be in the interest of an election designer who wishes to reduce strategic voting to leave voters uncertain about which of several reasonable voting methods will be used to determine the winners of an election.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121302986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we explore the application of methods for classical judgment aggregation in pooling probabilistic opinions on logically related issues. For this reason, we first modify the Boolean judgment aggregation framework in the way that allows handling probabilistic judgments and then define probabilistic aggregation functions obtained by generalization of the classical ones. In addition, we discuss essential desirable properties for the aggregation functions and explore impossibility results.
{"title":"Aggregating Probabilistic Judgments","authors":"Magdalena Ivanovska, M. Slavkovik","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.297.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.18","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we explore the application of methods for classical judgment aggregation in pooling probabilistic opinions on logically related issues. For this reason, we first modify the Boolean judgment aggregation framework in the way that allows handling probabilistic judgments and then define probabilistic aggregation functions obtained by generalization of the classical ones. In addition, we discuss essential desirable properties for the aggregation functions and explore impossibility results.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122373516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a new model for forming beliefs and learning about unknown probabilities (such as the probability of picking a red marble from a bag with an unknown distribution of coloured marbles). The most widespread model for such situations of 'radical uncertainty' is in terms of imprecise probabilities, i.e. representing the agent's knowledge as a set of probability measures. We add to this model a plausibility map, associating to each measure a plausibility number, as a way to go beyond what is known with certainty and represent the agent's beliefs about probability. There are a number of standard examples: Shannon Entropy, Centre of Mass etc. We then consider learning of two types of information: (1) learning by repeated sampling from the unknown distribution (e.g. picking marbles from the bag); and (2) learning higher-order information about the distribution (in the shape of linear inequalities, e.g. we are told there are more red marbles than green marbles). The first changes only the plausibility map (via a 'plausibilistic' version of Bayes' Rule), but leaves the given set of measures unchanged; the second shrinks the set of measures, without changing their plausibility. Beliefs are defined as in Belief Revision Theory, in terms of truth in the most plausible worlds. But our belief change does not comply with standard AGM axioms, since the revision induced by (1) is of a non-AGM type. This is essential, as it allows our agents to learn the true probability: we prove that the beliefs obtained by repeated sampling converge almost surely to the correct belief (in the true probability). We end by sketching the contours of a dynamic doxastic logic for statistical learning.
{"title":"Learning Probabilities: Towards a Logic of Statistical Learning","authors":"A. Baltag, S. R. Rad, S. Smets","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.297.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.3","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new model for forming beliefs and learning about unknown probabilities (such as the probability of picking a red marble from a bag with an unknown distribution of coloured marbles). The most widespread model for such situations of 'radical uncertainty' is in terms of imprecise probabilities, i.e. representing the agent's knowledge as a set of probability measures. We add to this model a plausibility map, associating to each measure a plausibility number, as a way to go beyond what is known with certainty and represent the agent's beliefs about probability. There are a number of standard examples: Shannon Entropy, Centre of Mass etc. We then consider learning of two types of information: (1) learning by repeated sampling from the unknown distribution (e.g. picking marbles from the bag); and (2) learning higher-order information about the distribution (in the shape of linear inequalities, e.g. we are told there are more red marbles than green marbles). The first changes only the plausibility map (via a 'plausibilistic' version of Bayes' Rule), but leaves the given set of measures unchanged; the second shrinks the set of measures, without changing their plausibility. Beliefs are defined as in Belief Revision Theory, in terms of truth in the most plausible worlds. But our belief change does not comply with standard AGM axioms, since the revision induced by (1) is of a non-AGM type. This is essential, as it allows our agents to learn the true probability: we prove that the beliefs obtained by repeated sampling converge almost surely to the correct belief (in the true probability). We end by sketching the contours of a dynamic doxastic logic for statistical learning.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133542547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Kuznets, Laurent Prosperi, U. Schmid, Krisztina Fruzsa
Causality is an important concept both for proving impossibility results and for synthesizing efficient protocols in distributed computing. For asynchronous agents communicating over unreliable channels, causality is well studied and understood. This understanding, however, relies heavily on the assumption that agents themselves are correct and reliable. We provide the first epistemic analysis of causality in the presence of byzantine agents, i.e., agents that can deviate from their protocol and, thus, cannot be relied upon. Using our new framework for epistemic reasoning in fault-tolerant multi-agent systems, we determine the byzantine analog of the causal cone and describe a communication structure, which we call a multipede, necessary for verifying preconditions for actions in this setting.
{"title":"Causality and Epistemic Reasoning in Byzantine Multi-Agent Systems","authors":"R. Kuznets, Laurent Prosperi, U. Schmid, Krisztina Fruzsa","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.297.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.19","url":null,"abstract":"Causality is an important concept both for proving impossibility results and for synthesizing efficient protocols in distributed computing. For asynchronous agents communicating over unreliable channels, causality is well studied and understood. This understanding, however, relies heavily on the assumption that agents themselves are correct and reliable. We provide the first epistemic analysis of causality in the presence of byzantine agents, i.e., agents that can deviate from their protocol and, thus, cannot be relied upon. Using our new framework for epistemic reasoning in fault-tolerant multi-agent systems, we determine the byzantine analog of the causal cone and describe a communication structure, which we call a multipede, necessary for verifying preconditions for actions in this setting.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132898161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed subset of the state space, our models allow the set of possible worlds that a piece of evidence corresponds to to vary from one possible world to another, and therefore itself be the subject of uncertainty. Such structures can be viewed as (epistemically motivated) generalizations of topological spaces. In this context, there arises a natural distinction between what is actually entailed by the evidence and what the agent knows is entailed by the evidence -- with the latter, in general, being much weaker. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the corresponding bi-modal logic of knowledge and evidence entailment, and investigate some natural extensions of this core system, including the addition of a belief modality and its interaction with evidence interpretation and entailment, and the addition of a "knowability" modality interpreted via a (generalized) interior operator.
{"title":"Uncertainty About Evidence","authors":"Adam Bjorndahl, Aybüke Özgün","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.297.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.5","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed subset of the state space, our models allow the set of possible worlds that a piece of evidence corresponds to to vary from one possible world to another, and therefore itself be the subject of uncertainty. Such structures can be viewed as (epistemically motivated) generalizations of topological spaces. In this context, there arises a natural distinction between what is actually entailed by the evidence and what the agent knows is entailed by the evidence -- with the latter, in general, being much weaker. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the corresponding bi-modal logic of knowledge and evidence entailment, and investigate some natural extensions of this core system, including the addition of a belief modality and its interaction with evidence interpretation and entailment, and the addition of a \"knowability\" modality interpreted via a (generalized) interior operator.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128123027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage this method to measure the subjective probabilities of a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer.
{"title":"Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude","authors":"Sven Neth","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.297.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.22","url":null,"abstract":"Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage this method to measure the subjective probabilities of a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116091131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler provide an epistemic characterization of iterated admissibility (IA), also known as iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, where uncertainty is represented using LPSs (lexicographic probability sequences). Their characterization holds in a rich structure called a complete structure, where all types are possible. In earlier work, we gave a characterization of iterated admissibility using an "all I know" operator, that captures the intuition that "all the agent knows" is that agents satisfy the appropriate rationality assumptions. That characterization did not need complete structures and used probability structures, not LPSs. However, that characterization did not deal with Samuelson's conceptual concern regarding IA, namely, that at higher levels, players do not consider possible strategies that were used to justify their choice of strategy at lower levels. In this paper, we give a characterization of IA using the all I know operator that does deal with Samuelson's concern. However, it uses LPSs. We then show how to modify the characterization using notions of "approximate belief" and "approximately all I know" so as to deal with Samuelson's concern while still working with probability structures.
{"title":"A Conceptually Well-Founded Characterization of Iterated Admissibility Using an \"All I Know\" Operator","authors":"Joseph Y. Halpern, R. Pass","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.297.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.15","url":null,"abstract":"Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler provide an epistemic characterization of iterated admissibility (IA), also known as iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, where uncertainty is represented using LPSs (lexicographic probability sequences). Their characterization holds in a rich structure called a complete structure, where all types are possible. In earlier work, we gave a characterization of iterated admissibility using an \"all I know\" operator, that captures the intuition that \"all the agent knows\" is that agents satisfy the appropriate rationality assumptions. That characterization did not need complete structures and used probability structures, not LPSs. However, that characterization did not deal with Samuelson's conceptual concern regarding IA, namely, that at higher levels, players do not consider possible strategies that were used to justify their choice of strategy at lower levels. In this paper, we give a characterization of IA using the all I know operator that does deal with Samuelson's concern. However, it uses LPSs. We then show how to modify the characterization using notions of \"approximate belief\" and \"approximately all I know\" so as to deal with Samuelson's concern while still working with probability structures.","PeriodicalId":118894,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124759673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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