Experimental psychology最新文献

Financial (dis)incentives (e.g., bonuses, taxes) and social incentives (e.g., public praise) have typically been proposed as methods to encourage greater cooperation for the benefit of all. However, when cooperation requires exertion of effort, such interventions might not always be effective. While incentives tend to be highly motivating when choosing to exert effort, evidence suggests that they have less of an effect on behavior during effort execution. The aim of this exploratory study was to incorporate these insights into empirical investigation of the effects of social incentives on cooperative effort. To this end, we modified a public goods game task to require effort contributions to a common good. Crucial manipulation involved incorporating social incentives into this task and linking them to (a) choices that people made or (b) effortful actions they exerted. Our findings suggest, in line with recent effort-based decision-making models, that social incentives have a stronger effect on cooperative effort when they are linked to choices that people make, rather than the actual effort they exert. This study demonstrates potential benefits of eliciting a priori declarations of cooperative effort tied to social incentives to encourage greater effort for the benefit of all.

Working memory performance is markedly disrupted when task-irrelevant sound is played during item presentation or retention. In a preregistered replication study, we systematically examined the role of intensity in two types of auditory distraction. The first type of distraction is the changing-state effect (i.e., increased disruption by changing-state relative to steady-state sequences). The second type is the auditory deviant effect (i.e., increased disruption by auditory deviant relative to steady-state sequences). In previous experiments, the changing-state effect was independent of intensity. Whether a deviation in intensity leads to an increase in disruption has not yet been examined. We replicated the classic finding that the increased disruption by changing-state relative to steady-state sequences is independent of intensity. Contrary to previous studies, we found an unexpected main effect of intensity. Steady-state and changing-state sequences presented at 75 dB(A) were more disruptive than presented at 45 dB(A), suggesting that intensity plays a more important role than previously assumed in the disruption of working memory performance. Furthermore, we tested the prediction of the violation of expectancy account, according to which deviant distractors at a lower and higher intensity than the rest of the sequence should be equally disruptive. Our results were consistent with this prediction.

Many occupational settings require individuals to make important decisions immediately after awakening. Although a plethora of psychological research has separately examined both sleep and anchoring effects on decision-making, little is known about their interaction. In the present study, we seek to shed light on the link between sleep inertia, the performance impairment immediately after awakening, and individuals' susceptibility to the anchoring bias. We proposed that sleep inertia would moderate participants' adjustment from anchors because sleep inertia leads to less cognitive effort invested, resulting in a stronger anchoring effect. One hundred four subjects were randomly assigned to an experimental group that answered anchoring tasks immediately after being awakened at nighttime or a control group that answered anchoring tasks at daytime. Our findings replicated the well-established anchoring effect in that higher anchors led participants to higher estimates than lower anchors. We did not find significant effects of sleep inertia. While the sleep inertia group reported greater sleepiness and having invested less cognitive effort compared to the control group, no systematic anchoring differences emerged, and cognitive effort did not qualify as a mediator of the anchoring effect. Bayesian analyses provide empirical evidence for these null findings. Implications for the anchoring literature and future research are discussed.

Beliefs about how memory works explain several effects on prospective metamemory judgments (e.g., the effect of font size on judgments of learning; JOLs). Less is known about the effect of beliefs on retrospective judgments (i.e., confidence). Here, we tested whether font size also affects confidence ratings and whether beliefs play a similar role in confidence than in JOLs. In two experiments, participants studied words in small and large size, rated JOLs, and completed a font-size test in which they indicated the font size at study and a standard old/new recognition test. The results confirmed that font size affected both JOLs and confidence ratings. The presentation of the counter-belief that memory is better for words in small font size in Experiment 2 and the analyses of confidence for participants who did not believe that large fonts improved memory suggested that the effect of font size on confidence was based on beliefs. This research shows that the debate on theory-based and experience-based factors should not be limited to prospective metamemory judgments but also encompass retrospective judgments.

How words are interrelated in the human mind is a scientific topic on which there is still no consensus, with different views on how word co-occurrence and semantic relatedness mediate word association. Recent research has shown that lexical associations are strongly predicted by the similarity of those words in terms of valence, arousal, and concreteness ratings. In the current study, we aimed at extending these results to more complex and realistic linguistic scenarios, since human communication is not done with word pairs, but rather through sentences. Hence, the aim of the current study was to verify whether valence, arousal, and concreteness also articulate sentence-level lexical representations. To this end, 32 native Spanish speakers were given cue words and asked to use them in sentences that would provide a meaningful context. The content words of the written sentences were then analyzed. Our results showed that the emotional dimensions (valence and arousal) and concreteness values of the cue words effectively predicted the same values of said dimensions of their sentences' words. In sum, the similarity in the emotional dimensions and concreteness are crucial mechanisms behind word association in the human mind.

Representational Momentum and Representational Gravity describe systematic perceptual biases, occurring for the localization of the final location of a moving stimulus. While Representational Momentum describes the systematic overestimation along the motion trajectory (forward shift), Representational Gravity refers to a systematic localization bias in line with gravitational force (downward shift). Those phenomena are typically investigated in a laboratory setting, and while previous research has shown that online studies perform well for different task, motion perception outside of the laboratory was not focused to date. Therefore, one experiment was conducted in two different settings: in a typical, highly controlled laboratory setting and in an online setting of the participants' choosing. In both experiments, the two most common trial types, implied motion stimuli and continuously moving stimuli, were used, and the influence of classical velocity manipulations (by varying stimulus timing and distance) was assessed. The data pattern across both experiments was very similar, indicating a robustness of both phenomena and indicating that motion perception can very well be studied outside the classical laboratory setting, opening a feasible possibility to diversify access to motion perception experiments everywhere.

We investigated the role of previous experience when providing summary judgments of mammography narratives. A total of 807 women who either did or did not have previous experience of a mammogram were presented with a written description of a mammography visit. We manipulated the presentation position of a negative element within the narrative to alter its accessibility in memory and determine whether the latter impacted equally on two types of summary judgments. After the narrative presentation, participants were asked to provide both retrospective and prospective evaluations, that is, summary judgments about the described event and an appraisal of the likelihood of participating in future instances of such event, respectively. A recency effect was observed only for retrospective but not for prospective evaluations. When examined only for the subset of women who had undergone a mammography visit themselves, prospective evaluations were shown to be predicted by the reported quality of the mammography participants experienced themselves. The findings support and extend the accessibility model of emotional self-report and suggest that own experience leaks into evaluations of hypothetical scenarios by selectively impacting on prospective evaluations.

The current study compared emotion perception in two cultures where display rules for emotion expression deviate. In Experiment 1, participants from America and Korea played a repeated prisoner's dilemma game with a counterpart, who was, in actuality, a programmed defector. Emotion expressions were exchanged via emoticons at the end of every round. After winning more points by defecting, the counterpart sent either a matching emoticon (a joyful face) or a mismatching emoticon (a regretful face). The results showed that Americans in the matching condition were more likely to defect, or to punish, compared to those in the mismatching condition, suggesting that more weight was given to their counterpart's joyful expression. This difference was smaller for Koreans, suggesting a higher disregard for the outward expression. In a second, supplementary experiment, we found that Korean participants were more likely to cooperate in the mismatching or regretful condition, when they thought their counterpart was a Westerner. Overall, our data suggest that emotion perception rules abide by the display rules of one's culture but are also influenced by the counterpart's culture.