Proposals for a universal basic income are generating interest across the globe, with pilot experiments underway or in the works in California, Canada, Finland, Italy, Kenya, and Uganda. Surprisingly, many of the most outspoken supporters of a universal basic income have been self-described libertarians — even though libertarians are generally considered to be antagonistic toward redistribution and a universal basic income is, at its core, a program of income redistribution. What explains such strong libertarian support for a policy that seems so contrary to libertarian ideals? This Article seeks to answer that question. We first show that a basic safety net is not only consistent with, but likely required by, several strands of libertarian thought. We then explain why libertarians committed to limited redistribution and limited government might support a system of unconditional cash transfers paid periodically. Delivering benefits in cash, rather than in-kind, furthers autonomy by recognizing that all citizens — even poor ones — are the best judges of their needs. Decoupling such transfers from a work requirement acknowledges that the state lacks the ability to distinguish between work-capable and work-incapable individuals. Providing payments periodically, rather than through a once-in-a-lifetime lump sum grant, ensures that all individuals can receive a minimum level of support over lifespans of variable lengths, while also allowing individuals to adjust payment flows through financial market transactions. Although our main objective is to assess the fit between libertarian theory and a universal basic income, we also address various design choices inherent in any basic income scheme: who should receive it?; how large should it be?; which programs might it replace?; and should it phase out as market income rises? Lastly, we consider the relationship between a basic income and the political economy of redistribution. We find that the case for a basic income as a libertarian “second-best” is surprisingly shaky: libertarians who oppose all redistribution but grudgingly accept a basic income as the least-worst form of redistribution should reconsider both aspects of their position. We conclude by drawing out lessons from our analysis for non-libertarians, regardless of whether they are supportive or skeptical of basic income arguments.
{"title":"Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income","authors":"M. Fleischer, Daniel Hemel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3056576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3056576","url":null,"abstract":"Proposals for a universal basic income are generating interest across the globe, with pilot experiments underway or in the works in California, Canada, Finland, Italy, Kenya, and Uganda. Surprisingly, many of the most outspoken supporters of a universal basic income have been self-described libertarians — even though libertarians are generally considered to be antagonistic toward redistribution and a universal basic income is, at its core, a program of income redistribution. What explains such strong libertarian support for a policy that seems so contrary to libertarian ideals? \u0000This Article seeks to answer that question. We first show that a basic safety net is not only consistent with, but likely required by, several strands of libertarian thought. We then explain why libertarians committed to limited redistribution and limited government might support a system of unconditional cash transfers paid periodically. Delivering benefits in cash, rather than in-kind, furthers autonomy by recognizing that all citizens — even poor ones — are the best judges of their needs. Decoupling such transfers from a work requirement acknowledges that the state lacks the ability to distinguish between work-capable and work-incapable individuals. Providing payments periodically, rather than through a once-in-a-lifetime lump sum grant, ensures that all individuals can receive a minimum level of support over lifespans of variable lengths, while also allowing individuals to adjust payment flows through financial market transactions. \u0000Although our main objective is to assess the fit between libertarian theory and a universal basic income, we also address various design choices inherent in any basic income scheme: who should receive it?; how large should it be?; which programs might it replace?; and should it phase out as market income rises? Lastly, we consider the relationship between a basic income and the political economy of redistribution. We find that the case for a basic income as a libertarian “second-best” is surprisingly shaky: libertarians who oppose all redistribution but grudgingly accept a basic income as the least-worst form of redistribution should reconsider both aspects of their position. We conclude by drawing out lessons from our analysis for non-libertarians, regardless of whether they are supportive or skeptical of basic income arguments.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116305991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the extent to which correcting for the underreporting of transfer benefits in the American Current Population Survey (CPS) complicates typical analyses comparing the effect of anti-poverty policy in the United States and Europe. Previous research suggests that up to one-half of social program spending by the American Federal government is not accounted for in CPS data harmonized for cross-national analysis by the Luxembourg Income Study and Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation. Using a microsimulation model to align survey responses with administrative data at the federal and state level decreases the overall and child relative poverty rates by 16% and 21% respectively. This doubles the number of Americans living in states with ‘European’ poverty rates to 25%, from 42 to 79 million, and demonstrates that more Americans live in states with ‘social democratic’ levels of poverty than the populations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden combined. Adjusting the national American poverty line for cost-of-living further suggests that 38% of Americans live in states with poverty rates typical of European countries. If a relative poverty line calculated across the European Union is used instead to reflect variation in standard of living across the EU, correcting for underreporting increases the share of Americans living in states with poverty rates below the EU member state average from 66% of the population to 94%.. Ultimately, given the varying adoption of administrative income data across countries, growing rates of underreporting in the CPS with variation across American states, and the increasing devolution of American social policy, comparative analyses of poverty and policy that do not consider underreporting or subnational variation risk biased conclusions.
{"title":"European America: The Effect of Underreported Transfer Benefits and Cost-of-Living on Cross-National Poverty Analysis","authors":"M. George","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2932938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2932938","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the extent to which correcting for the underreporting of transfer benefits in the American Current Population Survey (CPS) complicates typical analyses comparing the effect of anti-poverty policy in the United States and Europe. Previous research suggests that up to one-half of social program spending by the American Federal government is not accounted for in CPS data harmonized for cross-national analysis by the Luxembourg Income Study and Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation. Using a microsimulation model to align survey responses with administrative data at the federal and state level decreases the overall and child relative poverty rates by 16% and 21% respectively. This doubles the number of Americans living in states with ‘European’ poverty rates to 25%, from 42 to 79 million, and demonstrates that more Americans live in states with ‘social democratic’ levels of poverty than the populations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden combined. Adjusting the national American poverty line for cost-of-living further suggests that 38% of Americans live in states with poverty rates typical of European countries. If a relative poverty line calculated across the European Union is used instead to reflect variation in standard of living across the EU, correcting for underreporting increases the share of Americans living in states with poverty rates below the EU member state average from 66% of the population to 94%.. Ultimately, given the varying adoption of administrative income data across countries, growing rates of underreporting in the CPS with variation across American states, and the increasing devolution of American social policy, comparative analyses of poverty and policy that do not consider underreporting or subnational variation risk biased conclusions.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133364738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note constructs a simple two class example in which the Gini index is held constant while the size of the rich and poor populations change, in order to illustrate how very different societies can have the same Gini index and produce very similar estimates of standard inequality averse Social Welfare Functions. The rich/poor income ratio can vary by a factor of over 12, and the income share of the top one per cent can vary by a factor of over 16, with exactly the same Gini index. Focussing solely on the Gini index can thus obscure perceptions—e.g. of important market income trends or large changes in the redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system. Hence, analysts should supplement the use of an aggregate summary index of inequality with direct examination of the segments of the income distribution which they think are of greatest importance.
{"title":"On the Limitations of Some Current Usages of the Gini Index","authors":"L. Osberg","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12256","url":null,"abstract":"This note constructs a simple two class example in which the Gini index is held constant while the size of the rich and poor populations change, in order to illustrate how very different societies can have the same Gini index and produce very similar estimates of standard inequality averse Social Welfare Functions. The rich/poor income ratio can vary by a factor of over 12, and the income share of the top one per cent can vary by a factor of over 16, with exactly the same Gini index. Focussing solely on the Gini index can thus obscure perceptions—e.g. of important market income trends or large changes in the redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system. Hence, analysts should supplement the use of an aggregate summary index of inequality with direct examination of the segments of the income distribution which they think are of greatest importance.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114644959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper describes two stylized facts about the earnings dynamics throughout a worker’s career. First, this paper shows that more educated workers have higher earnings growth with work experience than less educated workers. Second, it demonstrates that more educated workers suffer greater earnings losses following job displacement. I propose a model that integrates human capital accumulation and learning mechanisms that can explain these empirical findings. In the model, employers use both education and past job displacement as a signal of a worker’s unobservable ability. As a result, educated workers receive more on-the-job training in the beginning of their careers. In addition, educated workers suffer greater wage losses after being laid off when potential employers learn that an educated worker is low ability.
{"title":"Earnings Dynamics: The Role of Education throughout a Worker's Career","authors":"Breno Braga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2979362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2979362","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes two stylized facts about the earnings dynamics throughout a worker’s career. First, this paper shows that more educated workers have higher earnings growth with work experience than less educated workers. Second, it demonstrates that more educated workers suffer greater earnings losses following job displacement. I propose a model that integrates human capital accumulation and learning mechanisms that can explain these empirical findings. In the model, employers use both education and past job displacement as a signal of a worker’s unobservable ability. As a result, educated workers receive more on-the-job training in the beginning of their careers. In addition, educated workers suffer greater wage losses after being laid off when potential employers learn that an educated worker is low ability.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116898704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides an intuitive additive decomposition of the global income Gini coefficient with respect to differences within and between countries. In 2005, nearly half the total global income inequality is due to income differences between Europeans and North Americans on the one side and inhabitants of Asia on the other, with the China-USA income differences alone accounting for six percent of global inequality. Historically, income differences between Asia and Europe have driven a large part of global inequality, but the quantitative importance of within-Asia income inequality has increased substantially since 1950.
{"title":"Decomposing Global Inequality","authors":"J. Modalsli","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12230","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an intuitive additive decomposition of the global income Gini coefficient with respect to differences within and between countries. In 2005, nearly half the total global income inequality is due to income differences between Europeans and North Americans on the one side and inhabitants of Asia on the other, with the China-USA income differences alone accounting for six percent of global inequality. Historically, income differences between Asia and Europe have driven a large part of global inequality, but the quantitative importance of within-Asia income inequality has increased substantially since 1950.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128496086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In June 2017, households’ real disposable cash income did not change as compared to June 2016. For the first time since January 2016 (if January 2017 is not taken into account), there was no decrease in real income. In Q1 2017, the poverty rate fell relative to Q1 2015 and Q1 2016. In H1 2017, the volume of consumer lending to individuals increased as compared to H1 2016, with lending growth being much higher in regions with a high poverty rate. As compared to 2016, people started to assess more positively the dynamics of their financial standing and the share of those who saved on food, clothes and footwear decreased.
{"title":"Incomes and the Poverty Rate: Stagnation and Cautious Optimism","authors":"E. Grishina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3025023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025023","url":null,"abstract":"In June 2017, households’ real disposable cash income did not change as compared to June 2016. For the first time since January 2016 (if January 2017 is not taken into account), there was no decrease in real income. In Q1 2017, the poverty rate fell relative to Q1 2015 and Q1 2016. In H1 2017, the volume of consumer lending to individuals increased as compared to H1 2016, with lending growth being much higher in regions with a high poverty rate. As compared to 2016, people started to assess more positively the dynamics of their financial standing and the share of those who saved on food, clothes and footwear decreased.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114611709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I document that married women's hours worked are significantly less cyclical than hours worked by married men and singles and argue that spousal insurance contributes to the low cyclicality. Analyzing volatility, transition rates, and household behavior, I show that (i) married women experience the lowest cyclical volatility; (ii) their volatility depends more on pastthan current fluctuations of business cycle indicators; (iii) married women are less likely to become unemployed or leave the labor force during recessions, but not more likely to join the laborforce; and (iv) unemployment of the husband is associated with more hours worked by the wife, particularly during recessions.
{"title":"Cyclicality of Hours Worked by Married Women and Spousal Insurance","authors":"Kathrin Ellieroth","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3023554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3023554","url":null,"abstract":"I document that married women's hours worked are significantly less cyclical than hours worked by married men and singles and argue that spousal insurance contributes to the low cyclicality. Analyzing volatility, transition rates, and household behavior, I show that (i) married women experience the lowest cyclical volatility; (ii) their volatility depends more on pastthan current fluctuations of business cycle indicators; (iii) married women are less likely to become unemployed or leave the labor force during recessions, but not more likely to join the laborforce; and (iv) unemployment of the husband is associated with more hours worked by the wife, particularly during recessions.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115553569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) on the housing market. Exploiting heterogeneity in UI generosity across US states and over time, we find that UI helps the unemployed avoid mortgage default. We estimate that UI expansions during the Great Recession prevented more than 1.3 million foreclosures and insulated home values from labor market shocks. The results suggest that policies that make mortgages more affordable can reduce foreclosures even when borrowers are severely underwater. An optimal UI policy during housing downturns would weigh, among other benefits and costs, the deadweight losses avoided from preventing mortgage defaults.
{"title":"Unemployment Insurance as a Housing Market Stabilizer","authors":"Joanne W. Hsu, David A. Matsa, Brian T. Melzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2185198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185198","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) on the housing market. Exploiting heterogeneity in UI generosity across US states and over time, we find that UI helps the unemployed avoid mortgage default. We estimate that UI expansions during the Great Recession prevented more than 1.3 million foreclosures and insulated home values from labor market shocks. The results suggest that policies that make mortgages more affordable can reduce foreclosures even when borrowers are severely underwater. An optimal UI policy during housing downturns would weigh, among other benefits and costs, the deadweight losses avoided from preventing mortgage defaults.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122593057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the role of credit markets in explaining the changes in the U.S. labor share by evaluating the effects of state-level banking deregulation, which resulted in improved access to cheaper credit. Utilizing a difference-in-differences strategy, we provide causal evidence showing labor share declined following the interstate banking deregulation. We show that the lower cost of credit, increase in the availability of credit, and greater bank competition in each state are mechanisms that led to the decline in the labor share. We use this evidence to obtain the elasticity of labor share with respect to borrowing costs, which itself is informative about the aggregate elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Finally, we focus on manufacturing and services to show that the impact of banking deregulation is particularly important in capital intensive and external finance dependent industries.
{"title":"Credit and the Labor Share: Evidence from U.S. States","authors":"Aslı Leblebicioğlu, Ariel Weinberger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3025116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025116","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the role of credit markets in explaining the changes in the U.S. labor share by evaluating the effects of state-level banking deregulation, which resulted in improved access to cheaper credit. Utilizing a difference-in-differences strategy, we provide causal evidence showing labor share declined following the interstate banking deregulation. We show that the lower cost of credit, increase in the availability of credit, and greater bank competition in each state are mechanisms that led to the decline in the labor share. We use this evidence to obtain the elasticity of labor share with respect to borrowing costs, which itself is informative about the aggregate elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Finally, we focus on manufacturing and services to show that the impact of banking deregulation is particularly important in capital intensive and external finance dependent industries.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"3 4, Supplement 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116786730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T. Mwangi, F. Simiyu, Lulit Mitik Beyene, Albert Onderi
In Kenya, there has been increased debate on the impact of minimum wage increases and pay disparities between sectors. Long-term differences in earnings across sectors and different regions (urban and rural) are reflected through higher poverty rates in rural areas, especially among wage earners. This study evaluates the effects of minimum wages on labor and its impact on growth. The study uses the single country static model, the PEP-1-1 model and the Social Accounting Matrix for Kenya for the year 2009. The key research questions are to assess the effects of minimum wages on rural or urban area labor markets, labor migration, and income distribution. To achieve this, the study simulates three scenarios: increases in minimum wages for formal workers in urban and rural areas at the same rate of 5%, different rates (10% rural and 5% urban), and a cut in the minimum wages in both regions. The findings indicate that increases in wage fuel the migration of labor from rural to urban areas, and stifles the expansion of the economy. A rise in minimum wages has an overall negative effect on incomes of rural households while benefiting urban households, which contributes to increased inequality. A fall in real minimum wages on the other hand, is supportive of output and employment growth.
{"title":"The Effects of Minimum Wages on the Labor Market and Income Distribution in Kenya: A CGE Analysis","authors":"T. Mwangi, F. Simiyu, Lulit Mitik Beyene, Albert Onderi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3159371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3159371","url":null,"abstract":"In Kenya, there has been increased debate on the impact of minimum wage increases and pay disparities between sectors. Long-term differences in earnings across sectors and different regions (urban and rural) are reflected through higher poverty rates in rural areas, especially among wage earners. This study evaluates the effects of minimum wages on labor and its impact on growth. The study uses the single country static model, the PEP-1-1 model and the Social Accounting Matrix for Kenya for the year 2009. The key research questions are to assess the effects of minimum wages on rural or urban area labor markets, labor migration, and income distribution. To achieve this, the study simulates three scenarios: increases in minimum wages for formal workers in urban and rural areas at the same rate of 5%, different rates (10% rural and 5% urban), and a cut in the minimum wages in both regions. The findings indicate that increases in wage fuel the migration of labor from rural to urban areas, and stifles the expansion of the economy. A rise in minimum wages has an overall negative effect on incomes of rural households while benefiting urban households, which contributes to increased inequality. A fall in real minimum wages on the other hand, is supportive of output and employment growth.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125358412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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