We study a labor market where firms have private information about their ex-ante heterogeneous productivities and search is random. In this environment, a binding minimum wage can be efficiency-enhancing - we show that setting it using a version of the Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism delivers full efficiency. In a dynamic, stochas-tic version of the model calibrated to the Routine Manual labor market in the U.S., our proposed mechanism generates sizeable welfare gains. The resulting minimum wage is procyclical, dampening the response of unemployment to aggregate shocks.
{"title":"Optimal Design and Quantitative Evaluation of the Minimum Wage","authors":"Zachary L. Mahone, P. Pujolas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3068822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3068822","url":null,"abstract":"We study a labor market where firms have private information about their ex-ante heterogeneous productivities and search is random. In this environment, a binding minimum wage can be efficiency-enhancing - we show that setting it using a version of the Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism delivers full efficiency. In a dynamic, stochas-tic version of the model calibrated to the Routine Manual labor market in the U.S., our proposed mechanism generates sizeable welfare gains. The resulting minimum wage is procyclical, dampening the response of unemployment to aggregate shocks.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123208439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how idiosyncratic earnings risk evolves over the business cycle in Italy and in the US. We distinguish between two sources of risk to annual earnings growth: changes in employment time (number of weeks of employment within a year) and changes in weekly earnings. Shocks to employment generate the tail distribution of annual earnings growth and account for the increased risk in recessions. In particular, an increase in the rate of separation and a decrease in the rate of hiring are responsible for the skewed annual earnings growth distribution observed in recessions. In contrast, the cross-sectional distribution of weekly earnings growth is relatively stable over the business cycle and exhibits little skewness. Thus, models that rely on cyclical idiosyncratic risk, should focus on cyclical employment risk rather than on cyclical wage risk.
{"title":"Employment Time and the Cyclicality of Earnings Growth","authors":"Eran B. Hoffmann, Davide Malacrinò","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2872933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2872933","url":null,"abstract":"We study how idiosyncratic earnings risk evolves over the business cycle in Italy and in the US. We distinguish between two sources of risk to annual earnings growth: changes in employment time (number of weeks of employment within a year) and changes in weekly earnings. Shocks to employment generate the tail distribution of annual earnings growth and account for the increased risk in recessions. In particular, an increase in the rate of separation and a decrease in the rate of hiring are responsible for the skewed annual earnings growth distribution observed in recessions. In contrast, the cross-sectional distribution of weekly earnings growth is relatively stable over the business cycle and exhibits little skewness. Thus, models that rely on cyclical idiosyncratic risk, should focus on cyclical employment risk rather than on cyclical wage risk.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124075285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Proposals for a universal basic income are generating interest across the globe, with pilot experiments underway or in the works in California, Canada, Finland, Italy, Kenya, and Uganda. Surprisingly, many of the most outspoken supporters of a universal basic income have been self-described libertarians — even though libertarians are generally considered to be antagonistic toward redistribution and a universal basic income is, at its core, a program of income redistribution. What explains such strong libertarian support for a policy that seems so contrary to libertarian ideals? This Article seeks to answer that question. We first show that a basic safety net is not only consistent with, but likely required by, several strands of libertarian thought. We then explain why libertarians committed to limited redistribution and limited government might support a system of unconditional cash transfers paid periodically. Delivering benefits in cash, rather than in-kind, furthers autonomy by recognizing that all citizens — even poor ones — are the best judges of their needs. Decoupling such transfers from a work requirement acknowledges that the state lacks the ability to distinguish between work-capable and work-incapable individuals. Providing payments periodically, rather than through a once-in-a-lifetime lump sum grant, ensures that all individuals can receive a minimum level of support over lifespans of variable lengths, while also allowing individuals to adjust payment flows through financial market transactions. Although our main objective is to assess the fit between libertarian theory and a universal basic income, we also address various design choices inherent in any basic income scheme: who should receive it?; how large should it be?; which programs might it replace?; and should it phase out as market income rises? Lastly, we consider the relationship between a basic income and the political economy of redistribution. We find that the case for a basic income as a libertarian “second-best” is surprisingly shaky: libertarians who oppose all redistribution but grudgingly accept a basic income as the least-worst form of redistribution should reconsider both aspects of their position. We conclude by drawing out lessons from our analysis for non-libertarians, regardless of whether they are supportive or skeptical of basic income arguments.
{"title":"Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income","authors":"M. Fleischer, Daniel Hemel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3056576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3056576","url":null,"abstract":"Proposals for a universal basic income are generating interest across the globe, with pilot experiments underway or in the works in California, Canada, Finland, Italy, Kenya, and Uganda. Surprisingly, many of the most outspoken supporters of a universal basic income have been self-described libertarians — even though libertarians are generally considered to be antagonistic toward redistribution and a universal basic income is, at its core, a program of income redistribution. What explains such strong libertarian support for a policy that seems so contrary to libertarian ideals? \u0000This Article seeks to answer that question. We first show that a basic safety net is not only consistent with, but likely required by, several strands of libertarian thought. We then explain why libertarians committed to limited redistribution and limited government might support a system of unconditional cash transfers paid periodically. Delivering benefits in cash, rather than in-kind, furthers autonomy by recognizing that all citizens — even poor ones — are the best judges of their needs. Decoupling such transfers from a work requirement acknowledges that the state lacks the ability to distinguish between work-capable and work-incapable individuals. Providing payments periodically, rather than through a once-in-a-lifetime lump sum grant, ensures that all individuals can receive a minimum level of support over lifespans of variable lengths, while also allowing individuals to adjust payment flows through financial market transactions. \u0000Although our main objective is to assess the fit between libertarian theory and a universal basic income, we also address various design choices inherent in any basic income scheme: who should receive it?; how large should it be?; which programs might it replace?; and should it phase out as market income rises? Lastly, we consider the relationship between a basic income and the political economy of redistribution. We find that the case for a basic income as a libertarian “second-best” is surprisingly shaky: libertarians who oppose all redistribution but grudgingly accept a basic income as the least-worst form of redistribution should reconsider both aspects of their position. We conclude by drawing out lessons from our analysis for non-libertarians, regardless of whether they are supportive or skeptical of basic income arguments.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116305991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In any dynamic economy, there is a risk of job loss. Job loss resulting from foreign rather than domestic competition has come under intense scrutiny recently with Britain’s exit from the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. While economists generally conclude that trade is broadly enriching, recent works have brought attention to the costs of trade to workers and communities. At the individual level, I find that the risk of layoff and unemployment to workers in trade-exposed sectors is comparable — or even lower — than the risk to workers in non-traded sectors and that these risks have not increased during the period of more intense competition with Chinese imports. At the community level, Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) find that local areas have experienced slower job and wage growth and higher unemployment because of import competition with China. Upon analyzing their data, I conclude that their results are biased by the weaker macroeconomic performance of 2000-2007 relative to the 1990s. When I analyze inter-local area economic changes — rather analyzing changes within and across areas — I fail to reject the null hypotheses that import competition has no effect on wage or employment growth, except within the manufacturing sector during the most recent period, or that it has no effect on many other outcomes, including labor force participation, intergenerational mobility, and mortality. During each period, import competition actually predicts an increase in average wages for manufacturing workers, as well as non-manufacturing during the 1990s period, and import competition predicts a shift toward college educated non-manufacturing jobs in the second period. I conclude that foreign competition does not appear to elevate the risk of job loss to a greater extent than domestic competition, and people living in the communities most exposed to foreign competition are no worse off on average.
{"title":"Cutting the Losses: Reassessing the Costs of Import Competition to Workers and Communities","authors":"J. Rothwell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2920188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920188","url":null,"abstract":"In any dynamic economy, there is a risk of job loss. Job loss resulting from foreign rather than domestic competition has come under intense scrutiny recently with Britain’s exit from the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. While economists generally conclude that trade is broadly enriching, recent works have brought attention to the costs of trade to workers and communities. At the individual level, I find that the risk of layoff and unemployment to workers in trade-exposed sectors is comparable — or even lower — than the risk to workers in non-traded sectors and that these risks have not increased during the period of more intense competition with Chinese imports. At the community level, Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) find that local areas have experienced slower job and wage growth and higher unemployment because of import competition with China. Upon analyzing their data, I conclude that their results are biased by the weaker macroeconomic performance of 2000-2007 relative to the 1990s. When I analyze inter-local area economic changes — rather analyzing changes within and across areas — I fail to reject the null hypotheses that import competition has no effect on wage or employment growth, except within the manufacturing sector during the most recent period, or that it has no effect on many other outcomes, including labor force participation, intergenerational mobility, and mortality. During each period, import competition actually predicts an increase in average wages for manufacturing workers, as well as non-manufacturing during the 1990s period, and import competition predicts a shift toward college educated non-manufacturing jobs in the second period. I conclude that foreign competition does not appear to elevate the risk of job loss to a greater extent than domestic competition, and people living in the communities most exposed to foreign competition are no worse off on average.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132179781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the extent to which correcting for the underreporting of transfer benefits in the American Current Population Survey (CPS) complicates typical analyses comparing the effect of anti-poverty policy in the United States and Europe. Previous research suggests that up to one-half of social program spending by the American Federal government is not accounted for in CPS data harmonized for cross-national analysis by the Luxembourg Income Study and Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation. Using a microsimulation model to align survey responses with administrative data at the federal and state level decreases the overall and child relative poverty rates by 16% and 21% respectively. This doubles the number of Americans living in states with ‘European’ poverty rates to 25%, from 42 to 79 million, and demonstrates that more Americans live in states with ‘social democratic’ levels of poverty than the populations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden combined. Adjusting the national American poverty line for cost-of-living further suggests that 38% of Americans live in states with poverty rates typical of European countries. If a relative poverty line calculated across the European Union is used instead to reflect variation in standard of living across the EU, correcting for underreporting increases the share of Americans living in states with poverty rates below the EU member state average from 66% of the population to 94%.. Ultimately, given the varying adoption of administrative income data across countries, growing rates of underreporting in the CPS with variation across American states, and the increasing devolution of American social policy, comparative analyses of poverty and policy that do not consider underreporting or subnational variation risk biased conclusions.
{"title":"European America: The Effect of Underreported Transfer Benefits and Cost-of-Living on Cross-National Poverty Analysis","authors":"M. George","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2932938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2932938","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the extent to which correcting for the underreporting of transfer benefits in the American Current Population Survey (CPS) complicates typical analyses comparing the effect of anti-poverty policy in the United States and Europe. Previous research suggests that up to one-half of social program spending by the American Federal government is not accounted for in CPS data harmonized for cross-national analysis by the Luxembourg Income Study and Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation. Using a microsimulation model to align survey responses with administrative data at the federal and state level decreases the overall and child relative poverty rates by 16% and 21% respectively. This doubles the number of Americans living in states with ‘European’ poverty rates to 25%, from 42 to 79 million, and demonstrates that more Americans live in states with ‘social democratic’ levels of poverty than the populations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden combined. Adjusting the national American poverty line for cost-of-living further suggests that 38% of Americans live in states with poverty rates typical of European countries. If a relative poverty line calculated across the European Union is used instead to reflect variation in standard of living across the EU, correcting for underreporting increases the share of Americans living in states with poverty rates below the EU member state average from 66% of the population to 94%.. Ultimately, given the varying adoption of administrative income data across countries, growing rates of underreporting in the CPS with variation across American states, and the increasing devolution of American social policy, comparative analyses of poverty and policy that do not consider underreporting or subnational variation risk biased conclusions.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133364738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note constructs a simple two class example in which the Gini index is held constant while the size of the rich and poor populations change, in order to illustrate how very different societies can have the same Gini index and produce very similar estimates of standard inequality averse Social Welfare Functions. The rich/poor income ratio can vary by a factor of over 12, and the income share of the top one per cent can vary by a factor of over 16, with exactly the same Gini index. Focussing solely on the Gini index can thus obscure perceptions—e.g. of important market income trends or large changes in the redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system. Hence, analysts should supplement the use of an aggregate summary index of inequality with direct examination of the segments of the income distribution which they think are of greatest importance.
{"title":"On the Limitations of Some Current Usages of the Gini Index","authors":"L. Osberg","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12256","url":null,"abstract":"This note constructs a simple two class example in which the Gini index is held constant while the size of the rich and poor populations change, in order to illustrate how very different societies can have the same Gini index and produce very similar estimates of standard inequality averse Social Welfare Functions. The rich/poor income ratio can vary by a factor of over 12, and the income share of the top one per cent can vary by a factor of over 16, with exactly the same Gini index. Focussing solely on the Gini index can thus obscure perceptions—e.g. of important market income trends or large changes in the redistributive impact of the tax and transfer system. Hence, analysts should supplement the use of an aggregate summary index of inequality with direct examination of the segments of the income distribution which they think are of greatest importance.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114644959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in Canada between 2002 and 2014 has been only 0.16% per year. Although many developed countries have experienced a productivity slowdown since the beginning of the century, this figure is still substantially smaller than that of the U.S. We perform multiple counterfactual exercises to show that this difference in TFP growth cannot be accounted for by several compositional effects and/or mismeasurements of factors of production. We identify two key sectors (Mining and Manufacturing) that drive all of the TFP growth difference with the U.S. Despite the lack of TFP growth, Canada has experienced sustained income growth due to a prolonged period of appreciation of the terms of trade (while terms of trade in the U.S. have deteriorated), making real income in the two countries grow at similar rates.
{"title":"The Canadian Productivity Stagnation, 2002–2014","authors":"J. Conesa, P. Pujolas","doi":"10.1111/caje.12383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12383","url":null,"abstract":"Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in Canada between 2002 and 2014 has been only 0.16% per year. Although many developed countries have experienced a productivity slowdown since the beginning of the century, this figure is still substantially smaller than that of the U.S. We perform multiple counterfactual exercises to show that this difference in TFP growth cannot be accounted for by several compositional effects and/or mismeasurements of factors of production. We identify two key sectors (Mining and Manufacturing) that drive all of the TFP growth difference with the U.S. Despite the lack of TFP growth, Canada has experienced sustained income growth due to a prolonged period of appreciation of the terms of trade (while terms of trade in the U.S. have deteriorated), making real income in the two countries grow at similar rates.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115761925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper describes two stylized facts about the earnings dynamics throughout a worker’s career. First, this paper shows that more educated workers have higher earnings growth with work experience than less educated workers. Second, it demonstrates that more educated workers suffer greater earnings losses following job displacement. I propose a model that integrates human capital accumulation and learning mechanisms that can explain these empirical findings. In the model, employers use both education and past job displacement as a signal of a worker’s unobservable ability. As a result, educated workers receive more on-the-job training in the beginning of their careers. In addition, educated workers suffer greater wage losses after being laid off when potential employers learn that an educated worker is low ability.
{"title":"Earnings Dynamics: The Role of Education throughout a Worker's Career","authors":"Breno Braga","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2979362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2979362","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes two stylized facts about the earnings dynamics throughout a worker’s career. First, this paper shows that more educated workers have higher earnings growth with work experience than less educated workers. Second, it demonstrates that more educated workers suffer greater earnings losses following job displacement. I propose a model that integrates human capital accumulation and learning mechanisms that can explain these empirical findings. In the model, employers use both education and past job displacement as a signal of a worker’s unobservable ability. As a result, educated workers receive more on-the-job training in the beginning of their careers. In addition, educated workers suffer greater wage losses after being laid off when potential employers learn that an educated worker is low ability.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116898704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides an intuitive additive decomposition of the global income Gini coefficient with respect to differences within and between countries. In 2005, nearly half the total global income inequality is due to income differences between Europeans and North Americans on the one side and inhabitants of Asia on the other, with the China-USA income differences alone accounting for six percent of global inequality. Historically, income differences between Asia and Europe have driven a large part of global inequality, but the quantitative importance of within-Asia income inequality has increased substantially since 1950.
{"title":"Decomposing Global Inequality","authors":"J. Modalsli","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12230","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an intuitive additive decomposition of the global income Gini coefficient with respect to differences within and between countries. In 2005, nearly half the total global income inequality is due to income differences between Europeans and North Americans on the one side and inhabitants of Asia on the other, with the China-USA income differences alone accounting for six percent of global inequality. Historically, income differences between Asia and Europe have driven a large part of global inequality, but the quantitative importance of within-Asia income inequality has increased substantially since 1950.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128496086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In June 2017, households’ real disposable cash income did not change as compared to June 2016. For the first time since January 2016 (if January 2017 is not taken into account), there was no decrease in real income. In Q1 2017, the poverty rate fell relative to Q1 2015 and Q1 2016. In H1 2017, the volume of consumer lending to individuals increased as compared to H1 2016, with lending growth being much higher in regions with a high poverty rate. As compared to 2016, people started to assess more positively the dynamics of their financial standing and the share of those who saved on food, clothes and footwear decreased.
{"title":"Incomes and the Poverty Rate: Stagnation and Cautious Optimism","authors":"E. Grishina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3025023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3025023","url":null,"abstract":"In June 2017, households’ real disposable cash income did not change as compared to June 2016. For the first time since January 2016 (if January 2017 is not taken into account), there was no decrease in real income. In Q1 2017, the poverty rate fell relative to Q1 2015 and Q1 2016. In H1 2017, the volume of consumer lending to individuals increased as compared to H1 2016, with lending growth being much higher in regions with a high poverty rate. As compared to 2016, people started to assess more positively the dynamics of their financial standing and the share of those who saved on food, clothes and footwear decreased.","PeriodicalId":125977,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Macroeconomics: Employment","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114611709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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