Pub Date : 2004-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S021986810400018X
Ira G. Kawaller, Walter R. Teets
Four possible hedge accounting treatments for a foreign currency forward contract used to hedge a purchase of equipment are illustrated. In addition to journal entries illustrating the accounting, the pros and cons of the alternative treatments are discussed.
{"title":"ALTERNATIVE HEDGE ACCOUNTING TREATMENTS FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE FORWARDS","authors":"Ira G. Kawaller, Walter R. Teets","doi":"10.1142/S021986810400018X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S021986810400018X","url":null,"abstract":"Four possible hedge accounting treatments for a foreign currency forward contract used to hedge a purchase of equipment are illustrated. In addition to journal entries illustrating the accounting, the pros and cons of the alternative treatments are discussed.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124120686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000166
T. Dunne, C. Helliar, D. Power, C. Mallin, Kean Ow-Yong, L. Moir
The aim of the paper is to examine the impact of FRS 13 on the financial statements of UK quoted companies. In particular, a content analysis survey is used to investigate: (i) UK companies' disclosures about derivatives in their annual reports prior to the introduction of FRS 13; and (ii) changes in UK companies' reporting practices for derivative instruments since the introduction of the standard. The results indicate that the implementation of FRS 13 was associated with an increase in derivatives related information available in corporate annual reports. This association appears to hold irrespective of whether the actual number of pages of FRS 13 related information disclosed, or the relative measure of the percentage of the annual report containing FRS 13 information is used. Not surprisingly, the largest disclosers are FTSE 100 listed companies. The industry grouping with the largest average disclosure comprises companies from the Non-Cyclical Services sector. Thus, the implementation of FRS 13 has had a significant impact on the content of annual reports. This additional disclosure may have provided stakeholders with useful information about these companies.
{"title":"THE INTRODUCTION OF DERIVATIVES REPORTING IN THE UK: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF FRS 13 DISCLOSURES","authors":"T. Dunne, C. Helliar, D. Power, C. Mallin, Kean Ow-Yong, L. Moir","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000166","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the paper is to examine the impact of FRS 13 on the financial statements of UK quoted companies. In particular, a content analysis survey is used to investigate: (i) UK companies' disclosures about derivatives in their annual reports prior to the introduction of FRS 13; and (ii) changes in UK companies' reporting practices for derivative instruments since the introduction of the standard. The results indicate that the implementation of FRS 13 was associated with an increase in derivatives related information available in corporate annual reports. This association appears to hold irrespective of whether the actual number of pages of FRS 13 related information disclosed, or the relative measure of the percentage of the annual report containing FRS 13 information is used. Not surprisingly, the largest disclosers are FTSE 100 listed companies. The industry grouping with the largest average disclosure comprises companies from the Non-Cyclical Services sector. Thus, the implementation of FRS 13 has had a significant impact on the content of annual reports. This additional disclosure may have provided stakeholders with useful information about these companies.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126765982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-09-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000178
Guy D. Coughlan, S. Emery, Johannes Kolb
HEAT™ or Hedge Effectiveness Analysis Toolkit is JPMorgan's latest addition to a long list of innovative and cutting-edge risk management solutions. HEAT is destined to help corporations navigate the complexities of hedge effectiveness testing under IAS 39 and FAS 133. HEAT comprises a consistent framework incorporating alternative methodologies for understanding and implementing hedge effectiveness testing. It is unique because it enables corporations to assess the effectiveness of hedges in both economic and accounting terms and also enables corporations to estimate the potential impact on earnings if hedge accounting is not obtained. While HEAT provides corporations with a consistent framework incorporating many alternative methodologies for hedge effectiveness testing, auditors will ultimately determine the appropriateness of any given methodology from a regulatory and accounting perspective, and as such accounting advice should be sought before implementing a particular methodology. In practice, even relatively simple hedge effectiveness methodologies can give surprising and sometimes counterintuitive results. HEAT helps to address the pitfalls that need to be negotiated in developing a consistent and intuitive approach to evaluating hedge effectiveness.
{"title":"HEAT™ (HEDGE EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS TOOLKIT): A CONSISTENT FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING HEDGE EFFECTIVENESS UNDER IAS 39 AND FAS 133 FROM JPMORGAN","authors":"Guy D. Coughlan, S. Emery, Johannes Kolb","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000178","url":null,"abstract":"HEAT™ or Hedge Effectiveness Analysis Toolkit is JPMorgan's latest addition to a long list of innovative and cutting-edge risk management solutions. HEAT is destined to help corporations navigate the complexities of hedge effectiveness testing under IAS 39 and FAS 133. HEAT comprises a consistent framework incorporating alternative methodologies for understanding and implementing hedge effectiveness testing. It is unique because it enables corporations to assess the effectiveness of hedges in both economic and accounting terms and also enables corporations to estimate the potential impact on earnings if hedge accounting is not obtained. While HEAT provides corporations with a consistent framework incorporating many alternative methodologies for hedge effectiveness testing, auditors will ultimately determine the appropriateness of any given methodology from a regulatory and accounting perspective, and as such accounting advice should be sought before implementing a particular methodology. In practice, even relatively simple hedge effectiveness methodologies can give surprising and sometimes counterintuitive results. HEAT helps to address the pitfalls that need to be negotiated in developing a consistent and intuitive approach to evaluating hedge effectiveness.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129287756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-03-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000075
S. Balsam, Richard Gifford
This paper examines whether stock option exercise behavior is consistent with the incentives provided by the US Internal Revenue Code using data provided by a large multinational corporation which made multiple broad-based and management grants over the period of examination. In particular we examine whether holders delay exercising their options to transfer income from one year to the next, hence deferring the tax payments associated with the option gains. We document that taxpayers rationally delay the exercise of taxable nonqualified options around the end of the year, consistent with the incentive to delay tax payments. In contrast we do not find this pattern with respect to the exercise of qualified stock options, upon which taxes may be indefinitely deferred.
{"title":"THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON THE TIMING OF STOCK OPTION EXERCISE","authors":"S. Balsam, Richard Gifford","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000075","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether stock option exercise behavior is consistent with the incentives provided by the US Internal Revenue Code using data provided by a large multinational corporation which made multiple broad-based and management grants over the period of examination. In particular we examine whether holders delay exercising their options to transfer income from one year to the next, hence deferring the tax payments associated with the option gains. We document that taxpayers rationally delay the exercise of taxable nonqualified options around the end of the year, consistent with the incentive to delay tax payments. In contrast we do not find this pattern with respect to the exercise of qualified stock options, upon which taxes may be indefinitely deferred.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124981786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-03-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000099
S. Balsam
This book examines the different components of executive pay packages such as basic salary, stock grants, stock options and also factors that determine the fulfilment of the agreement during and after the executive’s time in office. With data gathered from SEC filings, business publications (e.g. Forbes, The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Business Week) and a data base (i.e. ExecuCom from Standard & Poors, which contains information on the remuneration of the top management of 1500 firms in the USA), the author provides a detailed analysis of the design of executive compensation. In more than 60 statistical tables, 20 exhibits of extract of real life contractual pay agreements, and numerous graphs and figures, he provides a comparative analysis of the usage, magnitude, and dollar value of the different components of executive pay packages. The life cycle of an executive compensation agreement begins when a firm launches a search for an individual to fill the top post and, in theory, ends when the executive actually receives money in his or her bank account. Most executives get rewarded but some may never see the pay check. This occurs when performance and targets have not been met. But many get rewarded even when performance is poor and sometimes, leaving shareholders vehemently vociferous. To explain these contradictions, the author reviews some of the theories that underpin the mechanics of modern finance and economics. These include, for example, the risk–reward characteristics of each individual CEO, owner–manager conflict, which is captured in the agency theory and the class hegemony and figure head theories, which partly explain the mythology of CEOs today. He explores the notion of incentive and the extent to which it can contribute to productivity or add value to shareholders as propounded by the tournament theory. The author shows how these theories interplay in the design of an executive compensation package with several illustrations of their mutually reinforcing effects and also of their contradictory outcome. The design and outcome of executive pay contracts also depends on many factors. Some such as statutory regulations and tax are outside of the firm control. Others such as ownership structure, financial and accounting results are endogenous to the firm. The design process can also be influenced by informal institutions (e.g. shareholder activists) and changing laws and economics environments. Within the firm, formal bodies such as compensation committees may provide additional input. They influence the design process by highlighting the opinion of major stakeholders and also, as they seek to strike a balance between objective criteria (e.g. benchmarking to peer review) and subjective considerations (i.e. the relations between CEOs and individual members of the firm’s Board). Analysing executive compensation can be complicated by the fact that new issues emerge as current ones are addressed through regulation and or improved corpor
{"title":"Book Review: AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION","authors":"S. Balsam","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000099","url":null,"abstract":"This book examines the different components of executive pay packages such as basic salary, stock grants, stock options and also factors that determine the fulfilment of the agreement during and after the executive’s time in office. With data gathered from SEC filings, business publications (e.g. Forbes, The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Business Week) and a data base (i.e. ExecuCom from Standard & Poors, which contains information on the remuneration of the top management of 1500 firms in the USA), the author provides a detailed analysis of the design of executive compensation. In more than 60 statistical tables, 20 exhibits of extract of real life contractual pay agreements, and numerous graphs and figures, he provides a comparative analysis of the usage, magnitude, and dollar value of the different components of executive pay packages. The life cycle of an executive compensation agreement begins when a firm launches a search for an individual to fill the top post and, in theory, ends when the executive actually receives money in his or her bank account. Most executives get rewarded but some may never see the pay check. This occurs when performance and targets have not been met. But many get rewarded even when performance is poor and sometimes, leaving shareholders vehemently vociferous. To explain these contradictions, the author reviews some of the theories that underpin the mechanics of modern finance and economics. These include, for example, the risk–reward characteristics of each individual CEO, owner–manager conflict, which is captured in the agency theory and the class hegemony and figure head theories, which partly explain the mythology of CEOs today. He explores the notion of incentive and the extent to which it can contribute to productivity or add value to shareholders as propounded by the tournament theory. The author shows how these theories interplay in the design of an executive compensation package with several illustrations of their mutually reinforcing effects and also of their contradictory outcome. The design and outcome of executive pay contracts also depends on many factors. Some such as statutory regulations and tax are outside of the firm control. Others such as ownership structure, financial and accounting results are endogenous to the firm. The design process can also be influenced by informal institutions (e.g. shareholder activists) and changing laws and economics environments. Within the firm, formal bodies such as compensation committees may provide additional input. They influence the design process by highlighting the opinion of major stakeholders and also, as they seek to strike a balance between objective criteria (e.g. benchmarking to peer review) and subjective considerations (i.e. the relations between CEOs and individual members of the firm’s Board). Analysing executive compensation can be complicated by the fact that new issues emerge as current ones are addressed through regulation and or improved corpor","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113998999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-03-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000063
R. Aggarwal, B. Simkins
Derivatives have been blamed in recent years for many financial disasters and there is evidence that disclosure influences hedging activity and corporate value. Nevertheless, standards for the mandatory disclosure of derivatives usage have been very controversial. This paper examines the nature and determinants of voluntary disclosures of currency derivatives usage by large industrial firms under SFAS 107 and has implications for the new derivatives disclosures under SFAS 133. This study documents that, consistent with higher disclosure levels being associated with lower cost of capital and higher shareholder value, firms with higher quality voluntary disclosures have higher market/book value ratios. However, consistent with agency, political, and disclosure cost arguments, industry leaders and firms with higher executive compensation in the form of stock options are more likely to have poor voluntary disclosure. In addition, we do not find any evidence indicating firms with more exposure to currency risk or firms with higher levels of currency derivatives usage provide increased disclosure of derivatives activity.
{"title":"EVIDENCE ON VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES OF DERIVATIVES USAGE BY LARGE US COMPANIES","authors":"R. Aggarwal, B. Simkins","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000063","url":null,"abstract":"Derivatives have been blamed in recent years for many financial disasters and there is evidence that disclosure influences hedging activity and corporate value. Nevertheless, standards for the mandatory disclosure of derivatives usage have been very controversial. This paper examines the nature and determinants of voluntary disclosures of currency derivatives usage by large industrial firms under SFAS 107 and has implications for the new derivatives disclosures under SFAS 133. This study documents that, consistent with higher disclosure levels being associated with lower cost of capital and higher shareholder value, firms with higher quality voluntary disclosures have higher market/book value ratios. However, consistent with agency, political, and disclosure cost arguments, industry leaders and firms with higher executive compensation in the form of stock options are more likely to have poor voluntary disclosure. In addition, we do not find any evidence indicating firms with more exposure to currency risk or firms with higher levels of currency derivatives usage provide increased disclosure of derivatives activity.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121282897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-03-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000026
John C. Hull, Alan White
In this paper we argue that employee stock options should be expensed on the grant date and then marked to market on subsequent reporting dates. One of the advantages of our approach is that the cumulative amount expensed for a stock option over the whole of its life does not depend on the option pricing model used. The option pricing model influences only the way in which expenses are allocated to time periods. Our paper proposes an option pricing model appropriate for employee stock options. The model explicitly considers the vesting period, the possibility that employees will leave the company during the life of the option, the inability of employees to trade their options, and dilution issues.
{"title":"ACCOUNTING FOR EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO HANDLING THE VALUATION ISSUES","authors":"John C. Hull, Alan White","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000026","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we argue that employee stock options should be expensed on the grant date and then marked to market on subsequent reporting dates. One of the advantages of our approach is that the cumulative amount expensed for a stock option over the whole of its life does not depend on the option pricing model used. The option pricing model influences only the way in which expenses are allocated to time periods. Our paper proposes an option pricing model appropriate for employee stock options. The model explicitly considers the vesting period, the possibility that employees will leave the company during the life of the option, the inability of employees to trade their options, and dilution issues.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132215031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-03-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000051
Lerong He, M. Conyon
This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.
{"title":"CEO COMPENSATION, INCENTIVES, AND GOVERNANCE IN NEW ENTERPRISE FIRMS","authors":"Lerong He, M. Conyon","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000051","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125216937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-03-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000038
Shane A. Johnson, Yisong S. Tian
We extend research on executive stock options in two ways. First, we generalize Johnson and Tian's (Journal of Financial Economics, 57 (2000b)) single indexed executive stock option to incorporate multiple common risks. Second, we use an expected utility framework to analyze the efficiency and incentive effects of traditional and indexed option grants for risk-averse executives. If firms grant equal numbers of each option type and adjust their moneyness to provide equal utility to executives, single and multi-indexed option grants are less expensive than traditional options while providing stronger incentives to increase stock price. If firms adjust the number of options granted instead of their moneyness to produce equal utility, indexed option grants are more expensive than traditional grants. For firms facing multiple common risks, multi-indexed options are less expensive and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price than single indexed options.
本文从两个方面展开对高管股票期权的研究。首先，我们对Johnson和Tian (Journal of Financial Economics, 57 (2000b))的单指数高管股票期权进行了推广，以纳入多个共同风险。其次，我们使用预期效用框架来分析传统和指数期权授予对风险厌恶型高管的效率和激励效应。如果企业授予相同数量的每种期权，并调整其货币量以为高管提供相同的效用，那么单指数和多指数期权授予比传统期权更便宜，同时提供更强的股票价格上涨激励。如果公司调整授予期权的数量，而不是调整他们的资金，以产生相等的效用，指数期权授予比传统的授予更昂贵。对于面临多重共同风险的企业来说，多指数期权比单指数期权成本更低，对股价的激励作用更强。
{"title":"RISK-AVERSE EXECUTIVES, MULTIPLE COMMON RISKS, AND THE EFFICIENCY AND INCENTIVES OF INDEXED EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS","authors":"Shane A. Johnson, Yisong S. Tian","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000038","url":null,"abstract":"We extend research on executive stock options in two ways. First, we generalize Johnson and Tian's (Journal of Financial Economics, 57 (2000b)) single indexed executive stock option to incorporate multiple common risks. Second, we use an expected utility framework to analyze the efficiency and incentive effects of traditional and indexed option grants for risk-averse executives. If firms grant equal numbers of each option type and adjust their moneyness to provide equal utility to executives, single and multi-indexed option grants are less expensive than traditional options while providing stronger incentives to increase stock price. If firms adjust the number of options granted instead of their moneyness to produce equal utility, indexed option grants are more expensive than traditional grants. For firms facing multiple common risks, multi-indexed options are less expensive and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price than single indexed options.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133738505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-03-01DOI: 10.1142/S0219868104000257
S. Karlinsky, James Krochka
This paper introduces the reader to the US tax aspects of executive and employee compensation. It presents the basic tenets of the income tax system within which the context of employee compensation can be better understood. It discusses taxable and tax free fringe benefits and then focuses on the restricted employee stock option rules. With the accounting regulators both within the US and worldwide moving to require the expensing of stock options, alternative compensatory schemes are also presented.
{"title":"ERRATUM: AN INTRODUCTION TO US TAX ASPECTS OF EXECUTIVE/EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION WITH A STOCK OPTION FOCUS","authors":"S. Karlinsky, James Krochka","doi":"10.1142/S0219868104000257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000257","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces the reader to the US tax aspects of executive and employee compensation. It presents the basic tenets of the income tax system within which the context of employee compensation can be better understood. It discusses taxable and tax free fringe benefits and then focuses on the restricted employee stock option rules. With the accounting regulators both within the US and worldwide moving to require the expensing of stock options, alternative compensatory schemes are also presented.","PeriodicalId":128457,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Derivatives Accounting","volume":"234 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115502653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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