Over 150 countries allow expatriate citizens to vote in their country of origin. Yet, little is known about their voting behavior and how this is affected by host countries. Using unique micro-data on Chilean expatriates living in Europe, we study how the host country's turnout affects expatriates' electoral participation in the 2017 Chilean Presidential election. We focus on the 2014 European Parliament election turnout in the district of the Chilean's geocoded residence and exploit local transitory shocks to the cost of voting given by the rainfall on the day of the election. We find that migrants living in areas with higher political participation have lower engagement with their home country politics. A 1 percentage point increase in the host country's turnout decreases the electoral participation of Chilean expatriates by nearly 1 percentage point. The effects are stronger for young Chileans and those living in small communities, and in localities more welcoming to migrants. This suggests that integration into their local environment seems to play an important role on shaping political preferences.
{"title":"Voting from Abroad: Assessing the Impact of Local Turnout on Migrants' Voting behavior","authors":"Rubén Poblete-Cazenave, A. Toppeta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3933789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3933789","url":null,"abstract":"Over 150 countries allow expatriate citizens to vote in their country of origin. Yet, little is known about their voting behavior and how this is affected by host countries. Using unique micro-data on Chilean expatriates living in Europe, we study how the host country's turnout affects expatriates' electoral participation in the 2017 Chilean Presidential election. We focus on the 2014 European Parliament election turnout in the district of the Chilean's geocoded residence and exploit local transitory shocks to the cost of voting given by the rainfall on the day of the election. We find that migrants living in areas with higher political participation have lower engagement with their home country politics. A 1 percentage point increase in the host country's turnout decreases the electoral participation of Chilean expatriates by nearly 1 percentage point. The effects are stronger for young Chileans and those living in small communities, and in localities more welcoming to migrants. This suggests that integration into their local environment seems to play an important role on shaping political preferences.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127183764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The eurozone was created with the goal of economic convergence between its members. The Maastricht Treaty defined four convergence criteria – price stability, sound government finances, durability of convergence (measured by the long-term interest rate), and exchange rate stability. This paper analyses the developments during the 1999-2020 period in the field of sound government finances, as it is the only convergence criterion which continued to apply after eurozone membership and is by far the most important element of financial stability in the eurozone. According to the Maastricht framework, eurozone members are supposed to keep their annual budget deficits within 3% of GDP and their total government debt below 60% of GDP. In practice, the budget deficit threshold has been frequently exceeded – even by the largest economies in the eurozone – and as a consequence nowadays only a minority of eurozone members have government debt levels below 60% of GDP. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the financial framework of the Maastricht Treaty has been severely compromised: in 2020, the debt levels of nearly 1/3 of the euro area countries were well over 100% of GDP – even reaching 155.8% in the case of Italy, and 205.6% in the case of Greece.
{"title":"The Eurozone: From the Concept of Financial Stability to the Reality of Deficits and Debts","authors":"Vasil Gechev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3912862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912862","url":null,"abstract":"The eurozone was created with the goal of economic convergence between its members. The Maastricht Treaty defined four convergence criteria – price stability, sound government finances, durability of convergence (measured by the long-term interest rate), and exchange rate stability. This paper analyses the developments during the 1999-2020 period in the field of sound government finances, as it is the only convergence criterion which continued to apply after eurozone membership and is by far the most important element of financial stability in the eurozone. According to the Maastricht framework, eurozone members are supposed to keep their annual budget deficits within 3% of GDP and their total government debt below 60% of GDP. In practice, the budget deficit threshold has been frequently exceeded – even by the largest economies in the eurozone – and as a consequence nowadays only a minority of eurozone members have government debt levels below 60% of GDP. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the financial framework of the Maastricht Treaty has been severely compromised: in 2020, the debt levels of nearly 1/3 of the euro area countries were well over 100% of GDP – even reaching 155.8% in the case of Italy, and 205.6% in the case of Greece.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"21 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126925077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung, M. Ovádek, Nicolas Lampach
Drawing on neoclassical consumer choice theory, we design a model to study court performance in which a judge is facing a trade-off between judicial speed (time to decision) and verdict length (number of words) given a resource constraint. The model has two main implications. First, the trade-off can be interpreted as the rate of technical transformation that is taken as a measure of court productivity. A low transformation rate from time to verdict implies poor judge or court productivity. We study the evolution of the rate using data of the Court of Justice of the European Union from 1959 to 2017, and suggest that the estimate rate is a good measure of the court performance and indicates a need for court reform. Second, the model predicts that growing backlog of cases reduces either speed, length, or both, and the rise in resources improves either one or both of them. To deal with the simultaneous determination of speed, length, backlog and resources, we employ panel vector autoregression to allow court performance (speed and length), backlog and expenditure to be endogenously determined. We find that backlog impacts judicial speed negatively while expenditure has a positive impact on verdict length in the medium to long run.
{"title":"Court Productivity and Trade-off between Judicial Speed and Verdict Length: Evidence from the Court of Justice of the European Union}","authors":"Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung, M. Ovádek, Nicolas Lampach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3451889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3451889","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on neoclassical consumer choice theory, we design a model to study court performance in which a judge is facing a trade-off between judicial speed (time to decision) and verdict length (number of words) given a resource constraint. The model has two main implications. First, the trade-off can be interpreted as the rate of technical transformation that is taken as a measure of court productivity. A low transformation rate from time to verdict implies poor judge or court productivity. We study the evolution of the rate using data of the Court of Justice of the European Union from 1959 to 2017, and suggest that the estimate rate is a good measure of the court performance and indicates a need for court reform. Second, the model predicts that growing backlog of cases reduces either speed, length, or both, and the rise in resources improves either one or both of them. To deal with the simultaneous determination of speed, length, backlog and resources, we employ panel vector autoregression to allow court performance (speed and length), backlog and expenditure to be endogenously determined. We find that backlog impacts judicial speed negatively while expenditure has a positive impact on verdict length in the medium to long run.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126612590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Maastricht definition of government debt constitutes a central pillar of the European fiscal governance architecture. When EU member states agreed on the definition as part of the euro convergence criteria, they took a narrow approach to debt. The 2008 financial crisis and later the euro area crisis forced governments to engage in large debtincreasing bank bailouts, revealing gaps in the debt definition. Growing dissatisfaction with the outdated Maastricht indicators opened a window of opportunity for reform but the debt definition remained unchanged. We explain this puzzling indicator inertia by drawing on historical institutionalism. Examining the conflictual history of the EU’s debt measure, we show how the revision of the debt definition failed precisely due to its political charge and centrality in the EU fiscal surveillance framework. It also demonstrates that this path dependence enabled the European Commission to establish new fiscal sustainability indicators accounting for the implicit liabilities not captured by the narrow debt definition.
{"title":"Set in Stone? Conflict and Continuity Over the European Union’s Measurement of Government Debt","authors":"Jessica de Vlieger, Tobias Tesche","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3924608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3924608","url":null,"abstract":"The Maastricht definition of government debt constitutes a central pillar of the European fiscal governance architecture. When EU member states agreed on the definition as part of the euro convergence criteria, they took a narrow approach to debt. The 2008 financial crisis and later the euro area crisis forced governments to engage in large debtincreasing bank bailouts, revealing gaps in the debt definition. Growing dissatisfaction with the outdated Maastricht indicators opened a window of opportunity for reform but the debt definition remained unchanged. We explain this puzzling indicator inertia by drawing on historical institutionalism. Examining the conflictual history of the EU’s debt measure, we show how the revision of the debt definition failed precisely due to its political charge and centrality in the EU fiscal surveillance framework. It also demonstrates that this path dependence enabled the European Commission to establish new fiscal sustainability indicators accounting for the implicit liabilities not captured by the narrow debt definition.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130720093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does policy uncertainty affect productivity? Policy uncertainty creates delays as firms await new information about prices, costs and other market conditions before committing resources. Such delays can have real consequences on firms’ productivity and corporate decisions. First, we find that economic policy uncertainty has a negative impact on firm-level productivity. Second, debt magnifies the adverse effects of policy uncertainty on productivity, but access to external financing during periods of significant policy uncertainty shocks has a positive impact on firm-level productivity. Third, Policy uncertainty is positively related to cash holdings but this effect is mostly driven by highly productive firms and by firms with higher levels of irreversible investments since these firms face higher opportunity costs in future states. The three findings are robust to various specifications and provide an affirmative answer to the opening question.
{"title":"Capital Reallocation and Firm-Level Productivity Under Political Uncertainty","authors":"Daniel Tut, Melanie Cao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3875672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875672","url":null,"abstract":"Does policy uncertainty affect productivity? Policy uncertainty creates delays as firms await new information about prices, costs and other market conditions before committing resources. Such delays can have real consequences on firms’ productivity and corporate decisions. First, we find that economic policy uncertainty has a negative impact on firm-level productivity. Second, debt magnifies the adverse effects of policy uncertainty on productivity, but access to external financing during periods of significant policy uncertainty shocks has a positive impact on firm-level productivity. Third, Policy uncertainty is positively related to cash holdings but this effect is mostly driven by highly productive firms and by firms with higher levels of irreversible investments since these firms face higher opportunity costs in future states. The three findings are robust to various specifications and provide an affirmative answer to the opening question.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127615382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the economic effects on re-employment and program substitution behavior among elderly displaced workers who exogenously lose eligibility for their early retirement option. We use detailed Norwegian matched employer-employee data containing information on bankruptcy dates and individual-level wealth, income, pensions and social security benefits. Our empirical strategy employs a regression discontinuity design, as job displacement before a certain age cut-off results in losing eligibility for early retirement benefits between ages 62–67 years in Norway. We find that reemployment rates are indistinguishable between workers who just retain eligibility for early retirement benefits and those who just do not. Meanwhile, those who lose eligibility offset 69% of their lost benefits through take-up of other social security benefits, where 51% comes from disability insurance and 13% from unemployment insurance. Our findings are particularly policy relevant as tightening of age-limits for old-age pensions is on the agenda in several OECD countries, while current economic hardship throughout the region may lead to increased job displacement for elderly workers.
{"title":"Early Retirement Provision for Elderly Displaced Workers","authors":"Herman Kruse, Andreas Myhre","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3910440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3910440","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the economic effects on re-employment and program substitution behavior among elderly displaced workers who exogenously lose eligibility for their early retirement option. We use detailed Norwegian matched employer-employee data containing information on bankruptcy dates and individual-level wealth, income, pensions and social security benefits. Our empirical strategy employs a regression discontinuity design, as job displacement before a certain age cut-off results in losing eligibility for early retirement benefits between ages 62–67 years in Norway. We find that reemployment rates are indistinguishable between workers who just retain eligibility for early retirement benefits and those who just do not. Meanwhile, those who lose eligibility offset 69% of their lost benefits through take-up of other social security benefits, where 51% comes from disability insurance and 13% from unemployment insurance. Our findings are particularly policy relevant as tightening of age-limits for old-age pensions is on the agenda in several OECD countries, while current economic hardship throughout the region may lead to increased job displacement for elderly workers.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115528351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hungarian Abstract: Jelen dolgozat arra a kérdésre keres választ, hogy a társasági adó törvényben leírt feltételeknek megfelelő adóalap- és adókedvezmények igénybevételét mennyiben korlátozzák az uniós állami támogatás szabályok. A dolgozat első részében áttekintjük az állami támogatások fogalmát és rendszerét, a második részében pedig a főbb társasági adóalap-, és adókedvezményeket csoportosítjuk az állami támogatások szabályai mentén. Az egyéb adóintézkedések, illetve a bírósági eljárás során állami támogatásnak minősített adóintézkedések a jelen dolgozat keretein kívül esnek
English Abstract: The paper investigates whether and how much the utilization of taxable base incentives and tax credits granted by the corporate income tax law is limited by the state aid nature of the tax measures. The first part of the essay describes the most important attributes of state aid, and the European Union state aid system. In the second part corporate tax base incentives and tax credits will be explained from the point of their state aid character. Other tax measures and state aid related tax cases fall outside the scope of this paper.
{"title":"Társasági adóalap-, és adókedvezmények az állami támogatások rendszerében (Tax Incentives as State Aid)","authors":"Gabriella Erdős","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3779332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3779332","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Hungarian Abstract:</b> Jelen dolgozat arra a kérdésre keres választ, hogy a társasági adó törvényben leírt feltételeknek megfelelő adóalap- és adókedvezmények igénybevételét mennyiben korlátozzák az uniós állami támogatás szabályok. A dolgozat első részében áttekintjük az állami támogatások fogalmát és rendszerét, a második részében pedig a főbb társasági adóalap-, és adókedvezményeket csoportosítjuk az állami támogatások szabályai mentén. Az egyéb adóintézkedések, illetve a bírósági eljárás során állami támogatásnak minősített adóintézkedések a jelen dolgozat keretein kívül esnek <br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The paper investigates whether and how much the utilization of taxable base incentives and tax credits granted by the corporate income tax law is limited by the state aid nature of the tax measures. The first part of the essay describes the most important attributes of state aid, and the European Union state aid system. In the second part corporate tax base incentives and tax credits will be explained from the point of their state aid character. Other tax measures and state aid related tax cases fall outside the scope of this paper.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133438395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I analyse the effect of Brexit vote on UK manufacturing divisions using a synthetic control methodology. My results show that in the three years following the Brexit referendum, the UK total manufacturing sector's employment decreased by an average of 1.7% per quarter. When investigating the impact on individual manufacturing divisions, I found that two manufacturing divisions benefited from the Brexit vote, eight manufacturing divisions were negatively affected, while six manufacturing divisions were unaffected. My results are of particular importance to policymakers who will support sectors affected as a result of the Brexit referendum.
{"title":"The Winners and Losers of Brexit: A UK Manufacturing Sector Analysis","authors":"M. Farid","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3765122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3765122","url":null,"abstract":"I analyse the effect of Brexit vote on UK manufacturing divisions using a synthetic control methodology. My results show that in the three years following the Brexit referendum, the UK total manufacturing sector's employment decreased by an average of 1.7% per quarter. When investigating the impact on individual manufacturing divisions, I found that two manufacturing divisions benefited from the Brexit vote, eight manufacturing divisions were negatively affected, while six manufacturing divisions were unaffected. My results are of particular importance to policymakers who will support sectors affected as a result of the Brexit referendum.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133944471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest to use rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a way of providing incentives to originators that is easy to implement. This is possible if there is an additional market in which the originator operates, where copying is not easily possible. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies or tax breaks in the market for live performances. We provide a modeling framework that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving or even pareto efficient.
{"title":"Subsidies or Tax Breaks Versus Intellectual Property Rights: Dual Markets","authors":"Egle Skliaustyte, Matthias Weber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3849951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3849951","url":null,"abstract":"Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest to use rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a way of providing incentives to originators that is easy to implement. This is possible if there is an additional market in which the originator operates, where copying is not easily possible. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies or tax breaks in the market for live performances. We provide a modeling framework that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving or even pareto efficient.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121494293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-18DOI: 10.13133/2037-3651_73.292_6
Bianca Giannini, C. Oldani
L’indebitamento e la sua sostenibilita sono elementi cruciali per determinare la solidita delle finanze pubbliche, ma la risposta alla domanda “quanto debito dovrebbe emettere il settore dell’amministrazione pubblica” non e univoca. La sostenibilita del debito e un obiettivo primario nel processo di integrazione europea e Sylos Labini nel “Manifesto” evidenziava le conseguenze di un debito pubblico elevato. Il forte legame tra il problema della sostenibilita del debito e la necessita di stimolare la domanda, oltre che l’offerta, per evitare il diffondersi di disoccupazione e disuguaglianze rimane di estrema attualita. Un aspetto rilevante delle azioni correttive intraprese dai governi e il livellamento dei costi finanziari del debito e lo spostamento di parte del debito in avanti, attraverso l’utilizzo di strumenti finanziari derivati, come gli swap. Con il presente contributo, colmiamo la lacuna nel dibattito di policy, muovendo dal contributo al tema della sostenibilita del debito di Sylos Labini per attualizzarlo alle sfide poste dalla finanziarizzazione. Debt and its sustainability are crucial elements in determining the soundness of public finances, but the answer to the question “how much debt should the public administration sector issue” is not unique. Debt sustainability is a primary objective in the European integration process and Sylos Labini in the “Manifesto” highlighted the consequences of high public debt. The strong link between the problem of debt sustainability and the need to stimulate demand, as well as supply, to avoid the spread of unemployment and inequality remains extremely topical. An important aspect of the corrective actions taken by governments is the leveling of financial costs of debt and the shifting of part of the debt forward, through the use of financial derivative instruments, such as swaps. With this contribution, we fill the gap in the policy debate, moving from Sylos Labini’s contribution to the theme of debt sustainability to actualize it to the challenges posed by financialization. JEL codes: E612, G23, H63
{"title":"Governance Fiscale E Sostenibilità Del Debito Pubblico (The Sustainability of Public Debt in the European Union)","authors":"Bianca Giannini, C. Oldani","doi":"10.13133/2037-3651_73.292_6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13133/2037-3651_73.292_6","url":null,"abstract":"L’indebitamento e la sua sostenibilita sono elementi cruciali per determinare la solidita delle finanze pubbliche, ma la risposta alla domanda “quanto debito dovrebbe emettere il settore dell’amministrazione pubblica” non e univoca. La sostenibilita del debito e un obiettivo primario nel processo di integrazione europea e Sylos Labini nel “Manifesto” evidenziava le conseguenze di un debito pubblico elevato. Il forte legame tra il problema della sostenibilita del debito e la necessita di stimolare la domanda, oltre che l’offerta, per evitare il diffondersi di disoccupazione e disuguaglianze rimane di estrema attualita. Un aspetto rilevante delle azioni correttive intraprese dai governi e il livellamento dei costi finanziari del debito e lo spostamento di parte del debito in avanti, attraverso l’utilizzo di strumenti finanziari derivati, come gli swap. Con il presente contributo, colmiamo la lacuna nel dibattito di policy, muovendo dal contributo al tema della sostenibilita del debito di Sylos Labini per attualizzarlo alle sfide poste dalla finanziarizzazione. Debt and its sustainability are crucial elements in determining the soundness of public finances, but the answer to the question “how much debt should the public administration sector issue” is not unique. Debt sustainability is a primary objective in the European integration process and Sylos Labini in the “Manifesto” highlighted the consequences of high public debt. The strong link between the problem of debt sustainability and the need to stimulate demand, as well as supply, to avoid the spread of unemployment and inequality remains extremely topical. An important aspect of the corrective actions taken by governments is the leveling of financial costs of debt and the shifting of part of the debt forward, through the use of financial derivative instruments, such as swaps. With this contribution, we fill the gap in the policy debate, moving from Sylos Labini’s contribution to the theme of debt sustainability to actualize it to the challenges posed by financialization. JEL codes: E612, G23, H63","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"199 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133884863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}