In this article we present a new methodology to support fiscal monitoring by the Italian Revenue Agency (IRA) with the aim of improving current taxpayers fiscal compliance and fighting tax evasion within small and medium enterprises. In fact, given the methodology behind the Sector Studies (Studi di Settore - SdS) system, there is room for firms to implement tax evasion strategies by simply adjusting revenues (and costs) toward an estimated average threshold (known ex-ante), the so called "presumptive" revenues, and achieving the fiscal "congruity" status. By estimating a production function through stochastic frontier analysis we avoid estimating the average threshold know ex-ante and can combine information on firm economic efficiency with those on fiscal congruity, thus being able to disentangle underreporting of revenues due to potential firm tax evasion behaviours from underreporting due to firm inefficiencies. We apply this framework to two samples of Italian firms belonging to two Sector Studies. Our results confirm the potentiality of the approach, although more work is needed before moving to a large scale implementation for policy purposes.
在本文中，我们提出了一种新的方法来支持意大利税务局(IRA)的财政监测，目的是提高当前纳税人的财政合规性，打击中小企业的逃税行为。事实上，考虑到部门研究(Studi di Settore - SdS)系统背后的方法，企业有空间通过简单地将收入(和成本)调整到估计的平均阈值(已知的事前)，即所谓的“假定”收入，并实现财政“一致性”状态来实施逃税策略。通过随机前沿分析估计生产函数，我们避免了预估已知的平均阈值，并且可以将企业经济效率的信息与财政一致性的信息结合起来，从而能够将由于潜在的企业逃税行为而导致的收入漏报与由于企业效率低下而导致的收入漏报区分开来。我们将这一框架应用于属于两个部门研究的两个意大利公司样本。我们的研究结果证实了这种方法的潜力，尽管在大规模实施政策之前还需要做更多的工作。
{"title":"Disentangling Tax Evasion from Inefficiency in Firms Tax Declaration: An Integrated Approach","authors":"Giancarlo Ferrara, A. Campagna, V. Atella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3449228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449228","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we present a new methodology to support fiscal monitoring by the Italian Revenue Agency (IRA) with the aim of improving current taxpayers fiscal compliance and fighting tax evasion within small and medium enterprises. In fact, given the methodology behind the Sector Studies (Studi di Settore - SdS) system, there is room for firms to implement tax evasion strategies by simply adjusting revenues (and costs) toward an estimated average threshold (known ex-ante), the so called \"presumptive\" revenues, and achieving the fiscal \"congruity\" status. By estimating a production function through stochastic frontier analysis we avoid estimating the average threshold know ex-ante and can combine information on firm economic efficiency with those on fiscal congruity, thus being able to disentangle underreporting of revenues due to potential firm tax evasion behaviours from underreporting due to firm inefficiencies. We apply this framework to two samples of Italian firms belonging to two Sector Studies. Our results confirm the potentiality of the approach, although more work is needed before moving to a large scale implementation for policy purposes.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122105874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper was written in the context of the DIAMOND SBO project. Against the background of a growing concern over increasing market power by a handful of widely used online services, this paper starts from the assumption that such a situation may limit citizens’ access to or consumption of a diverse set of media content. Consequently, this would have a negative impact on citizens’ fundamental right of access to information, which would affect media pluralism in general.
This assumption sparks the question if the rise of such new digital media services necessitates a reconceptualization of existing monitoring frameworks for media pluralism. The development of practical indicators that are capable of measuring media pluralism in the online environment would allow more accurate monitoring of the situation. This could introduce more transparency of the online media environment, in turn enabling public scrutiny. Considering the complex nature of this environment however, close cooperation and interaction with various stakeholders based on a minimal consensus and understanding of the issues at hand are essential while developing relevant indicators. Therefore, this paper integrates the results of empirical studies with various stakeholders with the evaluation of the legal and policy framework for monitoring media pluralism in and for the Flemish community in Belgium specifically.
{"title":"Monitoring Online Media Pluralism in Flanders: Lessons Drawn from DIAMOND SBO Studies","authors":"I. Lambrecht, P. Valcke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3459919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3459919","url":null,"abstract":"This paper was written in the context of the DIAMOND SBO project. Against the background of a growing concern over increasing market power by a handful of widely used online services, this paper starts from the assumption that such a situation may limit citizens’ access to or consumption of a diverse set of media content. Consequently, this would have a negative impact on citizens’ fundamental right of access to information, which would affect media pluralism in general. <br><br>This assumption sparks the question if the rise of such new digital media services necessitates a reconceptualization of existing monitoring frameworks for media pluralism. The development of practical indicators that are capable of measuring media pluralism in the online environment would allow more accurate monitoring of the situation. This could introduce more transparency of the online media environment, in turn enabling public scrutiny. Considering the complex nature of this environment however, close cooperation and interaction with various stakeholders based on a minimal consensus and understanding of the issues at hand are essential while developing relevant indicators. Therefore, this paper integrates the results of empirical studies with various stakeholders with the evaluation of the legal and policy framework for monitoring media pluralism in and for the Flemish community in Belgium specifically.<br>","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"275 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133103074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Eerola, Oskari Harjunen, Teemu Lyytikäinen, Tuukka Saarimaa
Housing transfer taxes are fiscally important in many countries despite evidence of substantial welfare losses found in several quasi-experimental studies. Research designs used in this prior literature are prone to attenuation bias due to spillovers from mobility or trading across control and treatment groups. We account for these spillovers by combining quasi-experimental empirical analysis with a one-sided housing market model where households act as both buyers and sellers. Using a Finnish tax reform and total population register data, we find that an increase in the transfer tax has a significant negative effect on household mobility. We calibrate our theoretical model to match the mobility rates in our data and our quasi-experimental estimate. In our setting, relying only on the quasi-experiment and ignoring the spillovers would lead to a 20% underestimation of the effect. We argue that the welfare costs of transfer taxes are larger than previously thought.
{"title":"Effects of Housing Transfer Taxes on Household Mobility","authors":"E. Eerola, Oskari Harjunen, Teemu Lyytikäinen, Tuukka Saarimaa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3426938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3426938","url":null,"abstract":"Housing transfer taxes are fiscally important in many countries despite evidence of substantial welfare losses found in several quasi-experimental studies. Research designs used in this prior literature are prone to attenuation bias due to spillovers from mobility or trading across control and treatment groups. We account for these spillovers by combining quasi-experimental empirical analysis with a one-sided housing market model where households act as both buyers and sellers. Using a Finnish tax reform and total population register data, we find that an increase in the transfer tax has a significant negative effect on household mobility. We calibrate our theoretical model to match the mobility rates in our data and our quasi-experimental estimate. In our setting, relying only on the quasi-experiment and ignoring the spillovers would lead to a 20% underestimation of the effect. We argue that the welfare costs of transfer taxes are larger than previously thought.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133697096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper estimates the effects of fiscal stimulus on economic activity using a novel database on large fiscal expansions for 17 OECD countries for the period 1960-2006. The database is constructed by combining the statistical approach to identifying large shifts in fiscal policy with narrative evidence from contemporaneous policy documents. When correctly identified, large fiscal stimulus packages are found to have strong and persistent expansionary effects on economic activity, with a multiplier of 1 or above. The effects of stimulus are largest in slumps and smallest in booms.
{"title":"Aggregate Effects of Budget Stimulus: Evidence from the Large Fiscal Expansions Database","authors":"Jérémie Cohen-Setton, Egor Gornostay, Colombe Ladreit","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3426598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3426598","url":null,"abstract":"This paper estimates the effects of fiscal stimulus on economic activity using a novel database on large fiscal expansions for 17 OECD countries for the period 1960-2006. The database is constructed by combining the statistical approach to identifying large shifts in fiscal policy with narrative evidence from contemporaneous policy documents. When correctly identified, large fiscal stimulus packages are found to have strong and persistent expansionary effects on economic activity, with a multiplier of 1 or above. The effects of stimulus are largest in slumps and smallest in booms.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114265182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The recent elections in Greece reflects an enormous change in the political behavior of the electorate. The citizens have not chosen a simple switch on the power, but contributed with their votes to a strategic defeat of populism and in same time they paved the way for the search of a new type of leadership, which is close to realism in handling with social problems that can't be implemented with calculated financial costs. The vote of 7 th Juli is a vote against the over-promising and under-delivery experienced under Syriza’s rule. The voting for conservative ND is not an ideological choice. It's a choice that runs counter to the logic of falsely or hypocritical negotiating austerity measures opposed to Greece buy his Lenders (memorandum) and the consequent tax-tornado as a result of negotiating failure with the partners in the EEC and the IMF. The positive vote for ND also reflects the contradiction with the misguided manipulations of public opinion regarding the Skopje-Question and finally the strategy of micro concessions and micro- allowances as a means of concluding a “political-social alliance�? with an undefined hostile establishment.
{"title":"A Strategic Defeat of Populism in Greece","authors":"Emmanouil Mavrozacharakis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3423322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423322","url":null,"abstract":"The recent elections in Greece reflects an enormous change in the political behavior of the electorate. The citizens have not chosen a simple switch on the power, but contributed with their votes to a strategic defeat of populism and in same time they paved the way for the search of a new type of leadership, which is close to realism in handling with social problems that can't be implemented with calculated financial costs. The vote of 7 th Juli is a vote against the over-promising and under-delivery experienced under Syriza’s rule. The voting for conservative ND is not an ideological choice. It's a choice that runs counter to the logic of falsely or hypocritical negotiating austerity measures opposed to Greece buy his Lenders (memorandum) and the consequent tax-tornado as a result of negotiating failure with the partners in the EEC and the IMF. The positive vote for ND also reflects the contradiction with the misguided manipulations of public opinion regarding the Skopje-Question and finally the strategy of micro concessions and micro- allowances as a means of concluding a “political-social alliance�? with an undefined hostile establishment.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128598416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eurozone Debt Crisis has rekindled the debate on the nexus between currency areas and fiscal sovereigns. After the crisis, much of the intellectual and political debate has been on the benefit of a fiscal union, the idea of creating a common fiscal entity that is well equipped to make state-contingent cross-country transfers within the eurozone. Although the role of a benevolent fiscal union can in theory be welfare-improving for a currency union, it is understood that this is a highly politically constrained option, particularly in the Eurozone. Given this constraint, in this paper, we take the implausibility of fiscal union as given, and argue that debt restructuring can be a close substitute to a fiscal union, leading to welfare improvement. In contrast to a fiscal union that resorts to the government’s visible hand to move nominal resources across countries, the debt restructuring plan designs the bankruptcy rules, but it allows the invisible hand of the markets to make the choice based on context-dependent incentives. Much of the insight in this paper originates from Goodhart, Peiris and Tsomocos (2018) and Wang (2019). The authors show that debt restructuring is particularly vital in currency unions and can lead to significant welfare improvement for both the debtor and the creditor, given a hard government budget constraint. A wider implication of this paper is that for the understanding of modern monetary and financial phenomena, particularly the viability of a currency union, we simply cannot ignore the interplay of liquidity and default.
{"title":"Debt Restructuring for the Eurozone","authors":"D. Tsomocos, Xuan Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3427067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3427067","url":null,"abstract":"The Eurozone Debt Crisis has rekindled the debate on the nexus between currency areas and fiscal sovereigns. After the crisis, much of the intellectual and political debate has been on the benefit of a fiscal union, the idea of creating a common fiscal entity that is well equipped to make state-contingent cross-country transfers within the eurozone. Although the role of a benevolent fiscal union can in theory be welfare-improving for a currency union, it is understood that this is a highly politically constrained option, particularly in the Eurozone. Given this constraint, in this paper, we take the implausibility of fiscal union as given, and argue that debt restructuring can be a close substitute to a fiscal union, leading to welfare improvement. In contrast to a fiscal union that resorts to the government’s visible hand to move nominal resources across countries, the debt restructuring plan designs the bankruptcy rules, but it allows the invisible hand of the markets to make the choice based on context-dependent incentives. Much of the insight in this paper originates from Goodhart, Peiris and Tsomocos (2018) and Wang (2019). The authors show that debt restructuring is particularly vital in currency unions and can lead to significant welfare improvement for both the debtor and the creditor, given a hard government budget constraint. A wider implication of this paper is that for the understanding of modern monetary and financial phenomena, particularly the viability of a currency union, we simply cannot ignore the interplay of liquidity and default.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127176117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, better known under the name “TTIP”, is a bilateral trade and investment agreement that has been negotiated between the European Union and the United States since 2013. The respective administrations on both sides of the Atlantic have several times indicated their desire to resume the negotiations that have been put on hold (but not officially abandoned) after the last US presidential elections. If it is currently uncertain what will be the fate of the TTIP, the topic could be revived as the EU Council in April gave a new mandate to the European Commission to negotiate a Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US, without it being entirely clear what will be the exact scope of the negotiations. More generally, the dynamics of signing bilateral trade and investment agreements with third countries is steadily going forward so that lessons can certainly be learned from the TTIP experience, no matter what happens in the future with its negotiations. The proposed TTIP agreement has given rise to a number of concerns within European public opinion, in particular because of the secret nature of the discussions, which raised questions about the potential contents of the texts and the commitments made on both sides. These concerns recall those expressed at the time of the negotiations on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which mobilised significant concern among public opinion in Europe and ultimately led to the rejection of the Agreement by a large majority in the European Parliament in July 2012. The TTIP, although it obviously has a much broader content than ACTA, likewise contains provisions dedicated to intellectual property rights and more particularly to copyright. Its principal characteristic, however, lies in the inclusion of intellectual property rights in the list of investments protected by a specific section of the agreement. If implemented, the enforcement of this protection would be entrusted to arbitration tribunals or to a special court for the protection of investments that is yet to be set up. Hence the question arises as to whether the regulation of intellectual property by the European Union or one of its Member States, in a way that would affect the scope of the intellectual property rights held by certain large private companies, could be considered as a potential threat to their investments. If this was the case, proceedings could be brought against the EU or one of its Member States, leading to the risk of considerable limitations being imposed on legislators in the necessary implementation of a balanced and effective copyright law in Europe.
{"title":"Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreements and the Harmonisation of Copyright Law at International Level: Lessons to be Learned from the TTIP","authors":"C. Geiger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3410946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3410946","url":null,"abstract":"The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, better known under the name “TTIP”, is a bilateral trade and investment agreement that has been negotiated between the European Union and the United States since 2013. The respective administrations on both sides of the Atlantic have several times indicated their desire to resume the negotiations that have been put on hold (but not officially abandoned) after the last US presidential elections. If it is currently uncertain what will be the fate of the TTIP, the topic could be revived as the EU Council in April gave a new mandate to the European Commission to negotiate a Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US, without it being entirely clear what will be the exact scope of the negotiations. More generally, the dynamics of signing bilateral trade and investment agreements with third countries is steadily going forward so that lessons can certainly be learned from the TTIP experience, no matter what happens in the future with its negotiations. The proposed TTIP agreement has given rise to a number of concerns within European public opinion, in particular because of the secret nature of the discussions, which raised questions about the potential contents of the texts and the commitments made on both sides. These concerns recall those expressed at the time of the negotiations on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which mobilised significant concern among public opinion in Europe and ultimately led to the rejection of the Agreement by a large majority in the European Parliament in July 2012. The TTIP, although it obviously has a much broader content than ACTA, likewise contains provisions dedicated to intellectual property rights and more particularly to copyright. Its principal characteristic, however, lies in the inclusion of intellectual property rights in the list of investments protected by a specific section of the agreement. If implemented, the enforcement of this protection would be entrusted to arbitration tribunals or to a special court for the protection of investments that is yet to be set up. Hence the question arises as to whether the regulation of intellectual property by the European Union or one of its Member States, in a way that would affect the scope of the intellectual property rights held by certain large private companies, could be considered as a potential threat to their investments. If this was the case, proceedings could be brought against the EU or one of its Member States, leading to the risk of considerable limitations being imposed on legislators in the necessary implementation of a balanced and effective copyright law in Europe.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116667417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I find that corporate European leverage variation between 2007 and 2015 is largely driven by firm and industry characteristics. Conventional, time-varying firm characteristics explain as much leverage variation as country and industry fixed effects combined. Cross-sectional leverage disparities are more distinct between industries than between countries. Corporate tax rate does have a significant positive effect on leverage, as predicted by the traditional tradeoff theory. The impact is however negligibly small relative to firm- and industry-specific effects. Evidence on both the tradeoff and pecking order model is, at best, mixed. Moreover, macroeconomic conditions are largely insignificant and unable to explain leverage differences in a linear regression context. Macroeconomic effects on capital structure might however channel through firm and industry determinants, thus affecting financing choice indirectly. A more dynamic, possibly nonlinear model specification is needed. Effects of the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent European debt crisis are apparent across all of corporate Europe and are most severe for Southern European firms.
{"title":"Capital Structure Variation across Europe: Decomposing Country-, Industry- and Firm-Specific Effects on Leverage","authors":"Stefan Pohl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3406806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3406806","url":null,"abstract":"I find that corporate European leverage variation between 2007 and 2015 is largely driven by firm and industry characteristics. Conventional, time-varying firm characteristics explain as much leverage variation as country and industry fixed effects combined. Cross-sectional leverage disparities are more distinct between industries than between countries. Corporate tax rate does have a significant positive effect on leverage, as predicted by the traditional tradeoff theory. The impact is however negligibly small relative to firm- and industry-specific effects. Evidence on both the tradeoff and pecking order model is, at best, mixed. Moreover, macroeconomic conditions are largely insignificant and unable to explain leverage differences in a linear regression context. Macroeconomic effects on capital structure might however channel through firm and industry determinants, thus affecting financing choice indirectly. A more dynamic, possibly nonlinear model specification is needed. Effects of the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent European debt crisis are apparent across all of corporate Europe and are most severe for Southern European firms.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128135240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the role of capital market pressure in firms' international tax-motivated decisions. We use two exogenous events to identify the relation: the temporary lifting of short selling restrictions for randomly selected pilot firms under SEC Regulation SHO (called Pilot firms) and the repatriation tax holiday under the American Jobs Creation Act that occurred in this time period. We document that the Pilot firms are more likely to respond to the tax holiday only when they have foreign losses or generally do not repatriate foreign earnings. We also find that Pilot firms repatriate more, on average. This evidence is consistent with managers generally facing a conflict between self-serving international investment decisions and value-enhancing tax-motivated investment decisions, but this situation is mitigated by greater monitoring by active short sellers that occurs when short-selling restrictions are absent.
{"title":"Market Pressure and Multinational Corporations’ Tax-Motivated Decisions: Evidence from an SEC Experiment","authors":"Jeong‐Bon Kim, K. Klassen, Betty (Bin) Xing","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3590737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3590737","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the role of capital market pressure in firms' international tax-motivated decisions. We use two exogenous events to identify the relation: the temporary lifting of short selling restrictions for randomly selected pilot firms under SEC Regulation SHO (called Pilot firms) and the repatriation tax holiday under the American Jobs Creation Act that occurred in this time period. We document that the Pilot firms are more likely to respond to the tax holiday only when they have foreign losses or generally do not repatriate foreign earnings. We also find that Pilot firms repatriate more, on average. This evidence is consistent with managers generally facing a conflict between self-serving international investment decisions and value-enhancing tax-motivated investment decisions, but this situation is mitigated by greater monitoring by active short sellers that occurs when short-selling restrictions are absent.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122278523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dutch Abstract: Het voorstel van 29 juni 2017 betreffende een Verordening van het Europees Parlement en de Raad voor een Pan-Europees Persoonlijk Pensioenproduct (hierna: PEPP) werd in Nederland met argusogen ontvangen. Met dit voorstel wilde de Europese Commissie een impuls geven om de fragmentatie van nationale markten op het gebied van persoonlijke pensioenen aan te pakken. Via het PEPP wil de EU wetgever een vrijwillig, aanvullend, eenvoudig en kostenbesparend pensioenproduct in het leven roepen dat grotendeels op EU niveau wordt gereguleerd. Vanwege de meeneembaarheid voor consumenten is PEPP een welkome aanvulling voor de pensioenen van EU burgers. Nederland echter heeft te allen tijde kritisch tegenover de komst van een PEPP gestaan vanwege onder andere een vermeende inbreuk op de ‘verplichtstelling’ en de rol voor de Europese Autoriteit voor verzekeringen en bedrijfspensioenen (EIOPA). In dit artikel wordt het PEPP besproken: wat is de meerwaarde van het PEPP? Is de vrees van Nederland wel terecht? English Abstract: The proposal of 29 June 2017 concerning a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council for a Pan-European Personal Pension Product (hereinafter: PEPP) was received with suspicion in the Netherlands. With this proposal, the European Commission wanted to give an impulse to tackle the fragmentation of national markets in the field of personal pensions. Through the PEPP, the EU legislator wants to invoke a voluntary, supplementary, simple and cost-saving pension product that is regulated at EU level. Thanks to portability for consumers, PEPP is a welcome addition to the pensions of EU citizens. The Netherlands, however, has always criticized the arrival of a PEPP because of, among other things, an alleged breach of the "mandatory obligation" and the role for the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). This article discusses the PEPP: what is the added value of the PEPP? Is the fear of the Netherlands justified?
{"title":"De PEPP – Verordening. Pensioenfondsen: Quo Vadis? (The PEPP: Pensionfunds: Quo Vadis)","authors":"H. V. Meerten, An Wouters","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3516587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3516587","url":null,"abstract":"Dutch Abstract: Het voorstel van 29 juni 2017 betreffende een Verordening van het Europees Parlement en de Raad voor een Pan-Europees Persoonlijk Pensioenproduct (hierna: PEPP) werd in Nederland met argusogen ontvangen. Met dit voorstel wilde de Europese Commissie een impuls geven om de fragmentatie van nationale markten op het gebied van persoonlijke pensioenen aan te pakken. Via het PEPP wil de EU wetgever een vrijwillig, aanvullend, eenvoudig en kostenbesparend pensioenproduct in het leven roepen dat grotendeels op EU niveau wordt gereguleerd. Vanwege de meeneembaarheid voor consumenten is PEPP een welkome aanvulling voor de pensioenen van EU burgers. Nederland echter heeft te allen tijde kritisch tegenover de komst van een PEPP gestaan vanwege onder andere een vermeende inbreuk op de ‘verplichtstelling’ en de rol voor de Europese Autoriteit voor verzekeringen en bedrijfspensioenen (EIOPA). In dit artikel wordt het PEPP besproken: wat is de meerwaarde van het PEPP? Is de vrees van Nederland wel terecht? \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: The proposal of 29 June 2017 concerning a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council for a Pan-European Personal Pension Product (hereinafter: PEPP) was received with suspicion in the Netherlands. With this proposal, the European Commission wanted to give an impulse to tackle the fragmentation of national markets in the field of personal pensions. Through the PEPP, the EU legislator wants to invoke a voluntary, supplementary, simple and cost-saving pension product that is regulated at EU level. Thanks to portability for consumers, PEPP is a welcome addition to the pensions of EU citizens. The Netherlands, however, has always criticized the arrival of a PEPP because of, among other things, an alleged breach of the \"mandatory obligation\" and the role for the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). This article discusses the PEPP: what is the added value of the PEPP? Is the fear of the Netherlands justified?","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":" 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120933965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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