In the last decade all four areas of European integration – economic, social, legal and political – have faced a series of unprecedented crises that have shattered the foundations of the integration process and have thrown into question the future of the European Union. Among the many paradoxes that have riddled the integration project since its inception, none is more puzzling than the one the EU faces currently. Arguably never in any other time has the EU been so integrated and so successful as it is today, and likewise, never in any other time has there been a greater cognitive dissonance and distance between the peoples of Europe and the EU. This project argues that the greatest crisis afflicting the European project is an epistemological crisis, resulting from our continued failure to understand the processes and forces that drive European integration. Attempts to address questions regarding the future of Europe are failing precisely because we are attempting to answer Europe’s ontological question, without first answering Europe’s epistemological question, in other words, we are attempting to agree on a future for Europe without first understanding the very nature of the integration process, and if we persist on this fallacy we are doomed to fail in both pursuits, as we have been failing for the last seventy years. This project argues that in order to solve this paradox, in order to determine the future of the EU and overcome Europe’s crisis, we must adopt a systems theory approach to understand the complex adaptive nature of the integration process. A systems theory approach to European integration theory allows us to uncover and to understand the different inputs that both constrain and compel European integration and allows us to create predictive models of future integration and disintegration.
{"title":"European Integration Theory and the Future of the European Union after Brexit","authors":"Diogo Magalhaes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3533198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3533198","url":null,"abstract":"In the last decade all four areas of European integration – economic, social, legal and political – have faced a series of unprecedented crises that have shattered the foundations of the integration process and have thrown into question the future of the European Union. Among the many paradoxes that have riddled the integration project since its inception, none is more puzzling than the one the EU faces currently. Arguably never in any other time has the EU been so integrated and so successful as it is today, and likewise, never in any other time has there been a greater cognitive dissonance and distance between the peoples of Europe and the EU. This project argues that the greatest crisis afflicting the European project is an epistemological crisis, resulting from our continued failure to understand the processes and forces that drive European integration. Attempts to address questions regarding the future of Europe are failing precisely because we are attempting to answer Europe’s ontological question, without first answering Europe’s epistemological question, in other words, we are attempting to agree on a future for Europe without first understanding the very nature of the integration process, and if we persist on this fallacy we are doomed to fail in both pursuits, as we have been failing for the last seventy years. This project argues that in order to solve this paradox, in order to determine the future of the EU and overcome Europe’s crisis, we must adopt a systems theory approach to understand the complex adaptive nature of the integration process. A systems theory approach to European integration theory allows us to uncover and to understand the different inputs that both constrain and compel European integration and allows us to create predictive models of future integration and disintegration.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"346 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132763650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Procuring authorities frequently use screening in order to mitigate risky bids. This study estimates the effect of bid screening and litigation on entry and bidding using a unique data set on highway construction procurement auctions in Poland. The market exhibits a screening method that ex post selects eligible offers. We demonstrate with an empirical model that this method disproportionately affects small firms and creates a barrier to entry. Our results suggest that screening increases bids by two channels. First, it directly inflates bids as well as decreasing entry. Second, in a competitive market, lower entry also inflates bids and prices.
{"title":"On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement","authors":"Gyula Seres, A. Pigoń","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3938225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3938225","url":null,"abstract":"Procuring authorities frequently use screening in order to mitigate risky bids. This study estimates the effect of bid screening and litigation on entry and bidding using a unique data set on highway construction procurement auctions in Poland. The market exhibits a screening method that ex post selects eligible offers. We demonstrate with an empirical model that this method disproportionately affects small firms and creates a barrier to entry. Our results suggest that screening increases bids by two channels. First, it directly inflates bids as well as decreasing entry. Second, in a competitive market, lower entry also inflates bids and prices.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123940072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-01DOI: 10.5089/9781498314565.001
B. Akitoby, Jiro Honda, Hiroaki Miyamoto, Keyra Primus, Mouhamadou Sy
How can Low-Income Countries (LICs) enhance tax revenue collection to finance their vast development needs? We address this question by analyzing seven tax reform experiences in LICs (Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Maldives, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda). Three lessons stand out, although reforms must be tailored to individual circumstances: (i) Tax reforms require first and foremost political commitment and buy-in from key stakeholders; (ii) Countries that pursue both revenue administration and tax policy reforms tend to see much larger and persistent gains; and (iii) A successful strategy often starts with fiscal reform measures with immediate effect to build momentum. These can include: simplifying the tax system; curbing exemptions; reforming indirect taxes on goods and services (e.g., excises); and better managing compliance risks through strengthening taxpayer segmentation (often beginning with strengthening the Large Taxpayers Office). A comprehensive reform strategy (e.g., a medium-term revenue strategy) can help to properly sequence reform measures and facilitate their implementation.
{"title":"Case Studies in Tax Revenue Mobilization in Low-Income Countries","authors":"B. Akitoby, Jiro Honda, Hiroaki Miyamoto, Keyra Primus, Mouhamadou Sy","doi":"10.5089/9781498314565.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498314565.001","url":null,"abstract":"How can Low-Income Countries (LICs) enhance tax revenue collection to finance their vast development needs? We address this question by analyzing seven tax reform experiences in LICs (Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Maldives, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda). Three lessons stand out, although reforms must be tailored to individual circumstances: (i) Tax reforms require first and foremost political commitment and buy-in from key stakeholders; (ii) Countries that pursue both revenue administration and tax policy reforms tend to see much larger and persistent gains; and (iii) A successful strategy often starts with fiscal reform measures with immediate effect to build momentum. These can include: simplifying the tax system; curbing exemptions; reforming indirect taxes on goods and services (e.g., excises); and better managing compliance risks through strengthening taxpayer segmentation (often beginning with strengthening the Large Taxpayers Office). A comprehensive reform strategy (e.g., a medium-term revenue strategy) can help to properly sequence reform measures and facilitate their implementation.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129136390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jordan Becker, S. Kreps, Paul Poast, Rochelle Terman
Does “naming and shaming” of allies by US Presidents work? More precisely, does publicly criticizing members’ financial commitments to NATO increase allies’ defense spending and improve burden-sharing, or is it counterproductive, leading to lower contributions? We argue that the answer is likely neither. At best, excessive public shaming of allies is mere “cheap talk.” At worst, it is counterproductive. To evaluate this claim, we conducted textual analysis on all executive declarations, remarks, written statements, and media related to NATO members’ defense spending, all drawn from the American Presidency Project. We find provisionally that the more negatively US presidents speak about transatlantic burden-sharing, the less allies spend on defense. This finding addresses a gap in the current literature by analyzing the effectiveness of public “shaming” of allies in an attempt to redress burden-sharing problems endemic to alliances. Such actions do not appear to be effective, and may even be counterproductive.
{"title":"Transatlantic Shakedown: Does Presidential ‘Naming and Shaming’ Affect NATO Burden-Sharing?","authors":"Jordan Becker, S. Kreps, Paul Poast, Rochelle Terman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3493570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3493570","url":null,"abstract":"Does “naming and shaming” of allies by US Presidents work? More precisely, does publicly criticizing members’ financial commitments to NATO increase allies’ defense spending and improve burden-sharing, or is it counterproductive, leading to lower contributions? We argue that the answer is likely neither. At best, excessive public shaming of allies is mere “cheap talk.” At worst, it is counterproductive. To evaluate this claim, we conducted textual analysis on all executive declarations, remarks, written statements, and media related to NATO members’ defense spending, all drawn from the American Presidency Project. We find provisionally that the more negatively US presidents speak about transatlantic burden-sharing, the less allies spend on defense. This finding addresses a gap in the current literature by analyzing the effectiveness of public “shaming” of allies in an attempt to redress burden-sharing problems endemic to alliances. Such actions do not appear to be effective, and may even be counterproductive.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115909960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-01DOI: 10.18601/01245996.V21N41.02
A. Madariaga
Este artículo describe el desarrollo histórico de las interpretaciones de la economía política, critica la pretensión hegemónica de la economía neoclásica y rescata la “nueva economía política”: el estudio de la constitución social, política y moral de la economía. Muestra como se la concibe en la ciencia política actual y ofrece dos claves de análisis para orientar futuras investigaciones. Por último hace un recorrido por trabajos recientes en América Latina que recogen esta interpretación, en especial las revisiones de la literatura sobre ‘economía política de la política económica’, y algunos estudios sobre las variedades del capitalismo.
{"title":"El resurgimiento de la economía política en la ciencia política actual [The Resurgence of Political Economy in Today’s Political Science]","authors":"A. Madariaga","doi":"10.18601/01245996.V21N41.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.V21N41.02","url":null,"abstract":"Este artículo describe el desarrollo histórico de las interpretaciones de la economía política, critica la pretensión hegemónica de la economía neoclásica y rescata la “nueva economía política”: el estudio de la constitución social, política y moral de la economía. Muestra como se la concibe en la ciencia política actual y ofrece dos claves de análisis para orientar futuras investigaciones. Por último hace un recorrido por trabajos recientes en América Latina que recogen esta interpretación, en especial las revisiones de la literatura sobre ‘economía política de la política económica’, y algunos estudios sobre las variedades del capitalismo.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133257206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines the prospects for challenging a tax exemption granted to a private company by invoking the prohibition on discrimination in the European Charter on Human Rights (ECHR). Should the Court hold that certain selective tax rulings are a violation of the prohibition of discrimination under the ECHR, this finding would set a powerful precedent to rebut the claim that tax avoidance is “perfectly legal.” Accordingly, the hands-off treatment the international community has afforded tax-avoidance strategies might give rise to legal liability. Ultimately, to reform international tax policies, it is crucial to understand past practices and whether and why these practices should be considered broken and unjust. The chapter then looks at a specific case of tax exemption, allegedly granted to a subsidiary of McDonald’s by Luxembourg.
{"title":"ECHR Litigation as a Tool for Tax Justice in Europe","authors":"C. Braumann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3685819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3685819","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the prospects for challenging a tax exemption granted to a private company by invoking the prohibition on discrimination in the European Charter on Human Rights (ECHR). Should the Court hold that certain selective tax rulings are a violation of the prohibition of discrimination under the ECHR, this finding would set a powerful precedent to rebut the claim that tax avoidance is “perfectly legal.” Accordingly, the hands-off treatment the international community has afforded tax-avoidance strategies might give rise to legal liability. Ultimately, to reform international tax policies, it is crucial to understand past practices and whether and why these practices should be considered broken and unjust. The chapter then looks at a specific case of tax exemption, allegedly granted to a subsidiary of McDonald’s by Luxembourg.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127164959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-01DOI: 10.5089/9781498315623.001
David Amaglobeli, Laura Jaramillo, Pooja Karnane, A. Zdzienicka
This paper examines the role of tax policy reforms in enhancing fiscal shock smoothing in a panel of 13 OECD economies during the period 1980-2017. The results suggest that tax reforms, in particular those that broaden the tax base, significantly enhance the ability of fiscal policy to mitigate the impact of growth shocks on disposable income. We find that the magnitude of shock smoothing increases from an average of 2 percent to 3-3½ percent following the reform. The effects are considerably higher for tax base than tax rate changes, and also higher for indirect tax than direct tax changes. The effects are symmetric—that is, the increase in shock smoothing following a reform expanding the tax base (rate) is similar to the decline in shock smoothing after a reform narrowing the tax base (rate). Tax elasticity, collection efficiency, and the progressivity of the tax system are important channels through which tax reforms affect fiscal stabilization.
{"title":"Tax Reforms and Fiscal Shock Smoothing","authors":"David Amaglobeli, Laura Jaramillo, Pooja Karnane, A. Zdzienicka","doi":"10.5089/9781498315623.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498315623.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the role of tax policy reforms in enhancing fiscal shock smoothing in a panel of 13 OECD economies during the period 1980-2017. The results suggest that tax reforms, in particular those that broaden the tax base, significantly enhance the ability of fiscal policy to mitigate the impact of growth shocks on disposable income. We find that the magnitude of shock smoothing increases from an average of 2 percent to 3-3½ percent following the reform. The effects are considerably higher for tax base than tax rate changes, and also higher for indirect tax than direct tax changes. The effects are symmetric—that is, the increase in shock smoothing following a reform expanding the tax base (rate) is similar to the decline in shock smoothing after a reform narrowing the tax base (rate). Tax elasticity, collection efficiency, and the progressivity of the tax system are important channels through which tax reforms affect fiscal stabilization.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131936461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-01DOI: 10.5089/9781498312295.001
Feng Wei, Jean-François Wen
Presumptive income taxes in the form of a tax on turnover for SMEs are pervasive as a way to reduce the costs of compliance and administration. We analyze a model where entrepreneurs allocate labor to the formal and informal sectors. Formal sector income is subjected either to a corporate income tax or a tax on turnover, depending on whether their turnover exceeds a threshold. We characterize the private sector equilibrium for any given configuration of tax policy parameters (corporate income tax rate, turnover tax rate, and threshold). Given private behavior, social welfare is optimized. We interpret the first-order conditions for welfare maximization to identify the key margins and then simulate a calibrated version of the model.
{"title":"The Optimal Turnover Threshold and Tax Rate for SMEs","authors":"Feng Wei, Jean-François Wen","doi":"10.5089/9781498312295.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498312295.001","url":null,"abstract":"Presumptive income taxes in the form of a tax on turnover for SMEs are pervasive as a way to reduce the costs of compliance and administration. We analyze a model where entrepreneurs allocate labor to the formal and informal sectors. Formal sector income is subjected either to a corporate income tax or a tax on turnover, depending on whether their turnover exceeds a threshold. We characterize the private sector equilibrium for any given configuration of tax policy parameters (corporate income tax rate, turnover tax rate, and threshold). Given private behavior, social welfare is optimized. We interpret the first-order conditions for welfare maximization to identify the key margins and then simulate a calibrated version of the model.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126409147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2016 the government established a new sectoral regulator, with power to grant and withdraw licences, set performance standards, and impose sanctions, not as a statutory authority but in the form of a company wholly owned by the Secretary of State: the Oil and Gas Authority. This article critically examines this and other uses in the UK of government‐owned or ‐ controlled companies to discharge public regulatory functions, against the background of current government practice regarding arm's length public bodies in general and government companies in particular. It assesses the acceptability of the company form by reference to criteria of democratic control, independence and accountability of regulatory institutions.
{"title":"Government Companies as Regulators","authors":"T. Daintith","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12414","url":null,"abstract":"In 2016 the government established a new sectoral regulator, with power to grant and withdraw licences, set performance standards, and impose sanctions, not as a statutory authority but in the form of a company wholly owned by the Secretary of State: the Oil and Gas Authority. This article critically examines this and other uses in the UK of government‐owned or ‐ controlled companies to discharge public regulatory functions, against the background of current government practice regarding arm's length public bodies in general and government companies in particular. It assesses the acceptability of the company form by reference to criteria of democratic control, independence and accountability of regulatory institutions.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123658941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In order to build an efficient fiscal system, it is important to analyze not only the government’s activity in the design and implementation of fiscal policy and fiscal system administration, but also how such activity is perceived by taxpayers, as one of key stakeholders of this system. Fiscal policies implemented by governments over the years are largely focused on the objective of realizing budget revenues, rather than building an efficient fiscal system that produces consistent results. This paper addresses the efficiency of the fiscal system, in the perspective of Albanian taxpayers’ viewpoint, by focusing on three main directions: Fiscal burden. What is the fiscal burden and a general information on the fiscal burden in Albania compared to the region countries and the EU, and how the current fiscal burden is perceived by Albanian taxpayers. Fairness (Justice) of the fiscal system. Deals with horizontal justice and vertical justice, the principles of well-functioning of a fiscal system and their implementation in Albania, as well as the perception of Albanian taxpayers on the justice system of the fiscal system. The goods and public services received by the taxpayer in comparison with their contributions. Good public governance offers good and low-cost services and with the right standards. It also looks at how efficient the Albanian governments were in providing public goods and services, and how the taxpayers perceived the benefits they received compared to their contributions. The paper concludes with the main conclusions of the functioning of the current fiscal system and recommendations for improving the system based on the perception of taxpayers.
{"title":"The Efficiency of Fiscal System From the Albanian Taxpayers’ Viewpoint","authors":"Elvin S. Meka, Hysen Muceku","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3386023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3386023","url":null,"abstract":"In order to build an efficient fiscal system, it is important to analyze not only the government’s activity in the design and implementation of fiscal policy and fiscal system administration, but also how such activity is perceived by taxpayers, as one of key stakeholders of this system. Fiscal policies implemented by governments over the years are largely focused on the objective of realizing budget revenues, rather than building an efficient fiscal system that produces consistent results. This paper addresses the efficiency of the fiscal system, in the perspective of Albanian taxpayers’ viewpoint, by focusing on three main directions: Fiscal burden. What is the fiscal burden and a general information on the fiscal burden in Albania compared to the region countries and the EU, and how the current fiscal burden is perceived by Albanian taxpayers. Fairness (Justice) of the fiscal system. Deals with horizontal justice and vertical justice, the principles of well-functioning of a fiscal system and their implementation in Albania, as well as the perception of Albanian taxpayers on the justice system of the fiscal system. The goods and public services received by the taxpayer in comparison with their contributions. Good public governance offers good and low-cost services and with the right standards. It also looks at how efficient the Albanian governments were in providing public goods and services, and how the taxpayers perceived the benefits they received compared to their contributions. The paper concludes with the main conclusions of the functioning of the current fiscal system and recommendations for improving the system based on the perception of taxpayers.","PeriodicalId":132443,"journal":{"name":"European Economics: Political Economy & Public Economics eJournal","volume":"206 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121527792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}