A large body of literature estimates the relative wage impacts of immigration on low- and high-skill natives, but it is unclear how these effects map onto changes of the wage distribution. I document the movement of foreign-born workers in the U.S. wage distribution, showing that, since 1980, they have become increasingly overrepresented in the bottom. Downgrading of education and experience obtained abroad partially drives this pattern. I then undertake two empirical approaches to deepen our understanding of the way foreign-born workers shape the wage structure. First, I estimate a standard theoretical model featuring constant elasticity of substitution technology and skill types stratified across wage deciles. Second, I estimate reduced-form quantile treatment effects by constructing a ceteris paribus counterfactual wage distribution with lower immigration levels. Both analyses uncover a similar monotone pattern: a one percentage point increase in the share of foreign-born leads to a 0.2–0.3 (0.2–0.4) percent wage decrease (increase) in the bottom (top) decile and asserts no significant pressure in the middle. When analyzing the drivers of this pattern, I find suggestive evidence for a novel mechanism through which local labor markets absorb foreign-born workers: occupational differentiation of immigrants relative to natives.
{"title":"Immigrants and the U.S. Wage Distribution","authors":"Vasil Yasenov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3537685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3537685","url":null,"abstract":"A large body of literature estimates the relative wage impacts of immigration on low- and high-skill natives, but it is unclear how these effects map onto changes of the wage distribution. I document the movement of foreign-born workers in the U.S. wage distribution, showing that, since 1980, they have become increasingly overrepresented in the bottom. Downgrading of education and experience obtained abroad partially drives this pattern. I then undertake two empirical approaches to deepen our understanding of the way foreign-born workers shape the wage structure. First, I estimate a standard theoretical model featuring constant elasticity of substitution technology and skill types stratified across wage deciles. Second, I estimate reduced-form quantile treatment effects by constructing a ceteris paribus counterfactual wage distribution with lower immigration levels. Both analyses uncover a similar monotone pattern: a one percentage point increase in the share of foreign-born leads to a 0.2–0.3 (0.2–0.4) percent wage decrease (increase) in the bottom (top) decile and asserts no significant pressure in the middle. When analyzing the drivers of this pattern, I find suggestive evidence for a novel mechanism through which local labor markets absorb foreign-born workers: occupational differentiation of immigrants relative to natives.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131312538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Immigration was a major point of debate and disagreement in the UK during the 2016 Brexit referendum. Following three years of negotiations, the European Union and the UK have come to an agreement – though not yet in a binding form – on the protection of citizens’ rights post-Brexit. This agreement, however, covers only those EU nationals who are living in the UK (and vice versa) at the moment of UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The future mobility framework is yet to be determined. This article discusses what citizens’ rights have been negotiated between the Parties and what the possible mobility regimes for the future EU-UK relationship are. It is suggested that whatever policy is chosen the new regime will be far removed from the free movement notion as is currently enjoyed under EU law. Even more so in a no-deal Brexit scenario.
{"title":"Brexit and Citizens’ Rights","authors":"C. Barnard, Emilija Leinarte","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3471839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3471839","url":null,"abstract":"Immigration was a major point of debate and disagreement in the UK during the 2016 Brexit referendum. Following three years of negotiations, the European Union and the UK have come to an agreement – though not yet in a binding form – on the protection of citizens’ rights post-Brexit. This agreement, however, covers only those EU nationals who are living in the UK (and vice versa) at the moment of UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The future mobility framework is yet to be determined. This article discusses what citizens’ rights have been negotiated between the Parties and what the possible mobility regimes for the future EU-UK relationship are. It is suggested that whatever policy is chosen the new regime will be far removed from the free movement notion as is currently enjoyed under EU law. Even more so in a no-deal Brexit scenario.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"337 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129980727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In January 2015, an estimated 2.4 million unauthorized immigrants in California gained access to driver's licenses when Assembly Bill 60 (AB60) was implemented. The paper uses microdata from the American Community Survey from 2010 through 2017 to study this bill's employment effects for unauthorized immigrants. It shows that take-up of the reform was large and reduced the number of unauthorized immigrants without a car by 21 percent. The reform improved work intensity by allowing unauthorized immigrants to work up 65 hours more per year. However, AB60 had no effects on the job search process. It did not affect employment, earnings, or the type of occupation unauthorized immigrants have. The findings imply that driver's licenses alone are insufficient to improve the economic situation of unauthorized immigrants. The lack of work authorization prevents them from enjoying the full benefits of private transportation.
{"title":"Licensed to Drive, but not to Work: The Impact of AB60 on Unauthorized Employment in California","authors":"Hans Lueders","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3367629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3367629","url":null,"abstract":"In January 2015, an estimated 2.4 million unauthorized immigrants in California gained access to driver's licenses when Assembly Bill 60 (AB60) was implemented. The paper uses microdata from the American Community Survey from 2010 through 2017 to study this bill's employment effects for unauthorized immigrants. It shows that take-up of the reform was large and reduced the number of unauthorized immigrants without a car by 21 percent. The reform improved work intensity by allowing unauthorized immigrants to work up 65 hours more per year. However, AB60 had no effects on the job search process. It did not affect employment, earnings, or the type of occupation unauthorized immigrants have. The findings imply that driver's licenses alone are insufficient to improve the economic situation of unauthorized immigrants. The lack of work authorization prevents them from enjoying the full benefits of private transportation.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130672622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The topic of citizen‐making—turning migrants into citizens—is one of the most politically contested policy areas in Europe. Access to European citizenship is governed by national law with almost no EU regulation. The Article brings to the fore normative concerns associated with citizen‐making policies in Europe (Section 2). It examines ethical dilemmas involved in the process of creating new citizens (Section 3) and promotes the adoption of a European legal framework on access to citizenship (Section 4). The overall claim is that every newcomer will be required to demonstrate, as a prerequisite for citizenship, attachments to the constitution of the specific Member State, yet the test will be functional, flexible and non‐exclusive. As the topic of EU citizenship law is currently at the centre of the European agenda, this article has both theoretical significance and policy implications
{"title":"The Citizen‐Makers: Ethical Dilemmas in Immigrant Integration","authors":"Liav Orgad","doi":"10.1111/eulj.12338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/eulj.12338","url":null,"abstract":"The topic of citizen‐making—turning migrants into citizens—is one of the most politically contested policy areas in Europe. Access to European citizenship is governed by national law with almost no EU regulation. The Article brings to the fore normative concerns associated with citizen‐making policies in Europe (Section 2). It examines ethical dilemmas involved in the process of creating new citizens (Section 3) and promotes the adoption of a European legal framework on access to citizenship (Section 4). The overall claim is that every newcomer will be required to demonstrate, as a prerequisite for citizenship, attachments to the constitution of the specific Member State, yet the test will be functional, flexible and non‐exclusive. As the topic of EU citizenship law is currently at the centre of the European agenda, this article has both theoretical significance and policy implications","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"118287129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Opponents of immigration often claim that immigrants, particularly those who are unauthorized, are more likely than U.S. natives to commit crimes and that they pose a threat to public safety. There is little evidence to support these claims. In fact, research overwhelmingly indicates that immigrants are less likely than similar U.S. natives to commit violent and property crimes, and that areas with more immigrants have similar or lower rates of violent and property crimes than areas with fewer immigrants. There are relatively few studies specifically of criminal behavior among unauthorized immigrants, but the limited research suggests that these immigrants also have a lower propensity to commit crime than their native-born peers, although possibly a higher propensity than legal immigrants. Evidence about legalization programs is consistent with these findings, indicating that a legalization program reduces crime rates. Meanwhile, increased border enforcement, which reduces unauthorized immigrant inflows, has mixed effects on crime rates. A large-scale legalization program, which is not currently under serious consideration, has more potential to improve public safety and security than several other policies that have recently been proposed or implemented.
{"title":"Do Immigrants Threaten U.S. Public Safety?","authors":"Pia M. Orrenius, M. Zavodny","doi":"10.24149/wp1905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24149/wp1905","url":null,"abstract":"Opponents of immigration often claim that immigrants, particularly those who are unauthorized, are more likely than U.S. natives to commit crimes and that they pose a threat to public safety. There is little evidence to support these claims. In fact, research overwhelmingly indicates that immigrants are less likely than similar U.S. natives to commit violent and property crimes, and that areas with more immigrants have similar or lower rates of violent and property crimes than areas with fewer immigrants. There are relatively few studies specifically of criminal behavior among unauthorized immigrants, but the limited research suggests that these immigrants also have a lower propensity to commit crime than their native-born peers, although possibly a higher propensity than legal immigrants. Evidence about legalization programs is consistent with these findings, indicating that a legalization program reduces crime rates. Meanwhile, increased border enforcement, which reduces unauthorized immigrant inflows, has mixed effects on crime rates. A large-scale legalization program, which is not currently under serious consideration, has more potential to improve public safety and security than several other policies that have recently been proposed or implemented.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133196225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper estimates the economic impacts of DACA, on the educational attainment, earnings and federal tax payments of the DACA population, on state and local tax revenues, on the broader American workforce, and on the U.S. economy as a whole. We construct two models of the DACA population and its economic behaviors, the first assuming DACA is made permanent, and the second assuming DACA is terminated at the end of 2019. We find that eliminating DACA is lose-lose-lose. The DACA population would lose about $120 billion in income, the federal government would lose roughly $72 billion in tax revenue, and states and local governments would lose about $15 billion in tax revenue over the 2020-29 decade. Those losses would come without any offsetting gains. Eliminating DACA would be, in effect, throwing away some of our nation’s human capital resources, dramatically reducing the returns to education for the DACA population, and channeling them into jobs where legal status is ignored, and that do not allow them to take full advantage of their human capital. This failure to employ all of our human capital would hurt low-to-moderate income workers. Eliminating DACA would merely increase the competition for the kinds of jobs that tend to have an excess supply of workers, while reducing the supply of employable skilled workers in the areas where we have the most acute labor shortages. Overall, we find that eliminating DACA would benefit virtually no one while hurting pretty much everyone.
{"title":"Estimating the Economic Impacts of DACA","authors":"Ike Brannon, M. K. McGee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3420511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3420511","url":null,"abstract":"This paper estimates the economic impacts of DACA, on the educational attainment, earnings and federal tax payments of the DACA population, on state and local tax revenues, on the broader American workforce, and on the U.S. economy as a whole. We construct two models of the DACA population and its economic behaviors, the first assuming DACA is made permanent, and the second assuming DACA is terminated at the end of 2019. \u0000 \u0000We find that eliminating DACA is lose-lose-lose. The DACA population would lose about $120 billion in income, the federal government would lose roughly $72 billion in tax revenue, and states and local governments would lose about $15 billion in tax revenue over the 2020-29 decade. \u0000 \u0000Those losses would come without any offsetting gains. Eliminating DACA would be, in effect, throwing away some of our nation’s human capital resources, dramatically reducing the returns to education for the DACA population, and channeling them into jobs where legal status is ignored, and that do not allow them to take full advantage of their human capital. \u0000 \u0000This failure to employ all of our human capital would hurt low-to-moderate income workers. Eliminating DACA would merely increase the competition for the kinds of jobs that tend to have an excess supply of workers, while reducing the supply of employable skilled workers in the areas where we have the most acute labor shortages. Overall, we find that eliminating DACA would benefit virtually no one while hurting pretty much everyone.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126726789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Across the globe, migration has emerged as one of the most daunting challenges bedeviling globalization. The second decade of the 21st Century has been marked by issues on how to manage influx of migrants on both sides of the Atlantic (the European Migrant Crisis of 2015 and debates on ‘Migrant Caravan’ and border security in the US). A major borne of contention on migration is a war of words over its framing. The semantics of migration are meticulously exploited by rival politicians and political parties, policy actors, and other stakeholders to frame the issue, orient policy and mobilize support or acquiescence to their cause (usually securitization versus accommodation). This paper probes into the discourse on migration with a focus on its framing by pro and anti-migration actors and stakeholders and how this has affected policy decisions and actions concerning the issue. Empirical cases of how migration was framed in Europe and the US were examined with a greater tendency towards securitization. Recommendations were also advanced on how to resolved the migration stalemate with the de-politicization of the term as a starting point.
{"title":"What's in a Name? The Semantics of Migration and Its Policy Implications","authors":"Nguh Nwei Asanga Fon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3434108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3434108","url":null,"abstract":"Across the globe, migration has emerged as one of the most daunting challenges bedeviling globalization. The second decade of the 21st Century has been marked by issues on how to manage influx of migrants on both sides of the Atlantic (the European Migrant Crisis of 2015 and debates on ‘Migrant Caravan’ and border security in the US). A major borne of contention on migration is a war of words over its framing. The semantics of migration are meticulously exploited by rival politicians and political parties, policy actors, and other stakeholders to frame the issue, orient policy and mobilize support or acquiescence to their cause (usually securitization versus accommodation). This paper probes into the discourse on migration with a focus on its framing by pro and anti-migration actors and stakeholders and how this has affected policy decisions and actions concerning the issue. Empirical cases of how migration was framed in Europe and the US were examined with a greater tendency towards securitization. Recommendations were also advanced on how to resolved the migration stalemate with the de-politicization of the term as a starting point.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124803823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Opinion surveys consistently show that the British public is hostile to immigration. However, if we dig a little deeper into the polling data, a more differentiated picture emerges. Despite overall hostility to immigration, there are types of immigration that are widely accepted, or even popular with the public. Contrary to the way the debate is usually framed, concerns about immigration are not really about overall numbers. Anxieties about immigration are primarily cultural, not economic. The net migration target should be abolished, as net migration levels are irrelevant. The cap on the number of work visas for highly skilled people (Tier 2 visas) should also be abolished. Skilled migration is popular with the public, and Tier 2 migrants are, almost by definition, highly productive economic and fiscal net contributors. Limiting their numbers is not just needless economic self-harm: it is not even good politics. The government should also make it easier for foreign students to come here, to work alongside their studies, and to work here after their studies. Debates about post-Brexit immigration policy options are predicated on the assumption that after Brexit, the UK must have one single immigration regime vis-à-vis the EU as a whole. This is not true. The UK could keep free movement with some countries, and end it for others. Free movement was never controversial in the UK before the 2004 EU enlargement. There is no reason why the UK should not be able to keep free movement for the old member states (the EU-14) and the EFTA countries. There is a two-thirds majority for free movement between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK (“CANZUK”). This is a clear-cut example of where immigration policy can be liberalised with public support. Free movement between these countries should be introduced immediately, ideally on a reciprocal basis, or unilaterally if not. This could potentially be extended to other countries, if and when there is public support for it. Britain’s future migration system should be a two-lane system. There should be free movement for some countries, although unlike in the past, those would not all have to be European countries. They would simply be the countries which the British public is most comfortable to share an open border with. For the rest of the world, there should be a simplified, uncapped version of the current tier system.
{"title":"Immigration: Picking the low-hanging fruits","authors":"K. Niemietz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853123","url":null,"abstract":"Opinion surveys consistently show that the British public is hostile to immigration. However, if we dig a little deeper into the polling data, a more differentiated picture emerges. Despite overall hostility to immigration, there are types of immigration that are widely accepted, or even popular with the public. Contrary to the way the debate is usually framed, concerns about immigration are not really about overall numbers. Anxieties about immigration are primarily cultural, not economic. The net migration target should be abolished, as net migration levels are irrelevant. The cap on the number of work visas for highly skilled people (Tier 2 visas) should also be abolished. Skilled migration is popular with the public, and Tier 2 migrants are, almost by definition, highly productive economic and fiscal net contributors. Limiting their numbers is not just needless economic self-harm: it is not even good politics. The government should also make it easier for foreign students to come here, to work alongside their studies, and to work here after their studies. Debates about post-Brexit immigration policy options are predicated on the assumption that after Brexit, the UK must have one single immigration regime vis-à-vis the EU as a whole. This is not true. The UK could keep free movement with some countries, and end it for others. Free movement was never controversial in the UK before the 2004 EU enlargement. There is no reason why the UK should not be able to keep free movement for the old member states (the EU-14) and the EFTA countries. There is a two-thirds majority for free movement between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK (“CANZUK”). This is a clear-cut example of where immigration policy can be liberalised with public support. Free movement between these countries should be introduced immediately, ideally on a reciprocal basis, or unilaterally if not. This could potentially be extended to other countries, if and when there is public support for it. Britain’s future migration system should be a two-lane system. There should be free movement for some countries, although unlike in the past, those would not all have to be European countries. They would simply be the countries which the British public is most comfortable to share an open border with. For the rest of the world, there should be a simplified, uncapped version of the current tier system.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128462516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For over a decade, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has formed partnerships allowing local police to enforce immigration law by identifying and arresting undocumented residents. Prior stud...
{"title":"Vanished Classmates: The Effects of Local Immigration Enforcement on Student Enrollment","authors":"T. Dee, M. Murphy","doi":"10.3386/W25080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25080","url":null,"abstract":"For over a decade, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has formed partnerships allowing local police to enforce immigration law by identifying and arresting undocumented residents. Prior stud...","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128632842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we document the impact of immigration at the regional level on Europeans’ political preferences as expressed by voting behavior in parliamentary or presidential elections between 2007 and 2016. We combine individual data on party voting with a classification of each party’s political agenda on a scale of their "nationalistic" attitudes over 28 elections across 126 parties in 12 countries. To reduce immigrant selection and omitted variable bias, we use immigrant settlements in 2005 and the skill composition of recent immigrant flows as instruments. OLS and IV estimates show that larger inflows of highly educated immigrants were associated with a change in the vote of citizens away from nationalism. However the inflow of less educated immigrants was positively associated with a vote shift towards nationalist positions. These effects were stronger for non-tertiary educated voters and in response to non-European immigrants. We also show that they are consistent with the impact of immigration on individual political preferences, which we estimate using longitudinal data, and on opinions about immigrants. Conversely, immigration did not affect electoral turnout. Simulations based on the estimated coefficients show that immigration policies balancing the number of high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants from outside the EU would be associated with a shift in votes away from nationalist parties in almost all European regions.
{"title":"Skill of the Immigrants and Vote of the Natives: Immigration and Nationalism in European Elections 2007-2016","authors":"Simone Moriconi, G. Peri, Riccardo Turati","doi":"10.3386/W25077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25077","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we document the impact of immigration at the regional level on Europeans’ political preferences as expressed by voting behavior in parliamentary or presidential elections between 2007 and 2016. We combine individual data on party voting with a classification of each party’s political agenda on a scale of their \"nationalistic\" attitudes over 28 elections across 126 parties in 12 countries. To reduce immigrant selection and omitted variable bias, we use immigrant settlements in 2005 and the skill composition of recent immigrant flows as instruments. OLS and IV estimates show that larger inflows of highly educated immigrants were associated with a change in the vote of citizens away from nationalism. However the inflow of less educated immigrants was positively associated with a vote shift towards nationalist positions. These effects were stronger for non-tertiary educated voters and in response to non-European immigrants. We also show that they are consistent with the impact of immigration on individual political preferences, which we estimate using longitudinal data, and on opinions about immigrants. Conversely, immigration did not affect electoral turnout. Simulations based on the estimated coefficients show that immigration policies balancing the number of high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants from outside the EU would be associated with a shift in votes away from nationalist parties in almost all European regions.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124193444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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