The recent referendum in the UK on membership of the EU has sent shockwaves across the political establishment not just in the UK itself and throughout Europe, but also around the world. In the runup to the referendum, economists were (perhaps for the first time) united in pointing out that the economic case for Brexit is rather slim, that hardly any well-argued reason could be given by the Brexit camp as to why it may be a good idea to leave the EU, and that the economic consequences could be severe. That lack of economic argument in favour of Brexit, which should have been the key battleground in the run up to the referendum, led the debate to focus on one particular issue, Immigration. Like the free movement of goods, capital, and services, a fundamental pillar of the EU, and a non-negotiable requirement for any new member state, is the free movement of people. It is that particular aspect of EU membership that became the strongest single assertion of the Brexit camp. The inability to control immigration f m within the EU was made a symbol for everything else Brexit stood for (such as the idea of “sovereignty†or the pain of being subjugated to “rules made in Brussels and not the UK†), but – again – fact-based arguments against free mobility on economic or welfare grounds were hard to find. Nevertheless, free mobility within the EU became quickly the scapegoat for the economic and social woes that had distressed the country since the great recession, and perhaps even earlier, such as crime, real wage decline, inequality, unemployment, access to social services, health provision, and benefits and transfers. “Immigration†and everything people associated with it and were encouraged to believe by a relentless campaign of the majority of the tabloid press decisively contributed to the decision that the UK took on June 23, 2016. Immigration and free mobility will likely again be central in the negotiations between the UK and its European partners in developing a model for Brexit that minimises the economic costs fo both the UK and the EU.
{"title":"Immigration and the UK: Reflections after Brexit","authors":"M. Alfano, C. Dustmann, T. Frattini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2900373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900373","url":null,"abstract":"The recent referendum in the UK on membership of the EU has sent shockwaves across the political establishment not just in the UK itself and throughout Europe, but also around the world. In the runup to the referendum, economists were (perhaps for the first time) united in pointing out that the economic case for Brexit is rather slim, that hardly any well-argued reason could be given by the Brexit camp as to why it may be a good idea to leave the EU, and that the economic consequences could be severe. That lack of economic argument in favour of Brexit, which should have been the key battleground in the run up to the referendum, led the debate to focus on one particular issue, Immigration. Like the free movement of goods, capital, and services, a fundamental pillar of the EU, and a non-negotiable requirement for any new member state, is the free movement of people. It is that particular aspect of EU membership that became the strongest single assertion of the Brexit camp. The inability to control immigration f m within the EU was made a symbol for everything else Brexit stood for (such as the idea of “sovereignty†or the pain of being subjugated to “rules made in Brussels and not the UK†), but – again – fact-based arguments against free mobility on economic or welfare grounds were hard to find. Nevertheless, free mobility within the EU became quickly the scapegoat for the economic and social woes that had distressed the country since the great recession, and perhaps even earlier, such as crime, real wage decline, inequality, unemployment, access to social services, health provision, and benefits and transfers. “Immigration†and everything people associated with it and were encouraged to believe by a relentless campaign of the majority of the tabloid press decisively contributed to the decision that the UK took on June 23, 2016. Immigration and free mobility will likely again be central in the negotiations between the UK and its European partners in developing a model for Brexit that minimises the economic costs fo both the UK and the EU.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114552228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we document the importance of high-skilled immigration for U.S. employment in STEM fields. To begin, we review patterns of U.S. employment in STEM occupations among workers with at least a college degree. These patterns mirror the cycle of boom and bust in the U.S. technology industry. Among younger workers, the share of hours worked in STEM jobs peaked around the year 2000, at the height of the dot-com bubble. STEM employment shares are just now approaching these previous highs. Next, we consider the importance of immigrant labor to STEM employment. Immigrants account for a disproportionate share of jobs in STEM occupations, in particular among younger workers and among workers with a master's degree or PhD. Foreign-born presence is most pronounced in computer-related occupations, such as software programming. The majority of foreign-born workers in STEM jobs arrived in the U.S. at age 21 or older. Although we do not know the visa history of these individuals, their age at arrival is consistent with the H-1B visa being an important mode of entry for highly trained STEM workers into the U.S. Finally, we examine wage differences between native and foreign-born labor. Whereas foreign-born workers earn substantially less than native-born workers in non-STEM occupations, the native-foreign born earnings difference in STEM jobs is much smaller. Further, foreign-born workers in STEM fields reach earnings parity with native workers much more quickly than they do in non-STEM fields. In non-STEM jobs, foreign-born workers require 20 years or more in the U.S. to reach earnings parity with natives; in STEM fields, they achieve parity in less than a decade.
{"title":"High-Skilled Immigration and the Rise of Stem Occupations in U.S. Employment","authors":"Gordon H. Hanson, M. Slaughter","doi":"10.3386/W22623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W22623","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we document the importance of high-skilled immigration for U.S. employment in STEM fields. To begin, we review patterns of U.S. employment in STEM occupations among workers with at least a college degree. These patterns mirror the cycle of boom and bust in the U.S. technology industry. Among younger workers, the share of hours worked in STEM jobs peaked around the year 2000, at the height of the dot-com bubble. STEM employment shares are just now approaching these previous highs. Next, we consider the importance of immigrant labor to STEM employment. Immigrants account for a disproportionate share of jobs in STEM occupations, in particular among younger workers and among workers with a master's degree or PhD. Foreign-born presence is most pronounced in computer-related occupations, such as software programming. The majority of foreign-born workers in STEM jobs arrived in the U.S. at age 21 or older. Although we do not know the visa history of these individuals, their age at arrival is consistent with the H-1B visa being an important mode of entry for highly trained STEM workers into the U.S. Finally, we examine wage differences between native and foreign-born labor. Whereas foreign-born workers earn substantially less than native-born workers in non-STEM occupations, the native-foreign born earnings difference in STEM jobs is much smaller. Further, foreign-born workers in STEM fields reach earnings parity with native workers much more quickly than they do in non-STEM fields. In non-STEM jobs, foreign-born workers require 20 years or more in the U.S. to reach earnings parity with natives; in STEM fields, they achieve parity in less than a decade.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125837967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how the possibility of a conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in democracies. Conflict erupts when immigrants are given less than what they could obtain by resorting to confrontation. That in turn can make natives vote for lower tax rates and lower public spending. We show that income redistribution, both vertical (from the rich to the poor) and horizontal (from natives to migrants), decreases with the level of immigration. This is because the threat of conflict intensifies as the migrant population becomes bigger. Inequality softens the effect of immigration on tax rates but reduces horizontal redistribution. Despite the threat of conflict, the welfare of the native population unambiguously increases with the stock of migrants.
{"title":"Immigration, Conflict, and Redistribution","authors":"S. Sánchez-Pagés, Ángel Solano-García","doi":"10.1111/sjoe.12158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12158","url":null,"abstract":"We study how the possibility of a conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in democracies. Conflict erupts when immigrants are given less than what they could obtain by resorting to confrontation. That in turn can make natives vote for lower tax rates and lower public spending. We show that income redistribution, both vertical (from the rich to the poor) and horizontal (from natives to migrants), decreases with the level of immigration. This is because the threat of conflict intensifies as the migrant population becomes bigger. Inequality softens the effect of immigration on tax rates but reduces horizontal redistribution. Despite the threat of conflict, the welfare of the native population unambiguously increases with the stock of migrants.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125869839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For decades, migration economics has stressed the effects of migration restrictions on income distribution in the host country. Recently the literature has taken a new direction by estimating the costs of migration restrictions to global economic efficiency. In contrast, a new strand of research posits that migration restrictions could be not only desirably redistributive, but in fact globally efficient. This is the new economic case for migration restrictions. The case rests on the possibility that without tight restrictions on migration, migrants from poor countries could transmit low productivity ("A" or Total Factor Productivity) to rich countries--offsetting efficiency gains from the spatial reallocation of labor from low to high-productivity places. We provide a novel assessment, proposing a simple model of dynamically efficient migration under productivity transmission and calibrating it with new macro and micro data. In this model, the case for efficiency-enhancing migration barriers rests on three parameters: transmission, the degree to which origin-country total factor productivity is embodied in migrants; assimilation, the degree to which migrants' productivity determinants become like natives' over time in the host country; and congestion, the degree to which transmission and assimilation change at higher migrant stocks. On current evidence about the magnitudes of these parameters, dynamically efficient policy would not imply open borders but would imply relaxations on current restrictions. That is, the new efficiency case for some migration restrictions is empirically a case against the stringency of current restrictions.
{"title":"The New Case for Migration Restrictions: An Assessment","authors":"Michael A. Clemens, L. Pritchett","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2888155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2888155","url":null,"abstract":"For decades, migration economics has stressed the effects of migration restrictions on income distribution in the host country. Recently the literature has taken a new direction by estimating the costs of migration restrictions to global economic efficiency. In contrast, a new strand of research posits that migration restrictions could be not only desirably redistributive, but in fact globally efficient. This is the new economic case for migration restrictions. The case rests on the possibility that without tight restrictions on migration, migrants from poor countries could transmit low productivity (\"A\" or Total Factor Productivity) to rich countries--offsetting efficiency gains from the spatial reallocation of labor from low to high-productivity places. We provide a novel assessment, proposing a simple model of dynamically efficient migration under productivity transmission and calibrating it with new macro and micro data. In this model, the case for efficiency-enhancing migration barriers rests on three parameters: transmission, the degree to which origin-country total factor productivity is embodied in migrants; assimilation, the degree to which migrants' productivity determinants become like natives' over time in the host country; and congestion, the degree to which transmission and assimilation change at higher migrant stocks. On current evidence about the magnitudes of these parameters, dynamically efficient policy would not imply open borders but would imply relaxations on current restrictions. That is, the new efficiency case for some migration restrictions is empirically a case against the stringency of current restrictions.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131200498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Immigration is a possible instrument for offsetting longer-run adverse effects of population aging on per capita income. Our “laboratory” is a fictional country Alpha to which we assign demographic characteristics typical of a country experiencing population aging. Simulations indicate that a very high immigration rate with heavy concentration in younger working ages might be required to keep per capita income from declining. More rapid productivity growth would also offset population aging as would higher rates of labour participation of older people. Longer life expectancy, taken alone, would lower per capita real income, as would higher fertility rates.
{"title":"A Simulation Analysis of the Longer-Term Effects of Immigration on per Capita Income in an Aging Population","authors":"F. Denton, B. Spencer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2942346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2942346","url":null,"abstract":"Immigration is a possible instrument for offsetting longer-run adverse effects of population aging on per capita income. Our “laboratory” is a fictional country Alpha to which we assign demographic characteristics typical of a country experiencing population aging. Simulations indicate that a very high immigration rate with heavy concentration in younger working ages might be required to keep per capita income from declining. More rapid productivity growth would also offset population aging as would higher rates of labour participation of older people. Longer life expectancy, taken alone, would lower per capita real income, as would higher fertility rates.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"42 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131616208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With the rise of the far-right parties in the European parliamentary elections, concerns over immigration and national identity have again come into the limelight. In this paper, we document the empirical relationships between immigration, native concerns over the economic and cultural impact of immigration, and the rise of rightwing political parties in Europe. Empirical analysis first establishes the critical and distinct roles played by economic and cultural concerns over immigration in determining citizen’s rightward ideology and voting for right-wing parties. Second, we investigate the determinants of economic and cultural concerns over immigration, finding strong and consistent evidence for the salience hypothesis, which suggests that immigrant share of a country’s population shapes citizen concerns over immigration. Thereafter, we document the roles of macro-level economic and cultural channels in determining the strength of salience effects. Finally, we investigate how the characteristics of the immigrant population affect native concerns over immigration.
{"title":"Immigration, Attitudes and the Rise of the Political Right: The Role of Cultural and Economic Concerns Over Immigration","authors":"Lewis S. Davis, Sumit S. Deole","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2641016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2641016","url":null,"abstract":"With the rise of the far-right parties in the European parliamentary elections, concerns over immigration and national identity have again come into the limelight. In this paper, we document the empirical relationships between immigration, native concerns over the economic and cultural impact of immigration, and the rise of rightwing political parties in Europe. Empirical analysis first establishes the critical and distinct roles played by economic and cultural concerns over immigration in determining citizen’s rightward ideology and voting for right-wing parties. Second, we investigate the determinants of economic and cultural concerns over immigration, finding strong and consistent evidence for the salience hypothesis, which suggests that immigrant share of a country’s population shapes citizen concerns over immigration. Thereafter, we document the roles of macro-level economic and cultural channels in determining the strength of salience effects. Finally, we investigate how the characteristics of the immigrant population affect native concerns over immigration.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132413870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nearly 12 million undocumented immigrants currently live in the United States. Seemingly not a day goes by where the press does not cover immigration and immigrant issues. These articles discuss everything from the day-to-day experiences of undocumented immigrants in Alabama or Arizona, to the macro-political implications of Congress passing, or failing to pass, comprehensive immigration reform legislation. Yet, despite the press coverage, the on the ground realities, and the political ramifications, Congress has been unable to reform our broken immigration system. One reason posited for this failure is that the proposed solutions are simply too complicated. However, with respect to addressing the U.S.’s undocumented immigrant population, the solution need not be: Congress may amend a single date in the registry statute under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259, last altered during the Reagan Administration. By amending a single date, Congress could provide a path to legalization and citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants with strong ties to the communities where they live and work.
{"title":"A Modest Proposal: Legalize Millions of Undocumented Immigrants with the Change of a Single Statutory Date","authors":"Alexander Holtzman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2561911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2561911","url":null,"abstract":"Nearly 12 million undocumented immigrants currently live in the United States. Seemingly not a day goes by where the press does not cover immigration and immigrant issues. These articles discuss everything from the day-to-day experiences of undocumented immigrants in Alabama or Arizona, to the macro-political implications of Congress passing, or failing to pass, comprehensive immigration reform legislation. Yet, despite the press coverage, the on the ground realities, and the political ramifications, Congress has been unable to reform our broken immigration system. One reason posited for this failure is that the proposed solutions are simply too complicated. However, with respect to addressing the U.S.’s undocumented immigrant population, the solution need not be: Congress may amend a single date in the registry statute under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259, last altered during the Reagan Administration. By amending a single date, Congress could provide a path to legalization and citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants with strong ties to the communities where they live and work.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128679765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Immigrant populations may either be pulled into self-employment by the lure of high wages relative to wage and salary work, or they may be pushed into self-employment as a survival mechanism in the face of unemployment. Research that focuses on Mexican immigrant self-employment in the United States tends to stress the prosperity-pull hypothesis and pay little attention to recession-push hypotheses. The focus of this article is to understand the extent that Mexican immigrants enter self-employment as a response to unemployment. Using a unique panel dataset that captures fast-paced labor market changes over the 1994 to 2013 period, I find that Mexican immigrants – and Mexican immigrant men in particular – are more likely to become self-employed in economically bad times than native workers and less likely to become self-employed than native workers in good times. The threshold where Mexican immigrants have a higher rather than lower probability to become self-employed is at eight percent unemployment. These results filter throughout various subcategories and are consistent with recession-push hypotheses.
{"title":"Prosperity-Pull or Recession-Push?: Mexican Immigrant Self-Employment Across the Business Cycle","authors":"Peter Catron","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2894473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2894473","url":null,"abstract":"Immigrant populations may either be pulled into self-employment by the lure of high wages relative to wage and salary work, or they may be pushed into self-employment as a survival mechanism in the face of unemployment. Research that focuses on Mexican immigrant self-employment in the United States tends to stress the prosperity-pull hypothesis and pay little attention to recession-push hypotheses. The focus of this article is to understand the extent that Mexican immigrants enter self-employment as a response to unemployment. Using a unique panel dataset that captures fast-paced labor market changes over the 1994 to 2013 period, I find that Mexican immigrants – and Mexican immigrant men in particular – are more likely to become self-employed in economically bad times than native workers and less likely to become self-employed than native workers in good times. The threshold where Mexican immigrants have a higher rather than lower probability to become self-employed is at eight percent unemployment. These results filter throughout various subcategories and are consistent with recession-push hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124979860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I analyze the impact of a low-wage trade shock on manufacturing workers in a high-wage country, Denmark, and their subsequent adjustment to the shock. Employing a comprehensive person-level panel dataset matched with workplace-level employer data for the period 1999 to 2010, I exploit the dismantling of import quotas on Chinese textile and clothing products in conjunction with China's accession to the WTO as a quasi-natural experiment and utilize within-industry heterogeneity in workers' exposure to this trade shock. Results reveal negative and significant impact of the low-wage import shock on workers' future earnings and employment trajectories. The main channels through which the trade shock affects workers are shortened employment at the firm that was exposed to the competition shock and subsequent difficulty in maintaining stable employment. The abolishment of quotas also leads to higher likelihood of unemployment. The service sector is the main absorber of exposed workers of all types, but the success of recovery from the shock in subsequent service sector jobs varies greatly across workers depending on initial occupation, education and age. Less-educated, older and workers who had occupations that require industry-specific skills at the exposed firms had the worst adjustment experience. The results show that trade-induced adjustment costs are substantial and heterogeneous across different types of workers and highlight the nature of adjustment frictions by showing that, for some, challenges remain even after transition to full-time jobs outside of manufacturing.
{"title":"Workers Beneath the Floodgates: The Impact of Low-Wage Import Competition and Workers' Adjustment","authors":"Hâle Utar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2489936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2489936","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze the impact of a low-wage trade shock on manufacturing workers in a high-wage country, Denmark, and their subsequent adjustment to the shock. Employing a comprehensive person-level panel dataset matched with workplace-level employer data for the period 1999 to 2010, I exploit the dismantling of import quotas on Chinese textile and clothing products in conjunction with China's accession to the WTO as a quasi-natural experiment and utilize within-industry heterogeneity in workers' exposure to this trade shock. Results reveal negative and significant impact of the low-wage import shock on workers' future earnings and employment trajectories. The main channels through which the trade shock affects workers are shortened employment at the firm that was exposed to the competition shock and subsequent difficulty in maintaining stable employment. The abolishment of quotas also leads to higher likelihood of unemployment. The service sector is the main absorber of exposed workers of all types, but the success of recovery from the shock in subsequent service sector jobs varies greatly across workers depending on initial occupation, education and age. Less-educated, older and workers who had occupations that require industry-specific skills at the exposed firms had the worst adjustment experience. The results show that trade-induced adjustment costs are substantial and heterogeneous across different types of workers and highlight the nature of adjustment frictions by showing that, for some, challenges remain even after transition to full-time jobs outside of manufacturing.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114072241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some immigrants try to keep their ethnicity hidden while others become ever deeply more mired in their home culture. We argue that among immigrants this struggle manifests itself in the ethnic goods they choose to consume. Different types of ethnic goods have vastly different effects on immigrant assimilation. We develop a simple theoretical model useful for capturing the consequences of this struggle, illustrating it with examples of Central Asian assimilation into the Muscovite economy.
{"title":"Ethnic Goods and Immigrant Assimilation","authors":"Ilhom Abdulloev, G. Epstein, Ira N. Gang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2427775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427775","url":null,"abstract":"Some immigrants try to keep their ethnicity hidden while others become ever deeply more mired in their home culture. We argue that among immigrants this struggle manifests itself in the ethnic goods they choose to consume. Different types of ethnic goods have vastly different effects on immigrant assimilation. We develop a simple theoretical model useful for capturing the consequences of this struggle, illustrating it with examples of Central Asian assimilation into the Muscovite economy.","PeriodicalId":134919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Immigration (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124729063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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