Intelligence最新文献

It is well documented that memory is heritable and that older adults tend to have poorer memory performance than younger adults. However, whether the magnitudes of genetic and environmental contributions to late-life verbal episodic memory ability differ from those at earlier ages remains unresolved. Twins from 12 studies participating in the Interplay of Genes and Environment in Multiple Studies (IGEMS) consortium constituted the analytic sample. Verbal episodic memory was assessed with immediate word list recall (N = 35,204 individuals; 21,792 twin pairs) and prose recall (N = 3805 individuals; 2028 twin pairs), with scores harmonized across studies. Average test performance was lower in successively older age groups for both measures. Twin models found significant age moderation for both measures, with total inter-individual variance increasing significantly with age, although it was not possible definitively to attribute the increase specifically to either genetic or environmental sources. Pooled results across all 12 studies were compared to results where we successively dropped each study (leave-one-out) to assure results were not due to an outlier. We conclude the models indicated an overall increase in variance for verbal episodic memory that was driven by a combination of increases in the genetic and nonshared environmental parameters that were not independently statistically significant. In contrast to reported results for other cognitive domains, differences in environmental exposures are comparatively important for verbal episodic memory, especially word list learning.

Dual process theories often contrast a hot, reactive affective system with a cool, reflective cognitive system. The cognitive system permits rationality and reasoning, but may inhibit spontaneous affect. Such frameworks would seem to suggest that individual differences in general cognitive ability, which is linked to abstract forms of reasoning, may impact dynamic components of emotional reactivity. In two studies involving five samples (total N = 631), participants were asked to continuously rate their emotional experiences in response to presented affective images. General cognitive ability, assessed, by proxy, with self-reported ACT scores, was linked to less intense peak reactions, peak reactions that were delayed, and/or to velocities of affect change that were less pronounced. Such relationships tended to be observed regardless of whether images were positive or negative. The findings provide support for dual process theorizing and suggest that general cognitive ability modulates dynamic components of emotional responding.

This study addressed a gap in the research literature by evaluating the validity of general mental ability (g) and personality test scores for prediction of firearms proficiency via shooting range performance, an entirely objective task-based criterion. It was hypothesized that mental ability test scores would be positively related to firearms proficiency based on past research in related areas (e.g., g predicts skill acquisition and training performance) and conceptual similarities between firearms proficiency and cognitive tasks. Using 4 datasets with a combined sample size of 22,525 individuals, this hypothesis was confirmed: g had operational validities ranging from .162 to .188 and logical reasoning had operational validities ranging from .179 to .268 after correcting for range restriction and criterion unreliability. Mental ability test scores predicted an entirely psychomotor criterion task: use of firearms to hit targets at a pre-determined level of accuracy. Most of the validity appears to be attributable to g, but a post hoc analysis indicated that writing ability acted as a suppressor (i.e., the validity of g increased when writing ability was included in a regression model). Conscientiousness was hypothesized to have a positive relationship with firearms performance and emotional stability was hypothesized to have positive linear and quadratic relationships. In contrast, it was observed that conscientiousness had a negative operational validity (−.079) and emotional stability lacked validity relative to the firearms proficiency criterion. The implications for individual differences research and practice are discussed.

It is well known that genetic factors account for up to 70% of variability in cognition from childhood to adulthood. However, less is known about the first year of life. This study investigated the etiological factors influencing individual variability in different domains of emerging cognitive and motor abilities in early infancy, and to what extent genetic and environmental influences are unique or shared across different domains. We compared multivariate twin models built on scores from the five scales of the Mullen Scales of Early Learning (MSEL) in a community sample of monozygotic and dizygotic twins at 5 months of age (n=567). The results indicated a hierarchical etiological structure whereby a general genetic latent factor accounted for 54% of variance underlying the different domains of emerging cognitive and motor abilities (A=0.54, confidence interval CI=[0; 0.82]). We also found additional genetic influences that were specific to early motor and language development. Unlike previous findings on older children, we did not find significant influences of shared environment on the shared factor (C=0, CI=[0, 0.57]), or any specific scale. Furthermore, influences of unique environment, which include measurement error, were moderate and statistically significant (E=0.46, CI=0.18; 0.81]). This study provides strong evidence for a unitary hierarchical structure across different domains of emerging cognition. Evidence that a single common etiological factor, which we term infant g, contributes to a range of different abilities supports the view that in young infants, intrinsic and general neurodevelopmental processes are key drivers of observable behavioural differences in specific domains.

Generational intelligence test score gains have been documented worldwide in the twentieth century. However, recent evidence suggests these increased scores are coming to an end in some world regions. Here we compare two cohorts of university freshmen. The first cohort (n = 311) was assessed in 1991, whereas the second cohort (n = 349) was assessed thirty years later (2022). These cohorts completed the same intelligence battery including eight standardized speeded and power tests tapping reasoning (abstract and quantitative), language (vocabulary, verbal comprehension, and verbal meanings), rote calculation, and visuospatial relations. The results revealed a global gain of 3.5 IQ points but also upward and downward changes at the test level. The 2022 cohort outperformed the 1991 cohort on reasoning (abstract and quantitative), verbal comprehension, and vocabulary, whereas the 1991 cohort outscored the 2022 cohort on rote calculation, visuospatial relations (mental rotation and identical figures), and verbal meanings. These findings are thought to support one key claim made by James Flynn: generational changes on the specific cognitive abilities and skills tapped by standardized tests should be expected without appreciable or substantive changes in the structure of the intelligence construct identified within generations. This main conclusion is discussed with respect to theoretical causal implications putatively derived from current intelligence psychometric models.

Tilt refers to a pattern of specific abilities and is based on within subject differences in two abilities (e.g., math and verbal), yielding an ability profile with strengths and weaknesses. A common type of tilt is ability tilt based on math and verbal scores, yielding math tilt (math>verbal) and verbal tilt (verbal>math). This article responds to Sorjonen, Ingre, Nilsonne, and Melin's (2023, this issue) critique of tilt and investment theories. In their critique, Sorjonen et al. claim that tilt results are spurious and that investment theories cannot explain tilt. Contra Sorjonen et al.'s claims, the current article argues that the nomological network of tilt relations is not spurious but is parsimonious, falsifiable, and supports the predictions of investment theories. The nomological network indicates that (a) tilt levels increase with age in adolescence and are mediated by processing speed; (b) males show math tilt, whereas females show verbal tilt; and (c) math tilt correlates positively with analogous criteria (e.g., science and math) and negatively with competing criteria (e.g., verbal), whereas verbal tilt shows the opposite pattern. It is argued that these (and other) findings are not spurious but can be parsimoniously explained by investment theories, which assume that investment in a particular domain (e.g., STEM; science, technology, engineering, math) boosts the development of analogous abilities (e.g., math) and inhibits the development of competing abilities (e.g., verbal). The article concludes with a discussion of future research on tilt, focusing on factors that may affect the development of tilt and its predictive power (e.g., trait complexes and developmental dedifferentiation).

The aim of this study was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the potential linkages between intelligence and psychopathology across the full IQ range, while considering both absolute IQ scores and discrepancies between them. We drew data from the EDEN mother-child birth cohort, gathered at two time points: 5.5 and 11.5 years of age. We examined three instruments assessing psychopathology: the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire, the Child Behavior Checklist, and the Mental Health and Social Inadaptation Assessment for Adolescents. We focused on four distinct scales: internalizing disorder, conduct disorder, social problems, and ADHD symptoms.

Our analyses first examined correlations between Full-scale IQ, Verbal IQ, Performance IQ, and psychopathology scores. Subsequently, we explored correlations between absolute and relative verbal-performance IQ discrepancies and psychopathology scores. In general, we found that relations between intelligence index scores and psychopathology scales were generally null or negative (high IQ associated with fewer psychopathology symptoms). Our results do not lend support to the hypothesis that high intelligence or index score discrepancies are risk factors for psychopathology in children and adolescents.

Children's differences in early life cognitive development are driven by the interplay of genetic and environmental factors, but identifying replicable gene-environment interactions (GxE) has proven difficult. We systematically tested GxE effects in the prediction of cognitive development from 2 to 4 years, using polygenic scores (PGS) for years spent in education and 39 measures of the home and neighborhood environment. Data came from up to 6973 unrelated individuals from the Twins Early Development Study (TEDS), a UK population-representative cohort. The environmental measures accounted together for 20.6% of the variance in cognitive development, while the PGS accounted for 0.5% (p < .001). We observed substantial gene-environment correlations but found no conclusive evidence for GxE effects. While associations between PGS and cognitive development were weak, genetic and environmental factors had direct and additive (i.e., main effects) rather than interactive influences on early life cognitive development.

Examining factorial invariance provides the strongest test of the generalizability of psychological constructs across populations and should be investigated prior to cross-cultural interpretation of cognitive assessments. The aim of this systematic review was to critically evaluate the current evidence regarding the factorial invariance and the generalizability of cognition models across cultures. The review was structured using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. The literature search identified 57 original studies examining the factorial invariance of cognitive ability assessments across cultures. The results were strongly supportive of the cross-cultural generalizability of the underlying cognitive model. Ten studies found configural invariance, 20 studies found weak or partial weak factorial invariance, 12 found strong or partial strong factorial invariance, and 13 found strict factorial invariance. However, the quality of the factorial invariance analyses varied between studies, with some analyses not adopting the hierarchical approach to factorial invariance analysis, leading to ambiguous results. No study that provided interpretable results in terms of the hierarchical approach to factorial invariance found a lack of factorial invariance. Overall, the results of this review suggest that i) the factor analytic models of cognitive abilities generalize across cultures, ii) the use of the hierarchical approach to factorial invariance is likely to find strong or strict factorial invariance, iii) the results are compatible with well-established Cattell-Horn-Carroll constructs being invariant across cultures. Future research into factorial invariance should follow the hierarchical analytic approach so as not to misestimate factorial invariance. Studies should also use the Cattell-Horn-Carroll taxonomy to systematize intelligence research.

The main objective of this study is to compare the quantitative (correct answers) and qualitative (error types) performance of children belonging to different linguistic groups on a non-verbal reasoning test, Raven's Colored Progressive Matrices Test, after being matched based on level of exposure to poverty, certain individual characteristics and test performance. The sample is representative for Mexico at a population level and consists of children aged 5 to 12 (n = 4644), of which 671 are bilingual in Spanish and an indigenous language, 3970 are monolingual in Spanish and 78 are monolingual in an indigenous language. The results show significant quantitative differences with a lower overall performance in the Raven's test by bilingual children as compared to their monolingual (Spanish only) peers, but no qualitative differences when analyzing their error types. When considering each linguistic group individually, the relative frequency of three error types (Repetition, Wrong Principle, and Incomplete Correlate) is similar in children aged 5 to 8 and in those aged 9 to 12. However, considering the two age cohorts, the results reveal how the intragroup differences in each linguistic group, are only statistically significant in the case of Difference errors, in the group of monolingual children in Spanish.

In addition to practical use that may be potentially derived from this empirical evidence, these results may also be encouraging from a methodological point of view. They demonstrate how the method used, in addition to permitting greater comparison between the experimental groups of a representative sample at a population level, does not present high sensitivity, either for the model used to estimate the Generalized Propensity Score method, or for the specific estimator used.