Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80038
L. Vianna, Luiz Adriano Gonçalves Borges
In this article, we address the transhumanist philosophy underlying neurocognitive enhancements. We will outline an ethical-social critique of the movement, based on a bibliographic review of works by C. S. Lewis, Michael Polanyi, Jurgen Habermas, Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kaas, Michael Sandel, John Finnis and Jacques Maritain. We also address the issue of the common good in the face of the transhuman and the consequences that could arise from not thinking ethically about the implications of cognitive enhancement. We concluded that the “common good” foreseen in the transhumanist philosophy lacks an adequate completion of the term. The Aristotelian common good is, above all, a virtuous coordination of private goods. Considering, however, that these goods are linked to human nature, which can be substantially altered by transhumanist transformations, there are two risks that present themselves: or that one seeks to modify the human status of all in a hegemonic claim that violates individual freedom; or, in a liberal perspective, that the transformation of only those who so choose will jeopardize human ontology itself. Thus, it could become impossible to speak of the common good, since it derives from the coordination of private goods that, ultimately, depend on the sharing of a common ontological status.
{"title":"A filosofia transumanista subjacente aos aprimoramentos neurocognitivos e o risco de fragmentação do bem comum","authors":"L. Vianna, Luiz Adriano Gonçalves Borges","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80038","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we address the transhumanist philosophy underlying neurocognitive enhancements. We will outline an ethical-social critique of the movement, based on a bibliographic review of works by C. S. Lewis, Michael Polanyi, Jurgen Habermas, Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kaas, Michael Sandel, John Finnis and Jacques Maritain. We also address the issue of the common good in the face of the transhuman and the consequences that could arise from not thinking ethically about the implications of cognitive enhancement. We concluded that the “common good” foreseen in the transhumanist philosophy lacks an adequate completion of the term. The Aristotelian common good is, above all, a virtuous coordination of private goods. Considering, however, that these goods are linked to human nature, which can be substantially altered by transhumanist transformations, there are two risks that present themselves: or that one seeks to modify the human status of all in a hegemonic claim that violates individual freedom; or, in a liberal perspective, that the transformation of only those who so choose will jeopardize human ontology itself. Thus, it could become impossible to speak of the common good, since it derives from the coordination of private goods that, ultimately, depend on the sharing of a common ontological status.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129807186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79903
C. Nahra
The aim of this article is to discuss the challenges that the ethics of neuroscience will face in the third decade of the XXI century. I will discuss here the American project BRAIN initiative launched in 2013 and I challenge this regarding the participation and research that has been done by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of USA (DARPA). I also question the research on the brain and neurotechnologies developed by private corporations such as the Tech giants and other billionaire companies. I propose here that it is necessary to start a huge reformulation in the field of ethics of neuroscience aiming to contribute to make neuroscience and neurotechnology more and more available to everyone and for the benefit of humankind.
{"title":"Os novos desafios da ética da neurociência","authors":"C. Nahra","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79903","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to discuss the challenges that the ethics of neuroscience will face in the third decade of the XXI century. I will discuss here the American project BRAIN initiative launched in 2013 and I challenge this regarding the participation and research that has been done by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of USA (DARPA). I also question the research on the brain and neurotechnologies developed by private corporations such as the Tech giants and other billionaire companies. I propose here that it is necessary to start a huge reformulation in the field of ethics of neuroscience aiming to contribute to make neuroscience and neurotechnology more and more available to everyone and for the benefit of humankind.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"168 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123277412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79816
Daniele Costa
The findings of the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet are among the most discussed in moral philosophy. They present a clear challenge to the notion of intentional action as a consciously chosen action. According to them, the awareness of the decision to act by the subjects of his studies came only after the moment of preparedness of the action in our brains, called “readiness potential”. Many, including Libet, saw these results as an evidence that we do not have free will nor moral responsibility. The aim of this article is to criticize the claim that moral responsibility would be in danger because of the Libet’s findings. First, the concept of free will as intentional action will be explained in order to understand how the notion of being conscious in deciding when and how to act is relevant. Then, the findings from Libet’s experiments and the argument of how they could be a challenge to the notions of free will and of moral responsibility are presented. At the end, it will be argued that the notion of moral responsibility involves more than psychological capacities, but, foremost, the attribution of social roles in a moral community.
{"title":"The limits of the neuroscience of moral responsibility","authors":"Daniele Costa","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79816","url":null,"abstract":"The findings of the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet are among the most discussed in moral philosophy. They present a clear challenge to the notion of intentional action as a consciously chosen action. According to them, the awareness of the decision to act by the subjects of his studies came only after the moment of preparedness of the action in our brains, called “readiness potential”. Many, including Libet, saw these results as an evidence that we do not have free will nor moral responsibility. The aim of this article is to criticize the claim that moral responsibility would be in danger because of the Libet’s findings. First, the concept of free will as intentional action will be explained in order to understand how the notion of being conscious in deciding when and how to act is relevant. Then, the findings from Libet’s experiments and the argument of how they could be a challenge to the notions of free will and of moral responsibility are presented. At the end, it will be argued that the notion of moral responsibility involves more than psychological capacities, but, foremost, the attribution of social roles in a moral community.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126308635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79767
D. Mochcovitch, M. C. Dias
Neuroscience and Human-Computer Interaction studies are growing exponentially. It is argued that the realization of cognitive processes does not depend only on the brain, but also on the interaction between the cognitive agent and various artifacts and, therefore, human beings can be considered natural-born cyborgs. The symbiotic relationship we have with our gadgets, especially the smartphone, sheds new light on neuroethical problems that have arisen with the use of information and communication technologies, ICT. Our aim in this article is (1) to contextualize the use of digital technologies as extensions of the mind, in particular smarthphones, and (2) to discuss the neuroethical issues arising from this use. We argue that the suggestions of applications, through their algorithms, as well as the use of our information, can be considered changes in our minds and, consequently, in our self. For this reason, we seek, (3) to offer some guidelines so that the debate can take on a more preventive character for emerging problems.
{"title":"Mentes no bolso: considerações neuroéticas sobre a incorporação de aplicativos de smartphones na configuração do Self","authors":"D. Mochcovitch, M. C. Dias","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79767","url":null,"abstract":"Neuroscience and Human-Computer Interaction studies are growing exponentially. It is argued that the realization of cognitive processes does not depend only on the brain, but also on the interaction between the cognitive agent and various artifacts and, therefore, human beings can be considered natural-born cyborgs. The symbiotic relationship we have with our gadgets, especially the smartphone, sheds new light on neuroethical problems that have arisen with the use of information and communication technologies, ICT. Our aim in this article is (1) to contextualize the use of digital technologies as extensions of the mind, in particular smarthphones, and (2) to discuss the neuroethical issues arising from this use. We argue that the suggestions of applications, through their algorithms, as well as the use of our information, can be considered changes in our minds and, consequently, in our self. For this reason, we seek, (3) to offer some guidelines so that the debate can take on a more preventive character for emerging problems.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128821023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79915
Fabiana Cunha Leão Pompermayer, M. Vilaça, M. C. Dias
The purpose of this paper is to present the state of the art of scientific research on cognitive enhancement, aiming to provide subsidies for a less speculative discussion on the subject. To this end, we conducted an integrative review of literature on the current biotechnological cognitive enhancement devices. The result points to the inconclusive character of the research, so that there are no significant answers that certify the effectiveness of cognitive enhancement practices, at least in the way that it has been idealized and discussed. We will therefore defend that investments in the area need to be analyzed from the point of view of justice, taking into account other available and proven forms of cognitive enhancement. We aim to indicate as an alternative a substantial investment in the oldest form of human enhancement, education, so that new methodologies can be thought out and adapted to the demands of contemporary society and to an ideal of more just and egalitarian society.
{"title":"Aprimoramento cognitivo: técnicas e controvérsias","authors":"Fabiana Cunha Leão Pompermayer, M. Vilaça, M. C. Dias","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79915","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to present the state of the art of scientific research on cognitive enhancement, aiming to provide subsidies for a less speculative discussion on the subject. To this end, we conducted an integrative review of literature on the current biotechnological cognitive enhancement devices. The result points to the inconclusive character of the research, so that there are no significant answers that certify the effectiveness of cognitive enhancement practices, at least in the way that it has been idealized and discussed. We will therefore defend that investments in the area need to be analyzed from the point of view of justice, taking into account other available and proven forms of cognitive enhancement. We aim to indicate as an alternative a substantial investment in the oldest form of human enhancement, education, so that new methodologies can be thought out and adapted to the demands of contemporary society and to an ideal of more just and egalitarian society.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132958484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78854
Roberto Barros
The purpose of this article is to problematize the interpretative character of normative perspectives, assuming that the enunciative content of the norm is always understood through a projective and objective perspective on the part of those who formulate it, and with a comprehensive and meaningful attitude on the part of one who seeks to interpret it. Such approach presupposes, therefore, a consideration of structural aspects acting in normative formulations, but also of interpretive factors when a normative perspective is problematized. The intention is to highlight the impossibility of providing the ultimate foundation for standards and then to argue in favor of the positive aspects of this point of view.
{"title":"Normatividade semântica e naturalismo: uma consideração das dimensões semântica e interpretativa de perspectivas normativas","authors":"Roberto Barros","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78854","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to problematize the interpretative character of normative perspectives, assuming that the enunciative content of the norm is always understood through a projective and objective perspective on the part of those who formulate it, and with a comprehensive and meaningful attitude on the part of one who seeks to interpret it. Such approach presupposes, therefore, a consideration of structural aspects acting in normative formulations, but also of interpretive factors when a normative perspective is problematized. The intention is to highlight the impossibility of providing the ultimate foundation for standards and then to argue in favor of the positive aspects of this point of view.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127835117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80049
Fernando Henrique Vicente da Silva
Este trabalho não apresenta resumo.
本文不提供摘要。
{"title":"Resenha de \"Towards Neurobioethics\", de Darlei Dall’Agnol","authors":"Fernando Henrique Vicente da Silva","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80049","url":null,"abstract":"Este trabalho não apresenta resumo.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129922442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wahrend der gesamten Geschichte der Menschheit war die Verbesserung der Kognition nicht nur eine Konstante, sondern auch ein Muss fur die Evolution und das Wohlbefinden unserer Spezies. Philosophische Annahmen, dass die Verbesserung der Kognition durch biomedizinische Mittel gegen eine unveranderliche menschliche Natur verstost, konnen in Verbindung mit dem Mangel an schlussigen Daten uber ihre Verwendung bei gesunden Personen und Langzeiteffekten manchmal zu unzulassigen Ansatzen fuhren. In diesem Zusammenhang wollen die Autoren zeigen, dass die Verbesserung der Kognition, sei es auf „naturliche“ oder biotechnologische Weise, fur die Entstehung der Personlichkeit und fur die Existenz eines autonomen Lebens, das sich an der eigenen Vorstellung des Menschen vom Guten orientiert, von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist. Zu diesem Zweck werden die wichtigsten Moglichkeiten zur Verbesserung der Kognition durch Biotechnologien sowie ihre Vorteile und Moglichkeiten sowie ihre Risiken und Grenzen vorgestellt. Es wird auch argumentiert, dass kognitive Verbesserung sowohl ein Konsumgut ist, das wunschenswert und glucksfordernd ist, um eine gut funktionierende Kognition zu haben, als auch ein Kapitalgut, das Risiken reduziert, die Erwerbsfahigkeit erhoht und einen Schlusselbestandteil des Humankapitals bildet. In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet der Biotechnologie, die auf die Verbesserung der Kognition abzielen, das Wohlbefinden einer Person (und der Gesellschaft) verbessern konnen, werden die Autoren schlieslich argumentieren, dass weitere Forschung auf diesem Gebiet erforderlich ist, insbesondere Studien, die Dimensionen wie berucksichtigen Dosis, individuelle Merkmale und Aufgabenmerkmale.
{"title":"From the necessity of being human to the possibility of pursuing a good life: cognitive enhancement and the emergence of personhood","authors":"Giovana Figueiredo Peluso Lopes, Brunello Stancioli","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80030","url":null,"abstract":"Wahrend der gesamten Geschichte der Menschheit war die Verbesserung der Kognition nicht nur eine Konstante, sondern auch ein Muss fur die Evolution und das Wohlbefinden unserer Spezies. Philosophische Annahmen, dass die Verbesserung der Kognition durch biomedizinische Mittel gegen eine unveranderliche menschliche Natur verstost, konnen in Verbindung mit dem Mangel an schlussigen Daten uber ihre Verwendung bei gesunden Personen und Langzeiteffekten manchmal zu unzulassigen Ansatzen fuhren. In diesem Zusammenhang wollen die Autoren zeigen, dass die Verbesserung der Kognition, sei es auf „naturliche“ oder biotechnologische Weise, fur die Entstehung der Personlichkeit und fur die Existenz eines autonomen Lebens, das sich an der eigenen Vorstellung des Menschen vom Guten orientiert, von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist. Zu diesem Zweck werden die wichtigsten Moglichkeiten zur Verbesserung der Kognition durch Biotechnologien sowie ihre Vorteile und Moglichkeiten sowie ihre Risiken und Grenzen vorgestellt. Es wird auch argumentiert, dass kognitive Verbesserung sowohl ein Konsumgut ist, das wunschenswert und glucksfordernd ist, um eine gut funktionierende Kognition zu haben, als auch ein Kapitalgut, das Risiken reduziert, die Erwerbsfahigkeit erhoht und einen Schlusselbestandteil des Humankapitals bildet. In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet der Biotechnologie, die auf die Verbesserung der Kognition abzielen, das Wohlbefinden einer Person (und der Gesellschaft) verbessern konnen, werden die Autoren schlieslich argumentieren, dass weitere Forschung auf diesem Gebiet erforderlich ist, insbesondere Studien, die Dimensionen wie berucksichtigen Dosis, individuelle Merkmale und Aufgabenmerkmale.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130249879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79998
Darlei Dall'Agnol
This work has two main goals: (i) to present some neuroscientific investigations in order to understand the effects of the coronavirus (SARS-COV-2) on the human central nervous system (CNS) and (ii) to discuss how neuroethics can, considering these studies, contribute to the proper dealing with the impacts of the COVID-19. To reach these aims, in the first part, it will be scrutinized the current neuroscientific findings on how the human brain is affected by the new coronavirus: from stroke, encephalitis, loss of memory etc. to mental disorders given rise to anxiety and depression. In the second part, it presents a neuroethical framework to deal with these problems. Despite the prevalence of utilitarianism in neuroethics, the paper argues that classical bioethical principles, namely respect for persons, beneficence and justice are better qualified to guide (neuro) scientific practices. Applying these principles leads to recognize that it is necessary to intensify care in order to overcome the pandemic, which remains out of control in our country.
{"title":"Neuroética e COVID-19","authors":"Darlei Dall'Agnol","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79998","url":null,"abstract":"This work has two main goals: (i) to present some neuroscientific investigations in order to understand the effects of the coronavirus (SARS-COV-2) on the human central nervous system (CNS) and (ii) to discuss how neuroethics can, considering these studies, contribute to the proper dealing with the impacts of the COVID-19. To reach these aims, in the first part, it will be scrutinized the current neuroscientific findings on how the human brain is affected by the new coronavirus: from stroke, encephalitis, loss of memory etc. to mental disorders given rise to anxiety and depression. In the second part, it presents a neuroethical framework to deal with these problems. Despite the prevalence of utilitarianism in neuroethics, the paper argues that classical bioethical principles, namely respect for persons, beneficence and justice are better qualified to guide (neuro) scientific practices. Applying these principles leads to recognize that it is necessary to intensify care in order to overcome the pandemic, which remains out of control in our country.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134000121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568
Domingo García-Marzá
The current democracy decline, the systematic non-fulfillment of the expectations of equality, inclusion and participation, is undermining the credibility and trust of the set of institutions that make up the democratic system. The revisionist current of democracy gives a good account of this new scenario where democracy is neither the only nor the best answer to how to organize our life in common, to http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568 569 GARCÍA-MARZÁ, D. Contra el nuevo revisionismo democrático ethic@, Florianópolis, v. 19, n. 3, 568-591. Dez. 2020 achieve a collective formation of the will. In this context, democracy runs the risk of blurring its legitimacy under concepts such as illiberal democracy or algorithmic democracy. The expansion of populism, digital technologies and a new vindication of expertocracies, make up a not reassuring horizon. It is necessary to rethink democracy and justify a critical perspective that allows us to morally base the values that give it meaning. For this purpose, we need to recover the intrinsic value of democracy, its moral value. And it is in this reflection where it is important to use some ideas of K.O. Apel. They have to do with his justification of the moral value of democracy and the scope of an ethic of democracy. Throughout his works, Apel insisted on the need to establish a criterion of moral validity, a discursive or communicative ethics, capable of explaining the legitimacy of the expectations generated by democracy, but also the possibility of normative criteria for the application of the moral requirement of reciprocal recognition, a realization that considers the history and the particular situation, the plural, complex and global contexts in which we live. Both moments allow a critical perspective capable of arguing against the current revisionism and justifying the ethical bases that underlie our trust in democracy and its institutions.
当前民主的衰落，对平等、包容和参与的期望系统性地无法实现，正在破坏构成民主制度的一系列机构的信誉和信任。民主的修正主义潮流很好地解释了这种新的情况，即民主既不是唯一的也不是最好的答案，如何组织我们共同的生活，http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568 569 GARCÍA-MARZÁ， D. Contra el nuevo revisionismo democrático伦理学@，Florianópolis, v. 19, n. 3,568 -591。实现2020年集体形成的意志。在这种背景下，民主面临着在非自由民主或算法民主等概念下模糊其合法性的风险。民粹主义、数字技术的扩张，以及对专家统治的新辩护，构成了一个令人不安的前景。有必要重新思考民主，并证明一种批判性的观点是正确的，这种观点使我们能够以道德为基础，赋予民主意义。为此，我们需要恢复民主主义的内在价值，它的道德价值。正是在这种反思中，运用K.O.阿佩尔的一些思想是很重要的。它们与他对民主的道德价值和民主伦理的范围的论证有关。在他的作品中，阿佩尔坚持需要建立一种道德有效性的标准，一种话语或沟通的伦理，能够解释民主产生的期望的合法性，但也有规范性标准的可能性，用于相互承认的道德要求的应用，一种考虑历史和特殊情况的实现，我们生活的多元，复杂和全球背景。这两个时刻都提供了一种批判的视角，能够反对当前的修正主义，并为我们对民主及其制度的信任所依据的道德基础辩护。
{"title":"Contra el nuevo revisionismo democrático: el alcance del valor moral de la democracia en K.-O. Apel","authors":"Domingo García-Marzá","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568","url":null,"abstract":"The current democracy decline, the systematic non-fulfillment of the expectations of equality, inclusion and participation, is undermining the credibility and trust of the set of institutions that make up the democratic system. The revisionist current of democracy gives a good account of this new scenario where democracy is neither the only nor the best answer to how to organize our life in common, to http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568 569 GARCÍA-MARZÁ, D. Contra el nuevo revisionismo democrático ethic@, Florianópolis, v. 19, n. 3, 568-591. Dez. 2020 achieve a collective formation of the will. In this context, democracy runs the risk of blurring its legitimacy under concepts such as illiberal democracy or algorithmic democracy. The expansion of populism, digital technologies and a new vindication of expertocracies, make up a not reassuring horizon. It is necessary to rethink democracy and justify a critical perspective that allows us to morally base the values that give it meaning. For this purpose, we need to recover the intrinsic value of democracy, its moral value. And it is in this reflection where it is important to use some ideas of K.O. Apel. They have to do with his justification of the moral value of democracy and the scope of an ethic of democracy. Throughout his works, Apel insisted on the need to establish a criterion of moral validity, a discursive or communicative ethics, capable of explaining the legitimacy of the expectations generated by democracy, but also the possibility of normative criteria for the application of the moral requirement of reciprocal recognition, a realization that considers the history and the particular situation, the plural, complex and global contexts in which we live. Both moments allow a critical perspective capable of arguing against the current revisionism and justifying the ethical bases that underlie our trust in democracy and its institutions.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116883808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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