Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80038
L. Vianna, Luiz Adriano Gonçalves Borges
In this article, we address the transhumanist philosophy underlying neurocognitive enhancements. We will outline an ethical-social critique of the movement, based on a bibliographic review of works by C. S. Lewis, Michael Polanyi, Jurgen Habermas, Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kaas, Michael Sandel, John Finnis and Jacques Maritain. We also address the issue of the common good in the face of the transhuman and the consequences that could arise from not thinking ethically about the implications of cognitive enhancement. We concluded that the “common good” foreseen in the transhumanist philosophy lacks an adequate completion of the term. The Aristotelian common good is, above all, a virtuous coordination of private goods. Considering, however, that these goods are linked to human nature, which can be substantially altered by transhumanist transformations, there are two risks that present themselves: or that one seeks to modify the human status of all in a hegemonic claim that violates individual freedom; or, in a liberal perspective, that the transformation of only those who so choose will jeopardize human ontology itself. Thus, it could become impossible to speak of the common good, since it derives from the coordination of private goods that, ultimately, depend on the sharing of a common ontological status.
{"title":"A filosofia transumanista subjacente aos aprimoramentos neurocognitivos e o risco de fragmentação do bem comum","authors":"L. Vianna, Luiz Adriano Gonçalves Borges","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80038","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we address the transhumanist philosophy underlying neurocognitive enhancements. We will outline an ethical-social critique of the movement, based on a bibliographic review of works by C. S. Lewis, Michael Polanyi, Jurgen Habermas, Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kaas, Michael Sandel, John Finnis and Jacques Maritain. We also address the issue of the common good in the face of the transhuman and the consequences that could arise from not thinking ethically about the implications of cognitive enhancement. We concluded that the “common good” foreseen in the transhumanist philosophy lacks an adequate completion of the term. The Aristotelian common good is, above all, a virtuous coordination of private goods. Considering, however, that these goods are linked to human nature, which can be substantially altered by transhumanist transformations, there are two risks that present themselves: or that one seeks to modify the human status of all in a hegemonic claim that violates individual freedom; or, in a liberal perspective, that the transformation of only those who so choose will jeopardize human ontology itself. Thus, it could become impossible to speak of the common good, since it derives from the coordination of private goods that, ultimately, depend on the sharing of a common ontological status.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129807186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79903
C. Nahra
The aim of this article is to discuss the challenges that the ethics of neuroscience will face in the third decade of the XXI century. I will discuss here the American project BRAIN initiative launched in 2013 and I challenge this regarding the participation and research that has been done by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of USA (DARPA). I also question the research on the brain and neurotechnologies developed by private corporations such as the Tech giants and other billionaire companies. I propose here that it is necessary to start a huge reformulation in the field of ethics of neuroscience aiming to contribute to make neuroscience and neurotechnology more and more available to everyone and for the benefit of humankind.
{"title":"Os novos desafios da ética da neurociência","authors":"C. Nahra","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79903","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to discuss the challenges that the ethics of neuroscience will face in the third decade of the XXI century. I will discuss here the American project BRAIN initiative launched in 2013 and I challenge this regarding the participation and research that has been done by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of USA (DARPA). I also question the research on the brain and neurotechnologies developed by private corporations such as the Tech giants and other billionaire companies. I propose here that it is necessary to start a huge reformulation in the field of ethics of neuroscience aiming to contribute to make neuroscience and neurotechnology more and more available to everyone and for the benefit of humankind.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"168 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123277412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79767
D. Mochcovitch, M. C. Dias
Neuroscience and Human-Computer Interaction studies are growing exponentially. It is argued that the realization of cognitive processes does not depend only on the brain, but also on the interaction between the cognitive agent and various artifacts and, therefore, human beings can be considered natural-born cyborgs. The symbiotic relationship we have with our gadgets, especially the smartphone, sheds new light on neuroethical problems that have arisen with the use of information and communication technologies, ICT. Our aim in this article is (1) to contextualize the use of digital technologies as extensions of the mind, in particular smarthphones, and (2) to discuss the neuroethical issues arising from this use. We argue that the suggestions of applications, through their algorithms, as well as the use of our information, can be considered changes in our minds and, consequently, in our self. For this reason, we seek, (3) to offer some guidelines so that the debate can take on a more preventive character for emerging problems.
{"title":"Mentes no bolso: considerações neuroéticas sobre a incorporação de aplicativos de smartphones na configuração do Self","authors":"D. Mochcovitch, M. C. Dias","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79767","url":null,"abstract":"Neuroscience and Human-Computer Interaction studies are growing exponentially. It is argued that the realization of cognitive processes does not depend only on the brain, but also on the interaction between the cognitive agent and various artifacts and, therefore, human beings can be considered natural-born cyborgs. The symbiotic relationship we have with our gadgets, especially the smartphone, sheds new light on neuroethical problems that have arisen with the use of information and communication technologies, ICT. Our aim in this article is (1) to contextualize the use of digital technologies as extensions of the mind, in particular smarthphones, and (2) to discuss the neuroethical issues arising from this use. We argue that the suggestions of applications, through their algorithms, as well as the use of our information, can be considered changes in our minds and, consequently, in our self. For this reason, we seek, (3) to offer some guidelines so that the debate can take on a more preventive character for emerging problems.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128821023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79816
Daniele Costa
The findings of the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet are among the most discussed in moral philosophy. They present a clear challenge to the notion of intentional action as a consciously chosen action. According to them, the awareness of the decision to act by the subjects of his studies came only after the moment of preparedness of the action in our brains, called “readiness potential”. Many, including Libet, saw these results as an evidence that we do not have free will nor moral responsibility. The aim of this article is to criticize the claim that moral responsibility would be in danger because of the Libet’s findings. First, the concept of free will as intentional action will be explained in order to understand how the notion of being conscious in deciding when and how to act is relevant. Then, the findings from Libet’s experiments and the argument of how they could be a challenge to the notions of free will and of moral responsibility are presented. At the end, it will be argued that the notion of moral responsibility involves more than psychological capacities, but, foremost, the attribution of social roles in a moral community.
{"title":"The limits of the neuroscience of moral responsibility","authors":"Daniele Costa","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79816","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79816","url":null,"abstract":"The findings of the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet are among the most discussed in moral philosophy. They present a clear challenge to the notion of intentional action as a consciously chosen action. According to them, the awareness of the decision to act by the subjects of his studies came only after the moment of preparedness of the action in our brains, called “readiness potential”. Many, including Libet, saw these results as an evidence that we do not have free will nor moral responsibility. The aim of this article is to criticize the claim that moral responsibility would be in danger because of the Libet’s findings. First, the concept of free will as intentional action will be explained in order to understand how the notion of being conscious in deciding when and how to act is relevant. Then, the findings from Libet’s experiments and the argument of how they could be a challenge to the notions of free will and of moral responsibility are presented. At the end, it will be argued that the notion of moral responsibility involves more than psychological capacities, but, foremost, the attribution of social roles in a moral community.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126308635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79915
Fabiana Cunha Leão Pompermayer, M. Vilaça, M. C. Dias
The purpose of this paper is to present the state of the art of scientific research on cognitive enhancement, aiming to provide subsidies for a less speculative discussion on the subject. To this end, we conducted an integrative review of literature on the current biotechnological cognitive enhancement devices. The result points to the inconclusive character of the research, so that there are no significant answers that certify the effectiveness of cognitive enhancement practices, at least in the way that it has been idealized and discussed. We will therefore defend that investments in the area need to be analyzed from the point of view of justice, taking into account other available and proven forms of cognitive enhancement. We aim to indicate as an alternative a substantial investment in the oldest form of human enhancement, education, so that new methodologies can be thought out and adapted to the demands of contemporary society and to an ideal of more just and egalitarian society.
{"title":"Aprimoramento cognitivo: técnicas e controvérsias","authors":"Fabiana Cunha Leão Pompermayer, M. Vilaça, M. C. Dias","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79915","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to present the state of the art of scientific research on cognitive enhancement, aiming to provide subsidies for a less speculative discussion on the subject. To this end, we conducted an integrative review of literature on the current biotechnological cognitive enhancement devices. The result points to the inconclusive character of the research, so that there are no significant answers that certify the effectiveness of cognitive enhancement practices, at least in the way that it has been idealized and discussed. We will therefore defend that investments in the area need to be analyzed from the point of view of justice, taking into account other available and proven forms of cognitive enhancement. We aim to indicate as an alternative a substantial investment in the oldest form of human enhancement, education, so that new methodologies can be thought out and adapted to the demands of contemporary society and to an ideal of more just and egalitarian society.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132958484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78854
Roberto Barros
The purpose of this article is to problematize the interpretative character of normative perspectives, assuming that the enunciative content of the norm is always understood through a projective and objective perspective on the part of those who formulate it, and with a comprehensive and meaningful attitude on the part of one who seeks to interpret it. Such approach presupposes, therefore, a consideration of structural aspects acting in normative formulations, but also of interpretive factors when a normative perspective is problematized. The intention is to highlight the impossibility of providing the ultimate foundation for standards and then to argue in favor of the positive aspects of this point of view.
{"title":"Normatividade semântica e naturalismo: uma consideração das dimensões semântica e interpretativa de perspectivas normativas","authors":"Roberto Barros","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78854","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this article is to problematize the interpretative character of normative perspectives, assuming that the enunciative content of the norm is always understood through a projective and objective perspective on the part of those who formulate it, and with a comprehensive and meaningful attitude on the part of one who seeks to interpret it. Such approach presupposes, therefore, a consideration of structural aspects acting in normative formulations, but also of interpretive factors when a normative perspective is problematized. The intention is to highlight the impossibility of providing the ultimate foundation for standards and then to argue in favor of the positive aspects of this point of view.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127835117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80049
Fernando Henrique Vicente da Silva
Este trabalho não apresenta resumo.
本文不提供摘要。
{"title":"Resenha de \"Towards Neurobioethics\", de Darlei Dall’Agnol","authors":"Fernando Henrique Vicente da Silva","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80049","url":null,"abstract":"Este trabalho não apresenta resumo.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129922442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wahrend der gesamten Geschichte der Menschheit war die Verbesserung der Kognition nicht nur eine Konstante, sondern auch ein Muss fur die Evolution und das Wohlbefinden unserer Spezies. Philosophische Annahmen, dass die Verbesserung der Kognition durch biomedizinische Mittel gegen eine unveranderliche menschliche Natur verstost, konnen in Verbindung mit dem Mangel an schlussigen Daten uber ihre Verwendung bei gesunden Personen und Langzeiteffekten manchmal zu unzulassigen Ansatzen fuhren. In diesem Zusammenhang wollen die Autoren zeigen, dass die Verbesserung der Kognition, sei es auf „naturliche“ oder biotechnologische Weise, fur die Entstehung der Personlichkeit und fur die Existenz eines autonomen Lebens, das sich an der eigenen Vorstellung des Menschen vom Guten orientiert, von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist. Zu diesem Zweck werden die wichtigsten Moglichkeiten zur Verbesserung der Kognition durch Biotechnologien sowie ihre Vorteile und Moglichkeiten sowie ihre Risiken und Grenzen vorgestellt. Es wird auch argumentiert, dass kognitive Verbesserung sowohl ein Konsumgut ist, das wunschenswert und glucksfordernd ist, um eine gut funktionierende Kognition zu haben, als auch ein Kapitalgut, das Risiken reduziert, die Erwerbsfahigkeit erhoht und einen Schlusselbestandteil des Humankapitals bildet. In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet der Biotechnologie, die auf die Verbesserung der Kognition abzielen, das Wohlbefinden einer Person (und der Gesellschaft) verbessern konnen, werden die Autoren schlieslich argumentieren, dass weitere Forschung auf diesem Gebiet erforderlich ist, insbesondere Studien, die Dimensionen wie berucksichtigen Dosis, individuelle Merkmale und Aufgabenmerkmale.
{"title":"From the necessity of being human to the possibility of pursuing a good life: cognitive enhancement and the emergence of personhood","authors":"Giovana Figueiredo Peluso Lopes, Brunello Stancioli","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80030","url":null,"abstract":"Wahrend der gesamten Geschichte der Menschheit war die Verbesserung der Kognition nicht nur eine Konstante, sondern auch ein Muss fur die Evolution und das Wohlbefinden unserer Spezies. Philosophische Annahmen, dass die Verbesserung der Kognition durch biomedizinische Mittel gegen eine unveranderliche menschliche Natur verstost, konnen in Verbindung mit dem Mangel an schlussigen Daten uber ihre Verwendung bei gesunden Personen und Langzeiteffekten manchmal zu unzulassigen Ansatzen fuhren. In diesem Zusammenhang wollen die Autoren zeigen, dass die Verbesserung der Kognition, sei es auf „naturliche“ oder biotechnologische Weise, fur die Entstehung der Personlichkeit und fur die Existenz eines autonomen Lebens, das sich an der eigenen Vorstellung des Menschen vom Guten orientiert, von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist. Zu diesem Zweck werden die wichtigsten Moglichkeiten zur Verbesserung der Kognition durch Biotechnologien sowie ihre Vorteile und Moglichkeiten sowie ihre Risiken und Grenzen vorgestellt. Es wird auch argumentiert, dass kognitive Verbesserung sowohl ein Konsumgut ist, das wunschenswert und glucksfordernd ist, um eine gut funktionierende Kognition zu haben, als auch ein Kapitalgut, das Risiken reduziert, die Erwerbsfahigkeit erhoht und einen Schlusselbestandteil des Humankapitals bildet. In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet der Biotechnologie, die auf die Verbesserung der Kognition abzielen, das Wohlbefinden einer Person (und der Gesellschaft) verbessern konnen, werden die Autoren schlieslich argumentieren, dass weitere Forschung auf diesem Gebiet erforderlich ist, insbesondere Studien, die Dimensionen wie berucksichtigen Dosis, individuelle Merkmale und Aufgabenmerkmale.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130249879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79998
Darlei Dall'Agnol
This work has two main goals: (i) to present some neuroscientific investigations in order to understand the effects of the coronavirus (SARS-COV-2) on the human central nervous system (CNS) and (ii) to discuss how neuroethics can, considering these studies, contribute to the proper dealing with the impacts of the COVID-19. To reach these aims, in the first part, it will be scrutinized the current neuroscientific findings on how the human brain is affected by the new coronavirus: from stroke, encephalitis, loss of memory etc. to mental disorders given rise to anxiety and depression. In the second part, it presents a neuroethical framework to deal with these problems. Despite the prevalence of utilitarianism in neuroethics, the paper argues that classical bioethical principles, namely respect for persons, beneficence and justice are better qualified to guide (neuro) scientific practices. Applying these principles leads to recognize that it is necessary to intensify care in order to overcome the pandemic, which remains out of control in our country.
{"title":"Neuroética e COVID-19","authors":"Darlei Dall'Agnol","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79998","url":null,"abstract":"This work has two main goals: (i) to present some neuroscientific investigations in order to understand the effects of the coronavirus (SARS-COV-2) on the human central nervous system (CNS) and (ii) to discuss how neuroethics can, considering these studies, contribute to the proper dealing with the impacts of the COVID-19. To reach these aims, in the first part, it will be scrutinized the current neuroscientific findings on how the human brain is affected by the new coronavirus: from stroke, encephalitis, loss of memory etc. to mental disorders given rise to anxiety and depression. In the second part, it presents a neuroethical framework to deal with these problems. Despite the prevalence of utilitarianism in neuroethics, the paper argues that classical bioethical principles, namely respect for persons, beneficence and justice are better qualified to guide (neuro) scientific practices. Applying these principles leads to recognize that it is necessary to intensify care in order to overcome the pandemic, which remains out of control in our country.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134000121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487
Jürgen Habermas
Karl-Otto Apel occupies a preeminent place among the German philosophers of the first postwar generation. His groundbreaking achievement, which has been unjustly overshadowed by the tenacious debate over the “ultimate justification” of ethics, consisted in disclosing a new dimension in the philosophy of language and thereby completing the “linguistic turn.” He made the transition from formal semantics, which concentrates on the structure of propositions, to “transcendental” pragmatics of language, which focuses on the formal aspects of the use and interpretation of linguistic expressions. In pursuing this path, he also laid the foundations for discourse ethics. The essay traces the stages of this “transformation of transcendental philosophy” leading from the late Heidegger to Apel’s conception of “transcendental hermeneutics” inspired by Peirce. Continuing the lifelong discourse with my friend Karl-Otto, I will conclude by addressing some problems raised by his justification of discourse ethics. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487
{"title":"Da semântica formal à pragmática transcendental: a ideia original de Karl-Otto Apel","authors":"Jürgen Habermas","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487","url":null,"abstract":"Karl-Otto Apel occupies a preeminent place among the German philosophers of the first postwar generation. His groundbreaking achievement, which has been unjustly overshadowed by the tenacious debate over the “ultimate justification” of ethics, consisted in disclosing a new dimension in the philosophy of language and thereby completing the “linguistic turn.” He made the transition from formal semantics, which concentrates on the structure of propositions, to “transcendental” pragmatics of language, which focuses on the formal aspects of the use and interpretation of linguistic expressions. In pursuing this path, he also laid the foundations for discourse ethics. The essay traces the stages of this “transformation of transcendental philosophy” leading from the late Heidegger to Apel’s conception of “transcendental hermeneutics” inspired by Peirce. Continuing the lifelong discourse with my friend Karl-Otto, I will conclude by addressing some problems raised by his justification of discourse ethics. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127121293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：