Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487
Jürgen Habermas
Karl-Otto Apel occupies a preeminent place among the German philosophers of the first postwar generation. His groundbreaking achievement, which has been unjustly overshadowed by the tenacious debate over the “ultimate justification” of ethics, consisted in disclosing a new dimension in the philosophy of language and thereby completing the “linguistic turn.” He made the transition from formal semantics, which concentrates on the structure of propositions, to “transcendental” pragmatics of language, which focuses on the formal aspects of the use and interpretation of linguistic expressions. In pursuing this path, he also laid the foundations for discourse ethics. The essay traces the stages of this “transformation of transcendental philosophy” leading from the late Heidegger to Apel’s conception of “transcendental hermeneutics” inspired by Peirce. Continuing the lifelong discourse with my friend Karl-Otto, I will conclude by addressing some problems raised by his justification of discourse ethics. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487
{"title":"Da semântica formal à pragmática transcendental: a ideia original de Karl-Otto Apel","authors":"Jürgen Habermas","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487","url":null,"abstract":"Karl-Otto Apel occupies a preeminent place among the German philosophers of the first postwar generation. His groundbreaking achievement, which has been unjustly overshadowed by the tenacious debate over the “ultimate justification” of ethics, consisted in disclosing a new dimension in the philosophy of language and thereby completing the “linguistic turn.” He made the transition from formal semantics, which concentrates on the structure of propositions, to “transcendental” pragmatics of language, which focuses on the formal aspects of the use and interpretation of linguistic expressions. In pursuing this path, he also laid the foundations for discourse ethics. The essay traces the stages of this “transformation of transcendental philosophy” leading from the late Heidegger to Apel’s conception of “transcendental hermeneutics” inspired by Peirce. Continuing the lifelong discourse with my friend Karl-Otto, I will conclude by addressing some problems raised by his justification of discourse ethics. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p487","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127121293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719
Nicolás Emanuel Olivares
At the beginning of the 2010's, German philosopher A. Honneth outlined a specific critical democratic conception based on a social model of individual freedom, which he considers superior to negative and reflective models. Honneth believes that deliberative democracy depends conceptually and empirically on the social model of individual freedom, so that if certain social conditions are not met, citizens lack the conditions that would allow them to participate in the construction of democratic will. In this work, we will proceed to the reconstruction of the main normative postulates of the critical democratic conception of Honneth, who positively defines justice as mutual recognition, contrasting them specularly with those of the republican conception defended by the Irish philosopher P. Pettit, which is based on a negative model of political freedom understood as nondomination. In summary, we will explain four comparative attractions that P. Pettit's theory offers over that of Honneth in terms of methodology, concept of justice, classification of models of freedom, and priority of justice. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n2p151 http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719
{"title":"Além do direito da liberdade: uma análise republicana da teoria democrática crítica de A. Honneth","authors":"Nicolás Emanuel Olivares","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719","url":null,"abstract":"At the beginning of the 2010's, German philosopher A. Honneth outlined a specific critical democratic conception based on a social model of individual freedom, which he considers superior to negative and reflective models. Honneth believes that deliberative democracy depends conceptually and empirically on the social model of individual freedom, so that if certain social conditions are not met, citizens lack the conditions that would allow them to participate in the construction of democratic will. In this work, we will proceed to the reconstruction of the main normative postulates of the critical democratic conception of Honneth, who positively defines justice as mutual recognition, contrasting them specularly with those of the republican conception defended by the Irish philosopher P. Pettit, which is based on a negative model of political freedom understood as nondomination. In summary, we will explain four comparative attractions that P. Pettit's theory offers over that of Honneth in terms of methodology, concept of justice, classification of models of freedom, and priority of justice. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n2p151 http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"521 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132079709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656
Â. V. Cenci
The construction of discourse ethics, with regard to its two original variants, was held under controversy. This was due to the different ways the sphere of moral discourse was addressed in each author’s program and to the distinct ways they conceived the concept of practical reason. The answers given to the problem of the very sphere of moral shall bring about two programs of discourse ethics that eventually move away from their common roots and, finally, project two conceptions of practical reason that are quite distinct and, to great extent, incompatible, so that it is impossible to combine them under the same rubric. Thus, due to the differences in each author’s initial program concerning the formulation of a stricter notion of moral – deontological, as defended by Habermas – or broader – deontological-teleological, as proposed by Apel – the consequence will be that, for Habermas, moral and practical reason shall be placed within a theory or http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656
{"title":"Apel versus Habermas: a trajetória controversa das duas variantes originais da ética do discurso","authors":"Â. V. Cenci","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656","url":null,"abstract":"The construction of discourse ethics, with regard to its two original variants, was held under controversy. This was due to the different ways the sphere of moral discourse was addressed in each author’s program and to the distinct ways they conceived the concept of practical reason. The answers given to the problem of the very sphere of moral shall bring about two programs of discourse ethics that eventually move away from their common roots and, finally, project two conceptions of practical reason that are quite distinct and, to great extent, incompatible, so that it is impossible to combine them under the same rubric. Thus, due to the differences in each author’s initial program concerning the formulation of a stricter notion of moral – deontological, as defended by Habermas – or broader – deontological-teleological, as proposed by Apel – the consequence will be that, for Habermas, moral and practical reason shall be placed within a theory or http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130127266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p678
Marina Velasco
In the debate between Habermas and Apel on the foundation of discourse ethics, many things are mixed. The article reconsiders the debate, analyzes the form of the pragmatic-transcendental argument, and distinguishes two major issues in confrontation: questions about argumentative assumptions and questions about moral obligations. We try to show that, having made the appropriate distinctions, in the first question, Apel is more right than Habermas, and that, in the second question, Habermas is more right than Apel. The implications of each position are considered.
{"title":"O debate Habermas versus Apel sobre a ética do discurso: reconsideração das razões da divergência","authors":"Marina Velasco","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p678","url":null,"abstract":"In the debate between Habermas and Apel on the foundation of discourse ethics, many things are mixed. The article reconsiders the debate, analyzes the form of the pragmatic-transcendental argument, and distinguishes two major issues in confrontation: questions about argumentative assumptions and questions about moral obligations. We try to show that, having made the appropriate distinctions, in the first question, Apel is more right than Habermas, and that, in the second question, Habermas is more right than Apel. The implications of each position are considered.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"829 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129043384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p483
D. Dutra, Alessandro Pinzani
Este texto não apresenta resumo.
本文不提供摘要。
{"title":"Apresentação – Dossiê O pensamento de Karl-Otto Apel","authors":"D. Dutra, Alessandro Pinzani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p483","url":null,"abstract":"Este texto não apresenta resumo.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126964201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p698
L. Repa
The article aims to show the fundamental differences between Habermas’s and Apel’s projects to transform philosophy. These differences can be measured by comparing Apel’s concept of transcendental reflection and Habermas’s method of rational reconstruction. Based on these differences, it is possible to state that the transformation of philosophy in Apel’s thought means to give another way to the attempt by first philosophy to establish an ultimate foundation for itself and the sciences while the Habermasian concept of reconstruction assigns philosophy the most innovative role of stand-in for scientific theories and interpreter of cultural developments.
{"title":"A transformação da filosofia entre a reflexão transcendental e a reconstrução racional: sobre o sentido de uma contraposição filosófica contemporânea","authors":"L. Repa","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p698","url":null,"abstract":"The article aims to show the fundamental differences between Habermas’s and Apel’s projects to transform philosophy. These differences can be measured by comparing Apel’s concept of transcendental reflection and Habermas’s method of rational reconstruction. Based on these differences, it is possible to state that the transformation of philosophy in Apel’s thought means to give another way to the attempt by first philosophy to establish an ultimate foundation for itself and the sciences while the Habermasian concept of reconstruction assigns philosophy the most innovative role of stand-in for scientific theories and interpreter of cultural developments.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"600 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116285864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p790
N. Corrêa, N. D. Oliveira
How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of the concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms themselves. 2-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do? In this study, we will review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for the aggregation and intertheoretical comparison of different normative structures, cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address decisionmaking problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts.
{"title":"Metanormativity: solving questions of moral and empirical uncertainty","authors":"N. Corrêa, N. D. Oliveira","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p790","url":null,"abstract":"How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of the concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms themselves. 2-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do? In this study, we will review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for the aggregation and intertheoretical comparison of different normative structures, cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address decisionmaking problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122241570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-21DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P318
C. Consani
This paper presents and analyzes the habermasian proposal for global politics without a world government. This will be done in three moments: first, the habermasian cosmopolitan model is presented; it will be stressed the multilevel system of institutions, which embrace the thesis of Constitution without a State; second, will be presented some objections to Habemas’s thesis elaborated recently by William Scheuerman; finally, this paper analyzes to what extent habermasian theory offers answers to these objections.
{"title":"É possível uma Constituição sem Estado? Uma análise da proposta habermasiana de política mundial sem governo mundial","authors":"C. Consani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P318","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents and analyzes the habermasian proposal for global politics without a world government. This will be done in three moments: first, the habermasian cosmopolitan model is presented; it will be stressed the multilevel system of institutions, which embrace the thesis of Constitution without a State; second, will be presented some objections to Habemas’s thesis elaborated recently by William Scheuerman; finally, this paper analyzes to what extent habermasian theory offers answers to these objections.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121251567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-21DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P151
J. Klein
Este texto não apresenta resumo.
本文不提供摘要。
{"title":"Apresentação - Dossiê Cosmopolitismo","authors":"J. Klein","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P151","url":null,"abstract":"Este texto não apresenta resumo.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133278684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-21DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P418
Rogério Moreira Orrutea Filho, A. Pavão
Este artigo desenvolve-se em tres secoes. Na primeira secao, examina-se o desacordo manifestado por Schopenhauer em relacao a Etica kantiana naquilo que tange a linguagem prescritiva da moral. Neste ponto, o desacordo surge por Schopenhauer julgar inadmissivel atribuir qualquer funcao moralizante a filosofia, a qual, na visao do filosofo, deve permanecer puramente teorica e contemplativa. Entretanto, em nossa analise e mostrado que Kant nao manifestou semelhante pretensao moralizadora. Na segunda secao, discute-se a tese schopenhaueriana de que a linguagem prescritiva teria origem na moral teologica, o que confirmaria, na visao de Schopenhauer, nao so a contingencia da relacao entre os conceitos de moral e de dever, mas, em uma analise mais profunda, ate mesmo a incompatibilidade entre ambos. Na terceira secao, argumentamos que, apesar de explicitamente negar o estatuto moral ao conceito de dever, a Etica de Schopenhauer implicitamente afirma-o. O motivo desta afirmacao implicita se sustentaria sobre o fato inelutavel de que os fenomenos morais sao intrinsecamente prescritivos.
{"title":"O elemento prescritivo no fenômeno moral: desacordos entre Kant e Schopenhauer","authors":"Rogério Moreira Orrutea Filho, A. Pavão","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P418","url":null,"abstract":"Este artigo desenvolve-se em tres secoes. Na primeira secao, examina-se o desacordo manifestado por Schopenhauer em relacao a Etica kantiana naquilo que tange a linguagem prescritiva da moral. Neste ponto, o desacordo surge por Schopenhauer julgar inadmissivel atribuir qualquer funcao moralizante a filosofia, a qual, na visao do filosofo, deve permanecer puramente teorica e contemplativa. Entretanto, em nossa analise e mostrado que Kant nao manifestou semelhante pretensao moralizadora. Na segunda secao, discute-se a tese schopenhaueriana de que a linguagem prescritiva teria origem na moral teologica, o que confirmaria, na visao de Schopenhauer, nao so a contingencia da relacao entre os conceitos de moral e de dever, mas, em uma analise mais profunda, ate mesmo a incompatibilidade entre ambos. Na terceira secao, argumentamos que, apesar de explicitamente negar o estatuto moral ao conceito de dever, a Etica de Schopenhauer implicitamente afirma-o. O motivo desta afirmacao implicita se sustentaria sobre o fato inelutavel de que os fenomenos morais sao intrinsecamente prescritivos.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126584702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：