Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568
Domingo García-Marzá
The current democracy decline, the systematic non-fulfillment of the expectations of equality, inclusion and participation, is undermining the credibility and trust of the set of institutions that make up the democratic system. The revisionist current of democracy gives a good account of this new scenario where democracy is neither the only nor the best answer to how to organize our life in common, to http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568 569 GARCÍA-MARZÁ, D. Contra el nuevo revisionismo democrático ethic@, Florianópolis, v. 19, n. 3, 568-591. Dez. 2020 achieve a collective formation of the will. In this context, democracy runs the risk of blurring its legitimacy under concepts such as illiberal democracy or algorithmic democracy. The expansion of populism, digital technologies and a new vindication of expertocracies, make up a not reassuring horizon. It is necessary to rethink democracy and justify a critical perspective that allows us to morally base the values that give it meaning. For this purpose, we need to recover the intrinsic value of democracy, its moral value. And it is in this reflection where it is important to use some ideas of K.O. Apel. They have to do with his justification of the moral value of democracy and the scope of an ethic of democracy. Throughout his works, Apel insisted on the need to establish a criterion of moral validity, a discursive or communicative ethics, capable of explaining the legitimacy of the expectations generated by democracy, but also the possibility of normative criteria for the application of the moral requirement of reciprocal recognition, a realization that considers the history and the particular situation, the plural, complex and global contexts in which we live. Both moments allow a critical perspective capable of arguing against the current revisionism and justifying the ethical bases that underlie our trust in democracy and its institutions.
当前民主的衰落，对平等、包容和参与的期望系统性地无法实现，正在破坏构成民主制度的一系列机构的信誉和信任。民主的修正主义潮流很好地解释了这种新的情况，即民主既不是唯一的也不是最好的答案，如何组织我们共同的生活，http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568 569 GARCÍA-MARZÁ， D. Contra el nuevo revisionismo democrático伦理学@，Florianópolis, v. 19, n. 3,568 -591。实现2020年集体形成的意志。在这种背景下，民主面临着在非自由民主或算法民主等概念下模糊其合法性的风险。民粹主义、数字技术的扩张，以及对专家统治的新辩护，构成了一个令人不安的前景。有必要重新思考民主，并证明一种批判性的观点是正确的，这种观点使我们能够以道德为基础，赋予民主意义。为此，我们需要恢复民主主义的内在价值，它的道德价值。正是在这种反思中，运用K.O.阿佩尔的一些思想是很重要的。它们与他对民主的道德价值和民主伦理的范围的论证有关。在他的作品中，阿佩尔坚持需要建立一种道德有效性的标准，一种话语或沟通的伦理，能够解释民主产生的期望的合法性，但也有规范性标准的可能性，用于相互承认的道德要求的应用，一种考虑历史和特殊情况的实现，我们生活的多元，复杂和全球背景。这两个时刻都提供了一种批判的视角，能够反对当前的修正主义，并为我们对民主及其制度的信任所依据的道德基础辩护。
{"title":"Contra el nuevo revisionismo democrático: el alcance del valor moral de la democracia en K.-O. Apel","authors":"Domingo García-Marzá","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568","url":null,"abstract":"The current democracy decline, the systematic non-fulfillment of the expectations of equality, inclusion and participation, is undermining the credibility and trust of the set of institutions that make up the democratic system. The revisionist current of democracy gives a good account of this new scenario where democracy is neither the only nor the best answer to how to organize our life in common, to http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p568 569 GARCÍA-MARZÁ, D. Contra el nuevo revisionismo democrático ethic@, Florianópolis, v. 19, n. 3, 568-591. Dez. 2020 achieve a collective formation of the will. In this context, democracy runs the risk of blurring its legitimacy under concepts such as illiberal democracy or algorithmic democracy. The expansion of populism, digital technologies and a new vindication of expertocracies, make up a not reassuring horizon. It is necessary to rethink democracy and justify a critical perspective that allows us to morally base the values that give it meaning. For this purpose, we need to recover the intrinsic value of democracy, its moral value. And it is in this reflection where it is important to use some ideas of K.O. Apel. They have to do with his justification of the moral value of democracy and the scope of an ethic of democracy. Throughout his works, Apel insisted on the need to establish a criterion of moral validity, a discursive or communicative ethics, capable of explaining the legitimacy of the expectations generated by democracy, but also the possibility of normative criteria for the application of the moral requirement of reciprocal recognition, a realization that considers the history and the particular situation, the plural, complex and global contexts in which we live. Both moments allow a critical perspective capable of arguing against the current revisionism and justifying the ethical bases that underlie our trust in democracy and its institutions.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116883808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719
Nicolás Emanuel Olivares
At the beginning of the 2010's, German philosopher A. Honneth outlined a specific critical democratic conception based on a social model of individual freedom, which he considers superior to negative and reflective models. Honneth believes that deliberative democracy depends conceptually and empirically on the social model of individual freedom, so that if certain social conditions are not met, citizens lack the conditions that would allow them to participate in the construction of democratic will. In this work, we will proceed to the reconstruction of the main normative postulates of the critical democratic conception of Honneth, who positively defines justice as mutual recognition, contrasting them specularly with those of the republican conception defended by the Irish philosopher P. Pettit, which is based on a negative model of political freedom understood as nondomination. In summary, we will explain four comparative attractions that P. Pettit's theory offers over that of Honneth in terms of methodology, concept of justice, classification of models of freedom, and priority of justice. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n2p151 http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719
{"title":"Além do direito da liberdade: uma análise republicana da teoria democrática crítica de A. Honneth","authors":"Nicolás Emanuel Olivares","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719","url":null,"abstract":"At the beginning of the 2010's, German philosopher A. Honneth outlined a specific critical democratic conception based on a social model of individual freedom, which he considers superior to negative and reflective models. Honneth believes that deliberative democracy depends conceptually and empirically on the social model of individual freedom, so that if certain social conditions are not met, citizens lack the conditions that would allow them to participate in the construction of democratic will. In this work, we will proceed to the reconstruction of the main normative postulates of the critical democratic conception of Honneth, who positively defines justice as mutual recognition, contrasting them specularly with those of the republican conception defended by the Irish philosopher P. Pettit, which is based on a negative model of political freedom understood as nondomination. In summary, we will explain four comparative attractions that P. Pettit's theory offers over that of Honneth in terms of methodology, concept of justice, classification of models of freedom, and priority of justice. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n2p151 http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p719","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"521 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132079709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656
Â. V. Cenci
The construction of discourse ethics, with regard to its two original variants, was held under controversy. This was due to the different ways the sphere of moral discourse was addressed in each author’s program and to the distinct ways they conceived the concept of practical reason. The answers given to the problem of the very sphere of moral shall bring about two programs of discourse ethics that eventually move away from their common roots and, finally, project two conceptions of practical reason that are quite distinct and, to great extent, incompatible, so that it is impossible to combine them under the same rubric. Thus, due to the differences in each author’s initial program concerning the formulation of a stricter notion of moral – deontological, as defended by Habermas – or broader – deontological-teleological, as proposed by Apel – the consequence will be that, for Habermas, moral and practical reason shall be placed within a theory or http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656
{"title":"Apel versus Habermas: a trajetória controversa das duas variantes originais da ética do discurso","authors":"Â. V. Cenci","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656","url":null,"abstract":"The construction of discourse ethics, with regard to its two original variants, was held under controversy. This was due to the different ways the sphere of moral discourse was addressed in each author’s program and to the distinct ways they conceived the concept of practical reason. The answers given to the problem of the very sphere of moral shall bring about two programs of discourse ethics that eventually move away from their common roots and, finally, project two conceptions of practical reason that are quite distinct and, to great extent, incompatible, so that it is impossible to combine them under the same rubric. Thus, due to the differences in each author’s initial program concerning the formulation of a stricter notion of moral – deontological, as defended by Habermas – or broader – deontological-teleological, as proposed by Apel – the consequence will be that, for Habermas, moral and practical reason shall be placed within a theory or http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p656","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130127266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p678
Marina Velasco
In the debate between Habermas and Apel on the foundation of discourse ethics, many things are mixed. The article reconsiders the debate, analyzes the form of the pragmatic-transcendental argument, and distinguishes two major issues in confrontation: questions about argumentative assumptions and questions about moral obligations. We try to show that, having made the appropriate distinctions, in the first question, Apel is more right than Habermas, and that, in the second question, Habermas is more right than Apel. The implications of each position are considered.
{"title":"O debate Habermas versus Apel sobre a ética do discurso: reconsideração das razões da divergência","authors":"Marina Velasco","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p678","url":null,"abstract":"In the debate between Habermas and Apel on the foundation of discourse ethics, many things are mixed. The article reconsiders the debate, analyzes the form of the pragmatic-transcendental argument, and distinguishes two major issues in confrontation: questions about argumentative assumptions and questions about moral obligations. We try to show that, having made the appropriate distinctions, in the first question, Apel is more right than Habermas, and that, in the second question, Habermas is more right than Apel. The implications of each position are considered.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"829 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129043384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p483
D. Dutra, Alessandro Pinzani
Este texto não apresenta resumo.
本文不提供摘要。
{"title":"Apresentação – Dossiê O pensamento de Karl-Otto Apel","authors":"D. Dutra, Alessandro Pinzani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p483","url":null,"abstract":"Este texto não apresenta resumo.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126964201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p698
L. Repa
The article aims to show the fundamental differences between Habermas’s and Apel’s projects to transform philosophy. These differences can be measured by comparing Apel’s concept of transcendental reflection and Habermas’s method of rational reconstruction. Based on these differences, it is possible to state that the transformation of philosophy in Apel’s thought means to give another way to the attempt by first philosophy to establish an ultimate foundation for itself and the sciences while the Habermasian concept of reconstruction assigns philosophy the most innovative role of stand-in for scientific theories and interpreter of cultural developments.
{"title":"A transformação da filosofia entre a reflexão transcendental e a reconstrução racional: sobre o sentido de uma contraposição filosófica contemporânea","authors":"L. Repa","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p698","url":null,"abstract":"The article aims to show the fundamental differences between Habermas’s and Apel’s projects to transform philosophy. These differences can be measured by comparing Apel’s concept of transcendental reflection and Habermas’s method of rational reconstruction. Based on these differences, it is possible to state that the transformation of philosophy in Apel’s thought means to give another way to the attempt by first philosophy to establish an ultimate foundation for itself and the sciences while the Habermasian concept of reconstruction assigns philosophy the most innovative role of stand-in for scientific theories and interpreter of cultural developments.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"600 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116285864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p790
N. Corrêa, N. D. Oliveira
How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of the concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms themselves. 2-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do? In this study, we will review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for the aggregation and intertheoretical comparison of different normative structures, cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address decisionmaking problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts.
{"title":"Metanormativity: solving questions of moral and empirical uncertainty","authors":"N. Corrêa, N. D. Oliveira","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n3p790","url":null,"abstract":"How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of the concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms themselves. 2-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do? In this study, we will review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for the aggregation and intertheoretical comparison of different normative structures, cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address decisionmaking problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122241570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-21DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P318
C. Consani
This paper presents and analyzes the habermasian proposal for global politics without a world government. This will be done in three moments: first, the habermasian cosmopolitan model is presented; it will be stressed the multilevel system of institutions, which embrace the thesis of Constitution without a State; second, will be presented some objections to Habemas’s thesis elaborated recently by William Scheuerman; finally, this paper analyzes to what extent habermasian theory offers answers to these objections.
{"title":"É possível uma Constituição sem Estado? Uma análise da proposta habermasiana de política mundial sem governo mundial","authors":"C. Consani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P318","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents and analyzes the habermasian proposal for global politics without a world government. This will be done in three moments: first, the habermasian cosmopolitan model is presented; it will be stressed the multilevel system of institutions, which embrace the thesis of Constitution without a State; second, will be presented some objections to Habemas’s thesis elaborated recently by William Scheuerman; finally, this paper analyzes to what extent habermasian theory offers answers to these objections.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121251567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-21DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P151
J. Klein
Este texto não apresenta resumo.
本文不提供摘要。
{"title":"Apresentação - Dossiê Cosmopolitismo","authors":"J. Klein","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P151","url":null,"abstract":"Este texto não apresenta resumo.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133278684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-21DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P418
Rogério Moreira Orrutea Filho, A. Pavão
Este artigo desenvolve-se em tres secoes. Na primeira secao, examina-se o desacordo manifestado por Schopenhauer em relacao a Etica kantiana naquilo que tange a linguagem prescritiva da moral. Neste ponto, o desacordo surge por Schopenhauer julgar inadmissivel atribuir qualquer funcao moralizante a filosofia, a qual, na visao do filosofo, deve permanecer puramente teorica e contemplativa. Entretanto, em nossa analise e mostrado que Kant nao manifestou semelhante pretensao moralizadora. Na segunda secao, discute-se a tese schopenhaueriana de que a linguagem prescritiva teria origem na moral teologica, o que confirmaria, na visao de Schopenhauer, nao so a contingencia da relacao entre os conceitos de moral e de dever, mas, em uma analise mais profunda, ate mesmo a incompatibilidade entre ambos. Na terceira secao, argumentamos que, apesar de explicitamente negar o estatuto moral ao conceito de dever, a Etica de Schopenhauer implicitamente afirma-o. O motivo desta afirmacao implicita se sustentaria sobre o fato inelutavel de que os fenomenos morais sao intrinsecamente prescritivos.
{"title":"O elemento prescritivo no fenômeno moral: desacordos entre Kant e Schopenhauer","authors":"Rogério Moreira Orrutea Filho, A. Pavão","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020V19N2P418","url":null,"abstract":"Este artigo desenvolve-se em tres secoes. Na primeira secao, examina-se o desacordo manifestado por Schopenhauer em relacao a Etica kantiana naquilo que tange a linguagem prescritiva da moral. Neste ponto, o desacordo surge por Schopenhauer julgar inadmissivel atribuir qualquer funcao moralizante a filosofia, a qual, na visao do filosofo, deve permanecer puramente teorica e contemplativa. Entretanto, em nossa analise e mostrado que Kant nao manifestou semelhante pretensao moralizadora. Na segunda secao, discute-se a tese schopenhaueriana de que a linguagem prescritiva teria origem na moral teologica, o que confirmaria, na visao de Schopenhauer, nao so a contingencia da relacao entre os conceitos de moral e de dever, mas, em uma analise mais profunda, ate mesmo a incompatibilidade entre ambos. Na terceira secao, argumentamos que, apesar de explicitamente negar o estatuto moral ao conceito de dever, a Etica de Schopenhauer implicitamente afirma-o. O motivo desta afirmacao implicita se sustentaria sobre o fato inelutavel de que os fenomenos morais sao intrinsecamente prescritivos.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126584702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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