Pub Date : 2020-01-29DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p175
Márcio Junglos
This article is concerned with inclusive hermeneutics. Six attitudes will be developed in order for a hermeneutics to be inclusive. In the first four attitudes, we are inspired by the resolutions of Husserl's paradoxes in his book The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy , discussed in the paragraphs 52-54. After this, the term reversibility , reworked by Merleau-Ponty, will be essential to broaden our conception of inclusiveness. Finally, the new perspectives on the concept of otherness/alienness in Waldenfels will support an inclusive ethical-practical interpretation. This inclusiveness will lead us within an authentic judgment, fostering a realization of the Law in the context of the recognition of the differences, through a constant process of Law itself.
{"title":"Inclusive Hermeneutics: Ethical Perspectives","authors":"Márcio Junglos","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p175","url":null,"abstract":"This article is concerned with inclusive hermeneutics. Six attitudes will be developed in order for a hermeneutics to be inclusive. In the first four attitudes, we are inspired by the resolutions of Husserl's paradoxes in his book The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy , discussed in the paragraphs 52-54. After this, the term reversibility , reworked by Merleau-Ponty, will be essential to broaden our conception of inclusiveness. Finally, the new perspectives on the concept of otherness/alienness in Waldenfels will support an inclusive ethical-practical interpretation. This inclusiveness will lead us within an authentic judgment, fostering a realization of the Law in the context of the recognition of the differences, through a constant process of Law itself.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"164 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127302617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-29DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p159
D. Restrepo
Evânia Reich presents the argument that the veil laws in France—the banning of the full-face coverings in public and the banning of the headscarf in public schools—are consistent with the emancipatory project of French Laicite. According to this argument, the veils that Muslim women wear are symbols of their oppression, whereas French education seeks to liberate each individual and Laicite serves as a bulwark against the creeping oppressive influence of religion. Unveiling Muslim women, then, is an act of emancipation. In this essay, I argue that the view of French secularism as an emancipatory project to free women of the oppressive mechanism of the veil is an example of what Marilyn Frye calls the “arrogant eye.” In this essay, I offer an alternative approach on the veil following Frye’s notion of the “loving eye.”
{"title":"The Arrogant Eye and the French Prohibitions of the Veil","authors":"D. Restrepo","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p159","url":null,"abstract":"Evânia Reich presents the argument that the veil laws in France—the banning of the full-face coverings in public and the banning of the headscarf in public schools—are consistent with the emancipatory project of French Laicite. According to this argument, the veils that Muslim women wear are symbols of their oppression, whereas French education seeks to liberate each individual and Laicite serves as a bulwark against the creeping oppressive influence of religion. Unveiling Muslim women, then, is an act of emancipation. In this essay, I argue that the view of French secularism as an emancipatory project to free women of the oppressive mechanism of the veil is an example of what Marilyn Frye calls the “arrogant eye.” In this essay, I offer an alternative approach on the veil following Frye’s notion of the “loving eye.”","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127214684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-29DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p139
C. Nahra
The aim of this article is to discuss and revisit what Sidgwick called the profoundest problem of ethics: the dualism of practical reason. I argue that Crisp’s dual source view provides a good solution for the dualism via the small cost principle showing that we have to balance agent relative and agent neutral reason in a kind of a rational “negotiation” between our egoistic and our altruistic motivations. I suggest, however, that in order to justify his solution it is necessary to go beyond Sidgwick establishing a limit for the acceptance of egoism as a legitimate method of ethics. I propose also that the dualism is not only the profoundest problem of ethics, but also one of the more serious, it is the biggest contemporary ethical puzzle of humankind, and whose practical solution is of paramount importance for the future of life on earth.
{"title":"The Dualism of Practical Reason: The Profoundest Problem of ethics","authors":"C. Nahra","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p139","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to discuss and revisit what Sidgwick called the profoundest problem of ethics: the dualism of practical reason. I argue that Crisp’s dual source view provides a good solution for the dualism via the small cost principle showing that we have to balance agent relative and agent neutral reason in a kind of a rational “negotiation” between our egoistic and our altruistic motivations. I suggest, however, that in order to justify his solution it is necessary to go beyond Sidgwick establishing a limit for the acceptance of egoism as a legitimate method of ethics. I propose also that the dualism is not only the profoundest problem of ethics, but also one of the more serious, it is the biggest contemporary ethical puzzle of humankind, and whose practical solution is of paramount importance for the future of life on earth.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"8 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132512526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-29DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p223
E. Santos
The aim of this article is to explore the different moments of the understanding of the concept of man in Heidegger's work, taking into account what has come to be known as the first and second periods of his writings. In this sense, short reflections are made to first show what is meant by Dasein (being there) and by man in Being and Time , emphasizing that in that work, "man" is a concept of minor importance. After that, the reintroduction of the concept of man in Heidegger's philosophy is presented based on a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach and its developments. Next, we describe what kind of role the concept of man plays in his thinking about the truth of being after 'the turn' ( Kehre ). Eventually, we show how central this concept is for the reflection on the appropriative event of being ( Ereignis ).
{"title":"Variações sobre o Conceito de Homem em Heidegger","authors":"E. Santos","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p223","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to explore the different moments of the understanding of the concept of man in Heidegger's work, taking into account what has come to be known as the first and second periods of his writings. In this sense, short reflections are made to first show what is meant by Dasein (being there) and by man in Being and Time , emphasizing that in that work, \"man\" is a concept of minor importance. After that, the reintroduction of the concept of man in Heidegger's philosophy is presented based on a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach and its developments. Next, we describe what kind of role the concept of man plays in his thinking about the truth of being after 'the turn' ( Kehre ). Eventually, we show how central this concept is for the reflection on the appropriative event of being ( Ereignis ).","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"263 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122662225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-29DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p245
Letícia Spinelli
This paper aims to reconstruct Joan Tronto's critique of Carol Gilligan's model of care ethics. Tronto's analysis comprises, on the one hand, that care is not restricted to a feminine morality, but a morality of groups in the condition of subordination, and, on the other hand (consequently), that one can not theorize care without social contribution. In this aspect, Tronto observes in Gilligan's analysis an essentialist and elitist discourse that seeks to universalize the experience of care from hegemonic groups.
{"title":"Contra uma moralidade das mulheres: a crítica de Joan Tronto a Carol Gilligan","authors":"Letícia Spinelli","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n2p245","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to reconstruct Joan Tronto's critique of Carol Gilligan's model of care ethics. Tronto's analysis comprises, on the one hand, that care is not restricted to a feminine morality, but a morality of groups in the condition of subordination, and, on the other hand (consequently), that one can not theorize care without social contribution. In this aspect, Tronto observes in Gilligan's analysis an essentialist and elitist discourse that seeks to universalize the experience of care from hegemonic groups.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125108025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p285
Pedro Merlussi, Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi
The Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that "not being responsible for" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p is true, and no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p ⸧ q is true, then no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that q is true. Here we argue that the principle is true if one accepts a truth-maker account of the relationship between non-responsibility and propositions. While non-responsibility transfers across conditionals, one upshot of the truth-maker account is that it allows one to be responsible for necessary truths.
{"title":"Transferring Non-Responsibility","authors":"Pedro Merlussi, Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p285","url":null,"abstract":"The Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that \"not being responsible for\" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p is true, and no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p ⸧ q is true, then no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that q is true. Here we argue that the principle is true if one accepts a truth-maker account of the relationship between non-responsibility and propositions. While non-responsibility transfers across conditionals, one upshot of the truth-maker account is that it allows one to be responsible for necessary truths.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"767 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123006075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p393
Martin Saar
Nada claro e o sentido em que a filosofia se relaciona com seu proprio tempo e seu proprio presente. Da perspectiva da historia do pensamento filosofico, varios modelos foram sugeridos, desde uma forte confianca na tradicao, ate a rejeicao completa do presente e a demanda por uma “filosofia do futuro“; desde a suspeita de que a filosofia nada mais e do que uma ideologia entre outras, ate a exigencia de que ela se engaje nas lutas e conflitos de seu tempo a fim de se preparar para um futuro melhor. Este ensaio apresenta uma analise e uma problematizacao dessas abordagens e defende um ponto de vista que parte da relacao precaria, ambivalente e contingente da filosofia com seu tempo e sua contemporaneidade. Nem totalmente autonoma, nem inteiramente submetida ao seu proprio tempo, a filosofia pode ocupar uma posicao instavel na qual critica e resistencia sao possiveis, mesmo que nao garantidas derradeiramente.
{"title":"Filosofia em (e contra) seu tempo","authors":"Martin Saar","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p393","url":null,"abstract":"Nada claro e o sentido em que a filosofia se relaciona com seu proprio tempo e seu proprio presente. Da perspectiva da historia do pensamento filosofico, varios modelos foram sugeridos, desde uma forte confianca na tradicao, ate a rejeicao completa do presente e a demanda por uma “filosofia do futuro“; desde a suspeita de que a filosofia nada mais e do que uma ideologia entre outras, ate a exigencia de que ela se engaje nas lutas e conflitos de seu tempo a fim de se preparar para um futuro melhor. Este ensaio apresenta uma analise e uma problematizacao dessas abordagens e defende um ponto de vista que parte da relacao precaria, ambivalente e contingente da filosofia com seu tempo e sua contemporaneidade. Nem totalmente autonoma, nem inteiramente submetida ao seu proprio tempo, a filosofia pode ocupar uma posicao instavel na qual critica e resistencia sao possiveis, mesmo que nao garantidas derradeiramente.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129762807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p357
Wilson Alves de Paiva
Rousseau foi um dos maiores expoentes da intelectualidade europeia do seculo XVIII e que, juntamente com os demais, nao escapou de reproduzir em seus escritos a visao da familia patriarcal, sobretudo no Emilio . Wollstonecraft foi uma escritora e filosofa inglesa, conhecida defensora dos direitos das mulheres, que criticou Rousseau. O presente texto procura discutir diferencas e aproximacoes entre os dois, buscando ressaltar que o filosofo genebrino contribuiu com o debate, mesmo sem ter discutido o tema diretamente. Tambem procura demonstrar que e um equivoco interpreta-lo como um antifeminista ou alguem que tenha sido contrario a educacao da mulher, tal como o fez Wollstonecraft em seu livro A vindication of the rights of woman .
{"title":"A questão da mulher em Rousseau e as críticas de Mary Wollstonecraft","authors":"Wilson Alves de Paiva","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p357","url":null,"abstract":"Rousseau foi um dos maiores expoentes da intelectualidade europeia do seculo XVIII e que, juntamente com os demais, nao escapou de reproduzir em seus escritos a visao da familia patriarcal, sobretudo no Emilio . Wollstonecraft foi uma escritora e filosofa inglesa, conhecida defensora dos direitos das mulheres, que criticou Rousseau. O presente texto procura discutir diferencas e aproximacoes entre os dois, buscando ressaltar que o filosofo genebrino contribuiu com o debate, mesmo sem ter discutido o tema diretamente. Tambem procura demonstrar que e um equivoco interpreta-lo como um antifeminista ou alguem que tenha sido contrario a educacao da mulher, tal como o fez Wollstonecraft em seu livro A vindication of the rights of woman .","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"230 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131919435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p381
C. Consani
Neste trabalho apresenta-se uma traducao do debate travado entre Emmanuel Sieyes e Thomas Paine acerca do conceito moderno de governo representativo.
本文翻译了伊曼纽尔·西耶斯和托马斯·潘恩关于代议制政府现代概念的争论。
{"title":"Controvérsia entre Thomas Paine e Emmanuel Sieyes sobre o conceito de governo representativo","authors":"C. Consani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p381","url":null,"abstract":"Neste trabalho apresenta-se uma traducao do debate travado entre Emmanuel Sieyes e Thomas Paine acerca do conceito moderno de governo representativo.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"113 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122433963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p333
Nunzio Ali, Diana Piroli
This paper argues that the future of capabilities approach lies on the theoretical development of the democratic political structure. For this purpose, we take into account Martha Nussbaum’s late theoretical works. Firstly, we argue that the capability approach can be divided into two main models: the top down and the bottom up. Nussbaum, for example, endorses a top-down model, which it begins from an abstractive theory of partial justice and then draws the issue of institutional implementation. On the other hand, Amartya Sem advocates the bottom-up model, which starts from the immanent demands of justice from public sphere and then up to normative and abstract questions (like his “idea of justice”). In the second part of this paper, we present Nussbaum’s partial theory of justice, arguing that it is mainly composed by four issues: (a) the elaboration of the list of capabilities, (b) the process of normative evaluation, (c) arguments for stability, (d) the implementation of the model. About this last topic, we argue in the third part that the current theoretical advance of the capabilities approach lies on the issue of the democratic political structure. In other words, the future of capabilities approach depends on the interaction between its own theory and a theory of democracy. Finally, in the last section we provide a re-elaboration of Nussbaum’s threshold level of capabilities (the list) in order to make it more adherent with the democratic political structure.
{"title":"Teoria parcial de justiça e estrutura política democrática na teoria de Nussbaum","authors":"Nunzio Ali, Diana Piroli","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p333","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the future of capabilities approach lies on the theoretical development of the democratic political structure. For this purpose, we take into account Martha Nussbaum’s late theoretical works. Firstly, we argue that the capability approach can be divided into two main models: the top down and the bottom up. Nussbaum, for example, endorses a top-down model, which it begins from an abstractive theory of partial justice and then draws the issue of institutional implementation. On the other hand, Amartya Sem advocates the bottom-up model, which starts from the immanent demands of justice from public sphere and then up to normative and abstract questions (like his “idea of justice”). In the second part of this paper, we present Nussbaum’s partial theory of justice, arguing that it is mainly composed by four issues: (a) the elaboration of the list of capabilities, (b) the process of normative evaluation, (c) arguments for stability, (d) the implementation of the model. About this last topic, we argue in the third part that the current theoretical advance of the capabilities approach lies on the issue of the democratic political structure. In other words, the future of capabilities approach depends on the interaction between its own theory and a theory of democracy. Finally, in the last section we provide a re-elaboration of Nussbaum’s threshold level of capabilities (the list) in order to make it more adherent with the democratic political structure.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114458265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：