Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P63
L. Silva
This article aims to establish the basis for understanding "sympathy" in Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy. In an undeveloped passage, Schopenhauer defines the concept of sympathy as the empirical irruption of the metaphysical identity of the will through the physical plurality of its appearances, which shows a connection completely different from that known we through the principle of reason. In characterizing sympathy, Schopenhauer seems to indicate both a conception of sympathy from the moral feeling, and a cosmological-metaphysical conception of this concept. Following the clue left by the philosopher of the will, these conceptions seem to find an adequate clarification in the thoughts of Hume and Plotinus. Both develop, in their own way, two conceptions of sympathy, which aid and enrich Schopenhauer's approach. While from Hume the conception of the communication of feelings and affections is extracted, Plotinus develops a conception of the sympathy from the primordial unit of the cosmos. In the face of the two positions, which exert mutual and indirect influence on Schopenhauer, a connection between ethics and metaphysics, between the stricto sensu morality of the individual and the lato sensu morality of the cosmos, becomes possible.
{"title":"A abordagem ético-metafísica da \"simpatia\" em Schopenhauer: entre Hume e Plotino","authors":"L. Silva","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P63","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to establish the basis for understanding \"sympathy\" in Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy. In an undeveloped passage, Schopenhauer defines the concept of sympathy as the empirical irruption of the metaphysical identity of the will through the physical plurality of its appearances, which shows a connection completely different from that known we through the principle of reason. In characterizing sympathy, Schopenhauer seems to indicate both a conception of sympathy from the moral feeling, and a cosmological-metaphysical conception of this concept. Following the clue left by the philosopher of the will, these conceptions seem to find an adequate clarification in the thoughts of Hume and Plotinus. Both develop, in their own way, two conceptions of sympathy, which aid and enrich Schopenhauer's approach. While from Hume the conception of the communication of feelings and affections is extracted, Plotinus develops a conception of the sympathy from the primordial unit of the cosmos. In the face of the two positions, which exert mutual and indirect influence on Schopenhauer, a connection between ethics and metaphysics, between the stricto sensu morality of the individual and the lato sensu morality of the cosmos, becomes possible.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132595377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P15
G. Spielthenner
Until recently, the method of professional ethics has been largely principle-based. But the failure of this approach to take into sufficient account the character of professionals has led to a revival of virtue ethics. The kind of professional virtue ethics that I am concerned with in this paper is teleological in that it relates the virtues of a profession to the ends of this profession. My aim is to show how empirical research can (in addition to philosophical inquiry) be used to develop virtue-based accounts of professional ethics, and that such empirically well-informed approaches are more convincing than traditional kinds of professional virtue ethics. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I outline the structure of a teleological approach to virtue ethics. In Section 2, I show that empirical research can play an essential role in professional ethics by emphasizing the difference between conceptual and empirical matters. Section 3 demonstrates the relevance of virtues in professional life; and the last section is concerned with some meta-ethical issues that are raised by a teleological account of professional virtues.
{"title":"Virtue-based Approaches to Professional Ethics: a Plea for More Rigorous Use of Empirical Science","authors":"G. Spielthenner","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P15","url":null,"abstract":"Until recently, the method of professional ethics has been largely principle-based. But the failure of this approach to take into sufficient account the character of professionals has led to a revival of virtue ethics. The kind of professional virtue ethics that I am concerned with in this paper is teleological in that it relates the virtues of a profession to the ends of this profession. My aim is to show how empirical research can (in addition to philosophical inquiry) be used to develop virtue-based accounts of professional ethics, and that such empirically well-informed approaches are more convincing than traditional kinds of professional virtue ethics. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I outline the structure of a teleological approach to virtue ethics. In Section 2, I show that empirical research can play an essential role in professional ethics by emphasizing the difference between conceptual and empirical matters. Section 3 demonstrates the relevance of virtues in professional life; and the last section is concerned with some meta-ethical issues that are raised by a teleological account of professional virtues.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"394 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128114732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P109
Daniel Duarte Flora Carvalho
Since the end of the Cold War, when the number of peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions considerably increased, the debate about their ethics raised as an important aspect regarding both its ends and its means. Literature was roughly divided between those who advocated for an approach centred on global actors, liberal peace and cosmopolitanism and those who stood for the role of local actors and indigenous solutions for the problems in question. In this regard, the relationship that the International Community usually held with warring parties in civil conflict came to the fore. This essay looks forward to providing insights about the role that warlords can play in facilitating and hindering internationally-led peace process. Using Burundi and Somalia as case-studies, it is argued that warlords can only commit to liberal and cosmopolitan ethics after the state institutions have been built and solidified.
{"title":"Ethics after intervention: should warlords be empowered as statesmen?","authors":"Daniel Duarte Flora Carvalho","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P109","url":null,"abstract":"Since the end of the Cold War, when the number of peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions considerably increased, the debate about their ethics raised as an important aspect regarding both its ends and its means. Literature was roughly divided between those who advocated for an approach centred on global actors, liberal peace and cosmopolitanism and those who stood for the role of local actors and indigenous solutions for the problems in question. In this regard, the relationship that the International Community usually held with warring parties in civil conflict came to the fore. This essay looks forward to providing insights about the role that warlords can play in facilitating and hindering internationally-led peace process. Using Burundi and Somalia as case-studies, it is argued that warlords can only commit to liberal and cosmopolitan ethics after the state institutions have been built and solidified.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127114828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-06DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P443
J. Peña
Kant es una figura crucial en la historia del cosmopolitismo: en el confluyen las ideas y propuestas cosmopolitas anteriores, y de sus planteamientos nace buena parte del cosmopolitismo futuro. El filosofo prusiano aborda las cuestiones centrales que aun hoy se plantean en torno al cosmopolitismo: que significa, en que puede fundarse una propuesta cosmopolita, como institucionalizarlo. Cualquier reflexion critica sobre el cosmopolitismo sigue pasando aun hoy por Kant. El objetivo de este articulo es atender a las lecciones del cosmopolitismo kantiano sobre estas cuestiones, con la vista puesta en como podria y deberia realizarse en nuestros dias una propuesta cosmopolita que parece hoy aun mas necesaria, pero tanto o mas dificil que en su tiempo. Kant presenta el cosmopolitismo como algo mas que una metaforica hermandad: es un proyecto de republica mundial pacifica cohesionada por normas juridicas compartidas. Ofrece razones para ser cosmopolita: la creciente interdependencia efectiva entre los hombres, en primer lugar, pero sobre todo su condicion moral compartida de sujetos autonomos que se deben mutuamente respeto y no deben ser meros instrumentos del interes de poder o lucro de otros. Apunta ademas posibles vias para encarnar el cosmopolitismo en una comunidad politica universal fundada en el derecho.
{"title":"Kant en la encrucijada del cosmopolitismo","authors":"J. Peña","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P443","url":null,"abstract":"Kant es una figura crucial en la historia del cosmopolitismo: en el confluyen las ideas y propuestas cosmopolitas anteriores, y de sus planteamientos nace buena parte del cosmopolitismo futuro. El filosofo prusiano aborda las cuestiones centrales que aun hoy se plantean en torno al cosmopolitismo: que significa, en que puede fundarse una propuesta cosmopolita, como institucionalizarlo. Cualquier reflexion critica sobre el cosmopolitismo sigue pasando aun hoy por Kant. El objetivo de este articulo es atender a las lecciones del cosmopolitismo kantiano sobre estas cuestiones, con la vista puesta en como podria y deberia realizarse en nuestros dias una propuesta cosmopolita que parece hoy aun mas necesaria, pero tanto o mas dificil que en su tiempo. Kant presenta el cosmopolitismo como algo mas que una metaforica hermandad: es un proyecto de republica mundial pacifica cohesionada por normas juridicas compartidas. Ofrece razones para ser cosmopolita: la creciente interdependencia efectiva entre los hombres, en primer lugar, pero sobre todo su condicion moral compartida de sujetos autonomos que se deben mutuamente respeto y no deben ser meros instrumentos del interes de poder o lucro de otros. Apunta ademas posibles vias para encarnar el cosmopolitismo en una comunidad politica universal fundada en el derecho.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121372208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-06DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P486
Nunzio Alì
Some scholars believe that only governments or those who uphold governmental policies can be human rights violators. Others argue that private individuals (with no governmental mandate and acting for themselves) are also able to violate human rights. The two positions have come to be known in the literature as the institutional interpretation and the interactional interpretation of human rights respectively. This paper critically analyzes an exemplary case: Thomas Pogge’s institutional conception of human rights as presented in World Poverty and Human Rights: Second Edition . This paper focuses on some of the negative consequences implicit in his approach. First of all, it shows that Pogge does not provide an adequate explanation of the reason why human rights should be conceived as claims on coercive social institutions and on those who uphold such institutions but not on single individuals, independently of their commitment to institutions. Secondly, it shows that official disrespect rather than violation as a criterion to evaluate the respecting of human rights is unsuccessful or at least insufficient. It sees in Pogge the same perspective mistake that infects Rawls’ conception of human rights, namely that of expanding unduly one of the functions human rights perform - establishing the limits of legitimate sovereignty - into their very essence. Therefore, this paper puts in question the way in which Pogge’s institutionalism mix the conception of human rights with the conception of (global) distributive justice. The conclusion to which the whole paper comes to is that proponents of the institutional interpretation (at least in the case of Pogge) misconstrue human rights because they conflate two philosophical agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice.
{"title":"Institutional Interpretation of Human Rights: Critical Remarks","authors":"Nunzio Alì","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P486","url":null,"abstract":"Some scholars believe that only governments or those who uphold governmental policies can be human rights violators. Others argue that private individuals (with no governmental mandate and acting for themselves) are also able to violate human rights. The two positions have come to be known in the literature as the institutional interpretation and the interactional interpretation of human rights respectively. This paper critically analyzes an exemplary case: Thomas Pogge’s institutional conception of human rights as presented in World Poverty and Human Rights: Second Edition . This paper focuses on some of the negative consequences implicit in his approach. First of all, it shows that Pogge does not provide an adequate explanation of the reason why human rights should be conceived as claims on coercive social institutions and on those who uphold such institutions but not on single individuals, independently of their commitment to institutions. Secondly, it shows that official disrespect rather than violation as a criterion to evaluate the respecting of human rights is unsuccessful or at least insufficient. It sees in Pogge the same perspective mistake that infects Rawls’ conception of human rights, namely that of expanding unduly one of the functions human rights perform - establishing the limits of legitimate sovereignty - into their very essence. Therefore, this paper puts in question the way in which Pogge’s institutionalism mix the conception of human rights with the conception of (global) distributive justice. The conclusion to which the whole paper comes to is that proponents of the institutional interpretation (at least in the case of Pogge) misconstrue human rights because they conflate two philosophical agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124840384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-06DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P343
N. D. Oliveira
In this article, I argue that the neuroethics of cognitive enhancement can help us bridge the explanatory gap between metaethics and bioethics ( qua normative, applied ethics) and throw light on the classic gap between moral beliefs and neural correlates of brain processes. Insofar as it unveils the irreducibility of first-person propositional attitudes (esp. moral beliefs and judgments), neuroethics allows for justifying cosmetic, pharmacological interventions so as to bring about human enhancement, regardless of descriptive accounts of its neural correlates and independently of the cognitivist, noncognitivist or hybrid inputs of metanormative theories. Precisely because it cannot provide the ultimate grounds for any conservative, libertarian or liberal attitudes towards cognitive enhancement, neuroethics is better conceived in terms of a Rawlsian-like wide reflective equilibrium, procedurally and without any specific substantive commitment to any moral or comprehensive doctrine of sorts.
{"title":"On Ritalin, Adderall, and Cognitive Enhancement: Metaethics, Bioethics, Neuroethics","authors":"N. D. Oliveira","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P343","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I argue that the neuroethics of cognitive enhancement can help us bridge the explanatory gap between metaethics and bioethics ( qua normative, applied ethics) and throw light on the classic gap between moral beliefs and neural correlates of brain processes. Insofar as it unveils the irreducibility of first-person propositional attitudes (esp. moral beliefs and judgments), neuroethics allows for justifying cosmetic, pharmacological interventions so as to bring about human enhancement, regardless of descriptive accounts of its neural correlates and independently of the cognitivist, noncognitivist or hybrid inputs of metanormative theories. Precisely because it cannot provide the ultimate grounds for any conservative, libertarian or liberal attitudes towards cognitive enhancement, neuroethics is better conceived in terms of a Rawlsian-like wide reflective equilibrium, procedurally and without any specific substantive commitment to any moral or comprehensive doctrine of sorts.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128578171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-06DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2016v15n3p418
José Maurício de Carvalho
Neste trabalho examinam-se os aspectos fundamentais da etica realiana. Examina-se sua axiologia base da formacao da cultura e mostra-se como ela incorpora elementos da etica crista. Se Reale toma a etica crista como base da cultura, nao se pode dizer que a etica realiana seja a exata expressao da etica crista ou que coincida perfeitamente com ela. Contudo os estudos de Reale ajudam a desenvolver a etica crista, destacando-se o cuidado com a dignidade da pessoa e a caracterizacao filosofica da condicao humana. Em contrapartida, a nocao realiana de eticidade, ou do que Angeles Garcia denominou de um humanismo integral, mostra que a afinidade da etica realiana com a etica crista era maior do que ele acreditava e nao se limitava a toma-la como a base da cultura em que vivemos.
{"title":"Personalismo axiológico e ética cristã no culturalismo de Miguel Reale","authors":"José Maurício de Carvalho","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2016v15n3p418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2016v15n3p418","url":null,"abstract":"Neste trabalho examinam-se os aspectos fundamentais da etica realiana. Examina-se sua axiologia base da formacao da cultura e mostra-se como ela incorpora elementos da etica crista. Se Reale toma a etica crista como base da cultura, nao se pode dizer que a etica realiana seja a exata expressao da etica crista ou que coincida perfeitamente com ela. Contudo os estudos de Reale ajudam a desenvolver a etica crista, destacando-se o cuidado com a dignidade da pessoa e a caracterizacao filosofica da condicao humana. Em contrapartida, a nocao realiana de eticidade, ou do que Angeles Garcia denominou de um humanismo integral, mostra que a afinidade da etica realiana com a etica crista era maior do que ele acreditava e nao se limitava a toma-la como a base da cultura em que vivemos.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"109 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128405858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-06DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P398
Thadeu Weber
A distincao kantiana entre leis eticas e leis juridicas, em sua “doutrina do direito”, a partir das leis morais, pode ser tomada como uma excelente chave de leitura para a discussao da fundamentacao moral do liberalismo politico rawlsiano. Alem do mais, o debate entre liberais e comunitaristas, examinado por Forst, em Contextos da Justica, pode ser considerado uma oportuna contribuicao na delimitacao do âmbito do etico, do juridico, do politico e do moral. Dessa forma, considerando a distincao kantiana e o acordo semântico expresso nos diferentes “contextos da justica”, pode-se sustentar uma fundamentacao moral da concepcao politica de justica de Rawls, mas nao etica. A questao que, entao, se impoe e: em que consiste propriamente esta fundamentacao moral? A resposta passa pela explicitacao da concepcao normativa de pessoa e da concepcao politica de justica, que envolve um estudo das reformulacoes dos seus principios, do alcance do consenso sobreposto e de seu conteudo, do tema da autonomia politica e do conteudo do minimo existencial e dos bens primarios.
{"title":"Fundamentação moral do liberalismo político de Rawls","authors":"Thadeu Weber","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P398","url":null,"abstract":"A distincao kantiana entre leis eticas e leis juridicas, em sua “doutrina do direito”, a partir das leis morais, pode ser tomada como uma excelente chave de leitura para a discussao da fundamentacao moral do liberalismo politico rawlsiano. Alem do mais, o debate entre liberais e comunitaristas, examinado por Forst, em Contextos da Justica, pode ser considerado uma oportuna contribuicao na delimitacao do âmbito do etico, do juridico, do politico e do moral. Dessa forma, considerando a distincao kantiana e o acordo semântico expresso nos diferentes “contextos da justica”, pode-se sustentar uma fundamentacao moral da concepcao politica de justica de Rawls, mas nao etica. A questao que, entao, se impoe e: em que consiste propriamente esta fundamentacao moral? A resposta passa pela explicitacao da concepcao normativa de pessoa e da concepcao politica de justica, que envolve um estudo das reformulacoes dos seus principios, do alcance do consenso sobreposto e de seu conteudo, do tema da autonomia politica e do conteudo do minimo existencial e dos bens primarios.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116275902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-06DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P369
Fábio César Scherer
Im Rahmen der Theorie Kants uber die Probleme der Vernunft und seine Hilfstheorie (Transzendentalphilosophie) zielt der vorliegende Artikel darauf ab, die in der Rechtslehre (1797) dargestellte Theorie des rechtlichen Besitzes anhand des analytisch-logischen Lesens zu interpretieren, dessen Beweisprozedur die Methode der Analyse und Synthese ist. Die vorliegende Untersuchung weist in eine Richtung, die die kritische Angehorigkeit dieses spaten rechtlichen Textes in dem Maβe verteidigt, wie die Theorie des intelligiblen Besitzes auf die kritische Ebene der Auserung von der Moglichkeit synthetischer Satze a priori im Allgemeinen bezogen ist.
{"title":"Interpretation der kantschen Theorie des rechtlichen Besitzes angesichts seiner Transzendentalphilosophie","authors":"Fábio César Scherer","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P369","url":null,"abstract":"Im Rahmen der Theorie Kants uber die Probleme der Vernunft und seine Hilfstheorie (Transzendentalphilosophie) zielt der vorliegende Artikel darauf ab, die in der Rechtslehre (1797) dargestellte Theorie des rechtlichen Besitzes anhand des analytisch-logischen Lesens zu interpretieren, dessen Beweisprozedur die Methode der Analyse und Synthese ist. Die vorliegende Untersuchung weist in eine Richtung, die die kritische Angehorigkeit dieses spaten rechtlichen Textes in dem Maβe verteidigt, wie die Theorie des intelligiblen Besitzes auf die kritische Ebene der Auserung von der Moglichkeit synthetischer Satze a priori im Allgemeinen bezogen ist.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125656049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-01-06DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2016V15N3P467
Ruy de Carvalho Rodrigues
O artigo pretende apresentar e defender a viabilidade de uma leitura da obra de Schopenhauer, em especial de sua metafisica da natureza , em uma dupla perspectiva: hermeneutica e cetica; e em uma quadrupla frente: 1) levando a serio a distincao schopenhaueriana entre ser subjetivo e ser objetivo, bem como, no interior deste ultimo, entre consideracao subjetiva e objetiva; 2) a partir daquilo que chamo de tese da inteligibilidade inversa ; 3) concebendo o processo de objetivacao da Vontade nos moldes de uma teoria dos mundos possiveis; 4) compreendendo a materia ( Materie ) como nocao-limite da filosofia schopenhaueriana e, esta, como uma filosofia do limite . Trata-se menos de conceber um Schopenhauer hermeneuta ou cetico que tentar estabelecer um dialogo entre sua obra e uma certa concepcao de hermeneutica e ceticismo. Dialogo que seria capaz de encaminhar possiveis solucoes para alguns problemas que sua filosofia sempre teve dificuldade em enfrentar, como a significacao profunda da nocao de Vontade e as implicacoes cosmologicas a ela ligadas.
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