On the unity of modal syllogistics in Aristotle. The goal of this paper is an interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistics closely oriented on the text using the resources of modern modal predicate logic. Modern predicate logic was successfully able to interpret Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistics uniformly, that is, with one formula for universal premises. A corresponding uniform interpretation of modal syllogistics by means of modal predicate logic is not possible. This thesis does not imply that a uniform view is abandoned. However, it replaces the simple unity of the assertoric by the complex unity of the modal. The complexity results from the fact that though one formula for universal premises is used as the basis, it must be moderated if the text requires.Aristotle introduces his modal syllogistics by expanding his assertoric syllogistics with an axiom that links two apodictic premises to yield a single apodictic sentence. He thus defines a regular modern modal logic. By means of the regular modal logic that is thus defined, he is able to reduce the purely apodictic syllogistics to assertoric syllogistics. However, he goes beyond this simple structure when he looks at complicated inferences.In order to be able to link not only premises of the same modality, but also premises with different modalities, he introduces a second axiom, the T-axiom, which infers from necessity to reality or – equivalently – from reality to possibility. Together, the two axioms, the axiom of regularity and the T-axiom, define a regular T-logic. It plays an important role in modern logic. In order to be able to account for modal syllogistics adequately as a whole, another modern axiom is also required, the so-called B-axiom. It is very difficult to decide whether Aristotle had the B-axiom. Each of the two last named axioms is sufficient to achieve the required contextual moderation of the basic formula for universal propositions.
{"title":"Zur Einheit der modalen Syllogistik des Aristoteles","authors":"K. Schmidt","doi":"10.1075/BPJAM.13.04SCH","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/BPJAM.13.04SCH","url":null,"abstract":"On the unity of modal syllogistics in Aristotle. The goal of this paper is an interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistics closely oriented on the text using the resources of modern modal predicate logic. Modern predicate logic was successfully able to interpret Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistics uniformly, that is, with one formula for universal premises. A corresponding uniform interpretation of modal syllogistics by means of modal predicate logic is not possible. This thesis does not imply that a uniform view is abandoned. However, it replaces the simple unity of the assertoric by the complex unity of the modal. The complexity results from the fact that though one formula for universal premises is used as the basis, it must be moderated if the text requires.Aristotle introduces his modal syllogistics by expanding his assertoric syllogistics with an axiom that links two apodictic premises to yield a single apodictic sentence. He thus defines a regular modern modal logic. By means of the regular modal logic that is thus defined, he is able to reduce the purely apodictic syllogistics to assertoric syllogistics. However, he goes beyond this simple structure when he looks at complicated inferences.In order to be able to link not only premises of the same modality, but also premises with different modalities, he introduces a second axiom, the T-axiom, which infers from necessity to reality or – equivalently – from reality to possibility. Together, the two axioms, the axiom of regularity and the T-axiom, define a regular T-logic. It plays an important role in modern logic. In order to be able to account for modal syllogistics adequately as a whole, another modern axiom is also required, the so-called B-axiom. It is very difficult to decide whether Aristotle had the B-axiom. Each of the two last named axioms is sufficient to achieve the required contextual moderation of the basic formula for universal propositions.","PeriodicalId":148050,"journal":{"name":"Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121629878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lawrence of Lindores on Immortality. An Edition with Analysis of Four of his Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros De anima","authors":"Thomas Dewender, O. Pluta","doi":"10.1075/BPJAM.2.11DEW","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/BPJAM.2.11DEW","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":148050,"journal":{"name":"Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116087067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AbstractThis essay outlines the history of Alexandrism in the Middle Ages, focusing on the reception of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the late-medieval universities. Alexander of Aphrodisias met with severe criticism in the 13th century from William of Auvergne, Albert the Great and Thomas of Aquinas among others, but in the 14th century this attitude changed completely with John Buridan, giving way to a positive and productive adoption of his theories. The centerpiece of the controversy was Alexander's doctrine that the human soul is similar to the animal soul and hence mortal "like the soul of a dog or a donkey." Previously condemned as the absurd thesis of an outsider - wrongly so, because Alexander was perfectly in line with a long peripatetic tradition beginning with Dikaiarch of Messene and Straton of Lampsakos -, this doctrine was now considered philosophically superior to and sounder than the competing theories of Averroes and the Roman Catholic faith. In connection with this doctrine, Buridan stated that some higher species of animals have the ability to think like a man or an ape (sicut homo vel simia) and that an ape can even be said to have some reason. Buridan's interpretation of Alexander was disseminated at the universities of the 14th and 15th centuries by his many followers, including Lawrence of Lindores, Marsilius of Inghen (who defended Alexander against Albert the Great), Nicholas of Amsterdam, Biagio Pelacani of Parma and Benedikt Hesse of Krakow.
摘要本文概述了中世纪亚历山大主义的历史，重点讨论了中世纪晚期大学对阿佛洛狄西亚斯的亚历山大的接受情况。13世纪，阿芙洛狄西亚斯的亚历山大遭到了来自奥弗涅的威廉、阿尔伯特大帝和阿奎那的托马斯等人的严厉批评，但在14世纪，这种态度随着约翰·布里丹的出现而彻底改变，让位于对他的理论的积极和富有成效的采纳。争论的核心是亚历山大的学说，即人类的灵魂与动物的灵魂相似，因此“像狗或驴的灵魂一样”是必死的。以前，这种学说被谴责为一个局外人的荒谬论点——这是错误的，因为亚历山大完全符合从梅塞尼的狄凯亚克和兰普萨科斯的斯特拉顿开始的长期漂泊传统——现在，这种学说在哲学上被认为比阿威罗伊和罗马天主教信仰的竞争理论更优越，更健全。关于这一学说，布里丹指出，一些高级动物物种具有像人或猿一样思考的能力(sicut homo vel simia)，猿甚至可以说是有某种理性的。布里丹对亚历山大的解释在14世纪和15世纪的大学里被他的许多追随者传播，包括林多雷斯的劳伦斯、因亨的马西利乌斯(他在阿尔伯特大帝的统治下为亚历山大辩护)、阿姆斯特丹的尼古拉斯、帕尔马的比亚乔·佩拉卡尼和克拉科夫的本尼迪克特·黑塞。
{"title":"Der Alexandrismus an den Universitäten im späten Mittelalter","authors":"Olaf Pluta","doi":"10.1075/BPJAM.1.05PLU","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/BPJAM.1.05PLU","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThis essay outlines the history of Alexandrism in the Middle Ages, focusing on the reception of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the late-medieval universities. Alexander of Aphrodisias met with severe criticism in the 13th century from William of Auvergne, Albert the Great and Thomas of Aquinas among others, but in the 14th century this attitude changed completely with John Buridan, giving way to a positive and productive adoption of his theories. The centerpiece of the controversy was Alexander's doctrine that the human soul is similar to the animal soul and hence mortal \"like the soul of a dog or a donkey.\" Previously condemned as the absurd thesis of an outsider - wrongly so, because Alexander was perfectly in line with a long peripatetic tradition beginning with Dikaiarch of Messene and Straton of Lampsakos -, this doctrine was now considered philosophically superior to and sounder than the competing theories of Averroes and the Roman Catholic faith. In connection with this doctrine, Buridan stated that some higher species of animals have the ability to think like a man or an ape (sicut homo vel simia) and that an ape can even be said to have some reason. Buridan's interpretation of Alexander was disseminated at the universities of the 14th and 15th centuries by his many followers, including Lawrence of Lindores, Marsilius of Inghen (who defended Alexander against Albert the Great), Nicholas of Amsterdam, Biagio Pelacani of Parma and Benedikt Hesse of Krakow.","PeriodicalId":148050,"journal":{"name":"Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123863780","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What made Socrates so special that he became the object of mockery, slander and hate? The answer in the Apology is expressed in the formula of the ‘Socratic pragma’. Plato claims that Socrates’ philosophical enterprise was a reaction to the Delphic oracle according to which no living Greek was wiser than Socrates. But does this really explain what it pretends to explain? The paper argues that this explanation tells us more about Plato’s philosophical approach than about this alleged turning point in Socrates’ life. Our understanding of Socrates’ philosophical development should be based on other Platonic dialogues and the Old Comedy as well, for they inform us about the historical shift of philosophical interest from questions of physics to questions of ethics and political anthropology.
{"title":"Platon und das Sokratische Pragma","authors":"Martin F. Meyer","doi":"10.1075/BPJAM.9.01MEY","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/BPJAM.9.01MEY","url":null,"abstract":"What made Socrates so special that he became the object of mockery, slander and hate? The answer in the Apology is expressed in the formula of the ‘Socratic pragma’. Plato claims that Socrates’ philosophical enterprise was a reaction to the Delphic oracle according to which no living Greek was wiser than Socrates. But does this really explain what it pretends to explain? The paper argues that this explanation tells us more about Plato’s philosophical approach than about this alleged turning point in Socrates’ life. Our understanding of Socrates’ philosophical development should be based on other Platonic dialogues and the Old Comedy as well, for they inform us about the historical shift of philosophical interest from questions of physics to questions of ethics and political anthropology.","PeriodicalId":148050,"journal":{"name":"Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125091059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Y. Nakayama, Kommentierte japanische Ausgabe der lateinischen Werke Meister Eckharts, Bd. V / U. Kern, Der Gang der Vernunft bei Meister Eckhart","authors":"B. Mojsisch","doi":"10.1075/bpjam.16.11moj","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.16.11moj","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":148050,"journal":{"name":"Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter","volume":"8 11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122596734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
From an epistemological point of view, monopsychism implies that the unity or universality of cognition can be secured only through the unity of the subject. Scholastics in the 13–14th centuries who did not accept it for various reasons therefore had to show that the multiplicity of subjects does not impair the unity of cognition. But the attempts to harmonize the unity of cognition with the plurality of subjects were not successful. While some of them only transformed the issue into another with some variations, others accepted monopsychism to some extent.
{"title":"Die Pluralität der Intellekte und die Einheit der Erkenntnis: Kritiken und Rezeptionen des Monopsychismus des Averroes in der sog. Scholastik","authors":"Sang-Sup Lee","doi":"10.1075/BPJAM.12.05LEE","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/BPJAM.12.05LEE","url":null,"abstract":"From an epistemological point of view, monopsychism implies that the unity or universality of cognition can be secured only through the unity of the subject. Scholastics in the 13–14th centuries who did not accept it for various reasons therefore had to show that the multiplicity of subjects does not impair the unity of cognition. But the attempts to harmonize the unity of cognition with the plurality of subjects were not successful. While some of them only transformed the issue into another with some variations, others accepted monopsychism to some extent.","PeriodicalId":148050,"journal":{"name":"Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122797999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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