Pub Date : 2024-03-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101489
Simon Hediger , Jeffrey Näf
The present paper combines nonlinear shrinkage with the multivariate generalized hyperbolic (MGHyp) distribution, thereby extending a flexible parametric model to high dimensions. An expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm is developed that is fast, stable, and applicable in high dimensions. Theoretical arguments for the monotonicity of the proposed algorithm are provided and it is shown in simulations that it is able to accurately retrieve parameter estimates. Finally, in an extensive Markowitz portfolio optimization analysis, the approach is compared to state-of-the-art benchmark models. The proposed model excels with a strong out-of-sample portfolio performance combined with a comparably low turnover.
{"title":"Combining the MGHyp distribution with nonlinear shrinkage in modeling financial asset returns","authors":"Simon Hediger , Jeffrey Näf","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101489","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The present paper combines nonlinear shrinkage with the multivariate generalized hyperbolic (MGHyp) distribution, thereby extending a flexible parametric model to high dimensions. An expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm is developed that is fast, stable, and applicable in high dimensions. Theoretical arguments for the monotonicity of the proposed algorithm are provided and it is shown in simulations that it is able to accurately retrieve parameter estimates. Finally, in an extensive Markowitz portfolio optimization analysis, the approach is compared to state-of-the-art benchmark models. The proposed model excels with a strong out-of-sample portfolio performance combined with a comparably low turnover.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 101489"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539824000240/pdfft?md5=84b1b3630884c1e067c4a40a2255ecc7&pid=1-s2.0-S0927539824000240-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140160588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-17DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101478
Chun Kuang , Jiawen Yang , Wenyu Zhu
Banks’ ability to convert liquidity into lending depends crucially on the various regulatory constraints they face. This paper investigates the differential lending responses of banks with varying levels of reserves, and their impact on the real economy. The distribution of reserves within the banking system became significantly more dispersed during the quantitative easing (QE) periods. Loan growth for those more liquidity-constrained does not vary meaningfully with liquidity changes, despite abundance at the aggregate level. Consequently, our findings imply that the uneven bank reserve distribution may exacerbate the spatial disparities in bank lending and regional economic development through differential lending responses of banks in different parts of the reserve distribution.
{"title":"Reserve holding and bank lending","authors":"Chun Kuang , Jiawen Yang , Wenyu Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101478","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Banks’ ability to convert liquidity into lending depends crucially on the various regulatory constraints they face. This paper investigates the differential lending responses of banks with varying levels of reserves, and their impact on the real economy. The distribution of reserves within the banking system became significantly more dispersed during the quantitative easing (QE) periods. Loan growth for those more liquidity-constrained does not vary meaningfully with liquidity changes, despite abundance at the aggregate level. Consequently, our findings imply that the uneven bank reserve distribution may exacerbate the spatial disparities in bank lending and regional economic development through differential lending responses of banks in different parts of the reserve distribution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 101478"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139914921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-15DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101477
J.H. John Kim , Ronald Anderson
This study investigates the relationship between CEO narcissism and debt financing costs, highlighting a potential trade-off between leadership traits and firm financial well-being. While prior research has identified potential benefits associated with narcissistic CEOs, such as enhanced innovation, we demonstrate that such leadership incurs higher borrowing costs, as evidenced by elevated bond yields in firms led by narcissistic executives. This effect is amplified for grandiose narcissists, suggesting that investors are particularly wary of their risk-taking tendencies. Leveraging a natural experiment, we establish a robust causal link between narcissism and debt costs, revealing higher bond yield premiums demanded by investors in firms with narcissistic CEOs. These findings underscore the critical importance of considering CEO personality traits, particularly narcissism when evaluating corporate governance practices and ensuring optimal alignment with stakeholders' interests.
{"title":"CEO narcissism and the agency cost of debt","authors":"J.H. John Kim , Ronald Anderson","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101477","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101477","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study investigates the relationship between CEO narcissism and debt financing costs, highlighting a potential trade-off between leadership traits and firm financial well-being. While prior research has identified potential benefits associated with narcissistic CEOs, such as enhanced innovation, we demonstrate that such leadership incurs higher borrowing costs, as evidenced by elevated bond yields in firms led by narcissistic executives. This effect is amplified for grandiose narcissists, suggesting that investors are particularly wary of their risk-taking tendencies. Leveraging a natural experiment, we establish a robust causal link between narcissism and debt costs, revealing higher bond yield premiums demanded by investors in firms with narcissistic CEOs. These findings underscore the critical importance of considering CEO personality traits, particularly narcissism when evaluating corporate governance practices and ensuring optimal alignment with stakeholders' interests.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"77 ","pages":"Article 101477"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139884773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-28DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101476
Xiaoyuan Wan
China launched a pilot program in March 2010 to lift the ban on margin-buying and short-selling. Based on the first two batches of designated stocks, the literature documents that lifting the ban has a negative effect on stock valuation. However, we show that the effect has reversed to positive for the next six batches of designated stocks. We explore several potential explanations. Our analyses show that as short-selling volume grew at a much slower pace or even declined relative to margin-buying volume over our sample period, the positive effect of margin-buying on stock valuation has dominated the negative effect of short-selling. Both time-series and cross-sectional tests show that the imbalance between margin-buying and short-selling is the main driver of the reversal. We further show that the effect of lifting margin-buying and short-selling ban on stock price efficiency and discovery also reversed over time.
{"title":"Margin-buying, short-selling, and stock valuation: Why is the effect reversed over time in China?","authors":"Xiaoyuan Wan","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101476","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>China launched a pilot program in March 2010 to lift the ban on margin-buying and short-selling. Based on the first two batches of designated stocks, the literature documents that lifting the ban has a negative effect on stock valuation. However, we show that the effect has reversed to positive for the next six batches of designated stocks. We explore several potential explanations. Our analyses show that as short-selling volume grew at a much slower pace or even declined relative to margin-buying volume over our sample period, the positive effect of margin-buying on stock valuation has dominated the negative effect of short-selling. Both time-series and cross-sectional tests show that the imbalance between margin-buying and short-selling is the main driver of the reversal. We further show that the effect of lifting margin-buying and short-selling ban on stock price efficiency and discovery also reversed over time.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101476"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139652699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-26DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101475
Xin Gao , Zhe An , Donghui Li , Weidong Xu
Employing a sample of 6,084 acquisitions from 2001 to 2017, we show that higher media coverage of rival firms (i.e., in the same industry as the target) increases their likelihood of being subsequently targeted and the announcement CARs. We conduct various tests to alleviate the endogeneity concern. Our results are robust when controlling for analyst coverage and the media coverage of acquirer and target firms. We further show that rivals with greater media attention have higher premiums when they receive future acquisition bids. Lastly, we find that the effect of media coverage on the rival response is more pronounced for rivals with a higher similarity score to the target, initial industry acquisitions, and acquisitions occur early in an industry merger wave. Our study highlights the media's vital role in shaping the rival response to acquisition targets.
{"title":"Does media affect the rival response to acquisition targets?","authors":"Xin Gao , Zhe An , Donghui Li , Weidong Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101475","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101475","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Employing a sample of 6,084 acquisitions from 2001 to 2017, we show that higher media coverage of rival firms (i.e., in the same industry as the target) increases their likelihood of being subsequently targeted and the announcement CARs. We conduct various tests to alleviate the endogeneity concern. Our results are robust when controlling for analyst coverage and the media coverage of acquirer and target firms. We further show that rivals with greater media attention have higher premiums when they receive future acquisition bids. Lastly, we find that the effect of media coverage on the rival response is more pronounced for rivals with a higher similarity score to the target, initial industry acquisitions, and acquisitions occur early in an industry merger wave. Our study highlights the media's vital role in shaping the rival response to acquisition targets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101475"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139585753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-22DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101466
William M. Cready , Zhonglan Dai , Guang Ma , Vikram Nanda
An extensive literature finds that CEO compensation, especially bonus pay, exhibits downward rigidity. This is despite corporate boards usually retaining the discretion to deviate from their stated bonus formulae. We conjecture that the infrequent occasions in which there is an unexpected bonus cut, the board likely possesses unfavorable private information about the firm's long-term prospects and the CEO's ability. We hypothesize, therefore, that unexpected bonus cuts will be predictive of the company's future operating performance as well as forced CEO turnovers. We first validate our private information premise by showing that stock market reactions to CEO firings or earnings announcements are muted for firms experiencing unexpected bonus cuts but not for those without cuts. Consistent with these predictions, we find that unexpected bonus cuts are robust predictors of subsequent underperformance (ROE) and lower firm valuation (Tobin's Q) as well as CEO firings. Further, we examine the impact of Regulation S-K (2006) and show that predictive power becomes stronger post Reg. S-K, along with the disappearance of downward rigidity. This suggests that compensation transparency makes it harder for boards to deviate from stated bonus formulae and, if they do, the deviations are more informative.
{"title":"Information in unexpected bonus cuts: Firm performance and CEO firings","authors":"William M. Cready , Zhonglan Dai , Guang Ma , Vikram Nanda","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101466","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101466","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>An extensive literature finds that CEO compensation, especially bonus pay, exhibits downward rigidity. This is despite corporate boards usually retaining the discretion to deviate from their stated bonus formulae. We conjecture that the infrequent occasions in which there is an unexpected bonus cut, the board likely possesses unfavorable private information about the firm's long-term prospects and the CEO's ability. We hypothesize, therefore, that unexpected bonus cuts will be predictive of the company's future operating performance as well as forced CEO turnovers. We first validate our private information premise by showing that stock market reactions to CEO firings or earnings announcements are muted for firms experiencing unexpected bonus cuts but not for those without cuts. Consistent with these predictions, we find that unexpected bonus cuts are robust predictors of subsequent underperformance (<em>ROE</em>) and lower firm valuation (Tobin's Q) as well as CEO firings. Further, we examine the impact of Regulation S-K (2006) and show that predictive power becomes stronger post Reg. S-K, along with the disappearance of downward rigidity. This suggests that compensation transparency makes it harder for boards to deviate from stated bonus formulae and, if they do, the deviations are more informative.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101466"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139517895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-09DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101465
Olga Kolokolova , Xia Xu
The performance of the widely used betting-against-beta (BAB) investment strategy is improved by controlling for the stochastic dominance (SD) relation between individual stocks and the market portfolio. Dominating stocks, preferred by all risk-averse and prudent investors, are excluded from the short leg of the BAB strategy. Stocks that are dominated by the market are excluded from the long leg of the strategy. This prefiltering significantly enhances a wide range of performance and risk measures including abnormal returns relative to various factor models. The improvements are especially pronounced for the third-order SD, are robust to transaction costs and different market conditions.
通过控制个股与市场投资组合之间的随机支配(SD)关系,提高了广泛使用的 "反贝塔投注(BAB)"投资策略的绩效。所有风险规避型和审慎型投资者都偏好的优势股票被排除在 BAB 策略的空头部分之外。被市场主导的股票则被排除在长线策略之外。与各种因素模型相比,这种预过滤方法大大提高了各种业绩和风险指标,包括异常收益。对三阶 SD 的改进尤为明显,而且不受交易成本和不同市场条件的影响。
{"title":"Enhancing betting against beta with stochastic dominance","authors":"Olga Kolokolova , Xia Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101465","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101465","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The performance of the widely used betting-against-beta (BAB) investment strategy is improved by controlling for the stochastic dominance (SD) relation between individual stocks and the market portfolio. Dominating stocks, preferred by all risk-averse and prudent investors, are excluded from the short leg of the BAB strategy. Stocks that are dominated by the market are excluded from the long leg of the strategy. This prefiltering significantly enhances a wide range of performance and risk measures including abnormal returns relative to various factor models. The improvements are especially pronounced for the third-order SD, are robust to transaction costs and different market conditions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"76 ","pages":"Article 101465"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539823001329/pdfft?md5=30beaa5c874f69809ae3e523ceabf06e&pid=1-s2.0-S0927539823001329-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139414991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101461
Zhuo Chen , Jinyu Liu , Andrea Lu , Libin Tao
We use carbon dioxide (CO) emissions growth to measure consumption risk within a consumption-based capital asset pricing model framework. Given the comprehensive worldwide coverage of CO emissions, this measure allows us to use the full history of stock market data in the US, Europe, the world, and fifteen international markets. For the US (Europe/the world), we are able to explain the observed equity market premium with a relative risk aversion of 6 (10/12), which is less than half the size of that estimated using the canonical expenditures-based consumption growth measure. The average estimated relative risk aversion across fifteen other international markets is 5. We also find evidence that the growth of CO emissions is a priced risk factor that captures the cross section of stock portfolio returns.
{"title":"Carbon dioxide and asset pricing: Evidence from international stock markets","authors":"Zhuo Chen , Jinyu Liu , Andrea Lu , Libin Tao","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101461","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101461","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We use carbon dioxide (CO<span><math><msub><mrow></mrow><mrow><mtext>2</mtext></mrow></msub></math></span><span>) emissions growth to measure consumption risk within a consumption-based capital asset pricing model framework. Given the comprehensive worldwide coverage of CO</span><span><math><msub><mrow></mrow><mrow><mtext>2</mtext></mrow></msub></math></span> emissions, this measure allows us to use the full history of stock market data in the US, Europe, the world, and fifteen international markets. For the US (Europe/the world), we are able to explain the observed equity market premium with a relative risk aversion of 6 (10/12), which is less than half the size of that estimated using the canonical expenditures-based consumption growth measure. The average estimated relative risk aversion across fifteen other international markets is 5. We also find evidence that the growth of CO<span><math><msub><mrow></mrow><mrow><mtext>2</mtext></mrow></msub></math></span> emissions is a priced risk factor that captures the cross section of stock portfolio returns.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 101461"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139070410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101464
Dongxu Li
I find on average firms respond to a horizontal merger by investing less in PP&E, labor, and R&D. There is notable heterogeneity among the non-merging rivals. The laggard rivals reduce investments in PP&E, labor, and R&D while the neck-and-neck rivals do the opposite. There is an insignificant change for the leader rivals. These results support Aghion et al. (2005) on the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Also, I show evidence that financial constraints and innovativeness are two factors that drive rivals’ heterogeneous responses. This empirical study sheds light upon the pattern in which horizontal mergers shape industry evolvement.
我发现,企业对横向兼并的平均反应是减少在 PP&E、劳动力和研发方面的投资。非兼并对手之间存在显著的异质性。落后的竞争对手会减少在 PP&E、劳动力和研发方面的投资,而并驾齐驱的竞争对手则相反。领先者的变化并不显著。这些结果支持了 Aghion 等人(2005 年)关于竞争与创新之间倒 U 型关系的观点。此外,我还证明了财务约束和创新能力是驱动竞争对手做出异质性反应的两个因素。这项实证研究揭示了横向兼并影响行业发展的模式。
{"title":"Horizontal mergers and heterogeneous firm investments: evidence from the United States","authors":"Dongxu Li","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101464","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101464","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I find <em>on average</em> firms respond to a horizontal merger by investing less in PP&E, labor, and R&D. There is notable heterogeneity among the non-merging rivals. The laggard rivals reduce investments in PP&E, labor, and R&D while the neck-and-neck rivals do the opposite. There is an insignificant change for the leader rivals. These results support Aghion et al. (2005) on the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Also, I show evidence that financial constraints and innovativeness are two factors that drive rivals’ heterogeneous responses. This empirical study sheds light upon the pattern in which horizontal mergers shape industry evolvement.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 101464"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139070159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101460
Shengfeng Li , Liang Han , Biao Mi
We investigate the impact of the local banking market structure on the level of corporate cash holdings and the value of cash. We find that, in more concentrated banking markets, firms increase their cash holdings by issuing more equity. The marginal value of $1 cash increases by 10 cents with a one-standard-deviation increase in bank concentration. The positive relationship between bank concentration and value of cash is robust to a rich set of tests such as for firms having access to bond markets or firms using syndicated loans and is more prominent for more financially constrained firms. We also explore the mechanism, and our results suggest that in more concentrated banking markets firms demand more cash to shield against default risk.
{"title":"The effects of banking market structure on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash","authors":"Shengfeng Li , Liang Han , Biao Mi","doi":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101460","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jempfin.2023.101460","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the impact of the local banking market structure on the level of corporate cash holdings and the value of cash. We find that, in more concentrated banking markets, firms increase their cash holdings by issuing more equity. The marginal value of $1 cash increases by 10 cents with a one-standard-deviation increase in bank concentration. The positive relationship between bank concentration and value of cash is robust to a rich set of tests such as for firms having access to bond markets or firms using syndicated loans and is more prominent for more financially constrained firms. We also explore the mechanism, and our results suggest that in more concentrated banking markets firms demand more cash to shield against default risk.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15704,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Empirical Finance","volume":"75 ","pages":"Article 101460"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539823001275/pdfft?md5=fe3d182024698ade6512e7adbf1be39d&pid=1-s2.0-S0927539823001275-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139052531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}