Journal of Finance最新文献

We study the impact of an MBA-style executive education course in finance on corporate policies and firm performance targeting top managers of medium and large Mozambican enterprises. Using a randomized controlled trial, we find that the educational treatment induces changes in financial policies that improve firm performance. Specifically, a reduction in working capital (0.4 to 0.5 standard deviations) increases cash flow, and in turn long-term investments. This effect operates primarily through a reduction in accounts receivable (0.4 to 1 standard deviations). Our findings show that targeted educational interventions can build managerial capital and enhance corporate performance by improving financial decision making among executives.

Based on centuries of data, we demonstrate that demographics have been a major, predictable driver of house prices. High birth rates 25 to 29 (60 to 64) years ago predict declining (rising) rent-price ratios today. This pattern arises from age-concentrated entry into and exit from homeownership affecting house prices, rather than changes in housing consumption that could also impact rents. We provide evidence for possible mechanisms: slow responses of other market participants to shifts in homeownership demand, and geographic segmentation between rental and owner-occupied markets. Evidence for age-dependent demand effects on yields of bonds and stocks is significantly weaker.

Using account-level data on millions of U.S. middle-class investors over 2006 to 2018, we characterize the share of investable wealth that they hold in the stock market over their working lives. Relative to the 1990s, this share has both risen by 10% and become age-dependent. The Pension Protection Act (PPA)—which allowed target date funds (TDFs) to be default options in retirement plans—played an important role: younger (older) workers starting at a firm after TDFs became the default option post-PPA invested more (less) in stocks, in line with the TDF glidepath. In contrast, contribution rates changed little following the PPA.

We examine executive compensation in a general equilibrium model with dynamic moral hazard, where executives' outside options are endogenously determined by equilibrium market compensation. Firms provide incentives through compensation packages featuring deferred payments as “carrots” and termination as “sticks.” Crucially, the effectiveness of termination as an incentive device is undermined by the outside options available to executives. As individual firms fail to internalize the effect of their compensation design on these endogenous outside options, the equilibrium is generally inefficient. Compared to shareholder-value-maximizing compensation packages, executives are paid too much, too soon, and keep their jobs for too long.

We compare execution quality of six brokerage accounts across five brokers by generating a sample of 85,000 simultaneous market orders. Commission levels and payment for order flow (PFOF) differ across our accounts. We find that execution prices vary significantly across brokers: the mean account-level round-trip cost ranges from 0.07% to 0.46%, excluding any commissions. The dispersion is due to off-exchange wholesalers systematically giving different execution prices for the same trades to different brokers. Across brokers, variation in PFOF does not explain the large variation in price execution. We provide several suggestions for more informative disclosures on execution quality.