Journal of Finance最新文献

Central bank balance sheet expansion, through actions like quantitative easing, is run through commercial banks. While this increases liquid central bank reserves held on commercial bank balance sheets, demandable uninsured deposits issued to finance the reserves also increase. Subsequent shrinkage in the central bank balance sheet may entail shrinkage in bank-held reserves without a commensurate reduction in deposit claims. Furthermore, during episodes of liquidity stress, when many claims on liquidity are called, surplus banks may hoard reserves. As a result, central bank balance sheet expansion may create less additional liquidity than typically thought, and indeed, may increase the probability and severity of episodes of liquidity stress.

Financial institutions received investments under the Troubled Asset Relief Program in a bad state of the world but repaid them in a relatively good state. We show that the recipients paid considerably lower returns to taxpayers compared to private-market securities with similar risk over the same investment horizon, resulting in a subsidy of over $50 billion on the preferred equity investment by the government. Ex-post renegotiation of contract terms limited the upside gains received by taxpayers in good times and contributed to the subsidy. These findings have important implications for the design and implementation of future bailouts. Our simple methodology for calculating the subsidy can be applied to evaluate the financial costs of other bailouts.

We investigate the economic value of cash management. In the legal marijuana industry, where only half of businesses have access to cash management services from a financial institution, we examine dispensary profitability using administrative and survey data. Our results show that businesses with cash management charge higher retail prices (8.3%), pay lower wholesale prices (7.3%), and have higher sales volume (19%). Together, these advantages create a 40% increase in profitability. These results support our model in which reputational capital and administrative costs drive profitability regardless of whether national banks, credit unions, or fintech provide the cash management functions.

We experimentally study the transmission of subjective expectations into actions. Subjects in our experiment report valuations that are far too insensitive to their expectations, relative to the prediction from a frictionless model. We propose that the insensitivity is driven by a noisy cognitive process that prevents subjects from precisely computing asset valuations. The empirical link between subjective expectations and actions becomes stronger as subjective expectations approach rational expectations. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating weak transmission into belief-based asset pricing models. Finally, we discuss how cognitive noise can provide a microfoundation for inelastic demand in the stock market.

We study noisy aggregation of dispersed information in financial markets without imposing parametric restrictions on preferences, information, and return distributions. We provide a general characterization of asset returns by means of a risk-neutral probability measure that features excess weight on tail risks. Moreover, we link excess weight on tail risks to observable moments such as forecast dispersion and accuracy, and argue that it provides a unified explanation for several prominent cross-sectional return anomalies. Simple calibrations suggest the model can account for a significant fraction of empirical returns to skewness, returns to disagreement, and interaction effects between the two.

A higher U.S. government debt-to-output (D-O) ratio does not forecast higher surpluses or lower returns on Treasurys in the future. Neither future cash flows nor discount rates account for the variation in the current D-O ratio. The market valuation of Treasurys is surprisingly insensitive to macro fundamentals. Instead, the future D-O ratio accounts for most of the variation because the D-O ratio is highly persistent. Systematic surplus forecast errors may help account for these findings. Since the start of the Global Financial Crisis, surplus projections have anticipated a large fiscal correction that failed to materialize.

We study an economy with financial frictions in which a regulator designs a test that reveals outside information about a firm's quality to investors. The firm can also disclose verifiable inside information about its quality. We show that the regulator optimally aims for “public speech and private silence,” which is achieved with tests that give insiders an incentive to stay quiet. We fully characterize optimal tests by developing tools for Bayesian persuasion with incentive constraints, and use these results to derive novel guidance for the design of bank stress tests, as well as benchmarks for socially optimal corporate credit ratings.

We analyze the role of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and reserves when banks exert deposit market power and liquidity transformation entails externalities. Optimal monetary architecture minimizes the social costs of liquidity provision, and optimal monetary policy follows modified Friedman rules. Interest rates on reserves and CBDC should differ. Calibrations robustly suggest that CBDC provides liquidity more efficiently than deposits unless the central bank must refinance banks and this is very costly. Accordingly, the optimal share of CBDC in payments tends to exceed that of deposits.

We introduce a new measure of the price charged by financial intermediaries for connecting mortgage borrowers with capital market investors. Based on administrative lender pricing data, we document that the price of intermediation reacts strongly to variation in demand, reflecting capacity constraints of mortgage originators. This positive comovement of price with quantity reduced the pass-through of quantitative easing. We also find a notable upward trend in this price between 2008 and 2014, likely due to increased legal and regulatory burden in the mortgage market. The trend led to an implicit cost to borrowers of nearly $100 billion over this period.