Journal of International Economics最新文献

While recent work has documented a nexus between international trade and firm innovation, the underlying mechanisms explaining firms’ innovation in response to import competition are, thus far, poorly understood. To identify the mechanism of labor adjustments and its economic relevance, we use longitudinal linked employer–employee data from Denmark (1995–2012). We first show that import competition triggers a significant increase in the share of R&D workers at the firm level. The majority of the increase in the share of R&D workers is explained by between-firm, not within-firm, worker reallocation. The significance of this reallocation becomes evident when we show that innovation improvements are observed only among firms that experience a large increase in the share of R&D workers, especially if this increase is achieved through between-firm worker reallocation. We then extend our analysis to Portugal where the labor market is more rigid and find contrasting yet consistent results: labor reallocation occurs only within firms and it does not result in increased innovation.

We study the economics of international joint ventures using administrative data for China. We first show that foreign investors choose Chinese partners that are relatively large, productive, and more innovative to set up their joint venture. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we then provide evidence that joint ventures lead to domestic benefits in the form of productivity and technological spillovers to both the Chinese partners in joint ventures as well as other domestic Chinese firms. Exploiting the easing of joint venture requirements as China entered the WTO in the year 2001, we further show that intraindustry spillovers from joint ventures to other domestic firms increased in the wake of China’s WTO accession, consistent with gains from foreign technology rising due to enhanced commitment through the rules-based WTO system. Our results shed new light on the efficacy of FDI performance requirements as well as on claims regarding international technology transfer that underpinned the China–US trade war.

During a downturn in the global financial cycle there is a simultaneous retrenchment in gross capital flows and a fall in risky asset prices. The global financial cycle is closely related to fluctuations in risk appetite. We develop a model that can simultaneously produce a fall in gross outflows, inflows, and asset prices following an increase in global risk aversion. There is heterogeneity across investors within a country in the willingness to hold risky assets and to hold foreign assets. The fall in the asset price after a rise in global risk aversion shifts the wealth distribution towards investors that are less willing to hold foreign assets. This leads a drop in gross flows. We calibrate the within country heterogeneity in the model to match heterogeneity observed in micro data of household portfolios. The retrenchment in the calibrated model is quantitatively similar to what we observe in the macro data.

The H-1B program allows firms in the United States to temporarily hire high-skilled foreign citizens. The government restricts inflows of new H-1B workers and therefore creates potential rents typical of a quota. Importantly, however, the US allocates H-1B status by random lottery. We develop a theoretical model demonstrating that this lottery creates a negative externality that destroys quota rents by incentivizing firms to search for more workers than can actually be hired. Some firms specialize in hiring foreign labor and contracting out those workers’ services to third-party sites. These outsourcing firms exacerbate the search externality. Numerical exercises suggest that these processes result in an annual economic loss exceeding $10,000 per new H-1B worker hired relative to what would occur in the absence of lottery allocation.

This paper examines the patterns of macroeconomic recovery following natural disasters. In a panel with global coverage from 1960 to 2011, we make use of insurer-assessed losses to estimate growth responses conditional on risk transfer. We find that major disasters reduce growth by 1 to 2 percentage points on impact, and over time produce an output cost of 2$\text{\%}$ to 4$\text{\%}$ of GDP, on top of the initial damage to property and infrastructure. Akin to wars and financial crises, natural disasters have permanent effects, in the sense that output losses are not fully recovered over time. But it is the uninsured losses that drive the macroeconomic cost; insured losses are less consequential in the aggregate, and can even stimulate growth. By helping to finance the recovery, insurance mitigates the macroeconomic cost of disasters. Many countries lack the capacity to (re)insure themselves and would stand to benefit from more international risk sharing.

Central banks across the globe introduced large-scale asset purchase programs to address the unprecedented circumstances experienced during the pandemic. Many of these programs were announced as open-ended to shock-and-awe market participants and restore confidence in financial markets. This paper examines whether these whatever-it-takes announcements had larger effects than announcements with explicit limits on scale. We use a narrative approach to categorize announcements made by twenty-two central banks, and event study, propensity-score-matching, and local projection methods to measure the short-term effects of policy announcements on exchange rates and sovereign bond yields. We find that on average a central bank’s first whatever-it-takes announcement lowers 10-year bond yields by an additional 47 basis points relative to size-limited announcements, suggesting that communication of potential policy scale matters. Our results for yields hold for both advanced and emerging economies, while exchange rates go in opposing directions, muting their response when we group all countries together.

We revisit a central question for international macroeconomics: the response of export prices and quantities to movements in the exchange rate (ER). We use granular export data for Chile and study how the effects of ER movements vary over time with the currency of invoicing and the destination of exports. For prices, we find that the short-run effects of bilateral ER movements vanish when controlling for U.S. dollar ER, which supports dominant currency pricing. However, over longer horizons a more significant role is played by bilateral ER movements, in line with the predictions of producer currency pricing. These dynamics do not depend on the invoicing currency. The results we find for quantities support the view that bilateral ER movements contribute to macroeconomic adjustment through export volumes over the medium term.

We examine the impact of commodity price changes on the business cycles and capital flows in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), distinguishing between their role as a source of shock and as a channel of transmission of global shocks. Our findings reveal that surges in export prices, triggered by commodity price shocks, boost domestic GDP, an effect further amplified by the endogenous decline of country spreads. However, the effects on capital flows appear muted. Shifts in U.S. monetary policy and global risk appetite drive the global financial cycle in EMDEs. Eased global credit conditions, attributed to looser U.S. monetary policy or lower global risk appetite, lead to a rise in export prices, higher output, a decrease in government borrowing costs, and stimulate greater capital flows. The endogenous response of export prices amplifies the output effects of a more accommodative U.S. monetary policy while country spreads magnify the impact of shifts in global risk appetite.

We show that nonbank lenders act as global shock absorbers from US monetary policy spillovers. For identification, we exploit monetary policy surprises and the global syndicated lending market, where detailed loan-level data allow us to compare the participation of banks and nonbanks in the same loan. When US policy tightens, dollar credit to non-US firms falls, but nonbanks increase credit supply (relative to banks), thereby mitigating the total credit reduction. This relative increase is stronger for riskier non-US firms, proxied by emerging market firms, high-yield firms, or firms in countries with stronger capital inflow restrictions. Finally, there are real effects associated with the international nonbank channel of monetary policy, as firms with better access to nonbank credit relatively increase total corporate debt, investment, and employment.

We examine the effects of unilateral structural reforms within a currency union. Focusing on the surge of German competitiveness following the introduction of the Euro, we first provide reduced-form causal evidence supporting the notion that German structural labor-market reforms in the early 2000s led to a crowding-out of manufacturing employment in other Eurozone economies. To assess the impact of this German competitiveness shock, we build a quantitative multi-sector trade model that features downward nominal wage rigidities, endogenous labor supply, unemployment-insurance benefits and international savings. The fixed nominal exchange rate can create binding nominal rigidities in response to a foreign real supply shock – like the one prompted by the German reforms – resulting in significant contraction of manufacturing sectors and increased involuntary unemployment across other Eurozone countries. We consider a number of counterfactual scenarios, such as the impact of German labor-market reforms in the absence of a fixed exchange-rate regime, the role of coordinated reforms within the Eurozone and a higher average inflation rate.