Journal of International Economics最新文献

We use randomized controlled trials in the US, UK, and Brazil to examine the causal effect of public debt news on household inflation expectations. People tend to underestimate public debt levels and increase inflation expectations when informed about the correct levels. The extent of the revisions is proportional to the size of the information surprise. Confidence in the central bank considerably reduces the sensitivity of inflation expectations to public debt, while confidence in fiscal authorities plays a more limited role. We also show that people associate high public debt with stagflationary effects but not with a greater risk of monetary finance.

We explore how importing of intermediate goods affects the carbon intensity of firms in the Swedish manufacturing sector. By exploiting exogenous shocks to foreign export supply of intermediate goods, we estimate that a 10 percent increase in imports causes a 5.6 percent reduction in carbon intensity. Average carbon intensity among the firms in our sample between 2004 and 2016 decreased by around 50 percent, and our results suggest that import growth accounted for about a third of this decline. Exploring the mechanisms, we find evidence for both a technique effect and a product composition effect. Importing has a positive impact on productivity, scale of production, and abatement investments. It also encourages firms to focus more on their core products. We find no evidence for a pollution haven effect.

Sovereign debt restructurings are associated with declines in the growth of GDP, investment, bank credit to the private sector and capital flows. Our empirical findings show that the intensity of these losses depends on two aspects: whether the restructuring preempts a default and the extent of the reliance of the country’s private sector on domestic bank credit. Post-default restructurings are associated with worse outcomes than restructurings that take place preemptively without missing payments and going into default. Much of that difference is driven by restructurings in countries with relatively large banking sectors, in particular during post-default episodes.

We propose a method for identifying exposure to changes in trade policy based on asset prices that has several advantages over standard measures: it encompasses all avenues of exposure, it is natively firm-level, it yields estimates for both goods and service producers, and it can be used to study reductions in difficult-to-quantify non-tariff-barriers in a way that controls naturally for broader macroeconomic shocks. Applying our method to two well-studied US trade liberalizations provides new insight into service-sector responses and reveals dramatically different outcomes among small versus large firms, even within narrow industries.

To provide sharp answers to basic questions in international trade, a standard approach is to focus on a small open economy (SOE). Whereas the classic tradition is to define a SOE as an economy that takes world prices as given, in the new trade literature it is defined instead as one that takes foreign-good prices and export demand schedules as given. We develop a gravity model that nests all its standard microfoundations and show how to take the limit so that an economy that becomes infinitesimally small behaves like a SOE. We then derive comparative statics and optimal policy for the SOE. Ignoring standard tax indeterminacies, optimal policy is characterized by export taxes and import tariffs equal to the (inverse) foreign demand and supply elasticities, respectively, and employment subsidies determined by the scale elasticity (under perfect competition) or markups (under monopolistic competition).

Democracy matters for international merger activity. Using a sample of 101,834 cross-border deals announced between 1985 and 2018, we show that merger flows predominantly involve acquirers from more democratic countries than their targets. This result is primarily driven by a “pull” factor: firms in countries with weaker democratic institutions attract more cross-border deals. We find evidence of bonding as the key mechanism behind this effect. The democracy effect is stronger when target countries have weaker corporate governance standards. Furthermore, target abnormal returns around deal announcements increase with the difference in democracy between acquirer and target countries. Importantly, differences in investor protection or economic development do not directly explain the democracy effect. Combined, our findings imply that democracy is a fundamental, yet previously overlooked, determinant of cross-border mergers.