For better or worse, the study of International Relations (IR) continues to be marked by a protracted battle between two competing theories: realism and liberal internationalism. This article seeks to investigate which theory, offensive realism or liberal internationalism offers a more compelling explanation for the alliance formation of the intelligence services of Israel and South Africa. Although scholars have indeed examined the explanatory merit of realism and liberal internationalism in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of (liberal) democratic and mixed (democratic and non-democratic) dyads, attempts at bringing the two theories to bear on the interactions of intelligence services have not been forthcoming, a shortcoming this article attempts to address. This article seeks to bridge this gap by evaluating the relative explanatory worth of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in accounting for the alliance formation of the intelligence services of Israel and South Africa. The significance of this article lies in its examination of international politics and realist thought through the specific lens of intelligence services.
{"title":"Liberal Internationalism, Offensive Realism and Intelligence Liaison: The Case of the Israeli and South African Intelligence Services","authors":"Marno Swart, Eben Coetzee","doi":"10.5787/51-2-1417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/51-2-1417","url":null,"abstract":"For better or worse, the study of International Relations (IR) continues to be marked by a protracted battle between two competing theories: realism and liberal internationalism. This article seeks to investigate which theory, offensive realism or liberal internationalism offers a more compelling explanation for the alliance formation of the intelligence services of Israel and South Africa. Although scholars have indeed examined the explanatory merit of realism and liberal internationalism in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of (liberal) democratic and mixed (democratic and non-democratic) dyads, attempts at bringing the two theories to bear on the interactions of intelligence services have not been forthcoming, a shortcoming this article attempts to address. This article seeks to bridge this gap by evaluating the relative explanatory worth of offensive realism and liberal internationalism in accounting for the alliance formation of the intelligence services of Israel and South Africa. The significance of this article lies in its examination of international politics and realist thought through the specific lens of intelligence services.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135705058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is widely accepted today that hypersonic weapons pose insurmountable challengesto nuclear deterrence. Although speed has always been a critical factor in warfare, thedevelopment of hypersonics provides unprecedented advantages in terms of the speedand agility of missiles. The increase in the speed and agility of hypersonic missilesdrastically reduces the response time of nuclear states, encouraging the pre-emptive useof force. Two arguments inform the latter claim. The first holds that the speed and agilityof hypersonic missiles are likely to render existing and future missile defences obsolete.The second contends that the failure of missile defences coupled with the reductionof the response time of nuclear states encourages the pre-emptive use of force. Wherenuclear states are unable to field survivable second-strike forces, the stability of nucleardeterrence becomes highly problematic. Besides these arguments, the dual-use nature ofhypersonic weapons ostensibly increases the risk of nuclear escalation. Against this bleakassessment, in this article, the author questions the destabilising effects of hypersonicweapons on deterrence stability, arguing that nuclear deterrence is – and is likely toremain – deeply stable. A thoroughgoing consideration of the strategic implicationsof nuclear weapons provides optimism about the stability of nuclear deterrence inthe face of the development of hypersonic weapons. Two arguments are advanced insupport of the continuing stability of nuclear deterrence. First, missile defences have(and are likely to remain) inefficacious, with the development of hypersonic weaponsmerely reinforcing (rather than establishing) this fact. Second, a would-be aggressorcontemplating the pre-emptive use of force would have to believe that it could destroyall of an adversary’s nuclear force before any can be launched.
{"title":"Hypersonic weapons and the future of nuclear deterrence","authors":"E. Coetzee","doi":"10.5787/49-1-1318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/49-1-1318","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely accepted today that hypersonic weapons pose insurmountable challengesto nuclear deterrence. Although speed has always been a critical factor in warfare, thedevelopment of hypersonics provides unprecedented advantages in terms of the speedand agility of missiles. The increase in the speed and agility of hypersonic missilesdrastically reduces the response time of nuclear states, encouraging the pre-emptive useof force. Two arguments inform the latter claim. The first holds that the speed and agilityof hypersonic missiles are likely to render existing and future missile defences obsolete.The second contends that the failure of missile defences coupled with the reductionof the response time of nuclear states encourages the pre-emptive use of force. Wherenuclear states are unable to field survivable second-strike forces, the stability of nucleardeterrence becomes highly problematic. Besides these arguments, the dual-use nature ofhypersonic weapons ostensibly increases the risk of nuclear escalation. Against this bleakassessment, in this article, the author questions the destabilising effects of hypersonicweapons on deterrence stability, arguing that nuclear deterrence is – and is likely toremain – deeply stable. A thoroughgoing consideration of the strategic implicationsof nuclear weapons provides optimism about the stability of nuclear deterrence inthe face of the development of hypersonic weapons. Two arguments are advanced insupport of the continuing stability of nuclear deterrence. First, missile defences have(and are likely to remain) inefficacious, with the development of hypersonic weaponsmerely reinforcing (rather than establishing) this fact. Second, a would-be aggressorcontemplating the pre-emptive use of force would have to believe that it could destroyall of an adversary’s nuclear force before any can be launched.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123931570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Finding a mainstream South African publisher for an academic work on SouthAfrican history is a daunting prospect for an author. Doing so when it involves a nichetopic on an obscure personality in a forgotten period of South African history can beeven more disheartening. Praise for Protea Book House, who backing Mouton, haveprovided a mainstream publishing vehicle to bring a fascinating period of our historyback into the public domain. Works such as The opportunist: The political Life ofOswald Pirow, 1915–1959 might otherwise have remained inaccessible to the generalpublic, either residing in the rarefied atmosphere of academia or gathering dust on ashelf in a university library as an academic print. The hard truth is that well-researched,peer-reviewed and skilfully written works of history do not necessarily translate intobestsellers, and in most cases, the opposite is true. Publishers with a keen eye on theirbottom-line have a set of criteria designed to maximise profit, which often clashes withthe lofty standards demanded by academia. For that reason, it is always welcome whena work such as this book by Mouton manages to bridge the academic–popularist divide.
为一本关于南非历史的学术著作找到一家南非主流出版商，对作者来说是一件令人望而生畏的事情。当它涉及到南非历史上一个被遗忘时期的一个不知名人物的小众话题时，这样做可能会更令人沮丧。对支持木顿的普罗蒂亚书屋(Protea Book House)的赞扬，它提供了一种主流出版工具，将我们历史上一段迷人的时期带回了公共领域。像《机会主义者:奥斯瓦尔德·皮罗的政治生活，1915-1959》这样的作品，要么是作为学术印刷品存在于稀薄的学术氛围中，要么是在大学图书馆的书架上积满灰尘，否则公众可能仍然无法接触到。残酷的事实是，经过充分研究、经过同行评议、写作技巧高超的历史著作并不一定能成为畅销书，在大多数情况下，情况恰恰相反。密切关注自己底线的出版商有一套旨在实现利润最大化的标准，这往往与学术界所要求的崇高标准相冲突。出于这个原因，当像穆顿的这本书这样的作品设法弥合了学术与平民之间的鸿沟时，它总是受到欢迎的。
{"title":"The opportunist: The political life of Oswald Pirow, 1915-1959","authors":"D. Katz","doi":"10.5787/49-1-1325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/49-1-1325","url":null,"abstract":"Finding a mainstream South African publisher for an academic work on SouthAfrican history is a daunting prospect for an author. Doing so when it involves a nichetopic on an obscure personality in a forgotten period of South African history can beeven more disheartening. Praise for Protea Book House, who backing Mouton, haveprovided a mainstream publishing vehicle to bring a fascinating period of our historyback into the public domain. Works such as The opportunist: The political Life ofOswald Pirow, 1915–1959 might otherwise have remained inaccessible to the generalpublic, either residing in the rarefied atmosphere of academia or gathering dust on ashelf in a university library as an academic print. The hard truth is that well-researched,peer-reviewed and skilfully written works of history do not necessarily translate intobestsellers, and in most cases, the opposite is true. Publishers with a keen eye on theirbottom-line have a set of criteria designed to maximise profit, which often clashes withthe lofty standards demanded by academia. For that reason, it is always welcome whena work such as this book by Mouton manages to bridge the academic–popularist divide.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123574130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article reflects an effort to make sense of the objective realities of the SouthAfrican security predicament. The objective realities on the security agenda are rootedin the practical reality of experience and are open for public discussion, debate andspeculation. These realities are informed by the threats facing South Africans on adaily basis. Government provides security with subjective content to the extent thatpolitical power demarcates the threat agenda, prioritises the items on the threat agenda,and foots the security bill. Since the creation of the Union in 1910, South Africa hashad to find a balance between the security realities emanating from three key securitydomains – irrespective of the ruling entity: security threats from outside Africa, thosethreats facing the country from within Africa, and security threats from within theborders of South Africa. The article aims at a scholarly demarcation of some of the mostcritical, important, and key features of the South African security agenda using thesethree domains as a framework for discussion. On a secondary level, the discussion alsocritically reflects on the ability of the human security paradigm to address the SouthAfrican security predicament.
{"title":"The South African security predicament: making sense of the objective realities","authors":"A. Esterhuyse","doi":"10.5787/49-1-1307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/49-1-1307","url":null,"abstract":"This article reflects an effort to make sense of the objective realities of the SouthAfrican security predicament. The objective realities on the security agenda are rootedin the practical reality of experience and are open for public discussion, debate andspeculation. These realities are informed by the threats facing South Africans on adaily basis. Government provides security with subjective content to the extent thatpolitical power demarcates the threat agenda, prioritises the items on the threat agenda,and foots the security bill. Since the creation of the Union in 1910, South Africa hashad to find a balance between the security realities emanating from three key securitydomains – irrespective of the ruling entity: security threats from outside Africa, thosethreats facing the country from within Africa, and security threats from within theborders of South Africa. The article aims at a scholarly demarcation of some of the mostcritical, important, and key features of the South African security agenda using thesethree domains as a framework for discussion. On a secondary level, the discussion alsocritically reflects on the ability of the human security paradigm to address the SouthAfrican security predicament.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121945283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
“Most war stories”, according to Hynes, “begin with a nobody-in-particularyoung man, who lives through the experience of war, to emerge at the end definedby what has happened to him.”443 One such “nobody-in-particular young man” wasnational serviceman 74257684BC Private Stephen Pierre Joubert, born on 3 July 1958in Chingola, then Northern Rhodesia.444 Since the age of five, he and his family livedin Pretoria. He had a typical childhood in most respects.445 Barely seventeen yearsold, he, like many other young men, reported for national service. One year later,in 1977, he stood in a “perfectly pressed” uniform with “buttons and badges [that]sparkled like diamonds” in a large room in a nondescript building at the South AfricanAirforce (SAAF) Gymnasium in Valhalla, Pretoria.446 Facing him was an intimidating,expressionless collection of brass seated in a semicircle. It was Joubert’s second PilotSelection Board interview for the Pupil Pilot’s Course. Among the brass was thelegendary aviator, World War II and Korean War veteran, then chief of the SAAF,General Bob Rogers. The general asked the first question, “[h]ow long have you wantedto be a pilot?” Joubert responded, “[s]ince I stopped wanting to be an ice cream seller,sir!”447 Two years later, “on an early November day”, 21-year-old Joubert with wingspinned to his chest stepped onto AFB Ondangwa in South West Africa, now calledNamibia.448 The events that followed changed him forever. It was as Hynes notes, “outof that nobody, war has forged a self”.
{"title":"Gunship Over Angola : The Story of a Maverick Pilot","authors":"Anri Delport","doi":"10.5787/49-1-1323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/49-1-1323","url":null,"abstract":"“Most war stories”, according to Hynes, “begin with a nobody-in-particularyoung man, who lives through the experience of war, to emerge at the end definedby what has happened to him.”443 One such “nobody-in-particular young man” wasnational serviceman 74257684BC Private Stephen Pierre Joubert, born on 3 July 1958in Chingola, then Northern Rhodesia.444 Since the age of five, he and his family livedin Pretoria. He had a typical childhood in most respects.445 Barely seventeen yearsold, he, like many other young men, reported for national service. One year later,in 1977, he stood in a “perfectly pressed” uniform with “buttons and badges [that]sparkled like diamonds” in a large room in a nondescript building at the South AfricanAirforce (SAAF) Gymnasium in Valhalla, Pretoria.446 Facing him was an intimidating,expressionless collection of brass seated in a semicircle. It was Joubert’s second PilotSelection Board interview for the Pupil Pilot’s Course. Among the brass was thelegendary aviator, World War II and Korean War veteran, then chief of the SAAF,General Bob Rogers. The general asked the first question, “[h]ow long have you wantedto be a pilot?” Joubert responded, “[s]ince I stopped wanting to be an ice cream seller,sir!”447 Two years later, “on an early November day”, 21-year-old Joubert with wingspinned to his chest stepped onto AFB Ondangwa in South West Africa, now calledNamibia.448 The events that followed changed him forever. It was as Hynes notes, “outof that nobody, war has forged a self”.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116117033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Operation Crusader took place in the wide context of an integrated, multi-servicetheatre-level offensive operation in the Western Desert and the Mediterranean fromOctober 1941 through to January 1942. Seen through this lens, Operation Crusader wassimply the Army and the Royal Air Force component of a multi-service theatre-leveloffensive conducted by Allied forces. The operation ended with an almost completedefeat of the Axis troops, the lifting of the seven-month siege of Tobruk and the retreatof the surviving Axis forces to a position on the border of the colonial provinces ofTripolitania and Cyrenaica, in central Libya.Operation Crusader was the first army-level offensive undertaken by the Alliedforces in World War II, lasting from 17 November 1941 to 15 January 1942.355 Theaim of Operation Crusader was to trigger a large-scale tank battle with Axis tank forcesoutside the besieged desert port of Tobruk in Libya, to destroy the Axis armouredforces, and to pave the way to lift the siege of Tobruk, which had been conducted bythe Axis forces since April 1941. Operation Crusader was the first step in a set of threeoperations expected to lead to the clearing of the North African coast from Axis forcesand subsequently allow an invasion of Sicily in 1942. The battle was the largest tankoffensive conducted by Allied forces in either World War I or World War II until theSecond Battle of El Alamein in late October 1942. It was characterised by a number oftank battles between the Axis forces under the command of General der PanzertruppenErwin Rommel and Allied infantry and armoured forces under Lieutenant-General AlanCunningham and then Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie, who fought under the overalldirection of General Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East. 356 357The conduct of the battle showed weaknesses in the doctrine of British armouredforces, but it ultimately ended in a victory for the Allied forces. This article analysesthe first clash of British and German tanks during Operation Crusader and provides anew perspective on the performance of an experienced British cruiser tank regiment,which calls into question the overall assessment of how British armour performedduring the battle. The re-assessment provided in this article is in particular related to theperformance of both sides in the battle and the performance of both sides against theirtactical objectives on the day, as well as the comparative losses in tanks. The article covers the first engagement of British 4th Armoured Brigade with Germanarmour during the opening stage of Operation Crusader between 17 and 20 Novemberin which it managed to thwart a German counterattack. Utilising primary documents,such as war diaries, messages and reports, this article provides a new perspective on theestablished view of the battle that also affects our view of the performance of Britisharmoured units at regimental level during this period of the Desert War. The articlepresents a reassessment
{"title":"A reassessment of the tank battle between 4th Armoured Brigade and Panzerregiment 5 during Operation Crusader in North Africa on 19 November 1941","authors":"A. Biermann","doi":"10.5787/49-1-1319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/49-1-1319","url":null,"abstract":"Operation Crusader took place in the wide context of an integrated, multi-servicetheatre-level offensive operation in the Western Desert and the Mediterranean fromOctober 1941 through to January 1942. Seen through this lens, Operation Crusader wassimply the Army and the Royal Air Force component of a multi-service theatre-leveloffensive conducted by Allied forces. The operation ended with an almost completedefeat of the Axis troops, the lifting of the seven-month siege of Tobruk and the retreatof the surviving Axis forces to a position on the border of the colonial provinces ofTripolitania and Cyrenaica, in central Libya.Operation Crusader was the first army-level offensive undertaken by the Alliedforces in World War II, lasting from 17 November 1941 to 15 January 1942.355 Theaim of Operation Crusader was to trigger a large-scale tank battle with Axis tank forcesoutside the besieged desert port of Tobruk in Libya, to destroy the Axis armouredforces, and to pave the way to lift the siege of Tobruk, which had been conducted bythe Axis forces since April 1941. Operation Crusader was the first step in a set of threeoperations expected to lead to the clearing of the North African coast from Axis forcesand subsequently allow an invasion of Sicily in 1942. The battle was the largest tankoffensive conducted by Allied forces in either World War I or World War II until theSecond Battle of El Alamein in late October 1942. It was characterised by a number oftank battles between the Axis forces under the command of General der PanzertruppenErwin Rommel and Allied infantry and armoured forces under Lieutenant-General AlanCunningham and then Lieutenant-General Neil Ritchie, who fought under the overalldirection of General Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East. 356 357The conduct of the battle showed weaknesses in the doctrine of British armouredforces, but it ultimately ended in a victory for the Allied forces. This article analysesthe first clash of British and German tanks during Operation Crusader and provides anew perspective on the performance of an experienced British cruiser tank regiment,which calls into question the overall assessment of how British armour performedduring the battle. The re-assessment provided in this article is in particular related to theperformance of both sides in the battle and the performance of both sides against theirtactical objectives on the day, as well as the comparative losses in tanks. The article covers the first engagement of British 4th Armoured Brigade with Germanarmour during the opening stage of Operation Crusader between 17 and 20 Novemberin which it managed to thwart a German counterattack. Utilising primary documents,such as war diaries, messages and reports, this article provides a new perspective on theestablished view of the battle that also affects our view of the performance of Britisharmoured units at regimental level during this period of the Desert War. The articlepresents a reassessment ","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"129 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129102898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In most paradigm militaries of the world, there seems to be an expectation for ageneral to write and publish his or her biography as soon as possible after retirementfrom active duty – a type of ‘first duty’ in retirement. These biographies are often criticalfor militaries, much like in the medical, law and clerical professions, to grow their bodyof knowledge and empower the next generation of soldiers. For armed forces in general,military history of this nature has always played an important role in the geographicaland cultural contextualisation and shaping of their doctrine. Without a sound andcomprehensive military historical foundation for the development of their doctrine,militaries remain dependent on the imported knowledge base of paradigm militaries.
{"title":"Soldaat en mens","authors":"Abel Esterhuyse","doi":"10.5787/49-1-1324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/49-1-1324","url":null,"abstract":"In most paradigm militaries of the world, there seems to be an expectation for ageneral to write and publish his or her biography as soon as possible after retirementfrom active duty – a type of ‘first duty’ in retirement. These biographies are often criticalfor militaries, much like in the medical, law and clerical professions, to grow their bodyof knowledge and empower the next generation of soldiers. For armed forces in general,military history of this nature has always played an important role in the geographicaland cultural contextualisation and shaping of their doctrine. Without a sound andcomprehensive military historical foundation for the development of their doctrine,militaries remain dependent on the imported knowledge base of paradigm militaries.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125029668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, based on a study rooted in interpretivism, the South African NationalWar College military history staff ride, as an education and training method related tothe curriculum of the senior staff programmes since 2002, is discussed. The educationand training process, with specific reference to the staff ride to military battle sites andthe associated application of the theory of operational art, were researched accordingto the tenets of the theory of deep learning. While using the historical–comparativemethod during the staff ride enabled the majority of the students to determine whichviable options were available to the commander, not all students were necessarily ableto relate deep learning to critical thinking. Consequently, in certain instances, surfacelearning tended to dominate simply because that was the educational world into whichthe students had been socialised. Furthermore, the facilitation process did not alwaysfully serve the students by completely weaning them off learning habits associated withsurface learning. Consequently, while being able to claim some deep learning successesusing the staff ride, continuous reflection and educational interventions are neededto maintain the successes achieved and to use these as a building platform for deeplearning during future staff rides.
{"title":"The South African National War College military history staff ride as a deep learning experience","authors":"James Jacobs, J. Wassermann","doi":"10.5787/49-1-1317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/49-1-1317","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, based on a study rooted in interpretivism, the South African NationalWar College military history staff ride, as an education and training method related tothe curriculum of the senior staff programmes since 2002, is discussed. The educationand training process, with specific reference to the staff ride to military battle sites andthe associated application of the theory of operational art, were researched accordingto the tenets of the theory of deep learning. While using the historical–comparativemethod during the staff ride enabled the majority of the students to determine whichviable options were available to the commander, not all students were necessarily ableto relate deep learning to critical thinking. Consequently, in certain instances, surfacelearning tended to dominate simply because that was the educational world into whichthe students had been socialised. Furthermore, the facilitation process did not alwaysfully serve the students by completely weaning them off learning habits associated withsurface learning. Consequently, while being able to claim some deep learning successesusing the staff ride, continuous reflection and educational interventions are neededto maintain the successes achieved and to use these as a building platform for deeplearning during future staff rides.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120994171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Battle of Bangui has assumed near mythical proportions within South Africa,and specifically in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). During thebattle that occurred in March 2013, a small force of crack South African troops engaged a7 000-strong Seleka rebel force in an effort to stem their advance on Bangui – the capitalof the politically unstable and resource-rich Central African Republic (CAR). Over thecourse of two days, the South African force fought a number of gallant actions andinflicted heavy casualties on the advancing rebel forces. However, the South Africanscould not hold out indefinitely, especially against overwhelming odds and after takingsome casualties during the ensuing fighting. Moreover, they soon found themselvessurrounded in their makeshift base within Bangui, where they were ultimately forced tonegotiate a ceasefire with the Seleka rebels. Following the ceasefire, the South Africancontingent returned to South Africa, and so began the process of trying to make senseof the rationale to deploy SANDF troops to CAR, and what exactly happened duringthe so-called ‘Battle of Bangui’. Most importantly, the country, the defence force, andthe respective families, had to come to grips with the unnecessary loss of South Africanlives in a seemingly distant corner of Africa.
{"title":"The Battle of Bangui: The inside story of South Africa's worst military scandal since Apartheid","authors":"Evert Kleynhans","doi":"10.5787/49-1-1322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/49-1-1322","url":null,"abstract":"The Battle of Bangui has assumed near mythical proportions within South Africa,and specifically in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). During thebattle that occurred in March 2013, a small force of crack South African troops engaged a7 000-strong Seleka rebel force in an effort to stem their advance on Bangui – the capitalof the politically unstable and resource-rich Central African Republic (CAR). Over thecourse of two days, the South African force fought a number of gallant actions andinflicted heavy casualties on the advancing rebel forces. However, the South Africanscould not hold out indefinitely, especially against overwhelming odds and after takingsome casualties during the ensuing fighting. Moreover, they soon found themselvessurrounded in their makeshift base within Bangui, where they were ultimately forced tonegotiate a ceasefire with the Seleka rebels. Following the ceasefire, the South Africancontingent returned to South Africa, and so began the process of trying to make senseof the rationale to deploy SANDF troops to CAR, and what exactly happened duringthe so-called ‘Battle of Bangui’. Most importantly, the country, the defence force, andthe respective families, had to come to grips with the unnecessary loss of South Africanlives in a seemingly distant corner of Africa.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124378437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Die brug: Na die hel en terug in Angola - Deon Lamprecht","authors":"Anri Delport","doi":"10.5787/48-2-1301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/48-2-1301","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115818779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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