The study reported in this article explored the nexus between military theory and history. Military theory attempts to quantify, qualify and illuminate the often unpredictable phenomenon of war. The article consists of two parts: the theory of manoeuvre warfare and the history of the 1914-1915 South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA). The GSWA campaign has been described in many ways as a secondary theatre within the greater geostrategic chess game of the First World War. The objective of this analysis was to question whether the South African victory resulted from vast numerical superiority or from the operational concepts, which the South Africans applied in the execution of the campaign.
{"title":"A manoeuvre warfare analysis of South Africa’s 1914-1915 German South West African campaign","authors":"Antonio Garcia","doi":"10.5787/45-1-1194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/45-1-1194","url":null,"abstract":"The study reported in this article explored the nexus between military theory and history. Military theory attempts to quantify, qualify and illuminate the often unpredictable phenomenon of war. The article consists of two parts: the theory of manoeuvre warfare and the history of the 1914-1915 South African campaign in German South West Africa (GSWA). The GSWA campaign has been described in many ways as a secondary theatre within the greater geostrategic chess game of the First World War. The objective of this analysis was to question whether the South African victory resulted from vast numerical superiority or from the operational concepts, which the South Africans applied in the execution of the campaign.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126998883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite having a vast number of forces arrayed against it – the United States-led coalition, Putin’s Moscow, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, Kurdish Peshmerga and the regimes in Baghdad and Damascus – Islamic State (IS) has expanded into other areas. Despite losing territory in Iraq and Syria, IS is growing in the Far East, the Caucasus and Africa. Reasons for the resilience displayed on the part of the jihadis are encouraging polarisation between groups and then benefiting from this process. Its diverse funding sources from oil sales to the trafficking of antiquities and narcotics have allowed IS to build a war chest in excess of US$ 2 billion. With these funds, IS has deployed soft power – digging sewage systems and providing stipends to families – to earn the loyalty of its ‘citizens’. IS has also displayed superior military strategy combining conventional military doctrine with asymmetric warfare. As IS are confronted with superior conventional forces in their heartland, however, they embrace more asymmetric warfare.
{"title":"The evolution of Islamic State’s strategy","authors":"H. Solomon","doi":"10.5787/45-1-1191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/45-1-1191","url":null,"abstract":"Despite having a vast number of forces arrayed against it – the United States-led coalition, Putin’s Moscow, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, Kurdish Peshmerga and the regimes in Baghdad and Damascus – Islamic State (IS) has expanded into other areas. Despite losing territory in Iraq and Syria, IS is growing in the Far East, the Caucasus and Africa. Reasons for the resilience displayed on the part of the jihadis are encouraging polarisation between groups and then benefiting from this process. Its diverse funding sources from oil sales to the trafficking of antiquities and narcotics have allowed IS to build a war chest in excess of US$ 2 billion. With these funds, IS has deployed soft power – digging sewage systems and providing stipends to families – to earn the loyalty of its ‘citizens’. IS has also displayed superior military strategy combining conventional military doctrine with asymmetric warfare. As IS are confronted with superior conventional forces in their heartland, however, they embrace more asymmetric warfare.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114426371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The campaign in East and Central Africa during the First World War has received relatively little attention despite the remarkable exploits of Major General Edward Northey and Norforce. In field command for two and a half years, he successfully led a multi-ethnic and polyglot force across some of the most difficult terrain of the war. Exerting strong leadership and overseeing detailed logistical planning, Northey was able to maintain an effective force that was consistently able to march and fight the German Schutztruppe under von Lettow-Vorbeck. In contrast to the main body of the British East African Force, Norforce maintained its combat effectiveness despite high levels of sickness and highly trying climatic conditions. Overall, Northey must be considered the outstanding British general of the East African Campaign while Norforce deserves full credit for its singular achievements.
{"title":"Norforce: Major General Edward Northey and the Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia Frontier Force, January 1916 to June 1918","authors":"Ross Anderson","doi":"10.5787/44-1-1162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/44-1-1162","url":null,"abstract":"The campaign in East and Central Africa during the First World War has received relatively little attention despite the remarkable exploits of Major General Edward Northey and Norforce. In field command for two and a half years, he successfully led a multi-ethnic and polyglot force across some of the most difficult terrain of the war. Exerting strong leadership and overseeing detailed logistical planning, Northey was able to maintain an effective force that was consistently able to march and fight the German Schutztruppe under von Lettow-Vorbeck. In contrast to the main body of the British East African Force, Norforce maintained its combat effectiveness despite high levels of sickness and highly trying climatic conditions. Overall, Northey must be considered the outstanding British general of the East African Campaign while Norforce deserves full credit for its singular achievements.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122474393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The First World War marked a revolt against the traditional mode of official history as conceived and written by the General Staffs and taught at the Staff Colleges. After 1918, the publics in various countries, having experienced massed mobilisation and the impact of total warfare, demanded an explanation for the sacrifices so many had been called on to make. This more inclusive approach rejected the nineteenth-century, Staff College predilection for campaign narratives focussing narrowly on “lessons learned”. The South African tradition of official history dates from this period. This article outlines the creation of the first military archival organisation in Pretoria and analyses the South African First World War official history programme. It explores the apparent motives behind the programme and reveals the often-difficult relationships between the historians and their principals at Defence Headquarters and the tensions between the two modes of official history.
{"title":"Recording the Great War : military archives and the South African official history programme, 1914-1939","authors":"I. V. D. Waag","doi":"10.5787/44-1-1163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/44-1-1163","url":null,"abstract":"The First World War marked a revolt against the traditional mode of official history as conceived and written by the General Staffs and taught at the Staff Colleges. After 1918, the publics in various countries, having experienced massed mobilisation and the impact of total warfare, demanded an explanation for the sacrifices so many had been called on to make. This more inclusive approach rejected the nineteenth-century, Staff College predilection for campaign narratives focussing narrowly on “lessons learned”. The South African tradition of official history dates from this period. This article outlines the creation of the first military archival organisation in Pretoria and analyses the South African First World War official history programme. It explores the apparent motives behind the programme and reveals the often-difficult relationships between the historians and their principals at Defence Headquarters and the tensions between the two modes of official history.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128691535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most quarters of the Allied camp greeted the fall of Tobruk on 21 June 1942 with incredulity. The epitome of a heroic defence conducted the year before had now deteriorated into a military debacle, resulting in thousands of Allied soldiers sent ‘into the bag’. The enormity of the defeat, at first greeted in muted fashion by a stunned press, soon turned into outrage at yet another Allied military fiasco. The British and South African papers began to demand answers from politicians and military leaders for this shocking and unexpected catastrophe. The press, normally sensitive to maintaining positive home front morale, discarded their wartime cosseting approach and embarked on a quest to find a scapegoat. Those captured at Tobruk were equally outraged that their freedom had been traded cheaply with hardly a fight. To many of these prisoners of war, the blame for their ignominious surrender rested squarely with the fortress commander, Major General HB Klopper. It was of little consequence to those now languishing behind the wire that the reasons for defeat were much more intricate and went beyond the performance of one man. This article examines a selection of representative press reports in the weeks immediately preceding and following the rout, and the oral reminiscences of former prisoners-of-war taken at Tobruk, which together, have contributed towards an enduring memory of the so-called Tobruk ‘debacle’.
{"title":"The Surrender of Tobruk in 1942: Press reports and soldiers’ memories","authors":"K. Horn, D. Katz","doi":"10.5787/44-1-1167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/44-1-1167","url":null,"abstract":"Most quarters of the Allied camp greeted the fall of Tobruk on 21 June 1942 with incredulity. The epitome of a heroic defence conducted the year before had now deteriorated into a military debacle, resulting in thousands of Allied soldiers sent ‘into the bag’. The enormity of the defeat, at first greeted in muted fashion by a stunned press, soon turned into outrage at yet another Allied military fiasco. The British and South African papers began to demand answers from politicians and military leaders for this shocking and unexpected catastrophe. The press, normally sensitive to maintaining positive home front morale, discarded their wartime cosseting approach and embarked on a quest to find a scapegoat. Those captured at Tobruk were equally outraged that their freedom had been traded cheaply with hardly a fight. To many of these prisoners of war, the blame for their ignominious surrender rested squarely with the fortress commander, Major General HB Klopper. It was of little consequence to those now languishing behind the wire that the reasons for defeat were much more intricate and went beyond the performance of one man. This article examines a selection of representative press reports in the weeks immediately preceding and following the rout, and the oral reminiscences of former prisoners-of-war taken at Tobruk, which together, have contributed towards an enduring memory of the so-called Tobruk ‘debacle’.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125654683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The outbreak of the First World War divided the South African Labour Party, a movement representing the country’s white working class. The party’s parliamentary delegation supported South African government’s participation in the war effort, but many leadership figures within the party and the trade unions disagreed with this stance. The dissidents formed an organization called the War on War League. In mid-1915, the anti-war activists left the party and formed the International Socialist League, a predecessor of the Communist Party of South Africa. The War on War League has conventionally been regarded as important only for its role in the eventual formation of the Communist Party. This article however contends that it needs to be understood in its own terms, as a pacifist movement, reflecting a political moment of resistance to the plunge into global war.
{"title":"The War on War League: A South African Pacifist Movement, 1914-1915","authors":"J. Hyslop","doi":"10.5787/44-1-1160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/44-1-1160","url":null,"abstract":"The outbreak of the First World War divided the South African Labour Party, a movement representing the country’s white working class. The party’s parliamentary delegation supported South African government’s participation in the war effort, but many leadership figures within the party and the trade unions disagreed with this stance. The dissidents formed an organization called the War on War League. In mid-1915, the anti-war activists left the party and formed the International Socialist League, a predecessor of the Communist Party of South Africa. The War on War League has conventionally been regarded as important only for its role in the eventual formation of the Communist Party. This article however contends that it needs to be understood in its own terms, as a pacifist movement, reflecting a political moment of resistance to the plunge into global war.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134096162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The German armaments production during World War II (1939-1945) is a highly debatable issue. Many studies point out that it was a success story since the overall production increased in spite of the heavy Allied air bombing campaign during the period 1943-1945. Others point out that the size of the production could not balance the aggregate production of Britain, USA, and the USSR. This study points out that by the end of 1941 with the entry of the USSR and the US in the war Germany had to plan for two different types of war. One was a land war against the USSR and the second was a naval-air war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers (Britain and the USA). German industry did quite well with the first challenge (with the assistance of captured material and industrial power of occupied Europe) but failed in the naval-air war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers.
{"title":"A Re-assessment of the German armaments production during World War II","authors":"I. Salavrakos","doi":"10.5787/44-2-1178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/44-2-1178","url":null,"abstract":"The German armaments production during World War II (1939-1945) is a highly debatable issue. Many studies point out that it was a success story since the overall production increased in spite of the heavy Allied air bombing campaign during the period 1943-1945. Others point out that the size of the production could not balance the aggregate production of Britain, USA, and the USSR. This study points out that by the end of 1941 with the entry of the USSR and the US in the war Germany had to plan for two different types of war. One was a land war against the USSR and the second was a naval-air war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers (Britain and the USA). German industry did quite well with the first challenge (with the assistance of captured material and industrial power of occupied Europe) but failed in the naval-air war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127497566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It was with great sadness that we heard of the sudden passing of Professor Jeffrey Grey in Canberra on 26 July 2016. Jeff was a model military historian. He represented the best of our profession and espoused, often stridently, the merits of history as a discipline, its relevance to armed forces as organisations, and as its importance as a pillar in the education of military and naval officers. We were most fortunate to have had Jeff on our editorial board at Scientia Militaria from 2000.
{"title":"In Memoriam: Prof Jeffrey Grey, 1959-2016","authors":"I. V. D. Waag","doi":"10.5787/44-2-1184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/44-2-1184","url":null,"abstract":"It was with great sadness that we heard of the sudden passing of Professor Jeffrey Grey in Canberra on 26 July 2016. Jeff was a model military historian. He represented the best of our profession and espoused, often stridently, the merits of history as a discipline, its relevance to armed forces as organisations, and as its importance as a pillar in the education of military and naval officers. We were most fortunate to have had Jeff on our editorial board at Scientia Militaria from 2000.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126296471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
South Africa’s entry into the Second World War in 1939 was complex. The Smuts government lacked nation-wide support and experienced hostile reactions from opponents of its war policy. It was also subjected to Nazi propaganda offensives, which intensified national divisions and undermined public morale. In response, the Union authorities adopted a volunteer policy for military service and embarked on a massive drive to secure positive public opinion and national support for the war policy. This move led to the establishment of various publicity and propaganda organisations to influence public opinion and to stimulate enthusiasm for the war. However, inadequate policy direction and lacking a solid framework to guide propaganda organisation and operations created inter-agency frictions and rivalries. The study on which this article is based, examined the main propaganda agencies, the Bureau of Information (BOI), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS), which contested one another for jurisdiction, authority and power to shape public opinion in South Africa during the war. The analysis focused on the rationale for their establishment, their purpose, objectives and activities. Then the article reports on the inter-institutional relationships, organisational politics and competition, and how these aspects affected the Union’s propaganda enterprise, mobilisation drive and the prosecution of the war effort.
{"title":"South African propaganda agencies and the battle for public opinion during the Second World War, 1939–1945","authors":"F. Monama","doi":"10.5787/44-1-1165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/44-1-1165","url":null,"abstract":"South Africa’s entry into the Second World War in 1939 was complex. The Smuts government lacked nation-wide support and experienced hostile reactions from opponents of its war policy. It was also subjected to Nazi propaganda offensives, which intensified national divisions and undermined public morale. In response, the Union authorities adopted a volunteer policy for military service and embarked on a massive drive to secure positive public opinion and national support for the war policy. This move led to the establishment of various publicity and propaganda organisations to influence public opinion and to stimulate enthusiasm for the war. However, inadequate policy direction and lacking a solid framework to guide propaganda organisation and operations created inter-agency frictions and rivalries. The study on which this article is based, examined the main propaganda agencies, the Bureau of Information (BOI), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS), which contested one another for jurisdiction, authority and power to shape public opinion in South Africa during the war. The analysis focused on the rationale for their establishment, their purpose, objectives and activities. Then the article reports on the inter-institutional relationships, organisational politics and competition, and how these aspects affected the Union’s propaganda enterprise, mobilisation drive and the prosecution of the war effort.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130481734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors have produced a handsome book of encyclopaedic dimensions matched with an equally large price tag. Its sheer weight presents a physical challenge when reading and it may have been wiser rather to present the work in two or three more manageable volumes. The narrative takes the form of a chronicle. Steenkamp and Heitman deftly build the text around the personal accounts of the officers and men who served in the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) 61 Mechanised Battalion Group during the Border War and after that, with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) for a decade into the new democratic South Africa. In constructing the narrative, they place more emphasis on personal accounts than on primary archival material, but the extent is difficult to gauge as the book lacks a comprehensive bibliography or referencing system.
{"title":"Mobility conquers: The story of 61 Mechanised Battalion Group 1978–2005. Willem Steenkamp and Helmoed-Römer Heitman","authors":"D. Katz","doi":"10.5787/44-2-1181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5787/44-2-1181","url":null,"abstract":"The authors have produced a handsome book of encyclopaedic dimensions matched with an equally large price tag. Its sheer weight presents a physical challenge when reading and it may have been wiser rather to present the work in two or three more manageable volumes. The narrative takes the form of a chronicle. Steenkamp and Heitman deftly build the text around the personal accounts of the officers and men who served in the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) 61 Mechanised Battalion Group during the Border War and after that, with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) for a decade into the new democratic South Africa. In constructing the narrative, they place more emphasis on personal accounts than on primary archival material, but the extent is difficult to gauge as the book lacks a comprehensive bibliography or referencing system.","PeriodicalId":173901,"journal":{"name":"Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131412825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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