A four-party evolutionary game model for the collaborative construction strategies of zero-carbon tourism cities (ZCTCs) is established that considers the individual contributions of local governments, tourism enterprises, tourists and local residents to the overall carbon-neutralizing target. The evolutionary stability of the game players' strategies is then analyzed. The results show that there are three stable strategy combinations in the game system for ZCTC construction, which matches the construction modes of tourism cities at different levels of development. The initial value, costs, rewards, penalties, distribution coefficient, and reporting coefficient of the strategy selection affect the evolutionary paths of game players.
{"title":"A four-party evolutionary game analysis of collaborative construction strategies for zero-carbon tourism cities","authors":"Jing Wang, Weitao Liu, Zhaofeng Wang, Song Shi","doi":"10.1002/mde.4305","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4305","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A four-party evolutionary game model for the collaborative construction strategies of zero-carbon tourism cities (ZCTCs) is established that considers the individual contributions of local governments, tourism enterprises, tourists and local residents to the overall carbon-neutralizing target. The evolutionary stability of the game players' strategies is then analyzed. The results show that there are three stable strategy combinations in the game system for ZCTC construction, which matches the construction modes of tourism cities at different levels of development. The initial value, costs, rewards, penalties, distribution coefficient, and reporting coefficient of the strategy selection affect the evolutionary paths of game players.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regarding China's A-share-listed companies as research samples, we construct an empirical model to test the impact of corporate digital transformation on ESG performance. We find that a corporate digital transformation improves its ESG performance. Moreover, the higher the quality of environmental information and the efficiency of external resource allocation, the greater the role of digital transformation on ESG performance. Finally, the ESG performance ameliorates the financing and green performance of enterprises. Our research shows a new perspective for study on the digital transformation and sustainable development of enterprises, meanwhile experience summary for improving China's ESG scoring system and governance.
我们以中国 A 股上市公司为研究样本,构建了一个实证模型来检验企业数字化转型对环境、社会和公司治理绩效的影响。我们发现,企业数字化转型会提高其环境、社会和公司治理绩效。此外,环境信息质量和外部资源配置效率越高,数字化转型对环境、社会和公司治理绩效的影响越大。最后,环境、社会和治理绩效改善了企业的融资和绿色绩效。我们的研究为研究企业数字化转型与可持续发展提供了一个新的视角,同时也为完善中国的ESG评分体系和治理提供了经验总结。
{"title":"Can enterprise digital transformation improve ESG performance?","authors":"Ziming Liu, Zhao Chen, Ling Hu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4307","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4307","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Regarding China's A-share-listed companies as research samples, we construct an empirical model to test the impact of corporate digital transformation on ESG performance. We find that a corporate digital transformation improves its ESG performance. Moreover, the higher the quality of environmental information and the efficiency of external resource allocation, the greater the role of digital transformation on ESG performance. Finally, the ESG performance ameliorates the financing and green performance of enterprises. Our research shows a new perspective for study on the digital transformation and sustainable development of enterprises, meanwhile experience summary for improving China's ESG scoring system and governance.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141653324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In shopping days, e-commerce platforms (ECPs) and their sellers cooperate to promote sales through price discount and marketing effort. Supply chain finance (SCF) has been offered by ECPs to fuel sellers' preparations for shopping days. An ECP-seller supply chain (PSSC) model is constructed to study the strategic interaction between the ECP and the seller. Given a price discount rate, we derive the ECP's optimal marketing effort level and feasible SCF service rule, as well as the seller's optimal supply quantity and financing decisions. Furthermore, we identify a price-discount-rate interval, in which the Pareto improvement of the PSSC can be achieved.
{"title":"Sales promotion and supply chain finance for shopping days: Strategies of e-commerce platform and seller","authors":"Yujie Zhang, Jianhu Cai, Xueshu Shan, Siqing Li, Yongyi Shou","doi":"10.1002/mde.4310","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4310","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In shopping days, e-commerce platforms (ECPs) and their sellers cooperate to promote sales through price discount and marketing effort. Supply chain finance (SCF) has been offered by ECPs to fuel sellers' preparations for shopping days. An ECP-seller supply chain (PSSC) model is constructed to study the strategic interaction between the ECP and the seller. Given a price discount rate, we derive the ECP's optimal marketing effort level and feasible SCF service rule, as well as the seller's optimal supply quantity and financing decisions. Furthermore, we identify a price-discount-rate interval, in which the Pareto improvement of the PSSC can be achieved.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Antonio Carlos Mercer, Angela Cristiane Santos Póvoa, Wesley Pech
We investigated decision-making for others in ambiguous settings. In an online survey, subjects were asked to make decisions for themselves, and for other people. In Experiment 1, ambiguity was conveyed in numerical ranges. In Experiment 2, we used verbal probabilities expressions to convey uncertainty. Decisions encompass three degrees of ambiguity (low, moderate, and high). Consistent with previous literature findings, our results showed no significant differences between self-other decision-making on ambiguity. We build on the existing literature on ambiguity attitudes, emphasizing the use of verbal probability expressions to measure ambiguity, and provide novel evidence into decision-making for others.
{"title":"Decision-making for others: Ambiguity attitudes","authors":"Antonio Carlos Mercer, Angela Cristiane Santos Póvoa, Wesley Pech","doi":"10.1002/mde.4321","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4321","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigated decision-making for others in ambiguous settings. In an online survey, subjects were asked to make decisions for themselves, and for other people. In Experiment 1, ambiguity was conveyed in numerical ranges. In Experiment 2, we used verbal probabilities expressions to convey uncertainty. Decisions encompass three degrees of ambiguity (low, moderate, and high). Consistent with previous literature findings, our results showed no significant differences between self-other decision-making on ambiguity. We build on the existing literature on ambiguity attitudes, emphasizing the use of verbal probability expressions to measure ambiguity, and provide novel evidence into decision-making for others.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.
{"title":"Financing decisions of third-party remanufacturers with different co-opetition modes: The impact of blockchain adoption","authors":"Peng Ma, Junmei Li, Henry Xu, Mingjun Chen","doi":"10.1002/mde.4311","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4311","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141614263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The promotion of sustainability and innovation in the current dynamic landscape of global industry in the context of climate change has become imperative. This research paper explores the critical role of policy interventions in facilitating the diffusion of low-carbon technologies through intricate supply networks. As countries endeavor to meet environmental goals and transition to a more sustainable economy, it becomes critical to understand how policies can effectively shape the diffusion of these technologies through the supply chain. This study employs game theory and evolutionary game theory to investigate the intricate interactions within supply networks, with a particular focus on the nuanced effects of policy on the diffusion of low-carbon technology innovations. The findings suggest that dynamically adjusted policies have the potential to significantly increase the uptake of low-carbon technologies. In particular, an effective subsidy scheme not only promotes the diffusion of innovations, but also demonstrates the ability of government subsidies to be distributed efficiently. In addition, the implementation of dynamic carbon trading schemes is considered to be an important mechanism for promoting firms' decarbonization and stabilizing strategic decision-making processes within firms. This study highlights the significance of tailored dynamic policy frameworks in promoting the adoption of sustainable technologies in supply chains, thus making a significant contribution to the broader goal of achieving a sustainable future.
{"title":"Impact of policy interventions on low-carbon technology innovation diffusion in supply networks","authors":"Zehao Wang, Yu Feng, Nana Yao, Ouwen Lin, Qiyuan Li, Bowen Liu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4312","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4312","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The promotion of sustainability and innovation in the current dynamic landscape of global industry in the context of climate change has become imperative. This research paper explores the critical role of policy interventions in facilitating the diffusion of low-carbon technologies through intricate supply networks. As countries endeavor to meet environmental goals and transition to a more sustainable economy, it becomes critical to understand how policies can effectively shape the diffusion of these technologies through the supply chain. This study employs game theory and evolutionary game theory to investigate the intricate interactions within supply networks, with a particular focus on the nuanced effects of policy on the diffusion of low-carbon technology innovations. The findings suggest that dynamically adjusted policies have the potential to significantly increase the uptake of low-carbon technologies. In particular, an effective subsidy scheme not only promotes the diffusion of innovations, but also demonstrates the ability of government subsidies to be distributed efficiently. In addition, the implementation of dynamic carbon trading schemes is considered to be an important mechanism for promoting firms' decarbonization and stabilizing strategic decision-making processes within firms. This study highlights the significance of tailored dynamic policy frameworks in promoting the adoption of sustainable technologies in supply chains, thus making a significant contribution to the broader goal of achieving a sustainable future.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141574332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consumer impulsive purchasing is very common, especially in the livestream selling where they are influenced by policies such as low prices, limited time, and limited quantity. This behavior can increase a firm's sales, but it also leads to higher return rates. Considering consumer impulse purchase, this paper conducts an analytical model to investigate the conditions for a firm to introduce a livestream channel and whether the firm should adopt a low or moderate livestream price strategy when introducing a livestream channel. Our results show that, when return processing cost is small enough, the firm benefits from the livestream strategies as long as the streamer's fan effect is larger than a threshold. Specifically, a firm prefers to adopt the low livestream price strategy when cooperating with a large fan effect streamer and a moderate livestream price strategy with a small fan effect streamer. However, when return processing cost is large, the low livestream price strategy cannot be the dominant strategy. Furthermore, we make several extensions (i.e., different impulse utility on different livestream price, impact of positive impulse utility of low impulsive consumers, different online return rates of different types of consumers, the costs of introducing the livestream channel, and consumer return processing cost) to verify the robustness of the model, and the main conclusions remain unchanged. These results provide guidance for firms on the introduction of livestream channel and pricing decisions of different channels.
{"title":"Channel selection strategy with consumer impulse purchase in livestream selling","authors":"Lidong Chen, Qingyun Xu, Yi He","doi":"10.1002/mde.4299","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4299","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consumer impulsive purchasing is very common, especially in the livestream selling where they are influenced by policies such as low prices, limited time, and limited quantity. This behavior can increase a firm's sales, but it also leads to higher return rates. Considering consumer impulse purchase, this paper conducts an analytical model to investigate the conditions for a firm to introduce a livestream channel and whether the firm should adopt a low or moderate livestream price strategy when introducing a livestream channel. Our results show that, when return processing cost is small enough, the firm benefits from the livestream strategies as long as the streamer's fan effect is larger than a threshold. Specifically, a firm prefers to adopt the low livestream price strategy when cooperating with a large fan effect streamer and a moderate livestream price strategy with a small fan effect streamer. However, when return processing cost is large, the low livestream price strategy cannot be the dominant strategy. Furthermore, we make several extensions (i.e., different impulse utility on different livestream price, impact of positive impulse utility of low impulsive consumers, different online return rates of different types of consumers, the costs of introducing the livestream channel, and consumer return processing cost) to verify the robustness of the model, and the main conclusions remain unchanged. These results provide guidance for firms on the introduction of livestream channel and pricing decisions of different channels.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cornel Nesseler, Thadeu Gasparetto, Petr Parshakov
Research has suggested many ways in which professional football players can increase their penalty shooting success rate. We set up a field experiment testing these recommendations. We perform the experiment with one of the most successful youth academies in the world. All players are highly skilled, including prospective and current Brazilian youth national players. The players either decide themselves where to shoot or the coach tells them where to shoot. The coach does not reveal if the decision is based on a random allocation or his own choice. The algorithm randomly selects where players must shoot. The results from the experiment show that the best outcome is when players choose where they want to shoot. Coaches and random algorithm have a lower success rate, although following research-based recommendations. The findings are important as they show that researchers should test their recommendations in the field as they do not necessarily translate into real-life settings.
{"title":"Field-based validation of penalty shooting recommendations: An experiment with elite youth football players","authors":"Cornel Nesseler, Thadeu Gasparetto, Petr Parshakov","doi":"10.1002/mde.4283","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4283","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Research has suggested many ways in which professional football players can increase their penalty shooting success rate. We set up a field experiment testing these recommendations. We perform the experiment with one of the most successful youth academies in the world. All players are highly skilled, including prospective and current Brazilian youth national players. The players either decide themselves where to shoot or the coach tells them where to shoot. The coach does not reveal if the decision is based on a random allocation or his own choice. The algorithm randomly selects where players must shoot. The results from the experiment show that the best outcome is when players choose where they want to shoot. Coaches and random algorithm have a lower success rate, although following research-based recommendations. The findings are important as they show that researchers should test their recommendations in the field as they do not necessarily translate into real-life settings.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/mde.4283","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study builds a three-party evolutionary game to study the contributing factors of commission rate, productivity expansion, cooperation subsidy, brand strength, and platform stream. The proposed model investigates the diverse paths the three parties are motivated to pursue at different phases of omni-channel integration and further explores which party, the band owner with strong brand strength, or the platform with a mass consumer stream, dominates omni-channel negotiation regarding profit distribution arrangements.
{"title":"An exploration of omni-channel retail from a three-party evolutionary game perspective: Brand strength vs. platform stream","authors":"Chuan Zhao, Ziyang Guo, Mingke He, Kun Wang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4304","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4304","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study builds a three-party evolutionary game to study the contributing factors of commission rate, productivity expansion, cooperation subsidy, brand strength, and platform stream. The proposed model investigates the diverse paths the three parties are motivated to pursue at different phases of omni-channel integration and further explores which party, the band owner with strong brand strength, or the platform with a mass consumer stream, dominates omni-channel negotiation regarding profit distribution arrangements.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xiaoqian Liu, Javier Cifuentes-Faura, Ming Gao, Cunyi Yang
Economic resources within the jurisdiction of local governments in China shape the external financing environment of enterprises. However, few studies have focused on China's unique political hierarchy, which results in differentiated access to economic resources for different levels of local governments and substantially affects local corporate financing constraints. This paper examines the impact of city political hierarchy on firm financing constraints among Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2019. We use the 200,000 population criterion for delineating the political hierarchy of cities in 1927 as the cutoff for fuzzy regression discontinuity design to identify causal effects. The results show that the greater a city's political rank is, the lower its financing constraints are. The mechanism suggests that the central government provides more financial and political resources to high-level cities, directly and indirectly influencing the financing constraints of firms. In addition, high-level cities' government preferences, bank loans, debt financing costs, and business credit are vital channels at the firm level. However, this effect varies depending on the ownership and size of the firm.
{"title":"Financing constraints of firms: Is there political favoritism in the economic resources given by the central government?","authors":"Xiaoqian Liu, Javier Cifuentes-Faura, Ming Gao, Cunyi Yang","doi":"10.1002/mde.4296","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4296","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Economic resources within the jurisdiction of local governments in China shape the external financing environment of enterprises. However, few studies have focused on China's unique political hierarchy, which results in differentiated access to economic resources for different levels of local governments and substantially affects local corporate financing constraints. This paper examines the impact of city political hierarchy on firm financing constraints among Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2019. We use the 200,000 population criterion for delineating the political hierarchy of cities in 1927 as the cutoff for fuzzy regression discontinuity design to identify causal effects. The results show that the greater a city's political rank is, the lower its financing constraints are. The mechanism suggests that the central government provides more financial and political resources to high-level cities, directly and indirectly influencing the financing constraints of firms. In addition, high-level cities' government preferences, bank loans, debt financing costs, and business credit are vital channels at the firm level. However, this effect varies depending on the ownership and size of the firm.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141680120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}