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A four-party evolutionary game analysis of collaborative construction strategies for zero-carbon tourism cities 零碳旅游城市合作建设战略的四方进化博弈分析
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4305
Jing Wang, Weitao Liu, Zhaofeng Wang, Song Shi

A four-party evolutionary game model for the collaborative construction strategies of zero-carbon tourism cities (ZCTCs) is established that considers the individual contributions of local governments, tourism enterprises, tourists and local residents to the overall carbon-neutralizing target. The evolutionary stability of the game players' strategies is then analyzed. The results show that there are three stable strategy combinations in the game system for ZCTC construction, which matches the construction modes of tourism cities at different levels of development. The initial value, costs, rewards, penalties, distribution coefficient, and reporting coefficient of the strategy selection affect the evolutionary paths of game players.

建立了零碳旅游城市(ZCTC)协同建设战略的四方演化博弈模型,该模型考虑了地方政府、旅游企业、游客和当地居民对总体碳中和目标的各自贡献。然后分析了博弈者策略的演化稳定性。结果表明,ZCTC 建设博弈系统中存在三种稳定的策略组合,与不同发展水平的旅游城市的建设模式相匹配。策略选择的初始值、成本、奖励、惩罚、分配系数和报告系数影响博弈者的演化路径。
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引用次数: 0
Can enterprise digital transformation improve ESG performance? 企业数字化转型能否改善 ESG 业绩?
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4307
Ziming Liu, Zhao Chen, Ling Hu

Regarding China's A-share-listed companies as research samples, we construct an empirical model to test the impact of corporate digital transformation on ESG performance. We find that a corporate digital transformation improves its ESG performance. Moreover, the higher the quality of environmental information and the efficiency of external resource allocation, the greater the role of digital transformation on ESG performance. Finally, the ESG performance ameliorates the financing and green performance of enterprises. Our research shows a new perspective for study on the digital transformation and sustainable development of enterprises, meanwhile experience summary for improving China's ESG scoring system and governance.

我们以中国 A 股上市公司为研究样本,构建了一个实证模型来检验企业数字化转型对环境、社会和公司治理绩效的影响。我们发现,企业数字化转型会提高其环境、社会和公司治理绩效。此外,环境信息质量和外部资源配置效率越高,数字化转型对环境、社会和公司治理绩效的影响越大。最后,环境、社会和治理绩效改善了企业的融资和绿色绩效。我们的研究为研究企业数字化转型与可持续发展提供了一个新的视角,同时也为完善中国的ESG评分体系和治理提供了经验总结。
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引用次数: 0
Sales promotion and supply chain finance for shopping days: Strategies of e-commerce platform and seller 购物日的销售促进和供应链融资:电子商务平台和卖家的策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-12 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4310
Yujie Zhang, Jianhu Cai, Xueshu Shan, Siqing Li, Yongyi Shou

In shopping days, e-commerce platforms (ECPs) and their sellers cooperate to promote sales through price discount and marketing effort. Supply chain finance (SCF) has been offered by ECPs to fuel sellers' preparations for shopping days. An ECP-seller supply chain (PSSC) model is constructed to study the strategic interaction between the ECP and the seller. Given a price discount rate, we derive the ECP's optimal marketing effort level and feasible SCF service rule, as well as the seller's optimal supply quantity and financing decisions. Furthermore, we identify a price-discount-rate interval, in which the Pareto improvement of the PSSC can be achieved.

在购物日期间,电子商务平台(ECP)与其卖家合作,通过价格折扣和营销努力促进销售。电子商务平台提供供应链融资(SCF),以促进卖家为购物日做准备。我们构建了一个 ECP-卖家供应链(PSSC)模型来研究 ECP 和卖家之间的战略互动。在给定价格折扣率的情况下,我们得出了 ECP 的最优营销努力水平和可行的 SCF 服务规则,以及卖方的最优供应量和融资决策。此外,我们还确定了一个价格-折扣率区间,在该区间内 PSSC 可以实现帕累托改进。
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引用次数: 0
Decision-making for others: Ambiguity attitudes 为他人做决定:模糊态度
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-11 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4321
Antonio Carlos Mercer, Angela Cristiane Santos Póvoa, Wesley Pech

We investigated decision-making for others in ambiguous settings. In an online survey, subjects were asked to make decisions for themselves, and for other people. In Experiment 1, ambiguity was conveyed in numerical ranges. In Experiment 2, we used verbal probabilities expressions to convey uncertainty. Decisions encompass three degrees of ambiguity (low, moderate, and high). Consistent with previous literature findings, our results showed no significant differences between self-other decision-making on ambiguity. We build on the existing literature on ambiguity attitudes, emphasizing the use of verbal probability expressions to measure ambiguity, and provide novel evidence into decision-making for others.

我们研究了在模棱两可的环境中为他人做决定的情况。在一项在线调查中,受试者被要求为自己和他人做出决策。在实验 1 中,模糊性是通过数字范围来表达的。在实验 2 中,我们使用口头概率表达来传递不确定性。决策包含三种程度的模糊性(低、中、高)。与之前的文献研究结果一致,我们的结果表明,自我与他人的决策在模糊性上没有显著差异。我们以现有的关于模糊态度的文献为基础,强调使用口头概率表达来测量模糊性,并为他人决策提供了新的证据。
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引用次数: 0
Financing decisions of third-party remanufacturers with different co-opetition modes: The impact of blockchain adoption 不同合作竞争模式下第三方再制造商的融资决策:采用区块链的影响
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4311
Peng Ma, Junmei Li, Henry Xu, Mingjun Chen

The third-party remanufacturer (TPR) can cooperate with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and remanufactured products are sold by the OEM (i.e., the cooperation mode). The TPR can also sell remanufactured products individually to compete with the OEM's new products (i.e., the competition mode). Considering the issue of false information in remanufacturing supply chains and the TPR's limited capital, we build game models with blockchain to explore the TPR's optimal financing strategies under different co-opetition mode selections. We find that a high blockchain usage prompts the TPR to finance from the OEM in the competition mode, while a low blockchain usage motivates the TPR to choose the cooperation mode and opt for a bank credit. Besides, we also find that the difference between the TPR's optimal profits of cooperation and competition modes increases with the interest rate.

第三方再制造商(TPR)可以与原始设备制造商(OEM)合作,由原始设备制造商销售再制造产品(即合作模式)。第三方再制造企业也可以单独销售再制造产品,与原始设备制造商的新产品竞争(即竞争模式)。考虑到再制造供应链中的虚假信息问题和 TPR 的有限资金,我们利用区块链建立了博弈模型,以探索 TPR 在不同合作竞争模式选择下的最优融资策略。我们发现,在竞争模式下,区块链的高使用率会促使TPR向原始设备制造商融资,而区块链的低使用率则会促使TPR选择合作模式,并选择银行信贷。此外,我们还发现,TPR 在合作模式和竞争模式下的最优利润之间的差异随利率的提高而增大。
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引用次数: 0
Impact of policy interventions on low-carbon technology innovation diffusion in supply networks 政策干预对供应网络中低碳技术创新传播的影响
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-07 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4312
Zehao Wang, Yu Feng, Nana Yao, Ouwen Lin, Qiyuan Li, Bowen Liu

The promotion of sustainability and innovation in the current dynamic landscape of global industry in the context of climate change has become imperative. This research paper explores the critical role of policy interventions in facilitating the diffusion of low-carbon technologies through intricate supply networks. As countries endeavor to meet environmental goals and transition to a more sustainable economy, it becomes critical to understand how policies can effectively shape the diffusion of these technologies through the supply chain. This study employs game theory and evolutionary game theory to investigate the intricate interactions within supply networks, with a particular focus on the nuanced effects of policy on the diffusion of low-carbon technology innovations. The findings suggest that dynamically adjusted policies have the potential to significantly increase the uptake of low-carbon technologies. In particular, an effective subsidy scheme not only promotes the diffusion of innovations, but also demonstrates the ability of government subsidies to be distributed efficiently. In addition, the implementation of dynamic carbon trading schemes is considered to be an important mechanism for promoting firms' decarbonization and stabilizing strategic decision-making processes within firms. This study highlights the significance of tailored dynamic policy frameworks in promoting the adoption of sustainable technologies in supply chains, thus making a significant contribution to the broader goal of achieving a sustainable future.

在当前气候变化背景下全球工业的动态格局中,促进可持续性和创新已势在必行。本研究论文探讨了政策干预在通过错综复杂的供应网络促进低碳技术传播方面的关键作用。随着各国努力实现环境目标并向更可持续的经济转型,了解政策如何通过供应链有效塑造这些技术的传播变得至关重要。本研究采用博弈论和进化博弈论来研究供应网络内错综复杂的互动关系,尤其关注政策对低碳技术创新传播的细微影响。研究结果表明,动态调整的政策有可能显著提高低碳技术的采用率。特别是,有效的补贴计划不仅能促进创新的推广,还能证明政府补贴的有效分配能力。此外,实施动态碳交易计划被认为是促进企业去碳化和稳定企业内部战略决策过程的重要机制。本研究强调了量身定制的动态政策框架在促进供应链采用可持续技术方面的重要意义,从而为实现可持续未来这一更广泛的目标做出了重大贡献。
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引用次数: 0
Channel selection strategy with consumer impulse purchase in livestream selling 直播销售中消费者冲动购买的渠道选择策略
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4299
Lidong Chen, Qingyun Xu, Yi He

Consumer impulsive purchasing is very common, especially in the livestream selling where they are influenced by policies such as low prices, limited time, and limited quantity. This behavior can increase a firm's sales, but it also leads to higher return rates. Considering consumer impulse purchase, this paper conducts an analytical model to investigate the conditions for a firm to introduce a livestream channel and whether the firm should adopt a low or moderate livestream price strategy when introducing a livestream channel. Our results show that, when return processing cost is small enough, the firm benefits from the livestream strategies as long as the streamer's fan effect is larger than a threshold. Specifically, a firm prefers to adopt the low livestream price strategy when cooperating with a large fan effect streamer and a moderate livestream price strategy with a small fan effect streamer. However, when return processing cost is large, the low livestream price strategy cannot be the dominant strategy. Furthermore, we make several extensions (i.e., different impulse utility on different livestream price, impact of positive impulse utility of low impulsive consumers, different online return rates of different types of consumers, the costs of introducing the livestream channel, and consumer return processing cost) to verify the robustness of the model, and the main conclusions remain unchanged. These results provide guidance for firms on the introduction of livestream channel and pricing decisions of different channels.

消费者冲动性购买非常普遍,尤其是在直播销售中,他们会受到低价、限时、限量等政策的影响。这种行为可以增加企业的销售额,但也会导致更高的退货率。考虑到消费者的冲动性购买,本文通过分析模型研究了企业引入直播渠道的条件,以及企业在引入直播渠道时应采取低价还是适度的直播价格策略。我们的结果表明,当回报处理成本足够小时,只要流媒体的粉丝效应大于临界值,企业就能从直播策略中获益。具体来说,当与粉丝效应大的流媒体合作时,企业更倾向于采取低价流媒体策略,而与粉丝效应小的流媒体合作时,企业更倾向于采取适度的流媒体价格策略。然而,当回流处理成本较大时,低直播价格策略不可能成为主导策略。此外,我们还做了一些扩展(即不同直播价格的不同冲动效用、低冲动消费者的正冲动效用的影响、不同类型消费者的不同在线退货率、引入直播渠道的成本以及消费者退货处理成本)来验证模型的稳健性,主要结论保持不变。这些结果为企业引入直播频道和不同频道的定价决策提供了指导。
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引用次数: 0
Field-based validation of penalty shooting recommendations: An experiment with elite youth football players 点球射门建议的实地验证:青少年精英足球运动员实验
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4283
Cornel Nesseler, Thadeu Gasparetto, Petr Parshakov

Research has suggested many ways in which professional football players can increase their penalty shooting success rate. We set up a field experiment testing these recommendations. We perform the experiment with one of the most successful youth academies in the world. All players are highly skilled, including prospective and current Brazilian youth national players. The players either decide themselves where to shoot or the coach tells them where to shoot. The coach does not reveal if the decision is based on a random allocation or his own choice. The algorithm randomly selects where players must shoot. The results from the experiment show that the best outcome is when players choose where they want to shoot. Coaches and random algorithm have a lower success rate, although following research-based recommendations. The findings are important as they show that researchers should test their recommendations in the field as they do not necessarily translate into real-life settings.

研究表明,职业足球运动员可以通过多种方法提高点球命中率。我们设立了一个实地实验来测试这些建议。我们在世界上最成功的青少年足球学校之一进行实验。所有球员的技术都非常高超,包括未来和现役的巴西国青队球员。球员要么自己决定射门的位置,要么由教练告诉他们射门的位置。教练不会透露是随机分配还是自己选择。算法随机选择球员必须射门的位置。实验结果表明,当球员选择他们想投篮的位置时,结果最好。教练和随机算法虽然遵循了基于研究的建议,但成功率较低。这些研究结果非常重要,因为它们表明,研究人员应在实地测试他们的建议,因为这些建议并不一定能转化为现实生活中的环境。
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引用次数: 0
An exploration of omni-channel retail from a three-party evolutionary game perspective: Brand strength vs. platform stream 从三方进化博弈的角度探讨全渠道零售:品牌实力与平台流
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4304
Chuan Zhao, Ziyang Guo, Mingke He, Kun Wang

This study builds a three-party evolutionary game to study the contributing factors of commission rate, productivity expansion, cooperation subsidy, brand strength, and platform stream. The proposed model investigates the diverse paths the three parties are motivated to pursue at different phases of omni-channel integration and further explores which party, the band owner with strong brand strength, or the platform with a mass consumer stream, dominates omni-channel negotiation regarding profit distribution arrangements.

本研究建立了一个三方演化博弈模型,以研究佣金率、生产力扩张、合作补贴、品牌实力和平台流等因素的影响。所提出的模型研究了三方在全渠道整合的不同阶段所追求的不同路径,并进一步探讨了在全渠道利润分配安排的谈判中,拥有强大品牌实力的乐队所有者和拥有大量消费者的平台哪一方占据主导地位。
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引用次数: 0
Financing constraints of firms: Is there political favoritism in the economic resources given by the central government? 企业的融资限制:中央政府提供的经济资源是否存在政治偏袒?
IF 2.5 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/mde.4296
Xiaoqian Liu, Javier Cifuentes-Faura, Ming Gao, Cunyi Yang

Economic resources within the jurisdiction of local governments in China shape the external financing environment of enterprises. However, few studies have focused on China's unique political hierarchy, which results in differentiated access to economic resources for different levels of local governments and substantially affects local corporate financing constraints. This paper examines the impact of city political hierarchy on firm financing constraints among Chinese A-share listed firms from 2004 to 2019. We use the 200,000 population criterion for delineating the political hierarchy of cities in 1927 as the cutoff for fuzzy regression discontinuity design to identify causal effects. The results show that the greater a city's political rank is, the lower its financing constraints are. The mechanism suggests that the central government provides more financial and political resources to high-level cities, directly and indirectly influencing the financing constraints of firms. In addition, high-level cities' government preferences, bank loans, debt financing costs, and business credit are vital channels at the firm level. However, this effect varies depending on the ownership and size of the firm.

中国地方政府管辖范围内的经济资源决定了企业的外部融资环境。然而,很少有研究关注中国独特的政治层级结构,这种结构导致不同层级的地方政府获取经济资源的渠道不同,并对地方企业融资约束产生重大影响。本文研究了 2004 年至 2019 年中国 A 股上市公司中城市政治层级对企业融资约束的影响。我们以 1927 年划分城市政治等级的 20 万人口标准为分界点,采用模糊回归不连续设计来识别因果效应。结果表明,城市的政治等级越高,其融资约束越低。这一机制表明,中央政府为高级别城市提供了更多的财政和政治资源,直接或间接地影响了企业的融资约束。此外,高水平城市的政府偏好、银行贷款、债务融资成本和商业信用也是企业层面的重要渠道。然而,这种影响因企业的所有制和规模而异。
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引用次数: 0
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Managerial and Decision Economics
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