In the practical evolution of shared vehicle systems, numerous societal factors come into play, such as inadequate parking infrastructure, battery capacity, and the budget for technological improvement. This study integrates the operational realities of shared vehicle systems with governmental carbon emission reduction policies and “double control” initiatives. Considering various perturbations, the paper constructs a Stackelberg short-term model among diverse oligopolistic shared vehicle operators with technique sharing. It also develops a long-term repeated game framework to scrutinize the impact of pertinent parameters on operators' decision variables and profits, along with system stability and complexity. The findings, elucidated through numerical analyses, reveal that the burgeoning sensitivity of users to energy conservation augments the overall shared vehicle market. The technique sharing mechanism boosts the benefit of the whole group of shared vehicle operators while diminishing the start-up operators' revenue. In the long term, however, excessive price adjustments by SEV operators may lead to market chaos and profit erosion. Conversely, enhancing the adjustment coefficient of technological level levels by start-up SEV2 operators may result solely in their own decision-making becoming unmanageable. Finally, we found that both the methods of external force feedback control and parameter control are effective in restoring the chaotic market to stability.
{"title":"Research on dynamic game operation behavior of multi-oligopoly car-sharing operators considering off-peak pricing factors","authors":"Shuyuan Zhang, Qiaoyan Yang, Yongchun Wu, Meihong Zhu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4282","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4282","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the practical evolution of shared vehicle systems, numerous societal factors come into play, such as inadequate parking infrastructure, battery capacity, and the budget for technological improvement. This study integrates the operational realities of shared vehicle systems with governmental carbon emission reduction policies and “double control” initiatives. Considering various perturbations, the paper constructs a Stackelberg short-term model among diverse oligopolistic shared vehicle operators with technique sharing. It also develops a long-term repeated game framework to scrutinize the impact of pertinent parameters on operators' decision variables and profits, along with system stability and complexity. The findings, elucidated through numerical analyses, reveal that the burgeoning sensitivity of users to energy conservation augments the overall shared vehicle market. The technique sharing mechanism boosts the benefit of the whole group of shared vehicle operators while diminishing the start-up operators' revenue. In the long term, however, excessive price adjustments by SEV operators may lead to market chaos and profit erosion. Conversely, enhancing the adjustment coefficient of technological level levels by start-up SEV2 operators may result solely in their own decision-making becoming unmanageable. Finally, we found that both the methods of external force feedback control and parameter control are effective in restoring the chaotic market to stability.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Globally, high levels of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) have revamped the debate about its impact on different economic parameters of firms. In this regard, the literature exhibits three gaps. First, the effect of EPU on firm financial performance in an emerging economy context. Second, whether the influence of EPU on firm performance is asymmetric? Lastly, the moderating role of leverage in the relationship between EPU and firm performance. This paper fills all three gaps using the real options theory and investment irreversibility theory for India's NIFTY 100 firms over the period 2010–2019. The study applies several panel data econometrics models suitable to obtain comprehensive and robust results. Specifically, findings from the two-step system GMM confirm that EPU negatively influences financial performance, which is significant for both accounting (return on assets, return on equity, net profit margin) and market (Tobin's Q) based measures. Moreover, the results of panel quantile regression reveal considerable heterogeneity in the EPU-financial performance relationship. Further, higher levels of EPU appear to have unfavorable effects on excessively indebted firms. Overall, the study recommends that governments need to be alerted to the fact that mitigating EPU is crucial for promoting sustainable firm financial performance.
{"title":"Heterogeneous effect of economic policy uncertainty and firm financial performance: Empirical evidence from India","authors":"Jadhav Chakradhar, Ritika Gupta","doi":"10.1002/mde.4308","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4308","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Globally, high levels of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) have revamped the debate about its impact on different economic parameters of firms. In this regard, the literature exhibits three gaps. First, the effect of EPU on firm financial performance in an emerging economy context. Second, whether the influence of EPU on firm performance is asymmetric? Lastly, the moderating role of leverage in the relationship between EPU and firm performance. This paper fills all three gaps using the real options theory and investment irreversibility theory for India's NIFTY 100 firms over the period 2010–2019. The study applies several panel data econometrics models suitable to obtain comprehensive and robust results. Specifically, findings from the two-step system GMM confirm that EPU negatively influences financial performance, which is significant for both accounting (return on assets, return on equity, net profit margin) and market (Tobin's Q) based measures. Moreover, the results of panel quantile regression reveal considerable heterogeneity in the EPU-financial performance relationship. Further, higher levels of EPU appear to have unfavorable effects on excessively indebted firms. Overall, the study recommends that governments need to be alerted to the fact that mitigating EPU is crucial for promoting sustainable firm financial performance.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141523917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In light of the volatility of market demand and carbon trading prices, this study examines the effects of two carbon policies—the carbon tax policy and the cap-and-trade policy—as well as various information structures on the supply chain's carbon emission reduction incentives. A brand incentivizes the carbon abatement effort of an upstream supplier through a two-part contract in the form of a fixed salary and a proportional incentive. We discover that, under some circumstances, the brand may benefit more from the unobservability of supply chain information. The brand bundles the risk of uncertainty with the supplier through the proportional incentive. In classical incentive contracts, only the cost is considered and the positive effect of risk conveyance is often ignored. In our study, the brand needs to investigate a trade-off between the benefit of risk conveyance and the drawback of the incentive cost. On one hand, the proportional incentive characterizes the incentive cost. The brand increases the incentive intensity due to the unobservable effort of the supplier. On the other hand, it also has a risk conveyance effect. Specifically, the proportional incentive decreases with the correlation coefficient under the cap-and-trade policy. Additionally, there are situations in which consumer surplus benefits from the observability of supply chain information. However, supply chain information transparency is harmful to consumer surplus as supplier risk aversion increases.
{"title":"Incentive contract design for reducing carbon emissions in the supply chain under asymmetric information","authors":"Jianheng Zhou, Bo Wu","doi":"10.1002/mde.4302","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4302","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In light of the volatility of market demand and carbon trading prices, this study examines the effects of two carbon policies—the carbon tax policy and the cap-and-trade policy—as well as various information structures on the supply chain's carbon emission reduction incentives. A brand incentivizes the carbon abatement effort of an upstream supplier through a two-part contract in the form of a fixed salary and a proportional incentive. We discover that, under some circumstances, the brand may benefit more from the unobservability of supply chain information. The brand bundles the risk of uncertainty with the supplier through the proportional incentive. In classical incentive contracts, only the cost is considered and the positive effect of risk conveyance is often ignored. In our study, the brand needs to investigate a trade-off between the benefit of risk conveyance and the drawback of the incentive cost. On one hand, the proportional incentive characterizes the incentive cost. The brand increases the incentive intensity due to the unobservable effort of the supplier. On the other hand, it also has a risk conveyance effect. Specifically, the proportional incentive decreases with the correlation coefficient under the cap-and-trade policy. Additionally, there are situations in which consumer surplus benefits from the observability of supply chain information. However, supply chain information transparency is harmful to consumer surplus as supplier risk aversion increases.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The diversity of top management team can bring more resources and opportunities to the enterprise and contribute to its green strategy. This research focuses on the relationship between diversity of top management team and green innovation and further identifies internal influencing mechanism. We employ the number of green patents, ratio of green patents, and the ratio of green inventions to describe and measure firm's green innovation. It finds that the diversity of top management team could trigger strategic green innovation rather than substantive green innovation of enterprise. There are positive impacts of diversity of top management team on number of green patents and ratio of green patents. There is no evidence that diversity of top management team promotes the ratio of green inventions. Based on heterogeneity analysis, we further confirm that the results mentioned above only exist in those firms with high energy consumption and high pollution. Meanwhile, this research examines the influencing mechanism and finds that the diversity of top management team stimulates number of green patents and ratio of green patent through reducing tunneling effect and enhancing internal control.
{"title":"Impact of diversity of top management team on firm's green innovation: Evidence from China","authors":"Caiyu Yan, Yigui Xiao, Juan Li, Chuanwen Xia","doi":"10.1002/mde.4306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4306","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The diversity of top management team can bring more resources and opportunities to the enterprise and contribute to its green strategy. This research focuses on the relationship between diversity of top management team and green innovation and further identifies internal influencing mechanism. We employ the number of green patents, ratio of green patents, and the ratio of green inventions to describe and measure firm's green innovation. It finds that the diversity of top management team could trigger strategic green innovation rather than substantive green innovation of enterprise. There are positive impacts of diversity of top management team on number of green patents and ratio of green patents. There is no evidence that diversity of top management team promotes the ratio of green inventions. Based on heterogeneity analysis, we further confirm that the results mentioned above only exist in those firms with high energy consumption and high pollution. Meanwhile, this research examines the influencing mechanism and finds that the diversity of top management team stimulates number of green patents and ratio of green patent through reducing tunneling effect and enhancing internal control.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xue Peng, Lianghua Chen, Yingying Chi, Wan Li, Yiqiang Zhou
This study focuses on addressing quality supervision issues related to opportunistic behavior within the geographical indication product supply chain. It constructs an evolutionary game model comprising suppliers, distributors, government, and network media. Through analysis, it examines the influence of key factors on the decision-making dynamics of game participants and presents management suggestions accordingly. The findings are as follows: firstly, the dual supervision model with the assistance of network media can compensate for the regulatory gaps of the government's single supervision model. Secondly, the credibility of network media plays a pivotal role in determining the efficacy of public opinion supervision. With high credibility, measures such as increasing the synergy coefficient, imposing higher fines or compensation amounts, and enhancing the impact of reputational factors can all restrain the misconduct of operating entities. Conversely, when credibility is low, not only does the supervisory function of network media falter, but it also leads to reputational damage for both the operating entities and the government. Thirdly, differentiated management should be adopted for entities in different nodes of the supply chain; higher constraint intensity should be imposed on distributors compared to suppliers. The outcomes of this study provide some analytical paths for supply chain quality supervision and corporate behavior management and underscore the significance of collaborative regulation for sustainable industry practices.
{"title":"Four-party evolutionary game analysis of geographical indication product quality control issues with network media-assisted supervision","authors":"Xue Peng, Lianghua Chen, Yingying Chi, Wan Li, Yiqiang Zhou","doi":"10.1002/mde.4301","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4301","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study focuses on addressing quality supervision issues related to opportunistic behavior within the geographical indication product supply chain. It constructs an evolutionary game model comprising suppliers, distributors, government, and network media. Through analysis, it examines the influence of key factors on the decision-making dynamics of game participants and presents management suggestions accordingly. The findings are as follows: firstly, the dual supervision model with the assistance of network media can compensate for the regulatory gaps of the government's single supervision model. Secondly, the credibility of network media plays a pivotal role in determining the efficacy of public opinion supervision. With high credibility, measures such as increasing the synergy coefficient, imposing higher fines or compensation amounts, and enhancing the impact of reputational factors can all restrain the misconduct of operating entities. Conversely, when credibility is low, not only does the supervisory function of network media falter, but it also leads to reputational damage for both the operating entities and the government. Thirdly, differentiated management should be adopted for entities in different nodes of the supply chain; higher constraint intensity should be imposed on distributors compared to suppliers. The outcomes of this study provide some analytical paths for supply chain quality supervision and corporate behavior management and underscore the significance of collaborative regulation for sustainable industry practices.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Considering consumer channel preferences, our paper establishes a two-echelon differential low-carbon supply chain model and discusses the effects of member's cost-sharing and fairness concerns on equilibrium results. From a static perspective, the results indicate that retailers' fairness concern behavior will lead to a decrease in pricing and participants' efforts while manufacturers cost-sharing strategy will only enhance retailers' advertising efforts. From a dynamic perspective, products' greenness, long-term benefits of manufacturers and retailers, and social welfare will gradually increase and eventually saturate over time. In most cases, manufacturer-to-retailer cost-sharing is a win–win strategy that not only enhances the long-term interests but also realizes the greening and upgrading of the supply chain.
{"title":"Participant fairness concern and cost-sharing-based dual-channel low-carbon supply chain management","authors":"Haohao Song, Ying Wang, Xiangyu Mao, Yongming Li","doi":"10.1002/mde.4298","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4298","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Considering consumer channel preferences, our paper establishes a two-echelon differential low-carbon supply chain model and discusses the effects of member's cost-sharing and fairness concerns on equilibrium results. From a static perspective, the results indicate that retailers' fairness concern behavior will lead to a decrease in pricing and participants' efforts while manufacturers cost-sharing strategy will only enhance retailers' advertising efforts. From a dynamic perspective, products' greenness, long-term benefits of manufacturers and retailers, and social welfare will gradually increase and eventually saturate over time. In most cases, manufacturer-to-retailer cost-sharing is a win–win strategy that not only enhances the long-term interests but also realizes the greening and upgrading of the supply chain.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141523946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the context of the world economic downturn, consumers are showing a trend of brand weakening. In order to explore the product advantages of the source manufacturer, that is, the competitive supplier, we establish a game theory model to study the strategy choice of original equipment manufacturers (OEM), competitive suppliers (CS), and noncompetitive suppliers (NS) based on consumer heterogeneity. By dividing consumers into quality consumers and ordinary consumers and considering horizontal competition (between suppliers) and vertical competition (between OEM and suppliers), it is found that the products of the source manufacturers are becoming more and more popular with consumers. Contrary to the traditional view, we find that under the trend of brand weakening, the products of the source manufacturers should be positioned above the price range acceptable to consumers, and the OEM products of the brand owners should be appropriately reduced. The interesting question is whether CS will discontinue the supply of OEM components once it has its own branded products. Further, we analyze that CS terminating the component sales business is an untrustworthy threat to OEM. Finally, we find that there will be a “win–win” zone between OEM and competing suppliers, and the “win–win” region will decrease as the manufacturing cost of the competing supplier increases and increase as the manufacturing cost of the noncompeting supplier increases.
{"title":"Analysis of manufacturers' dual-source and dual-channel strategies under the trend of brand weakening","authors":"Jingpei Ma, Jiahui Shen, Xuejun Sun, Yuan Meng","doi":"10.1002/mde.4297","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4297","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the context of the world economic downturn, consumers are showing a trend of brand weakening. In order to explore the product advantages of the source manufacturer, that is, the competitive supplier, we establish a game theory model to study the strategy choice of original equipment manufacturers (OEM), competitive suppliers (CS), and noncompetitive suppliers (NS) based on consumer heterogeneity. By dividing consumers into quality consumers and ordinary consumers and considering horizontal competition (between suppliers) and vertical competition (between OEM and suppliers), it is found that the products of the source manufacturers are becoming more and more popular with consumers. Contrary to the traditional view, we find that under the trend of brand weakening, the products of the source manufacturers should be positioned above the price range acceptable to consumers, and the OEM products of the brand owners should be appropriately reduced. The interesting question is whether CS will discontinue the supply of OEM components once it has its own branded products. Further, we analyze that CS terminating the component sales business is an untrustworthy threat to OEM. Finally, we find that there will be a “win–win” zone between OEM and competing suppliers, and the “win–win” region will decrease as the manufacturing cost of the competing supplier increases and increase as the manufacturing cost of the noncompeting supplier increases.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study uses a data envelopment analysis model to assess the inclusive green growth (IGG) level for five major urban agglomerations in China from 2013 to 2020. In addition, it analyzes the potential digital finance (DIF) mechanism affecting IGG. Several conclusions are obtained. First, the IGG levels of the five major urban agglomerations in China increase yearly, narrowing their gaps. Second, DIF can significantly promote IGG. Third, heterogeneity exists in the impact of DIF on IGG owing to the differences in city tiers and sizes. Meanwhile, the coverage and digitization level of DIF significantly and positively promote IGG. Fourth, financial supervision intensity and human capital level play a single-threshold effect in the relationship between DIF and IGG. The contribution of DIF to IGG is further enhanced when financial regulation intensity and human capital level exceed the thresholds 0.0013 and 1.5084, respectively. Lastly, green technology innovation, regional entrepreneurship, and industrial structure upgrading have intermediary roles in the baseline path of DIF impacting IGG.
{"title":"Effect of digital finance on inclusive green growth: Evidence from China's urban agglomerations","authors":"Jiasen Sun, Tong Liu, Ruizeng Zhao","doi":"10.1002/mde.4303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4303","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study uses a data envelopment analysis model to assess the inclusive green growth (IGG) level for five major urban agglomerations in China from 2013 to 2020. In addition, it analyzes the potential digital finance (DIF) mechanism affecting IGG. Several conclusions are obtained. First, the IGG levels of the five major urban agglomerations in China increase yearly, narrowing their gaps. Second, DIF can significantly promote IGG. Third, heterogeneity exists in the impact of DIF on IGG owing to the differences in city tiers and sizes. Meanwhile, the coverage and digitization level of DIF significantly and positively promote IGG. Fourth, financial supervision intensity and human capital level play a single-threshold effect in the relationship between DIF and IGG. The contribution of DIF to IGG is further enhanced when financial regulation intensity and human capital level exceed the thresholds 0.0013 and 1.5084, respectively. Lastly, green technology innovation, regional entrepreneurship, and industrial structure upgrading have intermediary roles in the baseline path of DIF impacting IGG.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper utilizes a game theory model to investigate the interplay of cooperation and competition between smart vehicle companies (the incumbents) and traditional vehicle companies (the entrants) in the intelligent connected vehicle industry. The results show that technology sharing emerges as a critical factor in improving business performance and driving market expansion. Additionally, the collaborative endeavors of competitive firms, coupled with consumer involvement, play a crucial role during the value co-creation phase of new products, significantly impacting company efficiency and consumer satisfaction. Drawing on case studies such as Tesla further corroborates our management insights.
{"title":"Strategic interactions and market dynamics in the intelligent connected vehicle industry: An analysis of technology sharing, value co-creation, and market competition","authors":"Mingpu Ma, Wenjie Sun, Jianing Zhao, Xiufeng Li","doi":"10.1002/mde.4290","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4290","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper utilizes a game theory model to investigate the interplay of cooperation and competition between smart vehicle companies (the incumbents) and traditional vehicle companies (the entrants) in the intelligent connected vehicle industry. The results show that technology sharing emerges as a critical factor in improving business performance and driving market expansion. Additionally, the collaborative endeavors of competitive firms, coupled with consumer involvement, play a crucial role during the value co-creation phase of new products, significantly impacting company efficiency and consumer satisfaction. Drawing on case studies such as Tesla further corroborates our management insights.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141523978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Each portfolio model has its own advantages. Behavioral portfolio models can depict investor psychology, but it is not easy to obtain the preference parameters. We propose an interaction-based combined (InCo) portfolio that determines the proportions of assets based on investor preferences. We take the existing models as alternatives and innovatively develop a visualization tool to present the portfolio performance. Hesitant fuzzy set theory is used to describe investor evaluations and to then determine the proportions of alternatives. The out-of-sample performance of four strategies is tested on four datasets. The results show that InCo portfolio performs better in various markets.
{"title":"An interaction-based combined portfolio strategy with applications to stock markets","authors":"Tangtang He, Zongrun Wang, Debin Xiong","doi":"10.1002/mde.4300","DOIUrl":"10.1002/mde.4300","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Each portfolio model has its own advantages. Behavioral portfolio models can depict investor psychology, but it is not easy to obtain the preference parameters. We propose an interaction-based combined (InCo) portfolio that determines the proportions of assets based on investor preferences. We take the existing models as alternatives and innovatively develop a visualization tool to present the portfolio performance. Hesitant fuzzy set theory is used to describe investor evaluations and to then determine the proportions of alternatives. The out-of-sample performance of four strategies is tested on four datasets. The results show that InCo portfolio performs better in various markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":18186,"journal":{"name":"Managerial and Decision Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141532364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}