Yuxiao Ye, Shenyang Jiang, Dinghong Fan, Baofeng Huo, Maggie Wenjing Liu
It is important for firms to repurpose production responsively during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, to seize the market opportunity and create social value. However, occupational health and safety (OHS) can also be a concern in a crisis, and adherence to OHS management systems can undermine a firm's responsiveness in repurposing decision making. We adopt the "capability-rigidity" lens to construct a connection between OHS management standards (i.e., OHSAS 18001) and firms' adaptation responsiveness. After sampling 734 listed Chinese manufacturing firms, our match-based analysis reveals that firms certified with OHSAS 18001 were less responsive during COVID-19 in terms of production repurposing than those without the certification. Yet, certain experience, namely, prepandemic manufacturing of related products, experience of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, and being geographically located close to firms that produced medical supplies, could attenuate this effect. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of and adding to the literature on safety management, certified management standards, and organizational adaptation and learning.
{"title":"Rigidity in crisis: The impact of OHSAS 18001 certification on production repurposing during COVID‐19","authors":"Yuxiao Ye, Shenyang Jiang, Dinghong Fan, Baofeng Huo, Maggie Wenjing Liu","doi":"10.1111/poms.14008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14008","url":null,"abstract":"It is important for firms to repurpose production responsively during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, to seize the market opportunity and create social value. However, occupational health and safety (OHS) can also be a concern in a crisis, and adherence to OHS management systems can undermine a firm's responsiveness in repurposing decision making. We adopt the \"capability-rigidity\" lens to construct a connection between OHS management standards (i.e., OHSAS 18001) and firms' adaptation responsiveness. After sampling 734 listed Chinese manufacturing firms, our match-based analysis reveals that firms certified with OHSAS 18001 were less responsive during COVID-19 in terms of production repurposing than those without the certification. Yet, certain experience, namely, prepandemic manufacturing of related products, experience of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, and being geographically located close to firms that produced medical supplies, could attenuate this effect. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of and adding to the literature on safety management, certified management standards, and organizational adaptation and learning.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48403326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impact of praise cashback strategy: Implications for consumers and e‐businesses","authors":"Pengkun Wu, E. Ngai, Yuanyuan Wu","doi":"10.1111/poms.14011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41377993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Luoyi Sun, Guowei Hua, R. Teunter, T. Cheng, Z. Shen
{"title":"The effects of tokenization on ride‐hailing blockchain platforms","authors":"Luoyi Sun, Guowei Hua, R. Teunter, T. Cheng, Z. Shen","doi":"10.1111/poms.14007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43321424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mohammad Ebrahim Nikoofal, Morteza Pourakbar, Mehmet Gumus
Abstract Global trade is seafaring commerce; 90% of traded goods are carried by maritime transport, which has become vulnerable to security risks. This has led governments to initiate security programs serving tens of thousands of members worldwide. This paper studies the government's incentive design and the interaction between Customs inspection capacity and the incentives offered in security programs. Using the theory of incentives, we investigate the value of a partnership in improving the security of containerized supply chain. We developed a sequential game featuring the government, firms, and an adversary. The government selects the inspection capacity and incentives to foster the partnership, namely, an operational benefit in the form of a reduced inspection rate, and a security benefit obtained through reductions in the risks of adversarial infiltration. Firms subsequently decide on a collaboration level, followed by a strategic adversary's decision to infiltrate. Using the adversary's best response, we show that, in equilibrium, the government ranks all the firms and induces collaboration with only a subset of them. We demonstrate that, in equilibrium, while security incentives may benefit all participants, tailored operational incentives should be offered strictly to foster collaboration. The required condition to implement the inspection‐free lane for members is also characterized. Our results also inform practice to help security policymakers understand the underlying interaction between Customs inspection capacity and incentive design in forging collaboration with private firms. In particular, as firms opting for collaboration experience lower inspection rates, this further reduces overall congestion, which, in turn, creates a positive externality for nonmember firms. Therefore, having an excess inspection capacity may result in shorter wait times that could dissuade firms from collaborating.
{"title":"Securing containerized supply chain through public and private partnership","authors":"Mohammad Ebrahim Nikoofal, Morteza Pourakbar, Mehmet Gumus","doi":"10.1111/poms.13980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13980","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Global trade is seafaring commerce; 90% of traded goods are carried by maritime transport, which has become vulnerable to security risks. This has led governments to initiate security programs serving tens of thousands of members worldwide. This paper studies the government's incentive design and the interaction between Customs inspection capacity and the incentives offered in security programs. Using the theory of incentives, we investigate the value of a partnership in improving the security of containerized supply chain. We developed a sequential game featuring the government, firms, and an adversary. The government selects the inspection capacity and incentives to foster the partnership, namely, an operational benefit in the form of a reduced inspection rate, and a security benefit obtained through reductions in the risks of adversarial infiltration. Firms subsequently decide on a collaboration level, followed by a strategic adversary's decision to infiltrate. Using the adversary's best response, we show that, in equilibrium, the government ranks all the firms and induces collaboration with only a subset of them. We demonstrate that, in equilibrium, while security incentives may benefit all participants, tailored operational incentives should be offered strictly to foster collaboration. The required condition to implement the inspection‐free lane for members is also characterized. Our results also inform practice to help security policymakers understand the underlying interaction between Customs inspection capacity and incentive design in forging collaboration with private firms. In particular, as firms opting for collaboration experience lower inspection rates, this further reduces overall congestion, which, in turn, creates a positive externality for nonmember firms. Therefore, having an excess inspection capacity may result in shorter wait times that could dissuade firms from collaborating.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134955098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Motivated by the emerging mixed autonomous paradigm in cobotic order picking operations, we investigate the optimal information design to navigate human workers (HWs) who cooperate with autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) within an intralogistics system. We incorporate asymmetric information between AMRs and HWs in a routing game where connected AMRs are informed of the congestion state while HWs rely on information provided by the system. The system designs a communication policy aiming to navigate HWs away from congestion. Without strategic communications, we show that the deployment of AMRs cannot mitigate congestion unless the automation level reaches a threshold. Interestingly, we illustrate a substitution effect between automation and strategic communications when information distortion is mild. In contrast, severe information distortion complements automation due to exacerbated congestion. Furthermore, an in‐house AMR fleet is economically more efficient than a third‐party logistics service. Consequently, in‐house automation can be achieved with mild information distortion, while severe information distortion is required to complement the lack of efficiency in the third‐party AMR fleet. With simulated numerical examples to complement the analytical results, we provide managerial insights concerning the optimal information policies under different levels of automation, guiding warehouse managers in their communications with workers to achieve the best performance of the cobotic system.
{"title":"Smart navigation via strategic communications in a mixed autonomous paradigm","authors":"Yonghui Chen, Ailing Xu, Qiao‐Chu He, Ying‐Ju Chen","doi":"10.1111/poms.13987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13987","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Motivated by the emerging mixed autonomous paradigm in cobotic order picking operations, we investigate the optimal information design to navigate human workers (HWs) who cooperate with autonomous mobile robots (AMRs) within an intralogistics system. We incorporate asymmetric information between AMRs and HWs in a routing game where connected AMRs are informed of the congestion state while HWs rely on information provided by the system. The system designs a communication policy aiming to navigate HWs away from congestion. Without strategic communications, we show that the deployment of AMRs cannot mitigate congestion unless the automation level reaches a threshold. Interestingly, we illustrate a substitution effect between automation and strategic communications when information distortion is mild. In contrast, severe information distortion complements automation due to exacerbated congestion. Furthermore, an in‐house AMR fleet is economically more efficient than a third‐party logistics service. Consequently, in‐house automation can be achieved with mild information distortion, while severe information distortion is required to complement the lack of efficiency in the third‐party AMR fleet. With simulated numerical examples to complement the analytical results, we provide managerial insights concerning the optimal information policies under different levels of automation, guiding warehouse managers in their communications with workers to achieve the best performance of the cobotic system.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135543259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Disputes between retailers and manufacturers often result in the retailer delisting the manufacturer's products, which dramatically alters competition in the retail market. When rival products are temporarily delisted, the products remaining on retail shelves are expected to gain sales due to substitution. However, it is unclear how much sales gain of remaining products can be expected, how long the sales gain persists after the rival products are relisted, whether the sales gain varies in different product categories, and whether the sales gain spills over from the delisting retailer to nearby retailers. In this research, we exploit a natural experiment enabled by a dispute between a retail chain and a beverage manufacturer that resulted in a 4‐week delisting of all products by the manufacturer (the delisted manufacturer) across all of the retailer's U.S. stores. We focus on a manufacturer (the focal manufacturer) that directly competes with the delisted manufacturer and quantify the sales gain for this focal manufacturer during the delisting and after the relisting event. Interestingly, in a near‐duopoly market, the focal manufacturer only gained 12.2% of sales during the delisting. After the dispute was settled and competition restored, the focal manufacturer's sales fluctuated for about 2 months before returning to the pre‐delisting level. Additionally, we find a spillover in sales gain to nearby stores during the delisting, which was mainly to small‐box retail stores rather than big‐box stores. Moreover, at both delisting and nearby stores, we find the focal manufacturer's sugar‐sweetened, caffeinated, and star products gained sales during the event while other products did not. We check the robustness of our results with a machine learning nonparametric method, among a few other alternative methods, to measure the average treatment effects. Understanding the size and duration of these heterogeneous effects can help manufacturers and retailers better respond to changes in market competition and evaluate their delisting decisions.
{"title":"Impact of conflict delisting and relisting on remaining products in retail stores: Sales gains across products categories and spillovers to nearby stores","authors":"H. Alice Li, Xiang Wan","doi":"10.1111/poms.13972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13972","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Disputes between retailers and manufacturers often result in the retailer delisting the manufacturer's products, which dramatically alters competition in the retail market. When rival products are temporarily delisted, the products remaining on retail shelves are expected to gain sales due to substitution. However, it is unclear how much sales gain of remaining products can be expected, how long the sales gain persists after the rival products are relisted, whether the sales gain varies in different product categories, and whether the sales gain spills over from the delisting retailer to nearby retailers. In this research, we exploit a natural experiment enabled by a dispute between a retail chain and a beverage manufacturer that resulted in a 4‐week delisting of all products by the manufacturer (the delisted manufacturer) across all of the retailer's U.S. stores. We focus on a manufacturer (the focal manufacturer) that directly competes with the delisted manufacturer and quantify the sales gain for this focal manufacturer during the delisting and after the relisting event. Interestingly, in a near‐duopoly market, the focal manufacturer only gained 12.2% of sales during the delisting. After the dispute was settled and competition restored, the focal manufacturer's sales fluctuated for about 2 months before returning to the pre‐delisting level. Additionally, we find a spillover in sales gain to nearby stores during the delisting, which was mainly to small‐box retail stores rather than big‐box stores. Moreover, at both delisting and nearby stores, we find the focal manufacturer's sugar‐sweetened, caffeinated, and star products gained sales during the event while other products did not. We check the robustness of our results with a machine learning nonparametric method, among a few other alternative methods, to measure the average treatment effects. Understanding the size and duration of these heterogeneous effects can help manufacturers and retailers better respond to changes in market competition and evaluate their delisting decisions.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135648138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jianwei Liu, Karen L. Xie, Wei Chen, Yong Liu, Yunlong Sun
{"title":"How incumbents beat disruption? Evidence from hotel responses to home sharing","authors":"Jianwei Liu, Karen L. Xie, Wei Chen, Yong Liu, Yunlong Sun","doi":"10.1111/poms.14005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45774277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partial centralization in a durable‐good supply chain","authors":"Jin Li, Xiaodong Yang, Victor Shi, G. Cai","doi":"10.1111/poms.14006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49597932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thomas Y. Choi, Torbjørn H. Netland, Nada Sanders, ManMohan S. Sodhi, Stephan Wagner
Abstract The Covid‐19 pandemic and other recent disruptions in the early 2020s led to sections in the business press blaming just‐in‐time (JIT) practices for operational failings. Consequently, there are calls for moving away from JIT toward holding more inventory as preparation against future disruptions, which is referred to as just‐in‐case. The academic community is also divided. Some scholars argue that JIT is not resilient, while others maintain that JIT can continue providing superior performance even with disruptions. Motivated by this debate, we discuss various misconceptions about JIT that underlie this debate. Furthermore, we present different ways to adapt JIT for turbulent environments and argue that companies can improve their supply chain performance if JIT supply chain segments are chosen fittingly—even more so—during disruptions.
{"title":"Just‐in‐time for supply chains in turbulent times","authors":"Thomas Y. Choi, Torbjørn H. Netland, Nada Sanders, ManMohan S. Sodhi, Stephan Wagner","doi":"10.1111/poms.13979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13979","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Covid‐19 pandemic and other recent disruptions in the early 2020s led to sections in the business press blaming just‐in‐time (JIT) practices for operational failings. Consequently, there are calls for moving away from JIT toward holding more inventory as preparation against future disruptions, which is referred to as just‐in‐case. The academic community is also divided. Some scholars argue that JIT is not resilient, while others maintain that JIT can continue providing superior performance even with disruptions. Motivated by this debate, we discuss various misconceptions about JIT that underlie this debate. Furthermore, we present different ways to adapt JIT for turbulent environments and argue that companies can improve their supply chain performance if JIT supply chain segments are chosen fittingly—even more so—during disruptions.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135955767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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