Psychological Science最新文献

Assortative mating-the tendency to choose partners similar to oneself-is a ubiquitous phenomenon in mate choice. Despite numerous proposed explanations, a parsimonious mechanism has been overlooked: When individuals choose mates on the basis of heritable traits and preferences, offspring inherit a trait and the corresponding preference from each parent, creating genetic correlations that link having a trait to preferring that same trait. We evaluated this mechanism with an agent-based model simulating 100 generations in which agents, with traits and preferences each uniquely determined by 40 loci, chose reproductive partners based on preferences. Genetic correlations formed between preferences and preferred traits, as well as between partner traits (i.e., assortative mating), demonstrating that heritable variation in preferences and preferred traits is sufficient to drive assortative mating. We presented a toy model here, so we cannot speak to the robustness of such genetic correlations or to the relative explanatory power of this mechanism over others.

Research on interpersonal relationships frequently relies on accurate self-reporting across various relationship facets (e.g., conflict, trust, appreciation). Yet shared method biases-which may greatly inflate associations between measures-are rarely accounted for during measurement validation or hypothesis testing. To examine how method biases can affect relationship research, we embarked on the ironic exploration of a new construct-Pseudo-comprised of irrelevant relationship evaluations (e.g., "My relationship has very good Saturn"). Pseudo was moderately associated with common relationship measures (e.g., satisfaction, commitment) and predicted those measures 3 weeks later. Results of a dyadic longitudinal study suggested that Pseudo taps into method biases, particularly sentiment override (i.e., people's tendency to project their global relationship sentiments onto every relationship evaluation). We conclude that psychometric standards must be sufficiently rigorous to distinguish genuine constructs and associations from methodological artifacts that can otherwise pose a serious validity threat.

This study examined the sequence and timing of sexual identity development (SID) milestones among Generation Z LGBTQ+ Australians, focusing on variations across subgroups and their relationship with minority stressors. The study included 490 Australian LGBTQ+ individuals aged 16 to 26, predominantly White (n = 389) and assigned female at birth (n = 402), with a balanced distribution between cisgender and gender-diverse participants. Demographic differences in the timing and achievement of SID milestones were found for sexual and gender identity. Latent profile analysis identified four distinct profiles, highlighting identity-centered and sex-centered sequences. Differences in rejection sensitivity, emotion dysregulation, and self-acceptance of sexual identity were noted across these profiles, but not for internalized homonegativity. Our findings indicate that SID trajectories do not strictly conform to discrete sexual or gender identity categories. The cross-sectional design limits causality inference, and findings are not generalizable to all LGBTQ+ young people or Generation Z more broadly.

The idea that some people completely lack inner speech is of both scientific and popular interest. In a recent study, Nedergaard and Lupyan compared self-reporting high and low inner-speech-prevalence groups and found that participants in the low-prevalence group performed worse on a verbal working memory test and responded more slowly and less accurately during rhyme judgments. These results represent an original contribution to the study of inner speech. However, the authors go on to draw the unfounded conclusion that their findings, together with previous empirical and anecdotal data, show that some people have no inner speech at all. They have coined the term anendophasia for this trait. This commentary examines Nedergaard and Lupyan's claim of demonstrated anendophasia; I conclude they present no compelling evidence that some individuals lack inner speech.

Valuing the welfare of others is a fundamental aspect of empathy and prosocial behavior. How do people develop this valuation? Theories of associative learning suggest that people can associate social cues, such as smiles, with personal reward, thus feeling good when others thrive. Yet people often display generalized concern for others' welfare, regardless of the specific cues present. We propose that Pavlovian conditioning allows people to associate reward directly with others' abstract mental states, learning that another's happiness predicts their own reward. In four online experiments with 1,500 U.S.-based adults recruited from CloudResearch, participants' monetary outcomes were congruently or incongruently predicted by a target's mental states. Participants who experienced congruent learning reported more empathic feelings toward the target in novel situations. The values attached to mental states further influenced participants' prosocial choices. These results demonstrate how associative learning of abstract mental states can give rise to generalizable empathy and influence moral behavior.

Overconfidence is thought to be a fundamental cognitive bias, but it is typically studied in environments where people lack accurate information about their abilities. We conducted a preregistered survey experiment and replication to learn whether overconfidence persists among tournament chess players who receive objective, precise, and public feedback about their skill. Our combined sample comprised 3,388 rated players aged 5 to 88 years from 22 countries with an average of 18.8 years of tournament experience. On average, participants asserted that their ability was 89 Elo rating points higher than their observed ratings indicated-expecting to outscore an equally rated opponent by nearly 2 to 1. One year later, only 11.3% of overconfident players achieved their asserted ability rating. Low-rated players overestimated their skill the most, and top-rated players were calibrated. Patterns consistent with overconfidence emerged in every sociodemographic subgroup we studied. We conclude that overconfidence persists in tournament chess, a real-world information environment that should be inhospitable to it.

Scholars have extolled the virtues of rationality for centuries while also debating what rationality is and who is rational. Advancing these debates, we used word embeddings trained on 840 billion words of internet text-and validated with Prolific workers in the United States-to uncover the representation, group stereotypes, and occupational correlates of rationality at scale in naturalistic language. Four results emerged. First, rather than being synonymous with competence, representations of rationality included both an analytic/logic component and an interpersonal/trust component. Second, irrationality was not merely the opposite of rationality but contained its own unique subcomponents (volatility and unfairness). Third, rationality was consistently ascribed to high-power targets across 66 social groups. Last, rationality (especially its analytic component) was consistently associated with both earnings and wage gaps across 101 occupations. Associations with demographic representation were less consistent. Complementing normative approaches, these descriptive findings advance canonical debates about rationality, extending understanding of its components, stereotypes, and correlates.

Effective learning involves not only the ability to quickly acquire knowledge and skills, but also the capacity to accurately monitor one's ongoing learning progress. The present research probed the relation between learning ability and monitoring accuracy. A meta-analysis (Study 1, N = 2,406) counterintuitively found that individuals with superior learning ability exhibited slightly poorer monitoring accuracy (measured as the resolution of judgments of learning). Study 2 reanalyzed the meta-analysis data and observed that expert learners remembered more items they erroneously believed they would not remember, and this underconfidence in expert learners led to a negative association between learning ability and monitoring accuracy. Studies 3 (N = 102, adults aged 18-23) and 4 (N = 481, adults aged 18-59) conceptually replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in controlled experiments. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that good learners are also good monitors, suggesting instead that expert learners are actually the ones with monitoring deficits.

In seven studies, we investigated how reporting partial vote counts influences perceptions of election legitimacy. Beliefs in election fraud, as in the 2020 U.S. presidential election, may be fueled by the cumulative redundancy bias (CRB), which skews perceptions toward early leaders in partial vote counts. In line with this prediction, participants (Prolific adult participants from the United States and the United Kingdom) consistently rated early leaders more favorably and were more likely to suspect fraud when the eventual winner gained a late lead. This effect persisted across simulated elections (Studies 1-3) and real-world vote counts from the 2020 election in Georgia (Study 4). It is important to note that fraud suspicions already arose before the count was completed (Study 5) and persisted despite explanatory interventions (Study 6). Partisanship did not eliminate the CRB's influence on fraud beliefs (Study 7). Our findings suggest that the sequential reporting of vote counts may amplify false perceptions of election fraud and could be mitigated by revising how results are communicated.